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SUDAN: TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH
RECENT MEDIATION EFFORTS BY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND THE U.S. By Professor Kinfe Abraham Ambassador-At-Large, President of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) and CEO of the Horn of Africa Democracy and Development (HADAD) International Lobby Group A Paper Presented at the University of KhartoumKhartoum, Sudan January 18, 2006
The perseverance of the mediators produced tangible results which are noteworthy as this happened after many failed attempts. But, two caveats need to be emphasized. First, there could have been no progress without the SPLM/A and the Khartoum government making the necessary compromises and they were made as a result of a close assessment of their own particular interests. Second, at the time there was a long way to go from the signing of the Machakos Protocol to the final Naivasha agreement of May 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005.1 Author’s Own View
Hindsight The conflict in South Sudan which started immediately after the independence of the country in 1956 was an important security challenge faced by the Horn of Africa. The historical, racial and cultural basis of the conflict had drawn the attention of the world for nearly five decades. It had also attracted various mediation efforts which were attempted with varying degrees of success over the years. They include: The Addis Ababa agreement which bore fruit for more than a decade (1972 - 83) but which was unfortunately followed by the second phase of the conflict which gathered momentum because of the joining of forces between Anya Anya II and the group led by Colonel John Garang in 1983. The second phase of the conflict which started in 1983 has raged on up to the present, but in the process various mediation efforts were attempted by Nigeria, Germany, Egypt, the US, Libya and others (1994 - 2004). But as noted earlier, even more significant have been the concerted efforts made by the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which has convened more than a dozen rounds of talks from 1997 to 2004 via its ministerial sub-committee on the conflict in south Sudan. The committee is composed of Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The Contribution of Ethiopia and Other IGAD Members to the Peace Process The contribution of Ethiopia to the reconciliation process of the conflict in south Sudan has a special historical place. As noted earlier, it was Ethiopia via the good offices of Emperor Haile Selassie that brokered the Addis Ababa peace agreement of 1972. This held until 1983 when the agreement was annulled by President Nimeiry. In May 1994, in Nairobi, Ethiopia through the IGAD peace process helped the Sudan Government and the rebel forces to reach an agreement on the Declaration of Principle (DOP) to end the crisis in the Sudan. In this declaration the right of self-determination to the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through an internationally supervised referendum was affirmed. It was also declared that the Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Moreover, the DOP underscored the establishment of a secular and democratic Sudanese state.
One of the more recent reasons for the intensification of the conflict in south Sudan was that the Sudan was divided into 26 states in 1994. This replaced the 9 states set up after 1991 to which the President appointed state governors.
Ethiopia had also
played an important part in the various mediation efforts through its
role in the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee Meetings on the Sudan held
during the period 1997-2004.
The part which Ethiopia played in the mediation process is also
underscored by the critical role which it played in the formulation of
the Declaration of Principle (DOP) in 1993-1994
through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyoum Mesfin. The Ethiopian
contribution was crucial because the DOP was the basis of all the
negotiations which took place from July 1997 to the present. The Ethiopian contribution to the peace process was also strengthened by its designation of Prof. Kinfe Abraham, President of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD), as Chief Political Adviser to the IGAD Secretariat on the Sudan peace process.
In addition, Ethiopia
had successfully hosted the August 1998 Addis Ababa meeting. Its
role of mediation was continued even in spite of the Ethio-Eritrean
conflict of 1998-2000.
Its participation in the quest for a negotiated peaceful settlement of
the conflict was not restrained even at the height of the Ethio-Eritrean
war. The Role of Uganda, Eritrea and Djibouti It should also be noted that the other IGAD members of the Ministerial Sub-Committee on the conflict in south Sudan such as Uganda and Eritrea were visible players in the mediation efforts. For instance, Uganda had made repeated efforts to end the conflict by bringing together the leaders of the GOS and SPLM/A. Likewise, Eritrea had convened meetings in Asmara and Massawa in a bid to narrow the gap between the GOS and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Similarly, Djiboutian President Omer Gele had brought together Dr. Hassan al-Turabi and Dr. John Garang and got them to sign a Memorandum of Understanding in 1999. The agreement was however disregarded as unconstitutional by the GOS as Dr. Turabi did not have the mandate of the government. 4 The Early Machakos Negotiations – Oil and Other Issues of Contention – October 2002
The Machakos talks
were a natural continuation of earlier IGAD peace efforts. The talks
were launched in Nairobi on July 20, 2002.5 This led to the
signing of a protocol by senior representatives of the Government
of Sudan and the SPLM/A. At the start of the talks the mediators
underscored that the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLM/A stood to
benefit from a speedy end of the conflict rather than a prolonged one.
They also noted that, the human toll of the war and its exorbitant costs
were likely to have dire consequences on the parties to the conflict. The Machakos peace process is the culmination of several frustrated talks. Hope was, therefore, pinned on it to deliver a positive outcome. Nevertheless, one could not help being skeptical about its ultimate outcome for a number of reasons. The French Newspaper Le Monde in an article entitled “OIL, ISLAM, CHINESE WEAPONS AND AMERICAN MONEY” had made the following observation on the prospect it held for the Sudan:
The positions of
the two sides are incompatible. The first thing that separates them is
Sharia (Islamic law), the ideological distinction of the Islamic regime
in Khartoum
that has been in power since 1989. If a federal-style constitutional
proposal is adopted, the SPLM/A wants the capital to be neutral. But as
far as the Islamic regime is concerned, Khartoum is the capital of the
north, and is therefore Muslim. As noted in the above passage both the issues of self-determination, the separation of state and religion and the demand that Khartoum be the secular capital of the Sudan were questions that were pregnant with implications. The other issue was that the SPLM/A leader, Colonel John Garang, wanted to have a rotating presidency which would have allowed him to alternate with President Omar al-Bashir. But, as Dr. Garang was not able to win the hearts of the northerners on this matter, he is said to have proposed that the post of the vice-president be given to him with the option of the right to veto on the president’s actions at the same time leaving him in charge of the south.8 Yet, another issue of contention related to the question of how the south should be managed. The Government of Sudan (GOS) initially wanted to continue to appoint the regional governors for the southern provinces, whereas the SPLM/A wanted them elected. Similarly, the SPLM/A wanted to have half the administrative posts in the ministries of defense, finance, interior, energy and foreign affairs. A further source of problem was the status of the marginalized areas which are not at present part of what is designated as the south. These include the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile province and the Abyei region in southern Kordofan. Although the three regions have Christian-majorities who are predominantly black African, the controversy was that they were allocated to the north during the Addis Ababa agreement of February 1972 which ended the first civil war of 1956 to 1972.9 Despite the Addis Ababa agreement which was abrogated by General Nimeiry, nevertheless, the SPLM/A strongly felt that the above areas were constituent parts of the south. Naturally, the GOS had for a long time remained steadfastly opposed to this. Here, it is worth mentioning that the said contested areas were taken up at the IGAD mediation talks of 1998 and 1999 which decided that the matter was outside of the framework or the terms of reference of the IGAD negotiations. In other words, the issue was deferred as it was not seen as an integral part of the territory which is defined as the colonial south on the bases of the situation which obtained during the independence of the Sudan in 1956. An additional source of controversy was the issue of the sharing of revenue derived from oil. The south wanted a fair share of the oil revenue and enhanced allocations for the reconstruction of the south. Nevertheless, this as we shall see later had found a resolution in January 2004. The above situation was also somewhat ameliorated by the extent of the oil revenue which at present is not overwhelming.10 As observers of Sudanese affairs note, “Sudan is not and never will be a major oil producer like Saudi Arabia (with reserves of 260bn barrels) or Iraq (112bn barrels); it has only 1.5bn barrels in confirmed reserves, though that could rise to between 3 to 4bn barrels if production is extended to zones currently inaccessible because of the war.” Here, it is worth noting that oil was also a contributing factor to the abrogation of the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 which led to the resumption of the war in 1983. It is said that former President Jaffar Muhammad Nimeiry rescinded the agreement not so much because of Sharia as the realization that Sudan’s oil reserves were mainly in the south. In fact, it is alleged that it was after the US Company Chevron announced the discovery of oil in the south that the war started in earnest in May of the same year.11 When President Jaffar Muhammad Nimeiry realized that all the oilfields were in the south, which under the 1972 agreement was a semi-autonomous administration with a government in Juba, he unilaterally rescinded the agreement. He then arbitrarily created the Unity Province. Deprived of any control over resources in that territory, the southerners rebelled. For almost 19 years no government in Khartoum was able to raise the billion dollars that were needed to build an oil pipeline to the Red Sea. Nevertheless, the discovery of oil in the south did not immediately lead to exploitation. This was because the Sudan was unable to raise the 1bn US dollars needed to construct a pipeline to the Red Sea Coast. It, therefore, had to wait for another 19 years before the requisite finance could be raised. In fact, the matter was only resolved in 1999 “through an agreement between the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), the Malaysian company, Petronas, and the Canadian company, Talisman.” 12 The arrangement which resulted in the prospecting and exploitation of oil was possible because “the Chinese provided almost free labor (as their workers were convicts who came to the Sudan in exchange for a reduction of their sentences) and were not concerned with safety rules or individual rights.” Likewise, the Canadians brought technical know-how and lent some respectability to the project. They did this via the former BP of Canada and Talisman which was bought out by its employees. As a result of the creation of such a consortium the financial market was more responsive to the oil project.
Even more
respectability was added to the project as the pipeline was built by
major German and British companies run by a consortium called the
Greater Nile Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). Soon after, Sudanese oil
began to flow to the Red Sea. US Leveraging at Machakos and Naivasha The most recent phase of the mediation efforts is the Naivasha peace process which began in October 2002 with the leveraging of the US and EU via the UK, Italy and Norway. Although many allude to the terrorist attack on the US that took place on September 11, 2001 as a factor which spurred the US to take interest in the Sudan, in fact, this was not the case. This was so because the US special envoy, Senator Danforth, was appointed five days before the said attack. Interest in the Sudan was also expressed among the Congressional Black Caucus, the influential Christian right, liberals, human rights activists and American humanitarian agencies. This was also underpinned by the anxiety which the terrorist attacks of September 11 gave rise to. Increased US involvement made it clear to both Khartoum and the SPLM/A that the peace process could not be pursued in the same manner as before.
Indeed, although the IGAD peace initiative had some genuine accomplishments including an agreed DOP, workable relations with the parties, an institutional focus in the Sudan Secretariat and international legitimacy, by late 2001 it had become apparent to most analysts that the process needed new invigoration. It was also widely felt that an international engagement was a sine qua non to the success of the peace process. The US and EU involvement was especially underlined in this context. Nevertheless, the US itself had already taken some steps by establishing a Sudan task force already towards the close of the Clinton administration which was later resuscitated during the early phase of the presidency of Mr. George Bush.
Senator Danforth proposed a series of confidence-building measures, including: a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains; establishment of zones and times of tranquility in which vaccinations and other humanitarian activities could take place; and a commission to study and report on the issue of slavery and an end to attacks on civilian targets - all of which were aimed to achieve general, but not complete compliance.
Despite appeals from various sources that the US should formulate the peace initiative on the Sudan conflict, it had repeatedly made it clear that it preferred that the initiative be an IGAD one. As a result, it was the IGAD countries together with Britain, Norway, Italy and especially the US that proved crucial in making the most significant breakthrough on the Sudan peace process which subsequently led to the convening of the Machakos talks of July 2002 and the signing of the Naivasha protocols on May 26, 2004. The Signing of the Final Naivasha Protocols
As underlined in the introductory citation, the perseverance of the mediators produced tangible results which are noteworthy as this happened after many failed attempts. But, two caveats need to be emphasized. First, there could have been no progress without the SPLM/A and the Khartoum government making the necessary compromises and they were made as a result of a close assessment of their own particular interests. Second, at the time there was a long way to go from the signing of the Machakos Protocol to the final Naivasha agreement of May 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005.
Nevertheless, although the signing of the final protocols at Naivasha provided the long awaited silver lining on the lengthy Sudan civil war, its optimistic prospects were considerably diluted by the new crisis in Darfur which has precipitated a major political and humanitarian crisis. However, the Naivasha peace process was resumed in early December 2004 with the leveraging of the UN Security Council and the U.S. This meeting is hoped to lead to the signing of the final comprehensive agreement on the conflict.
The Darfur Crisis
The Darfur crisis is a consequence of scarce resources which has been compounded by ethnic conflict and the confrontation between the Arab Militia known as the Janjaweed and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
Several efforts have
been made to resolve the crisis by countries like
Chad.
Unfortunately, the aforesaid rebels of the region walked out of the last
peace effort which was mediated by the African Union (AU) on July 17,
2004. According to a spokesman of the rebels, the reason for the
withdrawal of the SLA and JEM from the talks was the alleged reluctance
of the government to meet the pre conditions set by them to end their
insurgency. The preconditions included the withdrawal of government
forces from Darfur and an international enquiry into charges of genocide
against non-Arabs in Darfur. The talks collapsed as reports emerged of a
riot aimed at aid workers at a camp for Sudanese refugees on July 16,
2004. The AU sponsored talks were aimed at breaking the deadlock between the Sudan government and the two rebel groups of Darfur. On July 17, 2004 a representative of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the two groups, said the talks were "finished.” Another JEM official added, "by refusing to accept our demands the government in Khartoum has said that it is not prepared to discuss the disarmament of the Janjaweed [militia] who are conducting ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Africans in the Sudan." He also indicated that the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) was also due to pull out. Nevertheless, the two rebel groups had not closed the option of talking to the AU. 15 As noted above, the talks between the GOS and the SLA and JEM were held in Addis Ababa, but did not bear fruit as the rebels had hardened their position with the final six-point demand which they wanted the government to meet. The demands included: · Pro-government Janjaweed militia, accused of the worst atrocities, be disarmed; · An international enquiry investigate charges of genocide; · Those who commit genocide or ethnic cleansing be brought to justice; · Obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid be removed; · Prisoners of war be released; and
·
Another venue should be found for future talks. Against the above backdrop, the government argued that some of the conditions on disarming the Janjaweed and improved humanitarian access were being met. Meanwhile, it should be recalled that the government and the rebels had agreed on a ceasefire in April 2004, but this did not hold. In fact, it was reported that the Janjaweed had intensified its raids despite the claim of the government that it was disarming it.
At the same time, the
US had threatened to impose sanctions on the Janjaweed leaders and
indicated that this could be extended to the government if the violence
continued. Meanwhile, the UN and international humanitarian agencies had expressed their concern about the shortage of food, water and medicines which had run low in the refugee camps. Besides, access to the region was hampered because of the rains which had made the roads impassable.
The acute
humanitarian situation had angered the residents so much so that some
groups were openly hostile to aid workers whom they targeted with rocks
and knives at the Bredjing camp. The trouble began when the aid workers
who were short of supplies could not respond to requests for food. CHRONOLOGY OFTHE HISTORY OF THE SUDAN
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