SUDAN:

TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH

 

RECENT MEDIATION EFFORTS BY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND THE U.S.

By 

Professor Kinfe Abraham 

Ambassador-At-Large, President of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) and CEO of the Horn of Africa Democracy and Development (HADAD) International Lobby Group 

A Paper Presented at the University of Khartoum

 Khartoum, Sudan January 18, 2006

                                                 

The perseverance of the mediators produced tangible results which are noteworthy as this happened after many failed attempts. But, two caveats need to be emphasized. First, there could have been no progress without the SPLM/A and the Khartoum government making the necessary compromises and they were made as a result of a close assessment of their own particular interests. Second, at the time there was a long way to go from the signing of the Machakos Protocol to the final Naivasha agreement of May 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005.¹ 

 Author’s Own View

Hindsight       

The conflict in South Sudan which started immediately after the independence of the country in 1956 was an important security challenge faced by the Horn of Africa.  The historical, racial and cultural basis of the conflict had drawn the attention of the world for nearly five decades.  It had also attracted various mediation efforts which were attempted with varying degrees of success over the years.  They include: The Addis Ababa agreement which bore fruit for more than a decade (1972 - 83) but which was unfortunately followed by the second phase of the conflict which gathered momentum because of the joining of forces between Anya Anya II and the group led by Colonel John Garang in 1983.  

The second phase of the conflict which started in 1983 has raged on up to the present, but in the process various mediation efforts were attempted by Nigeria, Germany, Egypt, the US, Libya and others (1994 - 2004).  But as noted earlier, even more significant have been the concerted efforts made by the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which has convened more than a dozen rounds of talks from 1997 to 2004 via its ministerial sub-committee on the conflict in south Sudan.  The committee is composed of Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti.  

The Contribution of Ethiopia and Other IGAD Members to the Peace Process 

The contribution of Ethiopia to the reconciliation process of the conflict in south Sudan has a special historical place.  As noted earlier, it was Ethiopia via the good offices of Emperor Haile Selassie that brokered the Addis Ababa peace agreement of 1972.  This held until 1983 when the agreement was annulled by President Nimeiry. 

In May 1994, in Nairobi, Ethiopia through the IGAD peace process helped the Sudan Government and the rebel forces to reach an agreement on the Declaration of Principle (DOP) to end the crisis in the Sudan.  In this declaration the right of self-determination to the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through an internationally supervised referendum was affirmed.  It was also declared that the Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society.  Moreover, the DOP underscored the establishment of a secular and democratic Sudanese state.

 

One of the more recent reasons for the intensification of the conflict in south Sudan was that the Sudan was divided into 26 states in 1994. This replaced the 9 states set up after 1991 to which the President appointed state governors.  

Ethiopia had also played an important part in the various mediation efforts through its role in the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee Meetings on the Sudan held during the period 1997-2004. The part which Ethiopia played in the mediation process is also underscored by the critical role which it played in the formulation of the Declaration of Principle (DOP) in 1993-1994 through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyoum Mesfin.  The Ethiopian contribution was crucial because the DOP was the basis of all the negotiations which took place from July 1997 to the present.² 

The Ethiopian contribution to the peace process was also strengthened by its designation of Prof. Kinfe Abraham, President of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD), as Chief Political Adviser to the IGAD Secretariat on the Sudan peace process. 

In addition, Ethiopia had successfully hosted the August 1998 Addis Ababa meeting. Its role of mediation was continued even in spite of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict of 1998-2000.  Its participation in the quest for a negotiated peaceful settlement of the conflict was not restrained even at the height of the Ethio-Eritrean war.³ 

The Role of Uganda, Eritrea and Djibouti 

It should also be noted that the other IGAD members of the Ministerial Sub-Committee on the conflict in south Sudan such as Uganda and Eritrea were visible players in the mediation efforts.  For instance, Uganda had made repeated efforts to end the conflict by bringing together the leaders of the GOS and SPLM/A. 

Likewise, Eritrea had convened meetings in Asmara and Massawa in a bid to narrow the gap between the GOS and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Similarly, Djiboutian President Omer Gele had brought together Dr. Hassan al-Turabi and Dr. John Garang and got them to sign a Memorandum of Understanding in 1999. The agreement was however disregarded as unconstitutional by the GOS as Dr. Turabi did not have the mandate of the government.⁴ 

The Early Machakos Negotiations – Oil and Other Issues of

Contention – October 2002

The Machakos talks were a natural continuation of earlier IGAD peace efforts.  The talks were launched in Nairobi on July 20, 2002.⁵ This led to the signing of a protocol by senior representatives of the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. At the start of the talks the mediators underscored that the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLM/A stood to benefit from a speedy end of the conflict rather than a prolonged one.  They also noted that, the human toll of the war and its exorbitant costs were likely to have dire consequences on the parties to the conflict.⁶ 

The Machakos peace process is the culmination of several frustrated talks.  Hope was, therefore, pinned on it to deliver a positive outcome.  Nevertheless, one could not help being skeptical about its ultimate outcome for a number of reasons.  The French Newspaper Le Monde in an article entitled “OIL, ISLAM, CHINESE WEAPONS AND AMERICAN MONEY” had made the following observation on the prospect it held for the Sudan:   

The positions of the two sides are incompatible. The first thing that separates them is Sharia (Islamic law), the ideological distinction of the Islamic regime in Khartoum that has been in power since 1989. If a federal-style constitutional proposal is adopted, the SPLM/A wants the capital to be neutral. But as far as the Islamic regime is concerned, Khartoum is the capital of the north, and is therefore Muslim.⁷ 

As noted in the above passage both the issues of self-determination, the separation of state and religion and the demand that Khartoum be the secular capital of the Sudan were questions that were pregnant with implications. The other issue was that the SPLM/A leader, Colonel John Garang, wanted to have a rotating presidency which would have allowed him to alternate with President Omar al-Bashir.  But, as Dr. Garang was not able to win the hearts of the northerners on this matter, he is said to have proposed that the post of the vice-president be given to him with the option of the right to veto on the president’s actions at the same time leaving him in charge of the south.⁸ 

Yet, another issue of contention related to the question of how the south should be managed. The Government of Sudan (GOS) initially wanted to continue to appoint the regional governors for the southern provinces, whereas the SPLM/A wanted them elected. Similarly, the SPLM/A wanted to have half the administrative posts in the ministries of defense, finance, interior, energy and foreign affairs.  

A further source of problem was the status of the marginalized areas which are not at present part of what is designated as the south.  These include the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile province and the Abyei region in southern Kordofan. Although the three regions have Christian-majorities who are predominantly black African, the controversy was that they were allocated to the north during the Addis Ababa agreement of February 1972 which ended the first civil war of 1956 to 1972.⁹ 

Despite the Addis Ababa agreement which was abrogated by General Nimeiry, nevertheless, the SPLM/A strongly felt that the above areas were constituent parts of the south.  Naturally, the GOS had for a long time remained steadfastly opposed to this.  

Here, it is worth mentioning that the said contested areas were taken up at the IGAD mediation talks of 1998 and 1999 which decided that the matter was outside of the framework or the terms of reference of the IGAD negotiations. In other words, the issue was deferred as it was not seen as an integral part of the territory which is defined as the colonial south on the bases of the situation which obtained during the independence of the Sudan in 1956.  

An additional source of controversy was the issue of the sharing of revenue derived from oil.  The south wanted a fair share of the oil revenue and enhanced allocations for the reconstruction of the south. Nevertheless, this as we shall see later had found a resolution in January 2004.  

The above situation was also somewhat ameliorated by the extent of the oil revenue which at present is not overwhelming.¹⁰ As observers of Sudanese affairs note, “Sudan is not and never will be a major oil producer like Saudi Arabia (with reserves of 260bn barrels) or Iraq (112bn barrels); it has only 1.5bn barrels in confirmed reserves, though that could rise to between 3 to 4bn barrels if production is extended to zones currently inaccessible because of the war.” 

Here, it is worth noting that oil was also a contributing factor to the abrogation of the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 which led to the resumption of the war in 1983. It is said that former President Jaffar Muhammad Nimeiry rescinded the agreement not so much because of Sharia as the realization that Sudan’s oil reserves were mainly in the south.   In fact, it is alleged that it was after the US Company Chevron announced the discovery of oil in the south that the war started in earnest in May of the same year.¹¹ 

When President Jaffar Muhammad Nimeiry realized that all the oilfields were in the south, which under the 1972 agreement was a semi-autonomous administration with a government in Juba, he unilaterally rescinded the agreement. He then arbitrarily created the Unity Province. Deprived of any control over resources in that territory, the southerners rebelled. For almost 19 years no government in Khartoum was able to raise the billion dollars that were needed to build an oil pipeline to the Red Sea. 

Nevertheless, the discovery of oil in the south did not immediately lead to exploitation. This was because the Sudan was unable to raise the 1bn US dollars needed to construct a pipeline to the Red Sea Coast. It, therefore, had to wait for another 19 years before the requisite finance could be raised. In fact, the matter was only resolved in 1999 “through an agreement between the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), the Malaysian company, Petronas, and the Canadian company, Talisman.”¹²

The arrangement which resulted in the prospecting and exploitation of oil was possible because “the Chinese provided almost free labor (as their workers were convicts who came to the Sudan in exchange for a reduction of their sentences) and were not concerned with safety rules or individual rights.” 

Likewise, the Canadians brought technical know-how and lent some respectability to the project. They did this via the former BP of Canada and Talisman which was bought out by its employees.  As a result of the creation of such a consortium the financial market was more responsive to the oil project.  

Even more respectability was added to the project as the pipeline was built by major German and British companies run by a consortium called the Greater Nile Petroleum Corporation (GNPC).  Soon after, Sudanese oil began to flow to the Red Sea.¹³ 

US Leveraging at Machakos and Naivasha

The most recent phase of the mediation efforts is the Naivasha peace process which began in October 2002 with the leveraging of the US and EU via the UK, Italy and Norway. Although many allude to the terrorist attack on the US that took place on September 11, 2001 as a factor which spurred the US to take interest in the Sudan, in fact, this was not the case. This was so because the US special envoy, Senator Danforth, was appointed five days before the said attack.   

Interest in the Sudan was also expressed among the Congressional Black Caucus, the influential Christian right, liberals, human rights activists and American humanitarian agencies. This was also underpinned by the anxiety which the terrorist attacks of September 11 gave rise to. Increased US involvement made it clear to both Khartoum and the SPLM/A that the peace process could not be pursued in the same manner as before.

 

Indeed, although the IGAD peace initiative had some genuine accomplishments including an agreed DOP, workable relations with the parties, an institutional focus in the Sudan Secretariat and international legitimacy, by late 2001 it had become apparent to most analysts that the process needed new invigoration. It was also widely felt that an international engagement was a sine qua non to the success of the peace process. The US and EU involvement was especially underlined in this context. Nevertheless, the US itself had already taken some steps by establishing a Sudan task force already towards the close of the Clinton administration which was later resuscitated during the early phase of the presidency of Mr. George Bush.

 

Senator Danforth proposed a series of confidence-building measures, including: a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains; establishment of zones and times of tranquility in which vaccinations and other humanitarian activities could take place; and a commission to study and report on the issue of slavery and an end to attacks on civilian targets - all of which were aimed to achieve general, but not complete compliance.

 

Despite appeals from various sources that the US should formulate the peace initiative on the Sudan conflict, it had repeatedly made it clear that it preferred that the initiative be an IGAD one. As a result, it was the IGAD countries together with Britain, Norway, Italy and especially the US that proved crucial in making the most significant breakthrough on the Sudan peace process which subsequently led to the convening of the Machakos talks of July 2002 and the signing of the Naivasha protocols on May 26, 2004.  

The Signing of the Final Naivasha Protocols

 

As underlined in the introductory citation, the perseverance of the mediators produced tangible results which are noteworthy as this happened after many failed attempts. But, two caveats need to be emphasized. First, there could have been no progress without the SPLM/A and the Khartoum government making the necessary compromises and they were made as a result of a close assessment of their own particular interests. Second, at the time there was a long way to go from the signing of the Machakos Protocol to the final Naivasha agreement of May 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005. 

 

Nevertheless, although the signing of the final protocols at Naivasha provided the long awaited silver lining on the lengthy Sudan civil war, its optimistic prospects were considerably diluted by the new crisis in Darfur which has precipitated a major political and humanitarian crisis. However, the Naivasha peace process was resumed in early December 2004 with the leveraging of the UN Security Council and the U.S. This meeting is hoped to lead to the signing of the final comprehensive agreement on the conflict.

 

The Darfur Crisis

 

The Darfur crisis is a consequence of scarce resources which has been compounded by ethnic conflict and the confrontation between the Arab Militia known as the Janjaweed and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).  

Several efforts have been made to resolve the crisis by countries like Chad. Unfortunately, the aforesaid rebels of the region walked out of the last peace effort which was mediated by the African Union (AU) on July 17, 2004. According to a spokesman of the rebels, the reason for the withdrawal of the SLA and JEM from the talks was the alleged reluctance of the government to meet the pre conditions set by them to end their insurgency. The preconditions included the withdrawal of government forces from Darfur and an international enquiry into charges of genocide against non-Arabs in Darfur. The talks collapsed as reports emerged of a riot aimed at aid workers at a camp for Sudanese refugees on July 16, 2004.¹⁴  

The AU sponsored talks were aimed at breaking the deadlock between the Sudan government and the two rebel groups of Darfur.  

On July 17, 2004 a representative of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the two groups, said the talks were "finished.”  Another JEM official added, "by refusing to accept our demands the government in Khartoum has said that it is not prepared to discuss the disarmament of the Janjaweed [militia] who are conducting ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Africans in the Sudan." He also indicated that the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) was also due to pull out. Nevertheless, the two rebel groups had not closed the option of talking to the AU.¹⁵  

As noted above, the talks between the GOS and the SLA and JEM were held in Addis Ababa, but did not bear fruit as the rebels had hardened their position with the final six-point demand which they wanted the government to meet. The demands included:  

·        Pro-government Janjaweed militia, accused of the worst atrocities, be disarmed;

·        An international enquiry investigate charges of genocide;

·        Those who commit genocide or ethnic cleansing be brought to justice;

·        Obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid be removed;

·        Prisoners of war be released; and

·        Another venue should be found for future talks.¹⁶

 Against the above backdrop, the government argued that some of the conditions on disarming the Janjaweed and improved humanitarian access were being met. Meanwhile, it should be recalled that the government and the rebels had agreed on a ceasefire in April 2004, but this did not hold. In fact, it was reported that the Janjaweed had intensified its raids despite the claim of the government that it was disarming it.  

At the same time, the US had threatened to impose sanctions on the Janjaweed leaders and indicated that this could be extended to the government if the violence continued.¹⁷  

Meanwhile, the UN and international humanitarian agencies had expressed their concern about the shortage of food, water and medicines which had run low in the refugee camps. Besides, access to the region was hampered because of the rains which had made the roads impassable. 

The acute humanitarian situation had angered the residents so much so that some groups were openly hostile to aid workers whom they targeted with rocks and knives at the Bredjing camp. The trouble began when the aid workers who were short of supplies could not respond to requests for food.¹⁸

CHRONOLOGY OF

1819	Egypt ruled Sudan with the help of a small number of British administrators.
1831	The armies of Mohammed Ali Pasha occupied Sudan after eliminating the Funj Kingdom that had begun to decline since the end of the 18th century.
1870	Samuel Baker visited Sudan and witnessed slave trade.
1885	An uprising led by Mahdi or the head of the Ansar religious sect freed Sudan from foreign control.
1898	The Anglo-Egyptian expedition against Sudan defeated the Mahdist troops.
1899	British forces imposed the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.
1922	The laws   promulgated   by   Britain   in   the Sudan promoted the isolation of the southern region from the rest of the country.
1927	Missionaries started to be paid for teaching services in southern Sudan.
1930	Special southern policy by the government fostered the separation of the southern region.
1932	Britain succeeded in controlling the Sudan fully. Its policy aimed to isolate the south from the north.
1946	James Robertson, the British Administrative Secretary in Sudan, wrote to the British government advising it to prevent the separation of the south from the north.
1946	[December]  A decision was made by Britain to annex the south to the north.
1947	The Juba Conference which was the start of the dialogue between north and south Sudan reached a decision about a legislative assembly where the south was to be represented.
1948	The legislative assembly inaugurated. Accordingly, the southern provinces were represented by 13 members.
1949	The control of missionary education by the Government began.
1952	The south was neglected in the Cairo negotiations between Egypt and the Sudan. This led to the collapse of the spirit of reconciliation witnessed at the Juba Conference.
1953	Agreement reached between Egypt and Britain regarding the Sudanization of services.
1953	When services were Sudanized the south got only six posts out of 180.
1953	Southern autonomy guaranteed.
1953	[November – December]  The first parliamentary election held. In the parliament, the south was represented by 22 deputies.
1954	The government which was dominated by the Unionist party, that wanted some form of union with Egypt, stated that it was aware that a conspiracy was being hatched in the south because southern deputies abandoned it.
1955	The National Unionist Party changed its position from advocating union with Egypt to a call for total independence.
1955	The revolt of the southern corps. It marked the beginning of the civil war. The underlying cause of the revolt was that the south was neglected in economic development and political representation. In addition, the south wanted a loose federal arrangement while the north wanted a centralized government. Hence when the Southern Equatorial Corps was called to participate in the anniversary marking the withdrawal of foreign troops from Sudan, it refused to leave the southern region.
1956	[January]  Sudan became independent In the constitutional commission, the south got three representatives out of 42. The southern members withdrew when a federal idea was rejected.
1958	The army took power under General Ibrahim Abboud. It adopted military solution to the problem of the south.
1959	Sudan and Egypt signed Treaty on the sharing of the total volume of the waters of the Nile. Ethiopia was not included in the treaty.
1963	Missionaries were expelled and the government became Islamist.
1964	[October 21]  The government was overthrown by popular uprising. A transitional government was established.
1965	Acts of violence took place in Juba and Wau.
1969	Colonel Jaffar al-Nimeiry took control of the government in a military coup.
1969	[June 9]  Declaration recognized the cultural, ethnic and historical differences between north and south. This declaration meant that southerners would have the right to develop their culture within the framework of unified Sudan.
1972	The Addis Ababa Conference granted regional autonomy to the south. This stopped the civil war until 1983.
1973	The Constitution stipulated that Islamic law, Sharia, and customs were the major sources of legislation and that personal status was to be dealt with in accordance with the customs of the parties involved.
1983	[February]  Battalion 105 revolted. John Garang formed Southern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
1983	[September]  Islamic Law (Sharia) and taxation (Zakat) were introduced.
1983	[September]  Relations with the south took a turn for the worse when Khartoum decided to divide the south into three administrative regions.
1985	Nimeiry’s government deposed by a popular uprising. A transitional military-civilian government was formed.
1986	[March] Koka Dam declaration was announced lifting the state of emergency, abrogating the September laws, returning the country to the 1974 laws, and the convening of a constitutional conference.
1986	[April]  Sadiq al-Mahdi elected Prime Minister for the first government that was called “National Unity Government.”
1987	The Nigerian General, Obasanjo, started a peace initiative to resolve the problem between south and north.
1989	[June]  General al-Bashir overthrew Mr. Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government. The new government was dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF) led by Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi.
1989	[June]  Bush Government of the United States met with rebel forces. President Bush called for fighting to be stopped. At that time rebels controlled many cities.
1989	[December]  Former US President, Jimmy Carter, started negotiation to resolve north-south problem.
1990	General al-Bashir requested the OAU to find a peaceful solution to the civil war in Sudan.
1990	[August] The first ever meeting between government representatives and the rebel movements since the war started in June 1983. The two sides agreed on the necessity of allowing relief assistance to continue reaching the affected population through Operation Life Line Sudan, as well as to open the channels for direct contacts between the two sides in order to continue the dialogue.
1990	[August]  Sudan supported the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait causing severe tension with Western governments and Arab states including Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
1990	[September] The revolutionary government convened a National Dialogue Conference on Peace, and representatives from various groups and sections of the community participated in it. The conference came up with a program for peace.
1992	The Adeer Declaration proclaimed in Ireland by opposition groups stated that secession is the only option.
1992	Sharia, Islamic Law, declared. But the south was exempted.
1993	A Transitional National Assembly with 300 members was established. The Assembly was dominated by the supporters of the NIF.
1993	Donors discussed the problem of the displaced in Sudan.
1993	[January]  Egypt reasserted its sovereignty over the disputed Haliab triangle on the Red Sea.
1993	[January]  The United States added Sudan in its list of states which allegedly sponsor terrorism because of Sudan’s links with Iran and Islamic groups in Algeria and Egypt.
1993	[February]  Nasir faction accepted federation of the south with the north as a means of ending the conflict.
1993	[February]  Government representative met Garang in Uganda. Garang accepted Abuja-I talk result.
1993	[May – June]  Abuja-I conference in Nigeria tried to find a peaceful solution to the problem of Sudan. Garang rejected the Abuja-I talk result.
1993	[May – June]  Abuja-II talks resumed in Nigeria. Garang arrived there toward the end of the talks and asked that powers not mentioned in the constitution should belong to    the     individual     states.    Disagreement   resulted on this point. Abuja-II ended without agreement.
1993	[July] Ministry for Peace and Rehabilitation established in Sudan.
1993	[September]  The Inter Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) became involved in finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Sudan.
1994	[May]  IGADD helped the Sudanese Government and the rebel forces to reach an agreement on the Declaration of Principles (DOP) to end the crisis in Sudan. In this declaration, the right of self-determination of the people of south Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum was affirmed. It was also declared that Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Moreover, it was agreed that a secular and democratic state must be established.
1994	[December]  Eritrea broke diplomatic relations with Sudan, claiming that Islamic extremists within its borders were being supported by Sudan.
1994	[December]  The country was divided into 26 states superseding the 9 states set up with the president appointing state governors.
1995	[June] Opposition groups sign the Asmara Declaration which affirmed the right of self-determination for all people of Sudan.
1995	[June] An assassination attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa is blamed on Egyptian Islamists with support from elements of the Sudanese security services.
1996	[March]  Presidential and parliamentary elections were held, but were boycotted by opposition parties.
1996	[May]  The UN Security Council agrees on diplomatic and visa sanctions against Sudan in response to Khartoum’s refusal to hand over suspects in the attack on President Mubarak.
1997	Sudan apologized to Kuwait for the stance it took in the Gulf war.
1997	[April]  A government peace charter is signed in Khartoum by smaller southern factions.
1997	[July]  Nairobi summit between the Sudanese government and the rebels reached a Declaration of Principles (DOP) to resolve the civil war.
1997	[August 4-7]  A meeting of the ministerial sub-committee on the conflict in south-Sudan held in Addis Ababa. The meeting discussed the out comes of previous sessions including self-determination and got both sides to reaffirm their commitment to it. Further, it led to agreements on the geographical definition of southern Sudanese and a temporary cease-fire for humanitarian purposes. It also discussed the issue of marginalized areas and contested territories like Abyei as well as the duration of the interim period.
1997	[September]  Preparatory meeting of the ministerial sub-committee meeting held in Nairobi to agree on modalities.
1997	[October]  Talks under the auspices of IGAD begin in Nairobi between the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A.
1997	[November]  The first ministerial sub-committee meeting between the parties to the conflict held.
1997	[November]  The Clinton administration imposed economic sanctions against Sudan citing terrorism, human rights violations and religious discrimination as the basis for the measure.
1998	[May]  The Sudan government and the rebels reached at an agreement on SPLM/A issue to self-determination for southern Sudan. The talk was held in Nairobi through the mediation of the IGAD Ministerial sub-committee.
1998	[April – July] The team of shuttle diplomats composed of Prof. Kinfe Abraham (IGAD), Ambassador Teshome Toga, Ambassador Alex Kamugisha and General L.K Sumbeiywo, held talks with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, President Isayas Afeworki, President Museveni and President Moi in addition to talking to the leaders of the parties to the conflict, President Omar al-Bashir and Dr. John Garang. This involved ten shuttle missions to the various capitals of the sub-region.
1998	[April – July] The fourth ministerial sub-committee meeting on the conflict in south Sudan held in Nairobi to discuss the interim-arrangement and other related issues of the conflict.