Islamic extremism in Somalia has its roots in the Middle Eastern Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Early penetrations to undermine the traditional Islamic School started in the 1960s by a well-known Somali scholar called Sheik Nur Ali Olow who graduated from Al Medina University in Saudi Arabia. He succeeded in influencing or baptizing the then Commander-in-Chief of the police force, Gen. Mohamed Abshir who remains up to now a faithful follower of International Islamic fundamentalism and an activist of a sophisticated character if not a ring leader of high caliber within the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Somalia.¹  

Hussein Aideed Jr. 1

 Orientation of Islamization in Somalia  

As implied in the above excerpt, the traditional brand of Islam pursued in Somalia has had a Sunni orientation. Hence, fundamentalist tendencies were, by and large, non-existent in Somalia until the post independence period. In fact, the extremist thrust did not begin until the mid 1960s. The early adherents of this were educated in Saudi Arabia, but were able to find sympathetic followers in the Somali establishment.   Mr. Hussein Aideed in a lecture delivered at the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) in 2002 elaborated on this issue as pointed out in the introductory excerpt. 

Some Somalis educated in Egypt are also said to have had influence on extremist Islamization tendencies in Somalia. Some are alleged to have had contacts with the Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt. Hence, "Al Azhar education institutions, whether in Somalia or Egypt, have also contributed to the formation of a group of religious scholars who have been greatly influenced by the Islamic Brotherhood movement, which had a considerable number of followers inside Egypt and produced priests like Sheikh Mohamed Moallim Hassan, an Azhar graduate, who laid the foundation of the current Islamic fundamentalist movement in Somalia."² 

This tendency was continued during the era of Siyad Barre as a reaction to the Socialist Ideology introduced by the military junta. Such activities were generally externally funded. Besides, they took "the form of an underground movement mostly funded by Saudi Arabia and Gulf philanthropic Islamic organizations. Through this method, the number of followers of islamist fundamentalist ideology increased."³  

In addition, internal dissident groups looking for alternatives to the military regime pursued this brand of Islam. The growth of the thrust toward fundamentalism was also assisted by the educational opportunities provided to some Somalis in some Middle Eastern universities, notably Saudi Arabia. Hussein Aideed has developed this point. He writes, "the roster of Islamic fundamentalists during this period grew through opportunities offered by Saudi Arabian academic institutions specialized in Wahabia Islamic teachings which was underlined with political indoctrination based on the philosophy of Islamic renewal."⁴ This, according to Aideed, has become the source and motto of the current expansion of "international Islamic fundamentalism, openly tainted with anti-Western and anti-American characteristics."⁵ 

Not surprisingly, statelessness in Somalia has also boosted the gravitation towards extremist brands of Islam. As noted earlier, in the process the role of Islamic charity organizations in Somalia has also been paramount.  It is also alleged that the assistance given by organizations and individuals in the Middle East and the Gulf area has been significant. Hussein Aideed has named “Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iran, Yemen, Libya, Kuwait, U.A.E. and Qatar" as some of the countries which at different times contributed to this process.  

International Network of Somali Religious Organizations 

The above has led to an expanding network of Somali organizations with international links. Further, "through these connections, a network of close ties have been developed with all international Islamic fundamentalist groups in Europe, North America, Australia and some Far Eastern countries like Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia, as part of a world-wide Islamic fundamentalist movement with Bin Laden as its supreme chief."⁶ 

As a result, the movement has produced a number of Islamist leaders in Somalia itself. Some groups opposed to the TNG, such as the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC), have expressed vociferous objections about such expansion as indeed Mr. H. Aideed does above. Such objection was, for instance, expressed in an annex attached to a presidential policy statement issued by the SRRC on October 10, 2001. 

Given the above, it seems that the extremist groups in Somalia are well integrated in the society.  Hence, an Afghanistan type of strike on Somalia is not likely to deliver good results. For one thing, it is difficult to determine where to strike without victimizing large populations of civilians. As it is the religious fundamentalist groups that are alleged to operate in Somalia are not large enough to warrant such targeting.  

Besides, as they are part and parcel of the population even discussion on the issue of terrorism in Somalia is exceedingly difficult. What is likely to work is, therefore, collaborating with the neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Kenya by providing them with the necessary financial and technical support. A second and very important approach would have been to persuade the TNG to step down and become part of a larger reconciliation process leading toward the establishment of a new Transitional Government. Nevertheless, this would have required persuading countries like Djibouti which was alleged to be close to the TNG to put pressure on it. 

Approaches for Changing the Environment Which Fosters Terrorism 

Any future transitional central authority which emerges in Somalia should be as inclusive as possible.   Besides, the central authority should embark on the task of reconciling the different clans and interest groups in earnest.  An eventual reconciliation process should also take stock of both the major clan groups as well as the minorities.   Such an arrangement should be preceded by negotiations on the allocation of parliamentary seats and ministerial portfolios as was done during the 2004 reconciliation effort.  This should include the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Finance.  

The above will hopefully be explored by the IGAD sponsored Somali conference which started in the town of Eldorate in Western Kenya in late 2002 and was continued in Nairobi in 2003.   At the time of the writing of this paper, the conference in Nairobi was still in session.  Scores of delegates were discussing the Somalia crisis with the aim of bringing peace to the country. The conference which was organized by the regional grouping of east African countries, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), had brought together the heads of Somali factions, politicians and other community leaders.  

Several factions including the TNG had threatened not to attend the conference or to pull out of it using different pretexts.  For instance, the leader of one group, Osman Ali Atto, had once told the BBC he would be staying away because his faction had been allowed fewer delegates than a rival group.  Nevertheless, although there were political factions that threatened not to attend the peace conference or to pull out of it including the TNG, one group that remained firmly committed to the talks was the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC).  Most members of the SRRC were, therefore, in attendance at the talks right from the outset.   

Opening the meeting on October 15, 2002, the then Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi urged delegates to "heed the cry of the Somali people for peace.” According to Joseph Warungu of the BBC the organizers had hoped to stop the fighting and set up an all-inclusive government. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the Eldorate meeting was the 16^th peace initiative aimed to resolve the Somalia crisis. Previous talks collapsed and the Eldorate conference was postponed several times.⁷ 

According to the AFP, the prime minister of the Transitional National Government (TNG), Hassan Abshir Farah, was one of the first to arrive in Eldoret. But, the Associated Press (AP) agency reported that he had initially refused to attend the opening ceremony because the Somali flag of a white star on a pale blue background was not flown. The neighboring countries and Foreign diplomats, hope against hope, that the talks would lead to some compromises on the future of Somalia.⁸ 

AFP also reported that the United States had financed the talks after reports that al-Qaeda operatives might move from Afghanistan to Somalia. According to diplomatic sources, the TNG President Abdulkassim Salat Hassan had warned the United Nations that his country risked becoming a haven for terrorists if the international community did not help it establish a viable state. He also promised to support US President George Bush's war on terror.⁹  

The Eldorate and Nairobi talks continued for several months.  The aim of the talks was to establish a more legitimate and inclusive Somali central government.  This was necessary because the "TNG which was set up in August 2000 after months of talks in neighboring Djibouti controls only  parts of Mogadishu and a few patches of territories in the rest of the country."¹⁰ 

Concerns about Terrorism and the Reconciliation Process 

Another factor which underscores the Western anxiety about terrorism in the Horn and some countries of the Middle East close to Somalia such as Yemen is the alleged presence of Al Qaeda cells in these countries. The arrival of several hundreds of U.S. troops in Djibouti at the end of September 2002 is one indication of this worry. This concern was further underlined by the bombing of a French Oil Tanker in early October of the same year for which Al Qaeda claimed responsibility.¹¹      

The above worry was also exacerbated by similar incidents in Indonesia, Kuwait and an aborted attempt at hijacking an aircraft in the US.   To this may be added, the dramatic explosions which took place at a Tourist Hotel owned by an Israeli in Mombassa (Kenya), explosions that took place in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq including the powerful one that took place at the headquarters of the UN which claimed the lives of 24 UN personnel among whom was the special representative of the UN Secretary General in August 2003 as well as the tragic railway explosions of Madrid (Spain) which claimed the lives of more than 200 passengers and the wounding of another 1400 people on March 11, 2004.  

The above events are said to have had an impact on the attitude of some of the Somali faction leaders who were attending the reconciliation conference in Nairobi.   Such pressure was also likely to intensify on Yemen and even the Sudanese government which was negotiating with the SPLM/A in Kenya at the same time.  It was also likely that pressure would mount on Eritrea which is still at loggerheads with Ethiopia and some of its other neighbours. 

Against the above backdrop of regional uncertainty, three countries - Yemen, Sudan and Ethiopia- had convened meetings in Sana’a, Addis Ababa and Khartoum starting from mid October 2002.   As a result, the three countries are said to have taken a common position on their security concerns, allegedly including Eritrea.

According to watchers of the region, concern over Eritrea stems from the fact that the Sudan accuses Eritrea of providing covert and overt support to the SPLM/A.   Similarly, Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of extending support to Somali and Oromo irredentist organizations which have perpetrated acts of violence such as the one which took place at the Tigray Hotel in the Ethiopian capital (Addis Ababa), in September 2002.  The Ethiopian allegation was also bolstered by the admission of those arrested that they were trained and armed by Eritrea.  This has underscored Ethiopia's long-held suspicion about Eritrea as a source of terrorist infiltration.  

Prospects of Reconciliation in Somalia  

The future of Somalia remained in a precarious balance as the mandate of the three-year old Transitional National Government (TNG) expired on August 13, 2003.  This was compounded by the threat of the TNG leader, Abdulkassim Salat Hassan, who announced on August 11, 2003 that he would not step down from his position unless and until "a new government and parliament were formed."  Nevertheless, the position taken by President Salat Hassan was rejected by his Prime Minster Abshir Farah who said that the TNG "would be illegitimate from August 13, 2003."  He also accused Mr. Salat of deliberately trying to frustrate the Nairobi Somali peace process in a bid to prolong his term of office.¹² 

The above split within the TNG came against the backdrop of a Somali reconciliation process which took place at Arta in Djibouti on August 13, 2000 leading to the establishment of the outgoing government by elders, civil society organizations etc...   Not surprisingly, news of the pull out of the TNG from the Nairobi talks of 2003/04 and anxiety about the establishment of a parallel government had heightened tension in Mogadishu. It had also caused worries among most Somalis and members of the international community.   

Residents of Mogadishu were worried about the standoff because they feared that the establishment of a parallel government might lead to renewed fighting in the city and its environs.  Meanwhile, opponents of President Salat Hassan accused him of running scared, adding that he wanted the failure of the Nairobi peace efforts in order to cling on to power.   In connection with this, a spokesman of his defecting Prime Minster was quoted as having said that Salat Hassan pulled out of the conference because he felt he would lose out.

Further, in response to their refusal to follow the president, the Prime Minster (Abshir Farah) and the speaker (Ahmed Isse Awad) were fired from their posts.  Nevertheless, the sacked prime minister who was also the chief negotiator of the TNG at the Nairobi reconciliation talks rejected the sackings stating, "it was illegal as the parliament did not make a quorum when the vote took place."¹³   

The justification used by Mister Hassan Salat for not stepping down from power was that the Somali constitution expressly states that there should not be a vacuum in governance.   This was clearly expressed by his Minster of Information (Abdirahman Adan Ibrahim "Ibbi ") who said, "We will stay until a new president, government and parliament have been elected."  On the fate of the sacked officials, he added that they were removed from office because "they refused to take orders from the president and continued to state that they represented the TNG at the ongoing peace talks in Nairobi."
According to some observers, another reason for the withdrawal of Salat Hassen from the Nairobi talks sponsored by IGAD, 10 days before the tenure of the TNG expired, was that he was unhappy over "the apparent anti-Islamic direction of the conference."¹⁴  

Meanwhile, the TNG seemed a little bit uncertain about the validity of its decision on the sackings of the said officials.   This, for instance, was expressed by the Minister of Information of the TNG who was quoted as having said that "the decision was not serious."  His statement was probably motivated by the wish of the TNG leader to keep the option of the readmission of the sacked officials open.  Besides, 154 out of the total of 245 members of the TNG parliament were still in attendance at the reconciliation conference in Nairobi when the decision to expel the officials was made.   Yet, two thirds of the parliament had to approve the decision.¹⁵ 

Given the above atmosphere of uncertainty, Somali watchers were in quandary as to which section of the Transitional National Government (TNG) had the legal sway.  Yet, observers were not totally surprised about the split because it was predictable.  In fact, as one observer put it, "it was typical of Somali political culture. No leader wants to relinquish power peacefully and this went for Abdiqassim too.  But, I don't think he will succeed."¹⁶  

The Challenges of a New Transitional Government 

In view of the above situation, there was uncertainty about how the Nairobi reconciliation talks would be concluded.  Nevertheless, there was greater optimism than ever before that the conference would be wound up with the formation of a new Transitional Government and Parliament.    But even so, it was equally difficult to foresee whether the emerging government would be more legitimate than its predecessor. 

Meanwhile an agreement was reached in Nairobi early in 2004 by all the faction leaders to establish a new parliament composed of 65 members from each of the four major clans and 35 members from the minorities. This parliament was then expected to establish a committee which would steer the process of forming a new government. The elected leader was then expected to form a cabinet which would be indorsed by the parliament. This was hoped to pave the way for the formation of a new transitional government. 

In connection with the above, several questions were asked.   One of them was whether the government formed in Nairobi would be able to move into Mogadishu and effectively control the city unless it enlists the support of the majority of the faction leaders who were in charge of the capital.  Besides, while this was expected to be an uphill task for the new government, questions were also asked about what alternatives it might come up with to control Mogadishu.   Moreover, there were those who asked questions about who might emerge as a unifying leader with appeal to all clan groups.    

There were also observers who held the view that the conference should have been preceded by in turn - and in intra - clan reconciliations.  This, for instance, would have been necessary to harmonize relations among the Hawiye and between the Hawiye and Darod clans as well as others.   

However, regardless of whether a new government emerged out of the Nairobi talks a strategy for dealing with the issue of terrorism would still remain relevant and very important.    Hence, it would be useful to take stock of the recommendations outlined in the next part.   

Recommendations 

Against the backdrop of the above discussion, it is important to heed the following recommendations of the ICG many of which are in consonance with views expressed in different sections of this book.  They include the following recommendations made to the U.S. and other members of the International Coalition against terrorism:

1. Continue to deny the use of Somalia to Al-Qaeda or other international terrorists by pursuing tight surveillance of the sea approaches and by monitoring remittance companies and transactions between Somali Islamic groups and the Gulf States;

2. Assist in establishing formal financial institutions and branches of international banks in Somalia as alternatives to informal  money transfer arrangements;

3. Engage Somaliland and other local, functional Somali authorities in sharing intelligence about extremist organisations; and

4. Calibrate any direct military operations inside the country carefully to the threat, avoiding to the extent possible in particular actions on a large-scale or in densely populated areas where such activity may stimulate a strong backlash that could benefit movements with extremist Islamist agendas.

It is also important to take note of the following recommendations specifically directed to Somalia's Neighbours such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and others: 

5.   Work closely with the international coalition in building the capacity to monitor cross-border movements and shipments of goods, and fully share intelligence with coalition partners. 

The Transitional National Government of Somalia (TNG) should also be privy to the recommendations below which are likely to have a defining impact on its future:  

6.  Cooperate in providing information about al-Itihaad and deny its members senior positions in the administration.

Moreover, the following suggestion which is of critical importance for the re-establishment of an effective Somali state should be given due consideration:  

7.   Name a single Special Envoy to lead the peace and reconciliation process, and continue efforts to convene a conference of Somali stakeholders, but with greater emphasis on careful preparation and flexible timetables, as well as increased international backing.  

The above has partly been done via the appointment of an envoy.  Nevertheless, the other issues attendant to it should be re-examined and evaluated from time to time for their effectiveness and usefulness. 

The Secretary General of the United Nations should also take cognizant of the following proposals

8.  Move rapidly to finalise formation of a “Friends of Somalia” contact group, while ensuring that it has a small core of committed states that can engage in peace-making efforts in Somalia, in particular by supporting the IGAD mediation efforts.

9. Establish with adequate staff the panel of experts proposed by the Security Council to investigate violations of the arms embargo on Somalia and to lay the groundwork for an enforcement mechanism that would – at a minimum – name and shame violators.

 Moreover, it is worthwhile for the U.S. and EU to take note of the recommendations below which can be further broadened and enhanced: 

10.  Participate actively in the proposed new “Friends” contact group and take the lead in creating a smaller core group of the “Friends” to operationalise efforts to work with IGAD in developing a more substantial, unified mediation structure for the peace and reconciliation process.

11.  Decide between each other who will assume primary responsibility within this core group to carry out shuttle diplomacy, through a senior envoy, in order to:

·        determine, with IGAD, the structure, and participation of a comprehensive agenda, IGAD-sponsored peace conference; and

·        consult intensively with outside sponsors of the various Somali groups (Ethiopia and others) to develop compromise positions.

12.  Engage the Somali factions to focus them on crucial issues, in particular political decentralisation.

13.  Implement targeted sanctions aimed at freezing personal assets, restricting travel and expelling family members living abroad if individual warlords or other factions which block or undermine the unified peace and reconciliation process.

14.  Support UN and NGO efforts to respond to humanitarian needs and support small-scale economic development.

15.  Devise specific programs of institutional support, including capacity building for law enforcement, disarmament and reintegration and constitutional development, that would be implemented if a broader-based Somali government is established.

16.  Respect the United Nations arms embargo, discontinue financial and military assistance to all sides and encourage them to engage in the peace and reconciliation process.

17.  If individual warlords or other faction blocks undermine the peace and reconciliation process, work with the EU and U.S. to implement the targeted sanctions described above.

 In addition to the above, various recommendations have been made under the different chapters of this book.  Besides, some of the recommendations are already under implementation. Nevertheless, as the Somali situation presents a fluid frontier it should be constantly monitored to keep pace with new developments. 

The monitoring process is of great value for assessing the usefulness of the aforesaid recommendations.  It is also of critical importance for the realization of the ultimate goal of creating a viable Somali state that would join the community of world states.¹⁷      

FOOTNOTES 

^1-3Hussein Aideed, International Terrorism in Somalia, Lecture Delivered at EIIPD, July 2002.

^4-6Ibid.

⁷BBC News, Somalia Peace Talks Open, October 16, 2002.

^8-9AFP, October 20, 2002.

^10-11The Somalia Crisis, Ibid., p. 192.

¹²BBC News, August 15, 2003.

^13-14BBC News, October 29, 2002.

¹⁵BBC News, August 17, 2003.

¹⁶IRIN, August 18, 2003.

¹⁷International Crisis Group (ICG), Somalia: Countering, Terrorism in a failed State, Africa Report No. 45, Nairobi/ Brussels, May 23, 2002.

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