Despite the formation of a Parliament, election of the President and formation of a cabinet, a durable solution to the Somali crisis can only be found if and when the Somali leaders and parties place the interests of their country above their own in a quest for finding a peaceful settlement based on essential compromises. This is crucial for the peace process and the international community should extend its strong appeal to all those who can make a difference. ¹

 Author’s Own View

The Election of a New Parliament  and President

October 2004 

The election of President Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed as Head of State signals a new optimistic and bright horizon for the war troubled Somalia Republic, but such optimism could scarcely be expected to bare foot unless the war shattered country is given all the necessary financial, military and political support to make a fresh start.                      

Somalia cannot make a fresh start without disarming the militia and collecting the estimated fifteen million arms that are freely at large. The appeal of the new President of Somalia for an AU peacekeeping force of twenty thousand soldiers is, therefore, the least that Somalia will require to establish law and order and assemblance of normalcy in the war-shuttered country.  

The Imperative of International Support 

The importance of the support of the International Community, particularly that of the EU, US, Arab League, the United Nations and AU to rehabilitate and rebuild the socio-economic fabric of the Somali society and start a modicum of developmental efforts cannot, therefore, be over emphasized.  In this connection, it should be noted that Somalia had not benefited from the Lome & Cottonou funds of the EU/ACP to which it would have been entitled under normal circumstances for nearly fourteen years.   

In connection with the above, it is important to note that the European Union Foreign Policy Chief, Havier Solana, had promised to provide resources for the training of security forces during his meeting with the Somali leader in Addis Ababa at the end of October 2004.   

The Kenyan - Mbagathi Peace Efforts 

The conflict which has afflicted Somalia for nearly fourteen years has been a serious challenge to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa in particular and Africa and global security as a whole. All previous peace efforts, from Sodere (Ethiopia, 1996-98), Arta (Djibouti, 2000) through Eldoret to Mbagathi (Kenya, 2002-2004) plus several other initiatives, including those of some Arab states like Egypt and Yemen did not succeed in restoring peace and statehood to Somalia.  

The latest Reconciliation Conference, which started at Eldoret and was continued at Mbagathi from October 2002 to October 2004, now, however, seems to have delivered a final peaceful settlement to the conflict with the formation of a national parliament and the election of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as President and Head of State of the Somalia Republic in October 2004. This happened after more than two years of deliberations and negotiations. The election of the President and MPs has resulted in the formation of a new government and the appointment of a Prime Minister. It is also hoped to lead to the adoption of a transitional national program. 

Past and Current Challenges 

In this connection, it should be noted that the progress of the reconciliation process in Somalia was hampered and frustrated by several factors right from the outset. Some of the above peace processes had hosted various political entities including the faction leaders. Many of the faction leaders lacked clear qualities of leadership and this had led to political fragmentation which resulted in the emergence of other faction leaders that continued to compete for positions of leadership.  

In some instances, old leaders were replaced at the conference and in the country by new and more powerful contenders which belonged to the same clans or sub-clans. In other instances, coalitions had emerged for the purpose of imposing new demands on the mediators.  But, such groups often disintegrated before or soon after their demands were met.  

The above was further compounded by the existence of state formations as in the de facto state of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland all of which claimed power and economic control in their areas.  In addition, the Somali factional leaders and other groups heavily relied on their military capabilities to realize their goals. 

Even in the wake of peace conferences, faction leaders had moved between different venues of meetings and their regions or enclaves to keep their military forces in a state of alert.  

The Recent Role of IGAD States in the Mediation Process

 Initially, progress at the Mbagathi Somali reconciliation talks was played down by lack of cohesion and unity of purpose among the IGAD frontline states.  However, this was significantly improved with the formation of the Facilitation Committee composed of the foreign ministers of the member states of IGAD in October 2003.   

Earlier, the absence of some frontline states from the conference had a divisive effect on the Somali delegates. Nonetheless, the 5^th IGAD Ministerial Facilitation Committee Meeting, held on May 6, 2004 in Nairobi, and attended by Ministers from all the IGAD member countries had helped make a significant headway in fostering cohesion. 

The IGAD member states, however, had difficulty financing the peace process. The crisis of funding reached its climax from February to March 2003 when it almost came to a halt. This situation did not show any sign of improvement as the conference faced a deficit in excess of $10m. The situation still underscores that there is still an urgent need to provide the necessary funding so that the outcome of the reconciliation could be implemented by the newly formed government. 

The New Role of the International Community 

In this connection, the international community should recognize that the IGAD member states cannot shoulder the financial burden, which constituting and operationalizing the new State would demand. To the above may be added the onerous and challenging tasks of disarming the militia and creating new police and armed forces to restore law and order in the country. Besides, the new states have to rehabilitate the fractured Somali society which has borne the heaviest brunt of the burden of the civil war which has afflicted Somalia for almost fourteen years.   

The most crucial step is that all the main Somali faction leaders and politicians signed a deal and set up a parliament which elected a Speaker and later the President who appointed a Prime Minister and formed a cabinet representing the various clans.  It should also be underscored that the agreement came after nearly two years of talks aimed at establishing a legitimate national Somali government. All these efforts would require the sustained support of the international community.  

Groping Toward State Formation  

The delegates who attended the conference agreed on a federal system of government. According to observers of Somali affairs, the international community had put pressure on the Somali faction leaders to agree on a peace deal. The new parliament is composed of 275 members, rather than 350 as was previously agreed. Traditional elders as well as faction leaders were involved in selecting them. According to the agreement, the four major clans are represented by 61 MPs each and a coalition of small clans selected 31 members. The task of selecting eligible members of parliament was left to each clan and this was lengthy and contentious.  

Earlier, there was anxiety that the de facto state of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland could potentially wreck the talks. Representatives of Somaliland have not taken part in the talks. Besides, there was an upsurge of fighting in central Somalia as the talks progressed in Kenya.  Some 13 people were killed and several others injured after inter-clan fighting over land and water in the Hiirran region.  

Following the clan skirmishes the Kenyan Minister of foreign affairs had appealed to the leaders to exercise restraint to save the fragile negotiations. According to a BBC journalist who was then based in Mogadishu, the fighting in the Hirran region was said to be the worst since the faction leaders signed a ceasefire agreement in October 2003.  

The Formation of a New Cabinet 

A new Somali administration was formed in October 2004 and the cabinet make-up was completed. Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi had the tall order of appeasing Somalia's rival clans and warlords who have been fighting one other since the last functioning government was toppled in 1991. The government was established in Kenya because it was still very dangerous to move to Mogadishu.  The new cabinet included:

1. Deputy Prime Minister: Mohammed Abdullahi "Sifir" Jama;
2. Deputy Prime Minister, Home Affairs Minister: Hussein Aideed;
3. Deputy Prime Minister: Shaykh Adan Madobe;
4. Foreign Minister: Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail;
5. Finance Minister: Salim Aliyow Ibrow;
6. National Security Minister: Mohammed Qanyare Afrah;
7. Minister of Religious Affairs: Omar "Finish" Mohammed Mahmut;
8. Agriculture Minister: Hassan Mohamed Nur "Shatigudud";
9. Reconstruction Minister: Barre "Hirale" Aden Shire; and
10. Minister of Public Works and Housing: Osman Ali Ato.²

A Somali minister and four deputies had resigned from the country's newly formed transitional government. The quintet complained that the administration was too large and not representative enough. But some Somalia analysts said they may have simply been unhappy with the jobs they were awarded in the new cabinet. These were the strongest signs yet of unhappiness with the make-up of the new government, tasked with restoring law and order after 13 years of anarchy.³

Meanwhile, the appointment of Hussein Mohammed Aideed, who is one of the powerful Somali warlords, who was named and sworn in as deputy prime minister after the first round, completed the formation of the cabinet. Mr. Aideed, who was also appointed as home affairs minister is the son of the late General Mohamed Farah Aideed, who US forces vainly tried to capture in 1993. His rival for the post, Mohammed Qanyare Afrah, was also sworn in as national security minister.⁴

The above appointments which were difficult at least temporarily seemed to end the difficult negotiations on the allocation of government portfolios. This was the most serious attempt to establish order in a country carved up by rival militias during the past 14 years.

On the occasion, the new Prime Minister said, "Let us go back home and face the realities on the ground... and rebuild Somalia.” He added, "You cannot justify our presence in Kenya anymore. It cannot be accepted by the host country and the international community".⁵

Hopes for the success of the 13th attempt to form a government loomed higher because of the backing of the neighboring countries and the involvement of the main warlords. But, some people were upset at the inclusion of so many warlords in the cabinet. As a result, there were violent protests against the new team in parts of southern Somalia. Thus, the challenges remain enormous as at least 50 people were killed in a space of five days in fighting in central Somalia.⁶  

The Cabinet Controversy  

Meanwhile, Somalia's new President Abdullahi Yusuf re-appointed his prime minister, Ali Muhammad Ghedi, a few days after parliament passed a vote of no confidence in him. The removal of the Prime Minister via a parliamentary measure of no confidence in him was caused by the fact that he had not paid due attention to the issue of clan quotas and that he did not consult the MPs. His reappointment might placate the MPs, as they now have a new opportunity to approve of him and his new cabinet.⁷  

The crucial issue for the vote of no confidence was that the names of the cabinet should have been first submitted to parliament. Another complicating factor which might have impacted the disagreement in parliament is that Somalia has been divided into a patchwork of fiefdoms during the past 13 years. Rival warlords have battled for control of the country, but fortunately most of them were involved in the two-year peace process in neighboring Kenya which led to the election of Mr. Yusuf as President  raising hopes that Somalia could soon return to normalcy.⁸

Somalia watchers had praised the choice of Mr. Ali as prime minister, as the academic comes from a rival clan to Mr. Yusuf, the Hawiye, which controls most of the capital, Mogadishu. He has not been involved with the factional fighting in the past 13 years. It is expected that Mr. Ghedi will make some changes to his cabinet line-up before the whole team is put to a vote of confidence in parliament.

The Somali President told the MPs they had to take seriously what is seen as the best chance to form a government in Somalia in nearly 14 years. He said, "It is up to you to take it seriously or as a joke. I am saying all of you cannot be ministers or deputy ministers…If we are not serious about creating a functioning government, let us go home without disturbing the international community, which funded the two years of peace talks."⁹

The president was justified in his statement because a government of nearly 80 ministers and deputy ministers is too expensive for one of the poorest countries in the world. According to some observers, it is also too large and not sufficiently inclusive.¹⁰  

Meanwhile, in late December no date had been fixed for the return of the new Somali government to the capital, Mogadishu, which was still divided among rival warlords. 

A Rift in the Somali Parliament  

On May 12, 2005, the Somalia parliament in exile voted in favor of two measures strongly opposed by key warlords. This led to a deep rift in the interim government. The MPs present in the session supported the call for a regional peacekeeping force and the relocation of the capital in two Somali towns, but not the lawless capital, Mogadishu. Nevertheless, the vote was boycotted by MPs loyal to the Mogadishu-based warlords, who agreed to bring together their forces in opposition to the parliamentary decision. The warlords who agreed to create united forces included Mohammed Qanyare Affra, Osman Ali Atto and Musa Sudi Yalahow. 

According to a BBC report released during the same day, the MPs erupted in jubilation when the results of the vote were announced. Of the 152 MPs present, 145 voted in favor of moving the capital to Baidoa and Jowhar until Mogadishu is considered safe.

A similar vote in March was declared null and void after MPs fought in parliament, but parliamentary speaker Sherif Hassan had said that it was unconstitutional because he did not convene it. At the time, it was reported that there were more than 100 MPs in Mogadishu out of the 275-strong parliament. It was also reported that the 100 MPs had refused to return to Nairobi where the parliament was then still in exile.

International reaction to the recent rift in the Somalia Parliament was strong.  In Washington, the US and the European Union released a joint statement voicing their concern at the lack of progress. The statement said, "the Somali reconciliation process is at a critical stage. There is an urgent need for a viable agreement on relocation and security." Similarly, other donors who bankrolled the long peace talks are pressing the transitional government to move from Nairobi to Somalia.

Simultaneously, the African Union met in mid-May to consider the issue of foreign troop deployment. The session examined the proposal of sending 1,700 troops drawn from the Sudan and Uganda to ensure the security of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Nevertheless, the issue of foreign troops remained controversial. This was so because some of the warlords were opposed to the involvement of Ethiopian troops, as they believe President Yusuf is a close ally of Ethiopia. The Mogadishu warlords are also suspicious of Ethiopia because of past history and the fact that they allege that Ethiopia had shipped arms to Somalia to support the President. 

Since his election in October 2004, President Yusuf had been appealing for an African Union protection force before he could move his government back to Somalia. The Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had positively responded to this request, but was unable to send troops because of lack of finance and worries about the security situation in the capital.  Observations 

After 14 years of clan warfare and lawlessness, Somalia despite the above recent difficulties still has a government, led by a president and a prime minister. One of the problems is that the capital, Mogadishu, remains too dangerous for them to work in. Besides, as observed above the Somali parliament is split on this issue.  

President Abdullahi Yusuf was treated as a head of state in exile until the return of the government and parliament in late February 2005 and even more recently. He has been enjoying red carpet treatment amid tight security as he moved around.  Yet, there is still no police force in Somalia capable of guaranteeing his security and that of his ministers, in a country with an estimated 60,000-armed militiamen.  

Many are skeptical of the success of the peace process because of 13 previous failed peace initiatives, the rift which has emerged in the new parliament and among the faction leaders. Others say that the chances are much better this time around as people were even more war-fatigued. Besides, all of Somalia's faction leaders had at least initially showed some commitment to the mediation effort of late 2004 which stood in a precarious balance in mid-2005. In addition, all Somalia’s neighbors have strongly supported the peace process. 

The above developments warrant some guarded optimism.  Nevertheless, as observed in the introductory citation which is also repeated here, despite the formation of a Parliament, election of the President and formation of a cabinet, a durable solution to the Somali crisis can only be found if and when the Somali leaders and parties place the interests of their country above their own in a quest for finding a peaceful settlement based on essential compromises. This is crucial for the peace process and the international community should extend its strong appeal to all those who can make a difference.  

In the above connection, Kenya, Ethiopia and the other IGAD countries as well as the IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF) and other members of the international community that had managed to keep the process on track amid the many obstacles encountered, should redouble their support to the peace process. The international community should also adopt a multi-pronged strategy of alternating carrots and sticks as appropriate.  Besides, in as much as Somalia has been highly criminalized because of the absence of central government the option of granting amnesty to some of the groups which fear facing justice should be considered.  

Nevertheless, the issue of amnesty should be addressed with extreme caution and in a way which does not reward impunity. Further, in the context of power-sharing the political clout, social base and capacity of the different political actors to cause damage which can have adverse effect on the peace process should be given serious consideration. This would call for a strategy of damage control.  

A mechanism of monitoring the peace process inside Somalia should also be put in place as soon as conditions permit. Such monitoring mechanism could, for instance, be handled by the AU and/or IGAD.  

The continued violations of the UN arms embargo also contribute to the prevailing insecurity and instability in Somalia. In this regard, the United Nations Monitoring Group should work closely with the AU, IGAD and the newly formed government.

The above is important in view of the negative impact of the prevailing insecurity caused by the proliferation of arms in the country which has dire consequences on the social fabric of the Somali society and the daily livelihood of ordinary people.  

One of Mr. Yusuf's first acts following his election was to call for 20,000 foreign peacekeepers, who would both disarm the many militias and protect his government. This was described as an over ambitious appeal. In fact, one of the key Mogadishu warlords, Hussein Aideed, before he was named deputy prime minister in the new government described the idea as ‘crazy’. He went on to add, the presence of such a large foreign force would only unite all the different Somali factions against the government.

Aideed drew on the experience of the disaster of the United States intervention in 1993 which ended after Somali gunmen were filmed dragging the bodies of US troops through the streets. This probably all the more make sense as a few western powers are willing to risk the lives of their soldiers in Somalia. But the prospect of eventually creating an indigenous security force looks somewhat promising as all the warlords pledged on the Koran to disarm their militias as Mr. Yusuf was being elected.

However, so far there are no signs of such action as none of the Mogadishu warlords has taken the initiative of disarming his militias. There are just as many armed men on their checkpoints as before.

In connection with the above, one should also note that the vacuum created by statelessness had produced an environment of arms proliferation, illicit trade as well as different strands of religious extremism and/or terrorism emanating from them.  This issue should also be urgently addressed.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia which demands urgent international attention has continued to deepen and intensify even in spite of the new ray of hope provided by the formation of the government.

According to a senior United Nations official the scale of suffering in Somalia, which is being largely ignored by the donor community is a "moral outrage.” Jan Egeland, speaking after a visit to parts of Somalia, said that death rates were on the scale of Sudan’s Darfur region, which is getting lots of international aid.¹¹

Mr. Egeland, who heads the UN emergency relief agency said, "The death rate among children in some parts of Somalia is five per 10,000 people (per day)… We have to triple what we have today to attend to needs here like we are in Darfur. Life is worth as much in Somalia as it is in Darfur, or in Iraq."¹²

Overall international assistance to Somalia is also very low. Last year, funding for Somalia was only $60m, half of what the UN had requested.¹³ Meanwhile, United Nations special envoy to Somalia Winston Tubman said the international community will only help if there is progress from the Somali side.  i.e. " the president of Somalia has to come up with plans,” he has to say,' this is what we want to do and we have marshaled our efforts to this extent'. He went on, "Once the donors see him taking those kind of steps, they would follow as opposed to if he says, 'I'm the president, write cheques for me.' It doesn't work that way."¹⁴ 

Here, it should be noted that Somalia's neighbors and donor countries have spent two years and some $10m on the peace talks which culminated in Mr. Yusuf's election, but they are only now turning their attention to the question of government security.

Meanwhile, on the issue of security, diplomats have been talking about the possibility of using the officer corps of Somalia's last police force as the basis of a new police service, backed up by some of the militiamen, after a few weeks training. Nevertheless, this remains an idea to be agreed upon and put to test. Hence, it will take some time before the new government can embark on such a mammoth project of rebuilding Somalia. ¹⁵

However, at the same time, the new government until mid-2005 included most of Somalia's main warlords, to the dismay of some. In fact, skeptics are in quandary as to whether the various warlords in the new cabinet who are accused of destroying the social and institutional fabric of the Somali society would be capable of rebuilding it.

Others argue that the faction leaders or warlords, as they are generally referred to, are a ‘necessary evil’ and that it is much better to have them inside the process rather than outside it. Thus, as one western diplomat close to the peace process put it, the cabinet should be a mixture of sinecures to keep the warlords happy and the technocrats working.¹⁶

In addition to the above recommendations, the ICG has also come out with critical proposals on the way forward stating, “President Yusuf and his partners need to use their political advantage to form a genuine government of national unity, rather than attempt to impose their own agenda on the transition.” They add, “the international community needs to make clear that only if this happens will the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) get the recognition and support it desperately seeks.” Their views are justified because the probable alternative is the resumption of Somali's conflict through all-too-familiar means.¹⁷  

The above point is underscored by the “archetypal Somali warlord, Yusuf's opposition to the now defunct Transitional National Government (TNG), his advocacy of a federal structure for Somalia and his close ties with neighboring Ethiopia which together place him firmly in one camp in Somalia's long-running conflict.”¹⁸  

The ICG also argues that the challenges ahead are formidable. It adds, “the TFG must reconstitute itself and return to Somalia.” Besides, it underlines that the decision to go to Mogadishu or identify an interim seat of government is charged with political significance and could have repercussions on the security situation in parts of the country.  

Restoration of a secure environment is a top priority: the AU favors a modest monitoring and observer force, rather than the big battalions envisioned by Yusuf; but no deployment is likely until a formal, measurable ceasefire instrument has been drawn up and the deployment of foreign troops has been authorized by the transitional parliament.  

Moreover, as the TFG has no resources it needs to secure funds quickly. Yet even at the end of 2005, few governments were willing or able to provide direct budgetary support, so the TFG will be obliged to tap domestic sources such as ports and airports. Although most faction leaders have agreed in principle that these should be turned over to the control of the interim government, their commitment is questionable, and no agreement has been reached as to how or when revenues will be shared and managed. If the TFG attempts to gain control of economic infrastructure by force or subterfuge, it risks serious violence.¹⁹  

Besides, in the long haul, the elaboration of a federal structure and the development of a permanent constitution will remain daunting. This is so because, despite the agreement on a Transitional Federal Charter, many (if not most) Somalis still need to be persuaded about the value of federalism. As yet, there has been little substantive discussion on the form it might take. The demarcation of new administrative boundaries, control of revenue, and the future of existing institutions such as regional "governors" or, where they exist, parliaments, are just some of the issues that are likely to be fiercely contested. 

The question of the unity of Somali is still pending and has been complicated by the election of President Yusuf's. The self declared Republic of Somaliland associates Yusuf, as the former president of Puntland, with Puntland's claims to the regions of eastern Sanaag and Sool, which lie within the colonial boundaries inherited by Somaliland. Within two weeks of his election, unusually bloody clashes between Somaliland and Puntland forces in the Sool region had left over 100 people dead. Violence has since subsided, and both sides are employing various channels of communication to defuse the tension, but Somaliland's claims to independent statehood have yet to be addressed by the international community and will continue to be a source of friction throughout the transitional period.²⁰ 

Against the above background, the ICG has made a number of recommendations with which the author concurs. The recommendations were made to the different stakeholders including the Leadership of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG): 

1. Constitute a new, smaller and cost-effective cabinet that is a genuine government of national unity.
2. Prepare for parliamentary debate and approval of a comprehensive and measurable cease-fire plan and proposal for deployment of an AU monitoring and observer force.
3. Enter negotiations with those groups currently in control of economic infrastructure, including on the terms of revenue sharing and management.
4. Initiate substantive dialogue and debate within the Transitional Federal Parliament and beyond on federalism options.

To the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP): 

5. Recommit to the cessation of hostilities implicit in the Transitional Federal Charter and co-operate with the TFG in designing comprehensive, verifiable ceasefire arrangements.
6. Pass legislation authorizing the deployment of an AU peace support mission, providing clear parameters for its mandate and duration.
7. Establish parliamentary committees as soon as possible to exercise oversight of the TFG and to help enforce the principle of parliamentary supremacy.

To the African Union (AU): 

8. Continue planning for deploying a modest monitoring, observation and protection force in Somalia, including some training for Somali security forces.

9. Insist that the preconditions of a measurable ceasefire plan and parliamentary approval for the force be in place prior to any deployment.
10. Exclude troops from "Front-line States" (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya) from the AU force, or at least from any role that could expose them to combat operations.
11. Dispatch a fact-finding mission to Somali and, take the leadership's claim to independent statehood under formal consideration, and in this context, also explore options for resolution of the border dispute with Puntland.

To the United Nations Secretariat and Specialized Agencies: 

12. Augment UN representation to the level of Special Representative of the Secretary- General and appoint a diplomat from a disinterested and impartial nation to the post.
13. Plan for expansion of the UN Political Office for Somalia to a fully-fledged Peace Building Office on condition that the TFG returns to Somalia and demonstrates a reasonable degree of legitimacy and authority.
14. Continue decentralized programming of aid resources in Somalia independently of the TFG (respecting the Coordination and Monitoring Committee's guidelines), while working toward gradually closer collaboration and coordination with TFG ministries and agencies.
15. Commit resources for capacity building of TFG institutions.
16. Expand the membership and resources of the existing UN Monitoring Group and recommend to the Security Council concrete actions against individuals and groups identified by the Group as being in violation of the embargo or otherwise obstructing the peace process.²¹

On the whole, the international community including the US and EU, the UN, AU, IGAD, the Arab League and all others concerned about Somalia should remain seized with the peace process until the newly formed government of President Abdullahi Yussuf is in place in the country exercising full powers for disarming the militia and putting in place the institutions of a workable government. This is crucial in order for the parliament, the president, the cabinet and all relevant institutions and elected and appointed individuals to acquire legitimacy and exercise their powers and discretion.