THE SOMALIA CRISIS

INCHING TOWARDS A RESOLUTION

Professor Kinfe Abraham

Ambassador-At-Large, President of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) and CEO of the Horn of Africa Democracy and Development (HADAD) International Lobby Group

A Paper Presented at the University of Khartoum

Khartoum, Sudan January 17, 2006

By Professor Kinfe Abraham

Despite the formation of a Parliament, election of the President and formation of a cabinet, a durable solution to the Somali crisis can only be found if and when the Somali leaders and parties place the interests of their country above their own in a quest for finding a peaceful settlement based on essential compromises. This is crucial for the peace process and the international community should extend its strong appeal to all those who can make a difference. ¹

Author’s Own View

The Election of a New Parliament and President

October 2004

The election of President Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed as Head of State signals a new optimistic and bright horizon for the war troubled Somalia Republic, but such optimism could scarcely be expected to bare foot unless the war shattered country is given all the necessary financial, military and political support to make a fresh start.

Somalia cannot make a fresh start without disarming the militia and collecting the estimated fifteen million arms that are freely at large. The appeal of the new President of Somalia for an AU peacekeeping force of twenty thousand soldiers is, therefore, the least that Somalia will require to establish law and order and assemblance of normalcy in the war-shuttered country.

The Imperative of International Support

The importance of the support of the International Community, particularly that of the EU, US, Arab League, the United Nations and AU to rehabilitate and rebuild the socio-economic fabric of the Somali society and start a modicum of developmental efforts cannot, therefore, be over emphasized. In this connection, it should be noted that Somalia had not benefited from the Lome & Cottonou funds of the EU/ACP to which it would have been entitled under normal circumstances for nearly fourteen years.

In connection with the above, it is important to note that the European Union Foreign Policy Chief, Havier Solana, had promised to provide resources for the training of security forces during his meeting with the Somali leader in Addis Ababa at the end of October 2004.

The Kenyan - Mbagathi Peace Efforts

The conflict which has afflicted Somalia for nearly fourteen years has been a serious challenge to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa in particular and Africa and global security as a whole. All previous peace efforts, from Sodere (Ethiopia, 1996-98), Arta (Djibouti, 2000) through Eldoret to Mbagathi (Kenya, 2002-2004) plus several other initiatives, including those of some Arab states like Egypt and Yemen did not succeed in restoring peace and statehood to Somalia.

The latest Reconciliation Conference, which started at Eldoret and was continued at Mbagathi from October 2002 to October 2004, now, however, seems to have delivered a final peaceful settlement to the conflict with the formation of a national parliament and the election of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as President and Head of State of the Somalia Republic in October 2004. This happened after more than two years of deliberations and negotiations. The election of the President and MPs has resulted in the formation of a new government and the appointment of a Prime Minister. It is also hoped to lead to the adoption of a transitional national program.

Past and Current Challenges

In this connection, it should be noted that the progress of the reconciliation process in Somalia was hampered and frustrated by several factors right from the outset. Some of the above peace processes had hosted various political entities including the faction leaders. Many of the faction leaders lacked clear qualities of leadership and this had led to political fragmentation which resulted in the emergence of other faction leaders that continued to compete for positions of leadership.

In some instances, old leaders were replaced at the conference and in the country by new and more powerful contenders which belonged to the same clans or sub-clans. In other instances, coalitions had emerged for the purpose of imposing new demands on the mediators. But, such groups often disintegrated before or soon after their demands were met.

The above was further compounded by the existence of state formations as in the de facto state of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland all of which claimed power and economic control in their areas. In addition, the Somali factional leaders and other groups heavily relied on their military capabilities to realize their goals.

Even in the wake of peace conferences, faction leaders had moved between different venues of meetings and their regions or enclaves to keep their military forces in a state of alert.

The Recent Role of IGAD States in the Mediation Process

Initially, progress at the Mbagathi Somali reconciliation talks was played down by lack of cohesion and unity of purpose among the IGAD frontline states. However, this was significantly improved with the formation of the Facilitation Committee composed of the foreign ministers of the member states of IGAD in October 2003.

Earlier, the absence of some frontline states from the conference had a divisive effect on the Somali delegates. Nonetheless, the 5^th IGAD Ministerial Facilitation Committee Meeting, held on May 6, 2004 in Nairobi, and attended by Ministers from all the IGAD member countries had helped make a significant headway in fostering cohesion.

The IGAD member states, however, had difficulty financing the peace process. The crisis of funding reached its climax from February to March 2003 when it almost came to a halt. This situation did not show any sign of improvement as the conference faced a deficit in excess of $10m. The situation still underscores that there is still an urgent need to provide the necessary funding so that the outcome of the reconciliation could be implemented by the newly formed government.

The New Role of the International Community

In this connection, the international community should recognize that the IGAD member states cannot shoulder the financial burden, which constituting and operationalizing the new State would demand. To the above may be added the onerous and challenging tasks of disarming the militia and creating new police and armed forces to restore law and order in the country. Besides, the new states have to rehabilitate the fractured Somali society which has borne the heaviest brunt of the burden of the civil war which has afflicted Somalia for almost fourteen years.

The most crucial step is that all the main Somali faction leaders and politicians signed a deal and set up a parliament which elected a Speaker and later the President who appointed a Prime Minister and formed a cabinet representing the various clans. It should also be underscored that the agreement came after nearly two years of talks aimed at establishing a legitimate national Somali government. All these efforts would require the sustained support of the international community.

Groping Toward State Formation

The delegates who attended the conference agreed on a federal system of government. According to observers of Somali affairs, the international community had put pressure on the Somali faction leaders to agree on a peace deal. The new parliament is composed of 275 members, rather than 350 as was previously agreed. Traditional elders as well as faction leaders were involved in selecting them. According to the agreement, the four major clans are represented by 61 MPs each and a coalition of small clans selected 31 members. The task of selecting eligible members of parliament was left to each clan and this was lengthy and contentious.

Earlier, there was anxiety that the de facto state of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland could potentially wreck the talks. Representatives of Somaliland have not taken part in the talks. Besides, there was an upsurge of fighting in central Somalia as the talks progressed in Kenya. Some 13 people were killed and several others injured after inter-clan fighting over land and water in the Hiirran region.

Following the clan skirmishes the Kenyan Minister of foreign affairs had appealed to the leaders to exercise restraint to save the fragile negotiations. According to a BBC journalist who was then based in Mogadishu, the fighting in the Hirran region was said to be the worst since the faction leaders signed a ceasefire agreement in October 2003.

The Formation of a New Cabinet

A new Somali administration was formed in October 2004 and the cabinet make-up was completed. Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi had the tall order of appeasing Somalia's rival clans and warlords who have been fighting one other since the last functioning government was toppled in 1991. The government was established in Kenya because it was still very dangerous to move to Mogadishu. The new cabinet included:

Deputy Prime Minister: Mohammed Abdullahi "Sifir" Jama;
Deputy Prime Minister, Home Affairs Minister: Hussein Aideed;
Deputy Prime Minister: Shaykh Adan Madobe;
Foreign Minister: Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail;
Finance Minister: Salim Aliyow Ibrow;
National Security Minister: Mohammed Qanyare Afrah;
Minister of Religious Affairs: Omar "Finish" Mohammed Mahmut;
Agriculture Minister: Hassan Mohamed Nur "Shatigudud";
Reconstruction Minister: Barre "Hirale" Aden Shire; and
Minister of Public Works and Housing: Osman Ali Ato.²

A Somali minister and four deputies had resigned from the country's newly formed transitional government. The quintet complained that the administration was too large and not representative enough. But some Somalia analysts said they may have simply been unhappy with the jobs they were awarded in the new cabinet. These were the strongest signs yet of unhappiness with the make-up of the new government, tasked with restoring law and order after 13 years of anarchy.³

Meanwhile, the appointment of Hussein Mohammed Aideed, who is one of the powerful Somali warlords, who was named and sworn in as deputy prime minister after the first round, completed the formation of the cabinet. Mr. Aideed, who was also appointed as home affairs minister is the son of the late General Mohamed Farah Aideed, who US forces vainly tried to capture in 1993. His rival for the post, Mohammed Qanyare Afrah, was also sworn in as national security minister.⁴

The above appointments which were difficult at least temporarily seemed to end the difficult negotiations on the allocation of government portfolios. This was the most serious attempt to establish order in a country carved up by rival militias during the past 14 years.

On the occasion, the new Prime Minister said, "Let us go back home and face the realities on the ground... and rebuild Somalia.” He added, "You cannot justify our presence in Kenya anymore. It cannot be accepted by the host country and the international community".⁵

Hopes for the success of the 13th attempt to form a government loomed higher because of the backing of the neighboring countries and the involvement of the main warlords. But, some people were upset at the inclusion of so many warlords in the cabinet. As a result, there were violent protests against the new team in parts of southern Somalia. Thus, the challenges remain enormous as at least 50 people were killed in a space of five days in fighting in central Somalia.⁶

The Cabinet Controversy

Meanwhile, Somalia's new President Abdullahi Yusuf re-appointed his prime minister, Ali Muhammad Ghedi, a few days after parliament passed a vote of no confidence in him. The removal of the Prime Minister via a parliamentary measure of no confidence in him was caused by the fact that he had not paid due attention to the issue of clan quotas and that he did not consult the MPs.His reappointment might placate the MPs, as they now have a new opportunity to approve of him and his new cabinet.⁷

The crucial issue for the vote of no confidence was that the names of the cabinet should have been first submitted to parliament. Another complicating factor which might have impacted the disagreement in parliament is that Somalia has been divided into a patchwork of fiefdoms during the past 13 years. Rival warlords have battled for control of the country, but fortunately most of them were involved in the two-year peace process in neighboring Kenya which led to the election of Mr. Yusuf as President raising hopes that Somalia could soon return to normalcy.⁸

Somalia watchers had praised the choice of Mr. Ali as prime minister, as the academic comes from a rival clan to Mr. Yusuf, the Hawiye, which controls most of the capital, Mogadishu. He has not been involved with the factional fighting in the past 13 years. It is expected that Mr. Ghedi will make some changes to his cabinet line-up before the whole team is put to a vote of confidence in parliament.

The Somali President told the MPs they had to take seriously what is seen as the best chance to form a government in Somalia in nearly 14 years. He said, "It is up to you to take it seriously or as a joke. I am saying all of you cannot be ministers or deputy ministers…If we are not serious about creating a functioning government, let us go home without disturbing the international community, which funded the two years of peace talks."⁹

The president was justified in his statement because a government of nearly 80 ministers and deputy ministers is too expensive for one of the poorest countries in the world. According to some observers, it is also too large and not sufficiently inclusive.¹⁰

Meanwhile, in late December no date had been fixed for the return of the new Somali government to the capital, Mogadishu, which was still divided among rival warlords.

A Rift in the Somali Parliament

On May 12, 2005, the Somalia parliament in exile voted in favor of two measures strongly opposed by key warlords. This led to a deep rift in the interim government. The MPs present in the session supported the call for a regional peacekeeping force and the relocation of the capital in two Somali towns, but not the lawless capital, Mogadishu. Nevertheless, the vote was boycotted by MPs loyal to the Mogadishu-based warlords, who agreed to bring together their forces in opposition to the parliamentary decision. The warlords who agreed to create united forces included Mohammed Qanyare Affra, Osman Ali Atto and Musa Sudi Yalahow.

According to a BBC report released during the same day, the MPs erupted in jubilation when the results of the vote were announced. Of the 152 MPs present, 145 voted in favor of moving the capital to Baidoa and Jowhar until Mogadishu is considered safe.

A similar vote in March was declared null and void after MPs fought in parliament, but parliamentary speaker Sherif Hassan had said that it was unconstitutional because he did not convene it. At the time, it was reported that there were more than 100 MPs in Mogadishu out of the 275-strong parliament. It was also reported that the 100 MPs had refused to return to Nairobi where the parliament was then still in exile.

International reaction to the recent rift in the Somalia Parliament was strong. In Washington, the US and the European Union released a joint statement voicing their concern at the lack of progress. The statement said, "the Somali reconciliation process is at a critical stage. There is an urgent need for a viable agreement on relocation and security." Similarly, other donors who bankrolled the long peace talks are pressing the transitional government to move from Nairobi to Somalia.

Simultaneously, the African Union met in mid-May to consider the issue of foreign troop deployment. The session examined the proposal of sending 1,700 troops drawn from the Sudan and Uganda to ensure the security of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Nevertheless, the issue of foreign troops remained controversial. This was so because some of the warlords were opposed to the involvement of Ethiopian troops, as they believe President Yusuf is a close ally of Ethiopia. The Mogadishu warlords are also suspicious of Ethiopia because of past history and the fact that they allege that Ethiopia had shipped arms to Somalia to support the President.

Since his election in October 2004, President Yusuf had been appealing for an African Union protection force before he could move his government back to Somalia. The Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had positively responded to this request, but was unable to send troops because of lack of finance and worries about the security situation in the capital. Observations

After 14 years of clan warfare and lawlessness, Somalia despite the above recent difficulties still has a government, led by a president and a prime minister. One of the problems is that the capital, Mogadishu, remains too dangerous for them to work in. Besides, as observed above the Somali parliament is split on this issue.

President Abdullahi Yusuf was treated as a head of state in exile until the return of the government and parliament in late February 2005 and even more recently. He has been enjoying red carpet treatment amid tight security as he moved around. Yet, there is still no police force in Somalia capable of guaranteeing his security and that of his ministers, in a country with an estimated 60,000-armed militiamen.

Many are skeptical of the success of the peace process because of 13 previous failed peace initiatives, the rift which has emerged in the new parliament and among the faction leaders. Others say that the chances are much better this time around as people were even more war-fatigued. Besides, all of Somalia's faction leaders had at least initially showed some commitment to the mediation effort of late 2004 which stood in a precarious balance in mid-2005. In addition, all Somalia’s neighbors have strongly supported the peace process.

The above developments warrant some guarded optimism. Nevertheless, as observed in the introductory citation which is also repeated here, despite the formation of a Parliament, election of the President and formation of a cabinet, a durable solution to the Somali crisis can only be found if and when the Somali leaders and parties place the interests of their country above their own in a quest for finding a peaceful settlement based on essential compromises. This is crucial for the peace process and the international community should extend its strong appeal to all those who can make a difference.

In the above connection, Kenya, Ethiopia and the other IGAD countries as well as the IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF) and other members of the international community that had managed to keep the process on track amid the many obstacles encountered, should redouble their support to the peace process. The international community should also adopt a multi-pronged strategy of alternating carrots and sticks as appropriate. Besides, in as much as Somalia has been highly criminalized because of the absence of central government the option of granting amnesty to some of the groups which fear facing justice should be considered.

Nevertheless, the issue of amnesty should be addressed with extreme caution and in a way which does not reward impunity. Further, in the context of power-sharing the political clout, social base and capacity of the different political actors to cause damage which can have adverse effect on the peace process should be given serious consideration. This would call for a strategy of damage control.

A mechanism of monitoring the peace process inside Somalia should also be put in place as soon as conditions permit. Such monitoring mechanism could, for instance, be handled by the AU and/or IGAD.

The continued violations of the UN arms embargo also contribute to the prevailing insecurity and instability in Somalia. In this regard, the United Nations Monitoring Group should work closely with the AU, IGAD and the newly formed government.

The above is important in view of the negative impact of the prevailing insecurity caused by the proliferation of arms in the country which has dire consequences on the social fabric of the Somali society and the daily livelihood of ordinary people.

One of Mr. Yusuf's first acts following his election was to call for 20,000 foreign peacekeepers, who would both disarm the many militias and protect his government. This was described as an over ambitious appeal. In fact, one of the key Mogadishu warlords, Hussein Aideed, before he was named deputy prime minister in the new government described the idea as ‘crazy’. He went on to add, the presence of such a large foreign force would only unite all the different Somali factions against the government.

Aideed drew on the experience of the disaster of the United States intervention in 1993 which ended after Somali gunmen were filmed dragging the bodies of US troops through the streets. This probably all the more make sense as a few western powers are willing to risk the lives of their soldiers in Somalia. But the prospect of eventually creating an indigenous security force looks somewhat promising as all the warlords pledged on the Koran to disarm their militias as Mr. Yusuf was being elected.

However, so far there are no signs of such action as none of the Mogadishu warlords has taken the initiative of disarming his militias. There are just as many armed men on their checkpoints as before.

In connection with the above, one should also note that the vacuum created by statelessness had produced an environment of arms proliferation, illicit trade as well as different strands of religious extremism and/or terrorism emanating from them. This issue should also be urgently addressed.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia which demands urgent international attention has continued to deepen and intensify even in spite of the new ray of hope provided by the formation of the government.

According to a senior United Nations official the scale of suffering in Somalia, which is being largely ignored by the donor community is a "moral outrage.” Jan Egeland, speaking after a visit to parts of Somalia, said that death rates were on the scale of Sudan’s Darfur region, which is getting lots of international aid.¹¹

Mr. Egeland, who heads the UN emergency relief agency said, "The death rate among children in some parts of Somalia is five per 10,000 people (per day)… We have to triple what we have today to attend to needs here like we are in Darfur. Life is worth as much in Somalia as it is in Darfur, or in Iraq."¹²

Overall international assistance to Somalia is also very low. Last year, funding for Somalia was only $60m, half of what the UN had requested.¹³ Meanwhile, United Nations special envoy to Somalia Winston Tubman said the international community will only help if there is progress from the Somali side. i.e. " the president of Somalia has to come up with plans,” he has to say,' this is what we want to do and we have marshaled our efforts to this extent'. He went on, "Once the donors see him taking those kind of steps, they would follow as opposed to if he says, 'I'm the president, write cheques for me.' It doesn't work that way."¹⁴

Here, it should be noted that Somalia's neighbors and donor countries have spent two years and some $10m on the peace talks which culminated in Mr. Yusuf's election, but they are only now turning their attention to the question of government security.

Meanwhile, on the issue of security, diplomats have been talking about the possibility of using the officer corps of Somalia's last police force as the basis of a new police service, backed up by some of the militiamen, after a few weeks training. Nevertheless, this remains an idea to be agreed upon and put to test. Hence, it will take some time before the new government can embark on such a mammoth project of rebuilding Somalia.¹⁵

However, at the same time, the new government until mid-2005 included most of Somalia's main warlords, to the dismay of some. In fact, skeptics are in quandary as to whether the various warlords in the new cabinet who are accused of destroying the social and institutional fabric of the Somali society would be capable of rebuilding it.

Others argue that the faction leaders or warlords, as they are generally referred to, are a ‘necessary evil’ and that it is much better to have them inside the process rather than outside it. Thus, as one western diplomat close to the peace process put it, the cabinet should be a mixture of sinecures to keep the warlords happy and the technocrats working.¹⁶

In addition to the above recommendations, the ICG has also come out with critical proposals on the way forward stating, “President Yusuf and his partners need to use their political advantage to form a genuine government of national unity, rather than attempt to impose their own agenda on the transition.” They add, “the international community needs to make clear that only if this happens will the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) get the recognition and support it desperately seeks.” Their views are justified because the probable alternative is the resumption of Somali's conflict through all-too-familiar means.¹⁷

The above point is underscored by the “archetypal Somali warlord, Yusuf's opposition to the now defunct Transitional National Government (TNG), his advocacy of a federal structure for Somalia and his close ties with neighboring Ethiopia which together place him firmly in one camp in Somalia's long-running conflict.”¹⁸

The ICG also argues that the challenges ahead are formidable. It adds, “the TFG must reconstitute itself and return to Somalia.” Besides, it underlines that the decision to go to Mogadishu or identify an interim seat of government is charged with political significance and could have repercussions on the security situation in parts of the country.

Restoration of a secure environment is a top priority: the AU favors a modest monitoring and observer force, rather than the big battalions envisioned by Yusuf; but no deployment is likely until a formal, measurable ceasefire instrument has been drawn up and the deployment of foreign troops has been authorized by the transitional parliament.

Moreover, as the TFG has no resources it needs to secure funds quickly. Yet even at the end of 2005, few governments were willing or able to provide direct budgetary support, so the TFG will be obliged to tap domestic sources such as ports and airports. Although most faction leaders have agreed in principle that these should be turned over to the control of the interim government, their commitment is questionable, and no agreement has been reached as to how or when revenues will be shared and managed. If the TFG attempts to gain control of economic infrastructure by force or subterfuge, it risks serious violence.¹⁹

Besides, in the long haul, the elaboration of a federal structure and the development of a permanent constitution will remain daunting. This is so because, despite the agreement on a Transitional Federal Charter, many (if not most) Somalis still need to be persuaded about the value of federalism. As yet, there has been little substantive discussion on the form it might take. The demarcation of new administrative boundaries, control of revenue, and the future of existing institutions such as regional "governors" or, where they exist, parliaments, are just some of the issues that are likely to be fiercely contested.

The question of the unity of Somali is still pending and has been complicated by the election of President Yusuf's. The self declared Republic of Somaliland associates Yusuf, as the former president of Puntland, with Puntland's claims to the regions of eastern Sanaag and Sool, which lie within the colonial boundaries inherited by Somaliland. Within two weeks of his election, unusually bloody clashes between Somaliland and Puntland forces in the Sool region had left over 100 people dead. Violence has since subsided, and both sides are employing various channels of communication to defuse the tension, but Somaliland's claims to independent statehood have yet to be addressed by the international community and will continue to be a source of friction throughout the transitional period.²⁰

Against the above background, the ICG has made a number of recommendations with which the author concurs. The recommendations were made to the different stakeholders including the Leadership of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG):

Constitute a new, smaller and cost-effective cabinet that is a genuine government of national unity.
Prepare for parliamentary debate and approval of a comprehensive and measurable cease-fire plan and proposal for deployment of an AU monitoring and observer force.
Enter negotiations with those groups currently in control of economic infrastructure, including on the terms of revenue sharing and management.
Initiate substantive dialogue and debate within the Transitional Federal Parliament and beyond on federalism options.

To the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP):

Recommit to the cessation of hostilities implicit in the Transitional Federal Charter and co-operate with the TFG in designing comprehensive, verifiable ceasefire arrangements.
Pass legislation authorizing the deployment of an AU peace support mission, providing clear parameters for its mandate and duration.
Establish parliamentary committees as soon as possible to exercise oversight of the TFG and to help enforce the principle of parliamentary supremacy.

To the African Union (AU):

Continue planning for deploying a modest monitoring, observation and protection force in Somalia, including some training for Somali security forces.

Insist that the preconditions of a measurable ceasefire plan and parliamentary approval for the force be in place prior to any deployment.
Exclude troops from "Front-line States" (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya) from the AU force, or at least from any role that could expose them to combat operations.
Dispatch a fact-finding mission to Somali and, take the leadership's claim to independent statehood under formal consideration, and in this context, also explore options for resolution of the border dispute with Puntland.

To the United Nations Secretariat and Specialized Agencies:

Augment UN representation to the level of Special Representative of the Secretary- General and appoint a diplomat from a disinterested and impartial nation to the post.
Plan for expansion of the UN Political Office for Somalia to a fully-fledged Peace Building Office on condition that the TFG returns to Somalia and demonstrates a reasonable degree of legitimacy and authority.
Continue decentralized programming of aid resources in Somalia independently of the TFG (respecting the Coordination and Monitoring Committee's guidelines), while working toward gradually closer collaboration and coordination with TFG ministries and agencies.
Commit resources for capacity building of TFG institutions.
Expand the membership and resources of the existing UN Monitoring Group and recommend to the Security Council concrete actions against individuals and groups identified by the Group as being in violation of the embargo or otherwise obstructing the peace process.²¹

On the whole, the international community including the US and EU, the UN, AU, IGAD, the Arab League and all others concerned about Somalia should remain seized with the peace process until the newly formed government of President Abdullahi Yussuf is in place in the country exercising full powers for disarming the militia and putting in place the institutions of a workable government. This is crucial in order for the parliament, the president, the cabinet and all relevant institutions and elected and appointed individuals to acquire legitimacy and exercise their powers and discretion.

CHRONOLOGY OF

THE HISTORY OF SOMALIA

00 AD	Arab tribes established the Sultanate of Adal on the coast of the Gulf of Aden.
800 AD	Somali people begin to migrate from Yemen.
1500	Sultanate of Adal disintegrated into small states.
1860	France acquired foothold on the Somali coast, later to become Djibouti.
1869	The Suez Canal was opened and this led to the start of European involvement in the Horn of Africa.
1875	Egypt occupied towns on the Somali coast and parts of the interior.
1884	Britain sets up a protectorate in northern Somalia.
1887	Britain proclaimed protectorate over Somaliland.
1888	The Anglo-French agreement defined the boundary between the Somali possessions of the two countries.
1889	Italy sets up a protectorate in central Somalia, later consolidated with territories in the South ceded by the Sultan of Zanzibar.
1889	Italy acquired two protectorates in the northern corner of Somalia.
1897	Formal partition of the Horn actualized in various treaties between Britain, France, Italy and Ethiopia.
1905	Italy assumed responsibility for another colony on the southern part of the Somali coast.
1920	The al-Jam’iyyah al-Khayriyyah al-Wataniyya formed in Somalia (JKW).
1925	The territory east of the Jubba River detached from Kenya became the western-most part of the Italian protectorate.
1936	· The Italian Somaliland was incorporated as a state in the Italian East African Empire. · Italian occupied Ethiopia and established “La Grande Somalia.” This was the first time that Somalis in Ethiopia came under one administration of Italian Somaliland.
1940	· The Italians invaded British Somaliland. · Italy occupied the British protectorate. This marked the inclusion of Somalis of the British protectorate in the Italian colony in the Horn.
1941	Britain took back the protectorate from Italy and administered it until 1950.
1943	The Somali Youth Club (SYC) was formed. 6 of the 13 founding members were Rahanwein, 4 Darood and 3 Hawiyee.
1947	The Somali National League was created from the Somali National society. British Somaliland politics was then centered around it. Further, Hizbia Digil-Mirifle (HDM) was formed.
1948	The British withdrew from the Ogaden and it became part of Ethiopia. Then, the Somali National League (SNL) emerged in the British Protectorate.
1949	The United Nations decided for the return of former Italian Somaliland to Italy as a “Trust” administration.
1950	· The transfer of Authority from Britain to Italy for the administration of the “Trust Territory” of Somalia took place. · The Baidoa Incident in which the Mirifle community in the city showed their disenchantment against the Darood elements brought by the previous British colonial administration took place. · Italian Somaliland became a UN trust territory under Italian control.
1951	The first territorial council was established in the “Trust Territory” of Somalia.
1952	The Kismayo incident in which the Digil community in the city expressed their resentment against the non-Rahanwein elements in the region took place.
1954	· First Municipal elections in the “Trust Territory” of Somalia occurred. · Assassination of Ustad Usman Mohamed Hussein, the President of HDM occurred.
1955	· The Somalization of the administration in the “Trust Territory” of Somalia took place. · The Haud and Reserved Areas were annexed by Ethiopia.
1956	· The first general election and the formation of the first legislative assembly in the “Trust Territory” of Somalia occurred. · The Italian Somaliland was renamed as Somalia and granted internal autonomy.
1957	The first legislative councils in the British protectorate were established.
1958	The second municipal elections in the “Trust Territory” took place.
1959	· The Second general election took place in Somalia and the number of deputies was extended from 60 to 90. · The legislative assembly was transformed into a national assembly.
1960	[July] · The First general election in the British Protectorate was conducted. · The independence of Somalia and the unification of the two regions as the Somali Republic were finalized. · The Formation of the first Somali government composed of both regions with Abdirashid A. Shermarke as premier took place.
1961	[June] · A referendum was held on the new constitution. Many Somali National League strongholds in the north campaigned against it in order to “safeguard northern interests” though the party was in the coalition government. · The first presidential election which Aden Abdulle Osman won as the first president of the Republic occurred.
1963	Border dispute with Kenya occurred and diplomatic relations with Britain was broken until 1968.
1964	The first general election after independence and unity occurred. Border dispute with Ethiopia erupted into hostilities.
1967	Abdirashid Ali Shermarke defeated Abdullah Osman Daar in elections for president.
1967	Northern Leader Mohammed Ibrahim Egal joined SYL and became Prime Minister, but this did not lull northern anxiety that they were being neglected.
1969	· During The second general election, the polarization of clan parties surfaced. · A coup d’etat in Somalia took place and Muhammed Siad Barre assumed power after Shermarke was assassinated.
1970	Barre declared Somalia a socialist state and nationalized most of the economy.
1972	The writing of Maha in Latin orthography declared relegating other major languages to a lesser status.
1974	Somalia joined the Arab League.
1974	The Somali-Soviet friendship treaty was signed and the Soviet naval base at Berbera established.
1974-1975	Severe drought caused widespread starvation.
1976	The Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was formed.
1977	Somalia invaded the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia.
1977	The Somali National Army was defeated by Ethiopian forces.
1978	Somali forces were pushed out of the Ogaden.
1979	A Referendum on the second Somali constitution was conducted.
1980	The United States took over the Berbera Base for use by the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (US Central Command).
1981	Opposition to Barre’s regime begun to emerge after he excluded members of the Majerteen and Isaaq clans from government positions, which were filled with people from his own Marehan clan.
1981	[January] Siyaad Barre for the first time appointed a Prime Minister, Lt. General Mohammed Ali Samater.
1988	· Somalia concluded a non-aggression pact with Ethiopia. · Uprooting and destruction of Hargeisa by government forces occurred.
1990	· Somalia effectively ceased to exist as a state as many of its institutions had been in decay for years. · 50,000 – 60,000 civilians had been killed by Siyaad Barre’s armed forces alone. · The US cut off all military and economic aid to Somalia.
1991	· The downfall of Mohamed Siyaad Barre occurred. · The former British protectorate of Somaliland declared unilateral independence. · USC announced its takeover from Siyaad Barre and invited all opposition groups to participate in a national conference. · Ali Mahdi Mohammed appointed acting president. · Northern Somali region’s call for secession and independence from the rest of Somalia under the “Somaliland Republic.” · Warlords turn the Inter-River regions into “the Triangle of Death.” · Opposition clans oust Barre who was forced to flee the country.
1992	US Marines landed near Mogadishu ahead of a UN peacekeeping force sent to restore order and safeguard relief supplies in Somalia.
1992	[May] Colonel Jess made another attack on Kismayo and captured the airport. General Morgan was defeated at Kismayo and retreated into Kenya where he was confined to Lamu by the Kenyan government. [June] Islam emerged as a serious political force for the first time. [August] · An Islamic conference was held in Merca and reports spoke of Iranian and Sudanese delegations being present. · General Aideed forced Siyaad Barre out of his headquarters in Bardera; and renamed his coalition Somali National Alliance (SNA). · The United Nations established a mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to assist political settlements and national reconciliation. · International intervention took place in the Somalia via UNITAF to assist in the establishment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation.
1992	[November] General Aideed spoke of the need for Somalia to be ruled in accordance with Sharia law, suggesting he had some concern about Islamic groups in the area he controlled, including Merca. [December] The United States intervened in Somalia. One reason for the US intervention was that the anarchic situation in Somalia was seen as “a breeding ground for the virus of fundamentalism.”
1993	[May] · UNOSOM II was established for peace making operations in the whole of Somalia. Their mandate was to use force not only in self-defense but also in the pursuit of their mission. · The peace and reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia took place.
1994	[March] A gradual decrease of UN force in Somalia started.
1995	[April] A total withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia took place.
1996	[January 11], the Darood and Hawiyee engage in major battle in the Juba valley area.
1996	[March 10] Mr. Ali Mahdi elected chairman of United Somali Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance USC/SSA.
1996	[Mid-March] Mr. Osman Atto and General Aideed exchange fire over the control of Merka Port.
1996	[March 15] · UN Security Council debates Somalia and considers the idea of sending a joint UN/OAU fact-finding mission. · Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohammed convenes a national reconciliation conference of the SSA.
1996	[April 30] Mr. Boutros Ghali meets some Somali leaders in Nairobi.
1996	[August 7- 8] Aideed dies after sustaining injuries in the fight over Medina.
1996	[August 8 – 9] Ethiopian forces bomb Al-Ithihad bases in Gedo for a limited operation in hot pursuit of international fundamentalist forces.
1996	[August 10] Ethiopia organizes a consultative meeting-involving representatives of the international community in Nairobi.
1996	[August 10] Mr. Ali Mahdi appeals to supporters of General Aideed.
1996	[August] Hussein Mohammed Aideed nominated to the post of interim president by factions of the United Somali Congress-Somali National Alliance USC/SNA..
1996	[October] convening of the Nairobi meeting involving Mr. Hussein Aideed, Mr. Ali Mahdi, and Osman Atto by President Moi of Kenya.
1997	[January 3] · The OAU and IGAD mandates given to Ethiopia resulted in the establishment of the National Salvation Council (NSC) at Sodere– Ethiopia. · A permanent NSC Secretariat was established in Addis Ababa. · The 26 political organizations (members of NSC) spoke with one voice and a unity of purpose from their headquarters in Addis Ababa.
1997	[April-June] Three key congresses were held at Sodere, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa after the establishment of the NSC.
1997	[June] The second session of the NSC decided that a Conference of National Reconciliation be held at Bossasso to bring together the paramount Somali political movements, elders, women, intellectuals and the civil society.
1997	[July] · The Bossasso Conference was given the explicit endorsement of the IGAD Summit. · A suggestion was made by the Nairobi Summit to bring Mr. Hussein Aideed on board, but it was also explicit in stating that it would endorse the outcome of the Bossasso Conference.
1997	[November] · The Egyptian Government called the Cairo Conference while preparation for the November Bossasso Conference was underway. · A delegation of the NSC toured the Middle East in an attempt to raise funds and canvass political support for the Bossasso Conference of November 1997. · NSC delegates cancelled their fund raising campaign and return to Addis Ababa to discuss whether to continue with their trips or go to Cairo.
1997	[December] · The Cairo Meeting which proved ill-timed and inauspicious as it collided with the planned Bossasso meeting of national reconciliation. · The Ethiopian Government advised the NSC to go to the Cairo Conference despite its effect on the planned Bossasso Conference. This was for the simple reason that Mr. Hussein Aideed would also attend. Ethiopia advised NSC members to attend the Cairo meeting to lull the anxiety of the international community, which would have perceived it as impeding the peace process. · The Cairo Meeting managed to bring together the NSC and Mr. Aideed, without whom the meeting would not have been possible, but it failed to produce a conclusive agreement.
1998	[January 4-12] The Third Session of the NSC was held in Addis Ababa, in a bid to: a. repair the damage done to the NSC in Cairo, and b. narrow down the new gulf created between the Hawiyee and Darood.
1998	[January 4-12] · The Addis Ababa NSC meeting was able to re-establish the credibility of the NSC. · Further, it was able to make a number of key proposals for the re-negotiation of issues raised in Cairo. Some of the key issues taken up at the Addis Ababa NSC Meeting for re-negotiation included: a. the issue of representation, b. allocation of reserve seats for participants who were absent, c. distribution of ministerial portfolios; and d. power-sharing at large.
1998	[January-May] · None of the proposals made by the Addis Ababa NSC Congress could be tabled for re-negotiation because of the climate of uncertainty. In fact, the group led by Mr. Ali Mahdi did not return to Addis Ababa in time. · The indefinite postponement of the Baidoa Conference of 10 February 1998 seemed in the words of one analyst like “the funeral of the peace process which Egypt re-launched in November/December.” · The Cairo Meeting saw its first “hair-crack” with the withdrawal of General Gebiyo, former Defense Minister in the Siyaad Bare Government who is backed by General Mohamed Said Hersi (a.k.a Morgan) and Col. Abdulahi Yusuf, chairman of the SSDF in charge of North-West Somalia (Puntland). · The Cairo agreement resulted in the additional perverse effect of bringing closer together clans of the Darood family such as the Harti, Majertine, Marehan and the Ogaden.
1998	[February] A group led by Mr. Ali Mahdi was sent to Mogadishu (following the Addis Ababa NSC Congress) to put forward the issues to be re-negotiated with Mr. Aideed ahead of the National Reconciliation Conference which was then scheduled to take place on 15 February 1998.
1998	[March] The NSC group led by Mr. Ali Mahdi was in Mogadishu for more than a month but the requisite condition for the convening of the National Reconciliation Conference was not fulfilled. Hence, this frustration was expressed by the Chairman of the NSC in Mogadishu. The unfulfilled conditions included: opening of the seaport; opening of the airport; de facto and de jure removal of the green line which divides Mogadishu; withdrawal of Aideed’s troops from Baidoa; and establishment of an interim administration.
1998	[June-July] The above pledges were not fulfilled for two main reasons: the airport and seaport were not in the hands of Mr. Aideed and Mr. Aideed couldn’t order the withdrawal of troops from Baidoa for the simple reason that he was not fully in charge.
1998	[June- July] Pro- and anti-Aideed Militias and RRA (Rahanwein Resistance Army) battled for the control of Baidoa.
1998	[July] The first international consultative meeting to discuss the strategy paper was convened in Addis Ababa under the chairmanship of Prof. Kinfe Abraham. The meeting brought together 26 members of the international community including the UN, OAU, IGAD, EU and countries like the US and Norway and the Arab League including Egypt, Yemen and Libya.
1998	[August] Discussion held with various armed Somali factions. This focused on strengthening the on-going peace process and the establishing of peaceful constituencies in Somalia.
1998	[August 26] The Chairman of SNA, Mr. Hussein Aideed and his high level delegation, visited Ethiopia for two weeks to hold discussion with high-ranking officials of the Ethiopian Government.
1998	[August] · Skirmishes occurred in Mogadishu which was largely in Hawiyee hands. They were still divided among themselves. For instance, on 15 and 16 February 1998 the Suliman and Ayr sub-clans of the Habir-Gedir were involved in intense fighting which left at least twelve dead. · The Cairo Meeting failed to bring peace in Somalia as Mr. Hussein Aideed could not establish a semblance of order within his own clan. This vindicated the Ethiopian prediction that: a. Cairo would create profound divisions among the Somali clan and political groups. b. A proliferation of initiatives would derail the peace process. · The peace process on Somalia was in disarray and confusion due to the above. Further, as none of the promises of Cairo were fulfilled, the only silver lining for salvaging the peace process remained in the hands of the NSC mandates given to Ethiopia by IGAD and OAU.
1998	[April] Mr. Hussein Aideed, Mr. Ali Mahdi and Mr. Osman Atto met President Moi in Nairobi to request him to preside over the opening of the sea and airport, but mainly also to help them solicit international funds.
1998	[April 29 - May 2] Mr. Koffi Anan visits Ethiopia and Djibouti for talks on Somalia, the Sudan and other regional issues.
1998	[May 4] The IGAD Partners Meeting took place in Rome to discuss the Somalia peace and reconciliation process and formation of a committee for this purpose.
1998	The regional State of Punt land established under the leadership of Col. Abdulahi Yusuf.
1998	[July 24] nearly 2000 delegates meeting at Arta, in Eastern Djibouti, developed a power-sharing arrangement and drafted a national constitution to see Somalia through a three-year transitional period.
1998	[September] The committee of Ambassadors met in New York with the participation of Prof. Kinfe Abraham Director of Humanitarian and Political Affairs of the IGAD.
1998	[January] David Stevens, UNPOS representative, was appointed as persona non grata by the Somaliland parliament.
1999	[September 30] The Strategy Paper was discussed by IGAD, the mandated country (Ethiopia), and members of the Standing Committee on Somalia. The central aim of the Meeting was to consider how the Peace Dividend should be extended to peaceful areas in Somalia, including de facto states such as Somaliland, and new regional states like Puntland whose stability was acknowledged by the Nairobi IGAD Summit of July 1997.
1999	[November 26] President Guelleh’s plan was endorsed by the Djibouti Summit of IGAD heads of state and government.
2000	[May 2] a national reconciliation conference aimed at restoring peace in Somalia began in Djibouti.
2000	[August] · The UN urges support for Somali Parliament. · The EU calls for Somali unity. · Clan leaders and senior figures meeting in Djibouti elect Abdilkasim Salat Hassan President of Somalia. · The US said it was encouraged by the recent Somali peace conference. · President Hassan visits important towns in Somalia. · Aideed warns the world against Somali President. · Somali President appeals for aid.
2000	[August 8] Mediators tried to sort out last minute disputes over the allocation of seats in the Transitional National Assembly.
2000	[August 13] Some powerful Somali faction leaders refused to give their backing to the Agreement. Many threatened to disrupt the establishment of the government in Mogadishu.
2000	[August 21] The tacit agreement among MPs, meant that the posts of president and vice president would be given to Somalia’s main clans (Darood and Hawiyee).
2000	[October] · Ali Kalif Galayadh was appointed as Prime Minster. · The first government in a decade was proclaimed. · Kenya urged for the recognition of the Somali Government.
2000	[October 2] The 70th ordinary session of the central organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Managements and Resolution, at Ambassadorial level, met in Addis Ababa to consider the result of the Djibouti peace initiative on Somalia.
2000	[October 18] unidentified gunmen shot and killed a close ally of Somali President Salat Hassen at an area of South Mogadishu controlled by a faction leader opposed to Salat’s appointment.
2000	[November] · Somali government calls in former soldiers. · Somali MP (Hassan Ahmed Elmi) killed. · Somaliland leader (Mohammed Ibrahim Egal) warns the moves to unify Somalia could lead to civil war. · TNG President Hassan visits Addis Ababa. · The Somali interim President meets Moamer Gaddafi. · The TNG runs its affairs from the Ramadan Hotel in Mogadishu. · The Somali currency (Shilling) slides down in value against the dollar.
2000	[December] · The TNG recruits a national police force. · Hossein Haji Bod, former deputy to Ali Mahadi Mohammed, declares support to the TNG. · Somali Prime Minister went on a three-day visit to Italy. · The UN welcomes moves towards Somali peace.
2001	[January] · Somali rebels ambushed a TNG delegation (speaker of the Parliament, Abdullah Darow Issak survived). · The TNG accused Ethiopia of interference but Ethiopia rejected it as baseless. · The UN Security Council supports the plan to send a peace –building mission to Somalia. · Somalia via the TNG Press agencies accuses Ethiopia of continued occupation; Ethiopia says there are “No Ethiopian troops in Somalia.”
2001	[January] · Mr. Ibrahim Egal, President of Somaliland, insisted that Somaliland is destined to become a country. · Somaliland said Djibouti was arming Mogadishu. · Forged notes in abundance in Somalia’s main market.
2001	[January] Col. Abdulahi Yusuf writes a letter to President Bush about the worsening situation in Somalia.
2001	[February] · Foreign currency distributed in Mogadishu. · The French oil group, TotalFinaElf, signed an agreement with Somalia’s transitional government to carry out oil exploration in the South of the country.
2001	[May 31] Somaliland President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal decides to hold a referendum on the future status of Somaliland. The aim was to confirm the independence of Somaliland and hold a three-party general election.
2001	[July] 300 killed in Mogadishu in spite of the presence of the TNG’s 2000-strong police force. This was because of the confrontation of the TNG with the members of the SRRC which include Col. Abdulahi Yusuf, Mr. Hussein Aideed, General Gebyo, General Morgan, Mr. Osman Atto Mr. Musa Sudi and others.
2001	[November 7] · US investigators raided several Somali-run foreign exchange bureaux in major American cities linked to Al-Barakata a financial network based in Dubai. There was talk of US military action or US support for operations by others against Al Itahaad bases inside Somalia. · The US considers action for the following reasons. First, Al Qaeda had been assessing Somalia as a potential home, stirring fears in Washington that Somalia will be ‘the next Afghanistan’. Second, the latest Executive order of the White House which froze terrorist assets, on 7 November, named several Somali individuals and firms. Third, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government sees the ‘government’ in Mogadishu as largely Islamist. Fourth, Addis Ababa also accused some groups in Punt land as Fundamentalist. Another reason was that Ethiopia considered Al Itahaad al Islamiya (Islamic Union) as a destabilizing factor.
2001	[November 21] Heavy fighting broke out between supporters of the contested President, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, and backers of Jama Ali Jama.
2001	[November 23] American and French ships patrolled the coastline and blockaded some ports. And there were reports of German troops joining them. This was considered an unprecedented deployment. Bossasso port in Punt land was a particular target.
2002	[January 10-11] The IGAD Summit which took place in Khartoum decided to convene a consultative meeting at the level of Foreign ministers eventually leading to a summit and national reconciliation conference on Somalia.
2002	[March 17] · General Tommy Franks, Head of the US military's Central Command of the war in Afghanistan told the BBC he had evidence that Al-Qaeda terrorist cells are present in Somalia and said this was of 'serious concern'. General Franks made the statement in Addis Ababa after visiting countries of the region including Eritrea, Kenya and Ethiopia. · His visit to the region came amid widespread speculation that Somalia could become the next target in the war against terrorism. General Franks was also quoted as having said," we are concerned about the situation in Somalia and we will not take off the table the possibility of action against countries of concern."
2002	[October] The latest reconciliation conference started at Eldoret and was continued at Mbagathi on this date. It lasted until October 2004.
2003	[October] · Formation of the facilitating committee composed of the foreign ministers of the member states if IGAD. · Faction leaders signed a ceasefire agreement.
2004	[October] · Election of a new president and parliament. · Election of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as president and head of state of the Somali Republic.
2004	[December] Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi is approved in office by parliament.
2005	[February] The new government returns to Somalia.
2005	[May] Explosion kills at least 10 people and injures many more at a rally in Mogadishu where Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi is giving a speech.
2005	[June] Somali government begins returning home from exile in Kenya, but there are bitter divisons over where in Somalia the new parliament should sit.
2005	[November] Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi survives an assassination attempt in Mogadishu. Gunmen attack his convoy, killing six people.
2006	[January] At talks in Yemen, President Abdullahi Yusuf and his political rival, Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, agree that the transitional parliament should meet for the first time on Somali soil. There is no mention of where the central government should be based.

REFERENCES

The Somalia Crisis Inching Towards a Resolution

¹Kinfe Abraham, IGAD Dilemmas: The Challenges of Conflicts, Insecurity and Conflict Resolution efforts in the Horn of Africa, EIIPD and HADAD, 2005, p. 39.

^2-3BBC News, December 8, 2004.

^4-6Ibid, December 7, 2004.

^7-9Ibid, December 14, 2004.

¹⁰Ibid, December 8, 2004.

^11-13Ibid, December 7, 2004.

^14-16Ibid, December 7, 2004.

^17-19International Crisis Group (ICG), Crisis Group Africa Report No. 88, Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?, December 21, 2004, Nairobi/Brussels, p. i.

^20-21Ibid, pp. i-ii.

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