PART TWO 

 Contents

4.0.The Nile Issue: Psycho-Political Hurdles to an Agreement Regional and Sub-Regional Roadblocks to a New Accord

5.0. The Red Sea Factor in the Nile Issue

6.0.The Effect of The Red Sea, And other Regional   Concerns on a Nile Agreement

7.0. Impact of Hydro-Politics on psycho-Politics: and on Attitudinal and Conservation Issues

4.0.The Nile Issue: Psycho-Political Hurdles to an Agreement Regional and Sub-Regional Roadblocks to a New Accord

Heretofore Egypt has successfully used its Middle Eastern role and international clout which derives from the first condition to obtain the support of some conservative Arab states and Mediterranean countries and a few countries of the East and West for different reasons.  Some of them are:- 

1. Its Middle Eastern role as a historical provider of essential leadership to the Arab world under the charismatic leadership of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser.

2. Its role of mediation under President Mubarak in the  search for a negotiated solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which now seems has not been problem-free.To the above may be added two recent sub-regional roles of mediation which Egypt unsuccessfully tried to play.  They include:-

3. The Somali Crisis in which Egypt tried to play a role by supporting the Ali Mahdi group against General Aideed with the assistance of the U.S. and the UN which had an immediate negative effect on Ethiopia’s negotiations efforts; and

4. Egypt’s desire to carve out a role of mediation in the conflict between Yemen and Eritrea over some Red Sea islands.

5. Egypt's overtures for membership in COMESA which most the Horn countries were wary to accept due its covert and overt design wanting to playing the role of the big brother in the politics of the Horn sub-region which was rejected on grounds of Egypt's geographical distance from the Horn.

One reason for the grand role which Egypt wants to play that it capitalizes too much on its newly won friendship with the west. This, according to some analysts, is exaggerated so much that it seems to lose sight of its regional friends on two counts. 

1. One reason is Egypt's grandiose image of itself which has seriously blunted its ability to realistically assess its relation with the constellation of countries around it. Take for instance its relationship with the Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia which it has tended to view from a pedestal of a superpower.

2. It had also played down the implications of the 1989 Sudanese coup due to its denigrating attitude toward the Sudan which it still views as an impoverished country incapable of exerting influence in the Arab world and the Horn of Africa.

3. Yet, contrary to the Egyptian assumption, however, the NIF seems to enjoy good contacts with individuals as well     as institutions of influence and financial clout.            For instance, it has good contacts with Sunni Gulf Millionaires, Islamic banks, businesses and a wide network of voluntary supporters who make substantial financial contributions to boost its efforts as the region’s only Sunni state. How else could the NIF have survived the increasingly well orchestrated pressure of the west which has cut off aid to it.⁸

4. To the above may be added the psychological boost which the NIF has been receiving from religious ideologues and Islamic militants who have been shuffling in and out of the country from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan and other areas of Jihad Converts. This implies that Egypt also seems to have less leverage on the attitude of financial institutions than is generally believed.

5. One evidence of the above is that the Sudan has even been able to woo over some western countries like France and has managed to strike a stand-by deals with the World Bank and IMF. The same applies to the EU which until recently had adopted a carrot and stick policy of conditional support to it vis-à-vis isolation

6. Further, the Sudan has had good ties with Saudi Millionaires and with Russia and is canvassing hard to lure western investors from Europe and North America to its mineral and energy sectors.

7. Yet despite this startling evidence in favour of the Sudan, the Egyptian Government seems to naively glosse over the above facts or underestimated its vulnerability because of the Nile waters with which Hassan El Turabi threatened when Egypt began massing its troops along the contested Sudanese-Egyptian border following the assassination attempt on the life of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in June 1995.

8. Turabi’s threat was not taken seriously last time but it may not be dismissed with the same impunity next time except that the NIF is losing ground. ⁹

9. Equally significant is Egypt's attitude toward the other riparians, Egypt might believe, and rightly so, that it is the gift of the Nile because as most old geography text books put it - - - the Nile is Egypt and Egypt is the Nile. While the first part may be true, nevertheless, arguably, other Nile countries like Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia may not agree with the second part. They are bound to ask a gift from whom.

10. They are also bound to ask: Egypt may be a gift of the Nile but is not the Nile also a gift to the riparians where it originates and from where it carries rich alluvial soil to its terraced fields ?

11. Undoubtedly, the Nile is a large enough gift to be shared, but  it must be shared fairly and equitably. The imperative of the same justice should entitle the other Nile countries to harness parts of it to develop their agriculture and improve their food security. The bilateral talks underway between some of the other Nile countries underline the importance of this issue which Egypt needs to address together with the other Nile basin countries sooner rather than later.¹⁰

5.0. The Red Sea Factor in the Nile Issue

Egypt wants to give the impression that its bargaining position on the Nile might be improved by its role as a major Red Sea actor. But there are divergent conflicting interests which militate against this.  

One reason is that despite the end of the cold war which to some extent has altered the political map of the region, Ethiopia also still remains as one of the major Red Sea and Middle Eastern actors. This position is underpinned by the joint military, which it has signed with Eritrea and its historical role.

The above position is also bound to be affected by Ethiopia's Sub-regional role in IGAD and its growing preoccupation with the issue of the Nile and the Egyptian position which would require an integrated strategy. This view is echoed by Al Hayat which observes:- 

Egypt is concerned over Sudan and as always, the Nile. It has not forgotten its former dreams of a Red Sea hegemony. Saudi Arabia uneasy and almost xenophobic about regimes on the other side of the Red Sea, is looking for allies against Yemen which in turn is trying to build an anti-Saudi coalition to support its side. In the differences over their largely unidentified border. Uneasy relation exists between Eritrea and Yemen over some Red Sea islands. This makes Egypt’s position on the choice of allies problematic.¹¹ 

These conflicting Red Sea interests stand in the way of Egypt’s attempt to canvass support for its position on the Nile in the Middle East. It is thus in its interest to cultivate good ties with countries like Ethiopia which have direct stakes and plausible claims.  

To the above may be added the lack of cohesion in the Middle East. In the last few years, both of the Former Yemens had exploited oil fields close to regions claimed by Saudi Arabia: and in 1992 Saudi Arabia had warned several international oil companies prospecting in the Hadramaut, between the Bab al-Khali desert and the Arabian Sea that they were not in Yemen. This suggests that Saudi Arabia claims a considerable amount of the Hadramaut.  

Likewise the Yemenis have not forgotten the provinces of Asir and Nlajran lost to Saudi Arabia 60 years ago. Then there is an Islamic angle, with Sudan looking for wider support against its rivals in the region. Until 1992, the targets for alliances were Ethiopia and Djibouti; and the two new states in the region Somaliland (still unrecognized by anyone) and Eritrea. Sudan and Eritrea are now at loggerheads with each other, but it is unlikely that this will be a permanent feature of their bilateral relations. 

The view of the Red Sea less of a lake than a region still makes conflict, real or potential.  There are considerable resources at stake-including known deposits of oil, gas, gold, silver, copper, iron ore, lead, chromium and zinc.  

Further super powers may no longer vie for control of strategic areas, but it has not taken too long for others to try and emulate them. This provides great potential for the export of energy which Ethiopia can develop and which  can become one the key pillars of a new Nile agreement.                        

6.0.The Effect of The Red Sea, And other Regional Concerns on a Nile Agreement

Regional and local conflicts are on the increase in the New World Order, particularly in areas where the only superpower now sees less strategic significance for itself.  There has also been a break-down of the assumption that boundaries are sacrosanct, particularly in the USSR and Eastern Europe.  Eritrea and Somaliland have been beneficiaries of this process.  This does not make the issue of the Nile a taboo any longer. 

Some 1,400 miles from the Gulf of Suez to the Bab el Mandeb, the Red Sea divides Africa from the Middle East and the Arabian peninsula.  It is 17 miles wide at its narrowest point at the southern end, and links the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal.¹²  

Nine countries share its littoral, with coastlines ranging from a mere five miles (Jordan) or seven miles (Israel), to 1,125 (Saudi Arabia), 875 (Egypt), or 628 (Eritrea).  Over 80% of its littoral lies within states of the Arab League, but they are by no means homogenous. 

Over two-thirds of the nearly 400 islands in the Red Sea are also controlled by Arab states: the rest are now in Eritrea.  They constitute a separate strategic factor.  There were frequent reports in the 1970s and 1980s that Ethiopia had allowed Israel to set up bases in the Dahlak Archipelago, off Massawa. 

Certainly, the USSR had a facility there. No Israeli presence was confirmed then or now.  After Mengistu, Israel has been quick to try and build up contacts with successor regimes.  Most recently it has been assisting starving Somalis; as well as making overtures to Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both have reacted cautiously. Israel had supported the anti-guerrilla struggle in Eritrea, as well as the southern Sudanese movement in the 1960s and 1980s as a way of weakening the regime in Khartoum.  Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea are now no longer close to Sudan because of its Islamism.

The Middle-Easternisation of the Nile Issue

In 1990 and 1991, Sudan was internationally isolated because of its relations with Iraq and then Iran, and with “radical” Islam causing concern to Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well as the US.  Reports of Iraqi arms supplies and of high level visits led to a cut-in Saudi and Gulf state aid. 

After the Gulf War, relations with Libya improved, and then at the end of 1991 close ties were established with Iran.  President Rafsanjani visited Sudan in mid-December. An agreement was signed in July for joint exploration of Sudan’s oil. 

As a result, relations with Egypt were complicated by the resurrection of conflict over the Halaib triangle, a small border area on the Red Sea claimed by both countries. A propaganda war over the issue flared up in April and again in August 1992. Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt is, however, most concerned over what it sees as Sudanese attempts to destabilize it via its support for Islamists. 

All these issues, and the apparent dreams of Sheik Hassan Al-Turabi for the creation of a string of Islamic states across southern Ethiopia to the Indian Ocean, keep Ethiopia and Eritrea wary of too close an alliance with the Sudan. Neither want to get caught up in Sudan’s alleged anti-Saudi or anti-Egyptian posturings. Both need all the assistance they can get to rebuild economies shattered by the years of fighting. To this may be added the 1996/97 renewed destabilization attempts of the Sudan. 

Eritrea, is now a major Red Sea naval actor. A base exists at Massawa and a number of Ethiopian patrol boats have been added to its fleet of small speed boats. It has one of the most efficient, sizable and well armed military forces in the region and it is establishing its credentials as a new state to underline its capacity for independent action. 

In 1991 President Issyas Afeworki singled out the Egyptian government for rejecting the idea of Eritrean independence. The EPLF extended Eritrea’s territorial waters and seized dozens of Egyptian fishermen. Egypt subsequently became the first country to send in an ambassador to Eritrea. 

France came in for heavy criticism due to the Afar factor. Eritrea was concerned about the growth of Afar nationalism following the moves of the Afar guerrilla movement Front Pour La Restauration de l’unite et de la Democratie (FRUD) to conduct armed struggle in Djibouti. Any attempt to set up an Afar state would, of course, have immediate implications on Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, which does make it easy for Egypt to canvass support for its Nile crusade.  

These Red Sea issues make it all the more necessary to arrive at a modus vivendi on the Nile issue now. Equally importantly, the lack of cohesion in the Middle East underlines the need for the Riparians to arrive at a rapprochement.                                                                                

7.0. Impact of Hydro-Politics on psycho-Politics: and on Attitudinal and Conservation Issues

As indicated earlier, the importance of the Nile issue is underpinned by its sheer span and length and the ten countries which are affected by it. It affects North Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire, Uganda, the Sudan, Egypt, Rwanda and Burundi and according to some scholars the Central African Republic. This, at once, amplifies its geo-political significance. 

To the above may be added the demographic size of the Nile basin which houses a population of more than 300 million people, has a catchment area of 3,030,700 kms and a length of 6,825 kms (UN:1978:16), which ranks it as the longest or second longest river in the world. 

The Nile also covers one tenth of the African continent which it traverses.  But, while this provides an enhanced opportunity for cooperation among the ten countries which it brings together, it is the great contrast “between the riparian state which contributes, almost all the water to the Nile and uses almost none (Ethiopia) and that which contributes nothing to its water (Egypt)” which is pregnant with anxieties about how the Nile problem and its multiple issues might be addressed. 

At the heart of the Nile issue are the attitudinal hurdles of governments which are preoccupied with the challenges of rapidly rising populations whose demand for water is set to continue to rise. This is exacerbated by the impact of distributional inequities. But, in addition to the distributional justice is the factor of the intelligent  utilization of this scarce resource whose value will inevitably continue to rise. This calls for exploring new technically efficient ways of putting the water to  use.   

The experience and innovative proposals of hydrological engineers and those of people involved in the field would probably prove very useful here.  Let us, for instance, look at the following interesting excerpt from the Economist of December/January 1995/1996 published under the title “Water in the Middle East: As Thick as Blood”. It notes: 

on the methods of finding new sources of water supply the article suggests. Finding untraditional new supplies, however difficult, is easier. Desalinating sea water or brackish water is an obvious, but expensive track; fine for oil-exporting countries, which have both the revenue to build the desalination plants and the energy to operate them, harder for others. Gradually, however, costs are coming down, making desalination a distinct possibility for countries, such as Israel, which have high income per head.¹⁴ 

The Economist article puts forward methods of economizing this scarce commodity stating, "Waste water is much more promising, a cheap resource that is almost always truly wasted. It need not be. On one rough estimate, half the water used in households could, if treated, be used again for irrigation. The trouble in many Arab towns is that there are virtually no facilities for collecting or treating waste water - in occupied Palestine sewerage was basic or nonexistent. But if treatment plants have to be built - as they do, for health and the environment - it is sensible to allow for the extra processing to provide irrigation water."   

The economist also makes technical proposals requiring some investment adding. 'A lot of domestic water that is wasted could be saved with better plumbing. With dual pipes for pure and impure water - all that good water, for example, used for flushing toilets - would be a help.  Huge amounts of municipal water, more than half the supply in some cities, is lost either because it is stolen or because it trickles away through leaks in the pipes'¹⁵. 

In the area of improving the utilization of water in farms, as the Economist recommends Israeli examples of innovative techniques identifying farming as the big thief, and where water could be saved by innovative techniques.  

It goes on; 'here Israel shows the way doubling its yield for half the water. It achieved this partly through new methods, partly through changing the crops to be grown, switching from everyday stuff to high value flowers or vegetables grown under glass. It cautions “it makes no economic sense for countries that depend on irrigation to grow low-value food with high water needs. The value of the water used for irrigating wheat, sugarcane or rice can end up being many times greater than the value of the produce: there is no way that these crops can compete with food staples grown in countries where the water rains down free from the heavens.” ¹⁶