THE NILE ISSUE

THE NILE ISSUE: PSYCHO-POLITICAL HURDLES TO AN AGREEMENT AND THE WAY FORWARD TOWARD A RAPPROCHEMENT

A paper presented at the Nile 2002 conference held in Addis Ababa

February 24-27,1997 By Dr. Kinfe Abraham

The Nile Issue psycho-Political Hurdles to an Agreement the Bases and contestability of previous Accords

PART ONE

Contents

1.0. Abstract

2.0.The Impact Of Geopolitics On Psycho-Politics Anxiety Over Water Security And Some Historical Reason For A Delayed Agreement On The Nile

3.0 The Psycho-Political Impact Of Propaganda On An Improved Climate For Negotiations On The Nile

Water, says Islamic law, is a source of life. It is not oil: countries may fight over oil, nobody gets emotional about the stuff. Water arouses intense, passionate emotions.

The Economist

Dec./Jan. 1995/6

A new Nile Waters Agreement should address the six major issues outlined below. In essence, the new agreement would focus on opportunities for expanding the usable yield of the Blue Nile river basin and encourage interdependencies among these basin countries. Allocations of water rights would include provisions for apportionment in times of scarcity and establish, at least in principle, guidelines for a regional water market in the upper basin.

Winttingate, Dale (et.al)

1.0. Abstracts

The complexity of the problem of the equitable sharing and utilization of the water of the Nile is underscored by the nature of past agreements such as the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement and the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water agreements signed between Egypt and the Sudan in which both countries agreed to allocate the net historical yield of 74 BCM at the Aswan Dam between themselves on the basis of 55.5 BCM for Egypt and 18.5 for the Sudan. Ethiopia was excluded from these negotiations and none of the total available water was made available to it.

The seriousness of this issue is also underpinned by many factors including the following:-

The legal contestability of the bilateral accords on a third party which has great vested interests in the issue
Ethiopia's disadvantaged position as the source of Nile and a crucial contributor of 85% of the water and the rich soil which it carries with it.
The demographic alarm which is ticking to remind Ethiopia to look into the future. This concern derives from two factors. One that by the year 2025 the population of Ethiopia is projected to reach 122 million. This will be 20% higher than that of Egypt.
The enigmatic question deriving from the above is and would be: Can Ethiopia morally and politically afford to let its population starve for fear of the cost of conflicts with other riparian? This has to carefully weigh the socio-moral and political costs of a domestic starving population vis-à-vis the costs of a Nile induced conflict whose victors if any, are hard to predict.
An equally disquieting issue relates to the implication of a rapidly degenerating eco-system. The ecological degradation taking place in the Ethiopian highlands will in the long-term exacerbate Ethiopia’s water level and adversely affect the volume of water which will flow to the other riparian countries like Egypt whose needs are also bound to rise because of demographic pressure. This should be an issue of common concern particularly to Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia.
A sixth factor which underlines the urgency of finding a lasting solution is that bad preparation is better than no preparation and a prolonged impasses is unaffordable to all riparian including the current beneficiaries. Needless to say, the situation will be exacerbated by the mismatch between supply and demand of water.
The urgency of finding a workable modus vivendi is also underpinned by the gap between the historical assertion of Egypt and Ethiopia's demand of justice and equity.
Given the above pressure and the somewhat pessimistic projections on the volume of the water of the Nile, most Nile countries cannot afford to live with edict of history. For Egypt the attempt to maintain the status quo on the argument of historical rights will be untenable morally, ethically and even politically. For it would be tantamount to depriving others of life while caring for ones own.
The predicament of other riparians is the same. It applies to the Sudan which, after all, sees itself as a junior beneficiary. For Ethiopia the obvious question is and will for a long time be: Why should the country which provides 85% of the water of the Blue Nile be deprived of its fair share? Even those countries which have heretofore endorsed the argument of historical rights which have leverage over banks and other financial institutions will finally vote for justice.

Against this backdrop, it is imperative to consider current hurdles to an agreement and explore the modalities and means for removing them by shedding all inhibitions and anxieties. For in the end, no matter how complex and enigmatic the issue is, it has to be faced squarely and with the open minds of all.

Naturally, the above would call for removing the Psycho-Political causes of distrust and difference. Given such positive efforts, the Nile offers a great potential for friendship and co-operation. But the opportunity must be seized in time and with the right spirit. A right start must begin with the affirmation of the maxim “What is good for the goose is also good for gander.”

Current And Historical Hurdles

Key Issue

The hurdles for a negotiated solution at present revolve around:-

The mood of distrust and suspicion surrounding the whole issue of the Nile.
The historical inability of Ethiopia and the Sudan to make credible commitments to Egypt due to past domestic constraints
Sudan’s current domestic turmoil which deprives it of a competitive edge in negotiations.
Egypt’s reluctance to make compromises without the assurance that the concession it makes today are worth the domestic political price of tomorrow. This in turn prevents it from halting its desert reclamation program
Capitalizing on military clout by some riparians.
The absence of qualified hydrological experts in the upstream countries with knowledge of details on the Nile and effective negotiation kits.
Lack of data base on the above and fear of being outmaneuvered by the Egyptian team of negotiators which include high caliber knowledgeable engineers and diplomats.
Lack of dialogue among all riparian countries.
The adverse effect of propaganda on the mood of negotiations.
The conflict of interest stemming from other sub-regional issues and interests.
The mystification of the Nile which in large measure has made open deliberations on it a taboo
Past personal politics which gave precedence to other issues and deprived the Nile of the attention it deserved
Regional Politics such as the establishment of the OAU which shifted attention from the Nile to the preoccupation of the continental organization and Pan-Africanism.
The Arab-Israeli conflict which skewed Ethiopia's alliance in favor of Israel and the OAU resolution of 1973 which made Ethiopia take a pro-Egyptian position despite its strong historical links with Israel which would have demanded neutrality.
Change of political systems and governments in Ethiopia which shifted focus to ideological consideration as in the era of the Derg in Ethiopia.
Changes in the ideological alliances of Egypt as embodied in Nasser's pro-socialist proclivity of the mid-1950s and Sadat's pro-western tack of the late 1970s.
The consistency of the Egyptian position on the Nile partly because of the unperturbed political lineage of leadership in Egypt and partly because of lack of assertion by other riparians
The historical weight of bi-polarism which made the superpowers favor one country as against the other with out due regard to the real issue of the Nile at stake.
The lack of past attention to issues like the environment and transboundary resources.
The recent shift of opinion on these issues due to globalisation and the desire to form economic blocs of in the Middle East.

2.0.The Impact of Geopolitics on Psycho-Politics Anxiety Over Water Security and Some Historical Reason for A Delayed Agreement on the Nile

The anxiety over the use of the water of the Nile is not simply a consequence of its impact as a key element in the support system of Egypt’s physical survival, but it is also intimately linked with the role of the Nile as a symbol of national security and national cohesion.

A Nile conflict is not necessarily negative for Egypt because for Egypt the Nile has historically been a rallying point of national fervour and source of life. This point is underscored by the classic dictum: Egypt is the Nile and the Nile is Egypt.

The role of the Nile as the monumental symbol which every Egyptian grasps and understands is due to its virile presence in Egyptian life. But it is also underscored by legend, myth and history. The historical factor in the Egyptian psyche in particular is bound to endure regardless of whether a rational rapprochement on the equitable utilization of the water of the Nile is reached or not.

It is instructive to note how the significance of the construction of the Aswan Dam was underscored in the early 1950s. The crucial concern was that Nasser needed a spectacular and visible symbol both for the new Egypt and for the establishment of Egyptian primacy in the Middle East. He thus adopted the concept of ‘water security’ from his enemies, the British who said ‘No one can hold Egypt securely unless he also holds the whole valley of the Nile. If the sources of the river is in hostile or even indifferent hands it must always be a grave cause of danger’ (Peel 1904:112)' Thus the Aswan High Dam was built to free Egypt from being the historic hostage of upstream riparian states (Pompe, quoted in Salel Badour 1960:213; Collins 1990b:1633)

For Egypt using the water security argument had several important facets. For one thing, it projected a visible external enemy which threatened the Egyptian national security, which in turn cemented the alliance of Egyptians for a common crusade. The second consequence was Egypt’s viability and survival as a country which is almost wholly dependent on the Nile.

Water security had therefore the purpose of providing freedom from foreign control over Egyptian waters and that of providing security during periods of water shortages. The Aswan High Dam’s first and most important purpose was to provide long-term storage of water within the boundaries of Egypt. The idea was that over years storage would protect Egypt from the fluctuations of the Nile floods.⁴

Clearly, and understandably Egypt did not have any compunctions about the necessity of protecting its interest over the Nile regardless of the associated costs such as a loss of goodwill among the countries like Ethiopia and other less significant riparians to whom it should at least be obliged.

Historically, while it lasted, the argument of ‘Water Security’ which President Nasser adeptly used was a strong argument for the Egyptians against the British and the riparians which share the Nile in common. The latter did not regard it as tenable in the long-term, but Nasser was again to exploit it adroitly in the emerging East-West geo-political rivalry. Here the manner in which the USSR was drawn into the Aswan project is revealing:-

On the global scale, the most dramatic influence affecting the construction of the Aswan High Dam was the Egyptian shift from its political alliance with the West to the Soviet Union. In 1956 the USA, Great Britain and the World Bank withdrew their offers to Egypt to construct the High Dam because of Egyptian policy towards neutrality and its alignment with the USSR. Subsequently, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in order to finance the construction of the High Dam with profits from the Canal. The consequent Anglo-French-Israeli war against Egypt (1956) made the Egyptians even more insistent on realizing the project. The Soviet Union stepped in and offered its technical and financial assistance in the construction of the dam. The Aswan Dam represented a very prestigious project for the USSR which was anxious to show its superior technology in this show case project. Success meant gaining more geo-political clout in the Middle East at large.⁵

Egypt’s Middle Eastern clout was clearly a plus not only for its role in the Arab world but also in large parts of Africa. Ethiopia which was pro-western at the time had no choice but to thread a cautious and slow path. Its western allies were not any more ready or interested to get embroiled in a squabble over the Nile. Many of them had other more pressing geo-political interest to attend to elsewhere.

Egypt was also assisted by the nascent mood of Arab nationalism which galvanized the Arab world behind it over the Palestinian cause. This received further boost after the liberation Euphoria of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism in which Ethiopia along with Ghana, Egypt and a few of the first group of independent African States tried to play a vanguard role. Again, this made the issue of the Nile less probable item of discussion on the agenda of Ethio-Egyptian bilateral diplomacy. The agenda of the day was set by the optimism of victory over colonialism and nascent imperialism which were detrimental to African cohesion and to personal politics.

Personal politics carried a lot of weight in the psycho-politics of the period. Nasser was close to Haile Selassie. Sentiments weighed above substance. While this lasted the Nile could no longer be a pressing agenda. Meantime Ethio-Egyptian friendship swung from between warm and Luke-warm.

A discussion on the Nile was also delayed by Ethiopia’s decision to support the OAU resolution which backed Egypt. This kept Ethio-Egyptian relations pitched at the same optimistic level for some more years. Nevertheless, there is no hiding the fact that Ethiopia was excluded from the bilateral agreement signed between Egypt and the Sudan. Ethiopia was indeed unhappy about the construction of the dams such as the ones located in the Sudan namely the Sennar, Kashm El Eirba, Jebel Aulia and Roseires. Jebel Aulia which was intended to store water for Egypt, which is totally useless with a storage of nil was particularly unnerving. It is now widely believed that through its removal it is possible to save about 1.5 bn m3 of water (Waterbury 1979:93)

Yet, historically the entitlement or legitimacy for using the water of the Nile is underscored by the Helsinki rules (Article V/K) which calls for satisfaction of the needs of one co-basin country without causing appreciable harm to the other adopted by the U.N.1970:78. This is further dwelt on in the concluding section of the reallocation of the water of the Nile.

3.0 The Psycho-Political Impact of Propaganda on an Improved Climate for Negotiations on The Nile

Several other factors have delayed the process. For instance, the adverse effect of negative propaganda on the psycho-political mood for negotiations on the Nile is significant. Such propaganda is mainly paraded through the national news and print media and external broadcasts which target Arab listeners and via newspapers which target mainly Arab readers.

At times, this has also found outlets in English newspapers and magazines. One very recent example of this: the coverage on Ethio-Egyptian relation carried in the Arabic paper Al Hayat published on August 16, 1996.

Any one who reads the article published in Al Hayat will not find it difficult to form some opinion on its content. The general impression one gets is that the article has an official blessing, and that it is intended to elicit official Ethiopian reaction. Further, its time of release suggests that it was clearly intended to drum up Arab League support for the Egyptian views on the Nile.

Coming as it did at a time when the Arab world was a loss about which strategy to adopt on the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian negotiations which following the victory of the Likud party of Prime Minister Benjamin Natenyahu, it was intended to have had a better attention in the Arab world.

The Nile also generally seems to have had an upper hand in other contexts. For instance, the above reaction came at a time when Ethiopia and Egypt were collaborating over sanctions to be applied on the Sudan seems somewhat outlandish. But all things taken into account, this is by no means surprising.

The same is true of the case of the assassination attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak which the Ethiopian security officers brilliantly foiled. The immediate reaction of sources close to Government circles was that the rescue operation was the work of Mr. Mubarak’s body guards. It thus took the strong reaction of the Ethiopian government for the Egyptians to concede the truth most reluctantly and agree on strategies of hunting down the terrorists. Such propaganda is not likely to strengthen the goodwill for negotiations.

Another example is Egypt’s change of heart on the comprehensive economic and military sanctions proposed to be applied on the Sudan which flew in the face of the UN resolution tabled by Ethiopia.

Propaganda has also played a negative role on the chances of improvement of the psycho-political mood for negotiations on the Nile which could have led to some form of modus vivendi. One reason for such reaction is that Egypt is unduly anxious about potential action by the Nile countries including Ethiopia. Such reaction surfaces even when the most minimalist suggestion of using a fraction of the water of the Nile which will not have any bearing on the total flow to Egypt is raised.

At times, such propaganda might be prompted by fear of the historical links between Ethiopia and Israel. An attempt to give the Nile issue a Zionist garb, for instance, surfaces in the Al Hayat article published at the time of acrimony in the Arab world. Mention is even made of a deal between Israel and Ethiopia.

The Egyptian government is fully cognizant of the fact that a deal between Ethiopia and Israel is non-existent. In fact, contrary to the suggestion of Al Hayat some Middle Eastern analysts suggest that the idea of building a canal to transport the water of the Nile to the Gaza Strip was taken up during deliberation on the Camp-David Accord of 1978 and 1979.

It is also suggested that the issue of the canal was taken up during the Egyptian-Israeli discussion over prospects of economic co-operation in the Middle-East in 1993. In fact, some sources allege that Mr. Arafat had pointedly solicited the reaction of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on the idea of building the said canal to pump water from the Nile to Gaza Strip.

This background partly explains the strong desire of the Egyptian Government clearly mirrored in Al Hayat. Further, it underpins that it inevitably generates counter-reactions which colour the psycho-political mood for effective negotiations. We need only discern between the lines of the following passage to understand the intended message. One of the paragraphs Al Hayat reads:-

The Ethiopian government under President Meles Zenawi sees its future relation with Egypt as the most important component of its foreign relations. Predicting future tension in its relations with Egypt, it has designed strategies based on various strategic axes: defense-oriented military power, economic strength, arranging relations with active countries inside and outside the region, and preparing for building dams to control the Nile water as Turkey has done with the Euphrates water flowing to Iraq and Syria, except the Ethiopian water plans are more shrewd and clear of the Turkish chauvinism. ⁶

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