Nile Hurdles 

CHAPTER ONE

THE BASIS AND CONTESTABILITY OF PREVIOUS ACCORDS

Water, says Islamic law, is a source of life. It is not oil: countries may fight over oil, nobody gets emotional about the stuff. Water arouses intense, passionate emotions. 

Islamic law

The Economist¹

A new Nile Waters Agreement should address six major issues ...  In essence, the new agreement would focus on opportunities for expanding the usable yield of the Blue Nile river basin and encourage interdependencies among these basin countries. Allocations of water rights would include provisions for apportionment in times of scarcity and establish, at least in principle, guidelines for a regional water market in the upper basin.      

Winttingate, Dale (et.al)²

Abstract

The complexity of the problem of the equitable sharing and utilization of the water of the Nile is underscored by the nature of past agreements such as the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water Agreements signed between Egypt and the Sudan in which both countries agreed to allocate the net historical yield of 74 BCM at the Aswan Dam between themselves on the basis of 55.5 BCM for Egypt and 18.5 for the Sudan.  Ethiopia was excluded from these negotiations and none of the total available water was made available to it. 

The seriousness of this issue is also underpinned by many factors including the following:

1. The legal contestability of the bilateral accords on a third party which has great vested interests in the issue.

2. Ethiopia's disadvantaged position as the source of Nile and a crucial contributor of 85% of the water and the rich soil which it carries with it. 

3. The demographic alarm which is ticking to remind Ethiopia to look into the future.  This concern erives from two factors: by the year 2025 the population of Ethiopia is projected to reach 122 million, this will be 20% higher than that of Egypt.

4. The enigmatic question deriving from the above is and will be: Can Ethiopia morally and politically afford to let its population starve for fear of the cost of conflicts with other riparians? This has to be carefully weighted against the socio-moral and political costs of a domestic starving population vis-à-vis the costs of a Nile-induced conflict, whose victors, if any, are hard to predict.

5. Three other equally disquieting issues relate to:

   1. theimplication of a rapidly degenerating ecosystem;

   2. the effect of ecological degradation taking place in the Ethiopian highlands in the long-term which will raise Ethiopia’s water requirement; and 

   3. the effect of the reduced volume of water which will flow to the lower riparian  countries like Egypt whose needs are also bound to rise because of demographic pressure.

6. A sixth factor which underlines the urgency of finding a lasting solution is that bad preparation is better than no preparation and a prolonged impasse is unaffordable to all riparians including the current beneficiaries.  Needless to say, the situation will be exacerbated by the mismatch between supply and demand of water.

7. The urgency of finding a workable modus vivendi is also underpinned by the gap between the historical assertion of Egypt and Ethiopia's demand of justice and equity.

8. Given the above pressure and the somewhat pessimistic projections on the volume of the water of the Nile, most Nile countries cannot afford to live with edict of history.  For Egypt the attempt to maintain the status quo on the argument of historical rights will be untenable morally, ethically and even politically.  For it would be tantamount to depriving others of life while caring for ones own.

9. The predicament of other riparians is the same. It applies to Sudan which, after all, sees itself as a junior beneficiary. For Ethiopia the obvious question is and will for a long time be: Why should the country which provides 85% of the water of the Blue Nile be deprived of its fair share?  Even those countries which have heretofore endorsed the argument of historical rights which have leverage over banks and other financial institutions will finally vote for justice.

Against this backdrop, it is imperative to consider current hurdles to an agreement and explore the modalities and means for removing them by shedding all inhibitions and anxieties. For in the end, no matter how complex and enigmatic the issue is, it has to be faced squarely and with the open minds of all.   

Naturally, the above would call for removing the psycho-political causes of distrust and in difference. Given such positive efforts, the Nile offers a great potential for friendship and co-operation.  But the opportunity must be seized in time and with the right spirit.  A right start must begin with the affirmation of the maxim “What is good for the goose is also good for gander.”³

^{CURRENT AND HURDLES TO AN AGREEMENT}

^{KEY ISSUES}

The hurdles for a negotiated solution at present revolve around:

1. the mood of distrust and suspicion surrounding the whole issue of the Nile;

2. the historical inability of Ethiopia and Sudan to make credible commitments to Egypt due to past domestic constraints;

3. Sudan’s current domestic conflict which deprives it of a competitive edge in negotiations;

4. Egypt’s reluctance to make compromises without the assurance that the concession it makes today are worth the domestic political price of tomorrow. This in turn prevents it from halting its desert reclamation program;

5. capitalizing on military clout by some riparians;

6. the absence of qualified hydrological experts in the upstream countries with knowledge of details on the Nile and effective negotiation kits;

7. lack of databases on the above and fear of being outmaneuvered by the Egyptian team of negotiators which include high caliber and knowledgeable engineers and diplomats;

8. lack of dialogue among all riparian countries;

9. the adverse effect of propaganda on the mood of negotiations;

10. the conflict of interest stemming from other sub-regional issues and interests;

11. The mystification of the Nile which in large measure has made open deliberations on it a taboo;

12. past personal politics which gave precedence to other issues and deprived the Nile of the attention it deserved;

13. regional politics such as the establishment of the OAU which shifted attention from the Nile to the preoccupation of the continental organization and Pan-Africanism;

14. the Arab-Israeli conflict which skewed Ethiopia's alliance in favor of Israel and the OAU resolution of 1973 which made Ethiopia take a pro-Egyptian      position  despite its strong historical links with Israel which would have demanded neutrality;

15. change of political systems and governments in Ethiopia which shifted focus to ideological consideration as in the era of the Derg in Ethiopia;

16. changes in the ideological alliances of Egypt as embodied in Nasser's pro-socialist proclivity of the mid-1950s and Sadat's pro-western tack of the late 1970s;

17. the consistency of the Egyptian position on the Nile partly because of the unperturbed political lineage of leadership in Egypt  and partly because of lack of assertion by other riparians;

18. the historical weight of bi-polarism which made the superpowers favor one country as against the other without due regard to the real issue of the Nile at stake;

19. the lack of past attention to issues like the environment and transboundary resources; and

20. the recent shift of opinion on these issues due to globalization and the desire to form economic blocs of in the Middle East.

To the above may also be added historical and cultural factors including religious ties which had linked Egypt and Ethiopia.  One such factor was the center of the Eastern Orthodox Church was in Egypt, and the Ethiopian bishops who appointed Ethiopian monarchs came from Egypt.  This gave Egypt some influence in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.  

One example of Egyptian interference in Ethiopian internal affairs was that it (Egypt) refused to send its bishops when Yukuno Amlak after accession to the throne in 1270 subdued the Moslem dominated sultanate of Yifat adjacent to Showa.  In fact, it was not until Emperor Yukuno Amlak conducted a successful campaign against all sultanates allied to Cairo that Egypt was again forced to send the bishops.  In addition to his military victories Amdetsion had in fact threatened Al Nasir that he would divert the course of the Nile.  It was then that Al-Umari said “Ethiopia is the guardian of the course of the Nile.”

CHAPTER TWO

THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICS ON PSYCHO-POLITICS: EGYPT'S ANXIETY OVER WATER SECURITY  

Some Historical Reasons for a Delayed Agreement on the Nile

The anxiety over the use of the water of the Nile is not simply a consequence of its impact as a key element in the life support system of Egypt’s physical survival, but it is also intimately linked with the role of the Nile as a symbol of national security and national cohesion. 

Above all, as Egyptian Ambassador Marwan Bedr at a lecture at the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development in Addis Ababa in 1999 observed, the Nile is also an issue of national obsession for Egyptians both individually and collectively.  This naturally heightens the general anxiety about conflicts.  This is not, however, to say that anxiety or emotion about the Nile (not a conflict) is necessarily negative for Egypt.  On the contrary, it has historically been positive because the Nile has been a magical rallying point for all Egyptians.    

The role of the Nile as the monumental symbol which every Egyptian grasps and understands is due to its virile presence in Egyptian life. But, it is also underscored by legend, myth and history. The historical factor in the Egyptian psyche in particular is bound to endure regardless of whether a rational rapprochement on the equitable utilization of the water of the Nile is reached or not. 

It is also instructive to note how the significance of the construction of the Aswan Dam was viewed in the early 1950s. The crucial concern was that President G. Nasser needed a spectacular and visible symbol both for the new Egypt and for the establishment of Egyptian primacy in the Middle East.  He thus adopted the concept of ‘water security’ from his enemies, the British  who said ‘No one can hold Egypt securely unless he also holds the whole valley of the Nile. If the sources of the river is in hostile or even indifferent hands it must always be a grave cause of danger’ (Peel 1904:112) ‘Thus, the Aswan High Dam was built to free Egypt from being the historic hostage of upstream riparian states’ (Pompe, quoted in Salel Badour 1960:213; Collins 1990b:163). 

For Egypt, using the water security argument had several important facets.  For one thing, it projected a visible external enemy which threatened the Egyptian national security, which in turn cemented the alliance of Egyptians for a common crusade. The second consequence was Egypt’s viability and survival as a country, which is almost wholly dependent on the Nile. 

Water security had, therefore, the purpose of providing freedom from foreign control over Egyptian waters and that of providing security during periods of water shortages. The Aswan High Dam’s first and most important purpose was, thus, to provide long-term storage of water within the boundaries of Egypt. The idea was that, over years, storage would protect Egypt from the fluctuations of the Nile floods.⁴ 

Clearly, and, to an extent, understandably Egypt did not have any compunctions about the necessity of protecting its interest over the Nile regardless of the associated costs such as a loss of goodwill among the countries like Ethiopia and other less significant riparians to whom it should at least be obliged. 

Historically, while it lasted, the argument of ‘Water Security’ which President Nasser adeptly used was a strong argument for the Egyptians against the British and the riparians which share the Nile in common. The latter did not regard it as tenable in the long-term, but Nasser was again to exploit it adroitly in the emerging East-West geo-political rivalry. Here, the manner in which the USSR was drawn into the Aswan project is revealing: 

On the global scale, the most dramatic influence affecting the construction of the Aswan High Dam was the Egyptian shift from its political alliance with the West to the Soviet Union. In 1956 the USA, Great Britain and the World Bank withdrew their offers to Egypt to construct the High Dam because of Egyptian policy towards neutrality and its alignment with the USSR.  Subsequently, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in order to finance the construction of the High Dam with profits from the Canal. The consequent Anglo-French-Israeli war against Egypt (1956) made the Egyptians even more insistent on realizing the project.  The Soviet Union stepped in and offered its technical and financial assistance in the construction of the dam.  The Aswan Dam represented a very prestigious project for the USSR which was anxious to show its superior technology in this show case project. Success meant gaining more geo-political clout in the Middle East at large.⁵  

Egypt’s Middle Eastern clout was clearly a plus not only for its role in the Arab world but also in large parts of Africa. Ethiopia which was pro-western at the time had no choice but to thread a cautious and slow path. Its western allies were not any more ready or interested to get embroiled in a squabble over the Nile. Many of them had other more pressing geo-political interest to attend to elsewhere. 

Egypt was also assisted by the nascent mood of Arab nationalism which galvanized the Arab world behind it over the Palestinian cause. This received further boost after the liberation euphoria of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism in which Ethiopia along with Ghana, Egypt and a few of the first group of independent African states tried to play a vanguard role.  Again, this made the issue of the Nile a less probable item of discussion on the agenda of Ethio-Egyptian bilateral diplomacy. The agenda of the day was set by the optimism of victory over colonialism and nascent imperialism which were seen as detrimental both to Arab, African cohesion, together or separately, and to the personal politics of the emergent leaders. 

Personal politics carried a lot of weight in the psycho-politics of the period. Nasser was close to Haile Selassie. Sentiments weighed above substance. While this lasted, the Nile could no longer be a pressing agenda. Meantime Ethio-Egyptian friendship swung from between warm, luke-warm and cold.  

A discussion on the Nile was also delayed by Ethiopia’s decision to support the OAU resolution which backed Egypt. This kept Ethio-Egyptian relations pitched at the same optimistic level for some more years. Nevertheless, there is no hiding the fact that Ethiopia was excluded from the bilateral agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia was indeed unhappy about the construction of the dams such as the ones located in the Sudan, namely, the Sennar, Kashm El Eirba, Jebel Aulia and Roseires. 

Jebel Aulia which was intended to store water for Egypt which is totally useless with a storage of nil, was particularly unnerving. It is now widely believed that through its removal it is possible to save about 1.5 bn m³ of water. (Waterbury 1979:93) 

Yet, historically the entitlement or legitimacy for using the water of the Nile is underscored by the Helsinki rules (Article V/K). It calls for the satisfaction of the needs of one co-basin country without causing significant harm to the other, as adopted as part of the Helsiaki understanding (U.N.1970:78). This is further dwelt on in the concluding section on the reallocation of the water of the Nile.