DEMOCRATIZATION DISCOURSE

The War in Northern Uganda: Behind the violence

Kenya: A Chequered Path to Democracy

By Frank Khachina Matanga

Opposition to the Moi Government: The Role of Civil Society and other Progressive Forces

With Kenya having become a de jure one-party state there were no opposition parties that could challenges KANU and by extension the Government. This task was now left to civil society organizations and movements and other progressive forces in society. Among the most active of these were religious organizations. Religious organizations, unlike formal political organizations, were able to actively engage the state for various reasons. Among them were the facts that they tended to having a large constituency of committed faithfully as well as having elaborate international connections that offered them moral and financial support. The financial support helped these organizations to escape state patronage and the compromise that goes with it. Commenting on the role of churches in confronting the state in Kenya in the 1990s, Freidman argued:

The absence of other organizations of a political nature that can confront the excesses of the state means that the church is the only nationwide body which because of its institutional strength and its sense of obligation for public morals and social justice can speak and act in implicitly political ways. The social evils of our time (corruption, political patronage in employment, interference of the state with basic human freedoms, electoral rigging, detention without trial, torture, gagging of the press etc) are so great …that Christians with any compassion cannot be indifferent to or complacent about the effects of such evils upon human lives in Kenya.

The national Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Anglican Church (Church of the Province of Kenya), the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), and the Catholic Church were some of the most significant players in this war with the state. Through fora such as pulpit sermons, radio broadcasts, the daily national newspapers, newsletter, special publications and national conferences, these organizations confronted the regime of Moi on wide-ranging political issues that had conspired to decay the process and institutions of democracy. These issues included criticism of the queue-voting electoral system, the draconian nature of KANU, the use of state violence on innocent and unarmed citizens (eg. The eviction of slum dwellers), the widespread ethnic clashes among others.

In the late 1980s, other progressive forces joined the religious organizations in confronting the state. Oginga Odinga, in a March 1991 sols move, while criticizing the government of authoritarianism, announced the formation of an opposition’s party, the National Democratic Party (NDP). Its objectives, according to Odinga, included the repeal of section 2A of the constitution that barred the formation of other political parties as well as the restoration of democracy in the country.

The Law Society of Kenya (LSK), a Professional lawyers’ body, was yet another active organization that very much contributed to the struggle for democratization in Kenya. Through its then (1991) chairman, Paul Muite, it declared its functions to be both legal and political. Through various fora, the LSK was able to take on the Moi regime on various issues that had amounted to democratic abuses. The formation of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) in August 1991 marked a fundamental move among the challenges mounted against the Moi government. Essentially a pressure group, FORD gave as its objectives the need to abolish detention without trial, the repeal of section 2A to allow multi-party politics in Kenya, and the need to limit the presidential tenure to two terms of five years each. FORD eventually converted itself into a political party in December 1991 with the repeal of section 2A of the constitution that eventually allowed the formation of opposition political parties.

The first multi-party elections in post-colonial Kenya were eventually held in 1992. This meant that for the first time in its recent history, KANU’s monopoly of power was challenged. However, this was never to be. The spilt in the opposition ranks meant there were several opposition parties competing with KANU over the capture of state power. Among the prominent opposition parties were Ford Asili, Ford Kenya, and the Democratic Party. The results of the 192 general elections gave KANU a 30% victory while the divided opposition shared amongst themselves a split 70%.KANU, as a consequence, emerged as the dominant party in parliament with 93 elected seats (which was to rise to 105 seats with the inclusion of nominated MPs) followed by Ford Kenya (31), Ford Asili (29), DP (23), and the others with one each.

In as much as the protected power struggle within the opposition ranks was significant in explaining their 1992 defeat, equally important was the fact that the elections were held under a constitution that was deliberately biased in favor of the ruling party, KANU. The Electoral commission that is charged with the responsibility for the organization and conduct of elections remained essentially a KANU organ. In addition, there was a lot of state sponsored violence that succeeded in disrupting campaign rallies organized by the opposition. At the same time, the state mass media deliberately gave the opposition activities a blackout.

The period between the 1992 elections and the second held in 1997 continued to witness an opposition movement riddled with ethnic divisions. In the absence of a united and agenda driven formal opposition, civil society organizations thus continued to spearhead the confrontation with the authoritarian Moi regime. Among the civil society movements that emerged in this period was the Citizens coalition for Constitutional Change (CCCC), which strongly argued for the need for radical constitutional changes before the holding of the 1979 general elections. Yet another civil society movement that arose out of the struggle for constitutional change was the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC). NCEC, very much a radical body and ready to use mass action against KANU for the purposes of forcing political change, found itself in alliance with the equally radical opposition parties.

This intense political pressure on KANU eventually forced the Moi regime to accept to effect some constitutional changes before holding the 1997 elections. But this acceptance also marked the beginning of opposition parties, now in agreement with KANU, to isolate NCEC form the ultimate constitutional talks. Whereas NCEC had maintained that it was necessary for it to attend the constitutional talks for purposes of guarding against KANU’s manipulation of a weakened opposition, it now became clear most of the opposition leaders were increasingly jealous of the limelight enjoyed by NCEC and, therefore, the move to keep it at an arm’s length. It was indeed a stab in the back for NCEC.

A coupe of meetings between KANU and the opposition parties gave way to the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) initiative. This in essence was a sort of compromise in terms of what to amend in the existing constitution. The results of the IPPG talks only went some distance in resolving the administrative and constitutional impasse while leaving unaddressed some very critical political issues. For instance, the requirement to posses a license before addressing a public rally was abolished and thus widening the scope for political association; the Public Security Act was amended to abolish detention without trial; the Provincial Administration was prohibited from participating in elections to avoid state interference and partiality; and that all political parties were to have an equal access and coverage in the state owned media. However, the IPPG failed to address major issues to do with the enormous presidential powers and the imperfect electoral system. NCEC, in particular, dismissed the IPPG administrative and political reforms as too mild and inconsequential to guarantee a level playing field in the 1997 multi-party elections.

Probably, NCEC was after all, right. As a result of the many weaknesses resulting form the imperfect constitution, opposition parties were once again beaten by Moi’s KANU in the 1997 elections. Moi reclaimed the presidency with 40% of the vote and scooped over half of the parliamentary seats, 104 out of a total of 197.

A Look at the Moi Regime’s Response to Political Criticism

The regime of Moi utilized several approaches in attempts to reign in forces that have been opposed to his government. These forces, as discussed earlier, included radical civil society groupings as well as opposition political parties. Among these approaches, this chapter will focus on legislation leading to de-registration or proscription; removal of radical leaders form positions of leadership; political appropriation and co-option; state propaganda to defame; and in rare circumstances, implementation of some reforms by the state.

Under legislation, the regime of Moi resorted to various practices that included actual de-registration and banning of organizations, the threat of de-registration, refusal to grant initial permission for registration, and the drawing of new legislation to control further activities of the these organizations and movements. Among the very first causalities of the Moi regime in being de-registered were the ethnic welfare associations were the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA), the Akamba Union, the Abaluhya Union, and the Luo Union. All these were banned in 1980. Many political analysts have observed that the real target of this new policy was GEMA, which posed a major threat to the Moi regime. Being largely a Gikuyu organization, GEMA was immensely powerful in terms of financial resources. Indeed, GEMA symbolized the power of the Gikuyu bourgeoisie in Kenya, many of whom were opposed to the Moi regime. Using its resources, GEMA played a leading role in attempts to stop Moi from ascending to power following the death of Kenyatta. This was orchestrated through the so-called “Change the Constitution Group” which consisted of Kenyatta’s inner circle of confidants. Other civil society organizations that became victims of de-registration as the regime became increasingly authoritarian were the University (of Nairobi) Staff Union, the Student’s Organization of Nairobi University (SONU), the Matatu Vehicle Owners Association (MVOA), and the Public Service Club.

The 1982 change of the constitution that banned the formation of opposition political parties in Kenya serves as a good example of use of legislation to curb opposition to the Moi government. This effectively buried the hopes of the likes of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga to form alternative parties such as the Kenya National Socialist Alliance at that time. Odinga’s yet other efforts of 1991 to form the National Democratic Party were also scuttled because of the by then prevailing one-party de-jure status of Kenya. It was not until December 1991 that the formation of opposition political parties was allowed with the repeal of section 2a that gave way to multi-partyism. This was as a result of intense domestic and international pressure. Apart from the use of legislation, the state employed elaborate propaganda to defame radical organizations opposed to the regime. Several accusations such as being tools of foreigners and, therefore, serving alien rather that Kenya’s interests were leveled at the criticism of the regime. For instance, in its criticism of the state for its excesses in the 1980s and 1990s, the radical church organizations were attacked by the government for not only being unpatriotic but also interfering with a docket politics in which they had no role.The LSK under the radical and confrontational leaderships of G.B. M. Kariuki and Paul Muite in the late 1980s and 1990s was also the subject of state propaganda. Even FORD, when still a lobby group in the early 1990s, was lambasted by the regime as “yet another clandestine movement started with the aim of destabilizing peace and causing chaos in the country”, in addition to being “agents of doom…propagating utopian and theoretical democracy which does not exist anywhere in the world”.

The acceptance of political reforms by the state may arguably be viewed as a given form of response to pressure for change. Confronted with overwhelming tensions for reform, the regime was forced to retreat rather than face a likelihood of a breakdown in the political system. The institution of the KANU Review Committee in 1990 by the Moi Government is a case in point. The findings of the Committee later led to the regime’s acceptance to scrape off the unpopular queue-voting system as well as the restoration of the security of tenure for the judges, the Attorney General and the Controller and Auditor General.In the same light, the repeal of section 2A of the constitution in December 1991 that allowed for a multi-party state was an acceptance by the state to reforms. This change was fundamental for it ended KANU’s monopoly of political power.

The Politics of Transition in the Post-1997 Period

Ever since the second multiparty elections in 1997, Kenya continued to be embroiled in constitutional politics with the radical opposition forces calling for an overhaul of the existing constitution largely seen to favor KANU’s continuity in power. The appointment of the Yash Pal Ghai Review Commission to look into the possibilities of reviewing the constitution can then be seen as having been the Moi regime’s response to these demands.

Among the salient changes that had been promised by the new draft constitution if implemented and adopted was a sharp reduction in presidential powers while strengthening the other state organs especially the parliament. In effect, this boiled down to the parliament. In effect, this boiled down to the uprooting of the presidential system of government and its replacement with a parliamentary democracy. While the existing presidential system has largely contributed to the current decay of politics, a parliamentary democracy would promote genuine democracy in several ways such as: increased parliamentary powers to control the budget, approve presidential appointees and monitor government operations; parliament having the power to impeach the president; and armed forces and intelligence agencies being made more accountable to parliament among other changes.

However, as things turned out, the regime of Moi literally took away life from the Ghai Review commission. Accusing the new draft constitution of being a product of foreigners and not Kenyans, the Moi regime termed it unworkable and, therefore, more or less sealing its fate. The Moi regime’s criticism of the Ghai draft constitution could only be rationally explained by its (the regime’s) fear of the fact that if implemented it would have severely checked the powers of the entrenched political executive. By creating and giving the office of the Prime Minister more executive powers, the Moi regime interpreted it as a deliberate move by the Gahi commission to undermine the presidency. The power of opposition parties and the progressive civil society forces to force the Moi KANU government to adopt the Gahi draft constitution for the December 2002 elections were effectively scuttled with the dissolution of parliament in October 2002. The dissolution meant that the national constitution conference, a core component in the life of the making of the new constitution, could not be held since the Members of Parliament of the just dissolved Parliament had to attend in their capacities as seating MPs.

parliamentary seats. It was by all purposes and intent a vanquishing of the KANU party and its presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta. NARC won the elections on a reform ticket. This fundamental victory carried with it Kenyan’s hopes for a revival of the economy and a political system run on open participatory politics. Bratton and Walle in differentiating between democratic transition and democratic consolidation have argued that a successful consolidation involves the legitimation and institutionalization of democratic practices over time and buttressed by the widespread adoption of democratic values. The NARC electoral victory in itself may represent a democratic transition signifying the change from an archaic and authoritarian system to a promising democracy. The very fact that the voting process was transparent and accountable attracting a majority of the electorate is a plus for the transition. But, now, the hard part: democratic consolidation. So, far there is no certainty. If a successful consolidation implies the strengthening of democratic institutions and processes to eliminate abuse of civil and political rights among other issues, then the newly elected NARC government may have some distance to go. In addition to consolidating itself in power it must clean up what remains of the former regimes’ political dirt. NARC must of necessity fulfill its election pledges, in particular, the putting into place a new constitution. The finalizing in the drawing up and adoption of a new constitution could just be the sure beginning point to spur up a successful democratic consolidation in Kenya.

Conclusion

This article has been an attempt to trace and analyze the status of democracy in Kenya. It began by examining the concept of democracy. It began by examining the concept of democracy. It was argued that a democracy presupposes certain fundamental political ideas: liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty. In a nutshell, then, democracy entails the establishment of an open participatory political system. The colonial state was contextualized as having been a doctorial and authoritarian system whose power relations were largely based on race rather than democratic principles. The Africans were virtually excluded from political participation until the twilight years of colonialism. The Kenyatta regime was characterized as a dictatorial system bent on personalization of power. This was facilitated through the many constitutional changes that expanded overwhelmingly the powers of the presidency at the expense of the civil society. However, the end of the Kenyatta regime in 1978 did not usher in the much-anticipated political changes. If anything, the successor regime of Moi further entrenched the politics of authoritarianism and personalization of power.

The conversion of Kenya into a de jure one-party state in 1982 further helped undermine the democratic process. It was not until the early 1990s following extensive internal and external pressure that the regime was force to embrace multi-party the regime was forced to embrace multi-party politics and thus some-how expanding the political space in Kenya. In fighting opposition and critics of his regime, the Moi government used various tactics with differing results. These included among others: legislation: deposition of radical leaders from positions of leadership; political appropriation and co-optation; state propaganda to defame; and in rare circumstances, the institution of political reforms.

The article ends up with a piece on the prospects of democratic transition and consolidation in Kenya. So far, the consensus it that, the phase of democratic transition has taken off with the recent democratic transition power transfer from KANU to NARC. The paper has further argued that the prospects for democratic consolidation as opposed to democratic transition are heavily hinged on the drawing up and adoption of the new national constitution.

A new constitution that enshrines democratic processes and institutions will for sure be at the core of entrenching democracy in Kenya.

HIV -AIDS

AIDS- ORPHANS: VOICELESS VICTIMS

By Diana Mattanovich University of California,

OVERFLOW AND STREET CHILDREN

Though data of the number of children in orphanages is not eadily available, it is estimated that the majority of Ethiopia’s orphans live on the streets of the capital. Though they are not limited to the capital. Though they are not limited to the urban areas, most end up coming to the cities in search of work and a livelihood. According to UNICEF’s report on Africa’s Orphaned Generations, over 40% of Ethiopia’s orphans live in urban areas. Some of these children beome, at a very young age the sole wage earners of their families. Most become responsible for younger children in child-headed households.

Their efforts notwithstanding, accoridng to Carol Bellamy, executive director of UNICEF, Almost without exception children orphaned by AIDS become marginalizied , stigmatized, malnourished, uneducated and psychologically damaged. The are affected by actions over which they have no control and in which they had no part. They deal with the most trauma, face the most dangerous threats and have the least protections. And because of all this, they too are very likely to become HIV postive.

Street children have very little hope for a healthy and productive future. Among the most at risk are the girls. Most that find theselves in hopless situations turn to prostituion; the easisest and most hazardous work available to them, thereby perpetuating the vivious cycle of HIV/AIDS in Africa.

The girl children are therfore the most at risk in this group. And it this particular group that is also thought to hold an important aspect of the overall country’s devlopment and health. According to the UNICEF, girls who are educated are more likely to make more informed choices about health care, have fewer children, and educate their children in turn.

AIDS ORPHANS AND MENTAL HEALTH

Children and young people of an AIDS infected household begin to suffer even before the parents die, according to UNICEF’s report on Africa’s oprhan crisis. As soon as a family member is infected, the income of the household drops, due to interuptin of work as well as considerably increased medical expenses. Children often interrupt medical expenses. Children often interrupt their schooling to care for the sick parents or for younger siblings in the family, or yet, to earn an income to help pay for the increasing medical exoenses. These children become depressed and alienated. Children, who have already lost their parents, fare even worse. In addition to undergoing the trauma of seeing the parents’ sickness and death, they are not likely to attend school, have access to adequate healthcare and are more likely to be malnourished. Thise children are also forced to raise their siblings, forcing them to face responsibilities for which they are not yet prepared. To this end, they become more likley to engage indangerous work, including commerical sex work, which increases their likelihood for HIV infection. The impact of HIV/AIDS on children is distrubing. In its wake, AIDS is leaving whole generations of unhealthy, uneducated, poorly socialized, vulerable children, which according to a joint report, “heightens the prospect of social instability.”

The World Health Organization (WHO) declares that child and adolescent mental health is central to the future development of low income countries throughout the world, but in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere where AIDS orphans, displaced populations of child combatants, reintegrated child soldiers, AIDS affected and Infected Youth and Youth marginalized because of lack of economic opportunity are jeopardizing the future of whole nations. The WHO and other international actors are biginning to recognize the importance of a more holistic approach to the HIV/AIDS issue. These actors recoginze that with increased international migration, issues that face one country cross borders… that migration brings to the West young people from affected aeas that are unable to adpat, adjust or integrate.

Due to lack of social infrastructure and capacity, little attention has been paid in most developing countries to the metnal health of these genrations of parnetless children who are raising themselves in the streets. What is to become of those that survive into adulthood? Without an education, without skills, and without hope, what is the future that awaits whole generations of African orphans?

RESPONSE

The strategies outlined by organizations that have been tracking the pandemic countinues to be that of, among other things, strenghening and supporting families to care for their children, strenghtening community-based responses, and raising awareness so as to increase the capacity of children and the youngto protect and defend theselves. These strategies are such that rely on the countreis’ own participation as well as fostering grass roots based responses that are more in touch with the conditions on the ground. They are bottom up responses that take into consideration the individual needs as well as divergent traditions. The predicted trends outline the situation if it is left unchecked. Though the problem is likely to worsen in the coming years, there is much that can be done to respond to the crisis.

Through the orphanages and other orphan oriented institutions and programs work is underway in Ethiopia to turn the tide. Among noteworthy programs is a sponsorship programs introduced by NGOs such as People to People, which attempt to strengthen exisitng bonds through sponsorship and aid before children are forced to leave their families, thereby reducing the trauma that the children inevitably experience.

Thorugh these institutions, one has a chance to observe and glean an understanding of the need of the children and how best to address and redress the conditions. Such programs, as well as the orphanages, are excellent examples of the potential that is achievable at grass-roots levels, as well as the will that exists throughout the country. Though there have not been any significant studies conducted to determine the state of mental health of Ethiopia’s children and youth the need is great, and though capacity is limited, it is not non-existent.

CONCLUSION

The orphan experience in Ethiopia is being observed in the tragic yet relatively lucky circumstances of the many orphanages that have opened throughout the city. Most of the fortunate ones are being assisted by adoption agencies that place them in familes abroad, but for countless unlucky children, the only option is the street, where in an effort to survive, and raisse siblings, they unwittingly perpetrate the vicious cycle that is the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Ethiopia.

The true effects and consequences are yet to be seen, as the generation of orphans is still in flux. Yet experts warn that matters may take a turn for the worst before they improve, and with Africa’s diminishing capacity (through death and migration) the effort to stem this problem must be all-inclusive, and must be addressed before the situation spirals further out of control.

Reference:

1. UNAIDS EpiUpdate 2004, http://www unaids.org

2. USAID Country Profile: Ethiopia, http://www.usaid.gov

3. UNICEF, UNAIDS, USAID. Childeren on the Brink 2002; a joint report on orphan estimates and program strategies. www.unicef.org

4. Figures taken from UNICEF, UNAIDS, USAID. Children on the Brink 2003; a joint report on orphan estimates and program strategies. www.unicef.org

5. UNICEF “Africa’s Orphaned Generations” www.unicef.org

6. Irin News Ethiopia: Foucs on AIDS and the elderly. Jan 2002 http://www.plusnews.org/ AIDS Report.ASP?Report ID=1198&Select Region=Horn_of_Africa&Select Country=ETHIOPIA

7. Ethiopia:AIDS orphans reaches one million mark. Dec 2001 http://www.irinnews.org/ report.asp? Report ID= 17631 & Select Region=Horn_of_Africa &Select Country=ETHIOPIA

8. Irin News Ethiopia: Warning over high toll of AIDS orphans. Jan 2003http://www.irinnews.org/ report.asp? Report ID=31681

9. Irin News Ethiopia: over 200,000 under-fives have HIV/AIDS. Feb 2002 http://www.oneworld.ca/external/?url=http%3A%2F%/

Fwww.irinnews.org%sFAIDSreport.asp%3FReportID%3D1210%SelectRegion%3/

DHorn_of_Africa%26SelectCountry%DETHIOPIA

10. Irin News Ethiopia:Foucs on AIDS and the Elderly. Jan 2003 http://ww.plusnews.org/AIDSReport.ASP?ReportID=1198&

SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA

11.Melissa Fay Greene, “What will become of Africa’s AIDS orphans?” New York Times Magazine, Dec 2002. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/22magazine/

22ADOPTION.html?ex=1103086800&en=200701b357fbo6d8&ei=5070&oref=login

12. UNICEF “Africa’s Orphaned Generations” http://www.unicef/org/publications/africas_orphans.pdf

13. Carol Bellamy, UNICEF pres realese, 27 Nov, 2002. http://www.usembassy.it/file2002_11/alia/a2112801.htm www.unicef.org

Horn -Politics

The War in Northern Uganda: Behind the violence

PART III

A deep-rooted regional divide

second major factor behind the northern conflict is the deep-seated division between northern and southern Uganda, a divide that has engendered a fear of being dominated by other regions or ethnic groups, and has served as an obstacle to national unity. This north-south divide is symptomatic of the regional divisions that exist throughout Uganda. As one former senior government official revealed, “How many people view the country as one? If you ask people, what is Uganda, it is difficult to say. The conflict is an issue of nationalism, because it is not viewed as a national issue really.”³⁹ This lingering attitude among many Ugandan citizens and even some policymakers has its roots in the policies and actions of previous governments that concentrated power and resources in the hands of specific groups in certain regions-to the exclusion of other regions.

In particular, political and economic patrimonialism occurred along a north-south dividing line, with leaders such as Obote and Idi Amin exacerbating anti-northern sentiments in the south through many of their policies. Such political decisions have engendered fear among those regions not in power, and have been one of the chief catalysts of conflict, in an environment in which leaders use ethnic sentiments to mobilize political support.

Policy-driven regional splits began during the colonial era. The British colonial regime was interested in securing political control of the territory of Uganda to deny other imperial contenders, as well as establish an economically profitable enterprise for Britain. To achieve this, it adopted a “divide and rule” policy that split Uganda into functional regions for administrative efficiency, and maximum economic profit. The south was used as an agricultural base for sugarcane and tea, while the north was seen as “a disturbed, hostile territory, in which there were some tribes powerful enough to offer stiff and prolonged resistance.”⁴⁰

The Baganda in the south were rewarded generously for their cooperation with the British, with the capital, parliament, university, principal hospital and best infrastructure all built in Buganda territory. British authorities also characterized and reinforced images relative to the “usefulness”, productivity, “suitability” and competence of the people in each region, leading to ethnic-based labels and stereotypes that have persisted to this day. People from the north were described as having certain inherent traits and flaws that made them brutal and marital “tribes” unsuited to rational political administration and economic governance, in contrast with the peaceful communities in the south. ⁴¹

It is important to point out that the British may have exacerbated these prejudices and rivalries, though they did not initiate them-many were present before the colonist’ arrival. This is crucial because we need to understand not only why the British adopted a policy of “divide and rule” but also why it was successful: by exploiting existing ethnic tensions, the British were able to undermine any possible coordinated resistance by Ugandans.

Regional divisions were accentuated by post-independence regimes. At the heart of such divisions lay each government’s failure to identify and priorities the issue of nation-building, or their use of approaches that only partially solved the problems or inadvertently reinforced them. Narrow individual political interest including exclusion and intolerance to alternative ideas and groups were the root issues in these regimes.

In order to help minimize disloyalty and the chances of revolt, successive governments in Uganda have promoted and surrounded themselves with relatives, friends and people particularly from their own ethno-regional-religious group. Tito Okello’s wide scale looting of Teso and Lango, fore example, is still remembered distinctly by many in these regions, with serious implications for the current conflict. As one local politician from Soroti (Teso) said: “Historically, the Acholi were not very nice.

They brutalized Ugandans when Obote left power. They put human dung in the Lira Hotel, the Okellos. This is rekindled today often in debate. We need to introduce a serious course of peace studies in Acholi.” ⁴² the domination by a single regional group, following the rule of Milton Obote from Lango and Idi Amin from West Nile, is one approach that the NRA claimed it would reverse:

The problem in Uganda is that the leadership has mainly been from the north. The southerners who are mainly Bantu have played a peripheral role all these years since independence in 1962…We are not against the northerners as such, and if a popular man from Acholi or Lango or even Madi wins, he will have our mandate.⁴³

hether the system offers full representation to a national entity is another matter, but continued perceptions about a north-south divide were revealed in many interviews, from Kitgum to Kampala, which suggests that this is still an important area of concern. As one senior government ex-official recalled, “Someone came into my office once while I was away. When I came back, I asked my colleagues whether the person was a Ugandan or a foreigner. They said, “Oh, he was not a Ugandan. He was and Achoil,” This is characteristic of wider things in the county.”⁴⁴ As a religious leader from the north said, “ This issue of marginalization of he Acholi people keeps coming back.”⁴⁵Or, as a business entrepreneur in Gulu noted, “When you are this side of Karuma Falls, you feel as if you are n another country.”⁴⁶The perception of political domination by a particular ethnic group has fuelled several regional conflicts in Uganda. Numerous Ugandans interviewed still nurture the perception that one’s group is not power, one’s security is not guaranteed.

As we apparent from numerous interviews, many northerners perceive that the recruiting ground for the government and military has shifted from the north to the west. As one local NGO worker in Kitgum alleged, “ Museveni has turned the government into a family affair.”⁴⁷ Many interviewees, particularly IDPs, also believe that it is the NRM’S fear of challenge and domination by the Acholi that explains why the NRM permits the LRA to weaken them as a people:

This war is a ploy by the current government to impoverish the Acholi, when you are poor; you become a beggar and accept anything that is offered to you. If you are thinking of hat you will eat or where you will sleep, you have no time to think about politics or your rights. You are not a challeng.⁴⁸

This does not mean that all northerners hat the government-there are many who disagree with the assertion above. However, the historical/ethnic dimension clearly continues to play a role in the current conflict, and the government needs to work harder out to reach out to the people of the north.

The consequence of these policy choices is a divided Uganda with a fragile sense of nationhood in which political upheavals become geographically localized or “regionalized”, and are perceived by other Ugandans as distant and unimportant,” as long as it doesn’t come here!”⁴⁹ While this in itself does not cause conflict, lack of concern on the pat of the general public not directly affected, and official blindness to a group’s problem because “they are like that!”, create fertile grounds for security-threatening elements to fester and destabilize whole communities, which in turn creates the motive and incentive for conflict.

As one interviewee in Luwero said,” Those Acholi is killing each other up there, and they always will. Why should we be concerned? We have our own worries her at home.”⁵⁰ This attitude may be beginning to change, however, according to interviews in Soroti, fore example; most people said they knew very little about the LRA because for 17 years it did not affect them. “When they came here, we knew what the Acholi have been going through, and we now feel we need to look at this as a national problem.”

hus the failure of successive governments to analyze and correctly diagnose the problems facing different areas of Uganda led them to pursue policies that failed to address these problems, or to adopt strategies riddled with inconsistencies that inadvertently permitted contentious issues to degenerate into violence. In particular, lack of clear leadership that is seen to stand above prejudices both at a national and grassroots level is a recurring issue, and explains the failure to address these root causes. In the context of the northern Uganda conflict, much of the current government’s official policy response to the physical and human security challenges has been to de-legitimise the rebellion by focusing on the LRA as criminal elements or terrorists who can be easily suppressed.

However, extensive on-the-ground interviews show that the war in fact encompasses two much broader fundamental issues that must also be considered when dealing with the conflict today; a lingering north-south division in many people’s mind and a legacy of political violence that is difficult, but not impossible, to overcome.

ANATOMY OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

BACKGROUND

t is against this background that Joseph Kony’s LRA waged a relentless war across northern Uganda for the past 17 years. It is estimated that between 20000 and 25000 children,⁵² including girls used as both commanders’ wives and fighters have been kidnapped since the LRA began operations. Indeed, the group is one of the most brutal across the globe, forcing young children to kill and torture soon after capture, making them massacre their own communities to create a “clean break” with the past, and coercing abductees to walk for miles with their hands tied together with rope. The LRA, which originally consisted of 200 core fighters, currently comprises approximately 3000 child combatant, most of who are not allowed to carry a gun, and 150-200 armed commanders.

Although a peace deal was close to being reached between the Government of Uganda and the LRA in 1994, the LRA turned to Sudan for arms and military training that same year and has been substantially better equipped since that time-at times better equipped than the UPDF. There are few resources that can be sold for arms in northern Uganda, and thus the Sudanese strategic assistance has been a critical supply line. Indeed, the LRA’s entire resource base rests on raiding farms, abducting children and getting a relatively small supply of small arms from Sudan.

Kony himself is shrouded in a veil of secrecy: on the one hand he is presented as a disorganized criminal who can be quickly and easily crushed, and on the other he is portrayed as an invincible messenger of God whom no bullets can penetrate. A BBC reporter confirmed what RLP found in the field: “Little is known about the rebel leader… and it is clear that this is exactly how he likes it. He has created an aura of fear and mysticism around himself which is an image difficult to dispel.”Given this confusion numerous labels have been used to describe Kony and the LRA: “lunatic”, “irrational”, “inexplicable”, “terrorist bandits”, and “thugs”, these caricatures have had important practical implications, making it hard to know what strategies would be most effective in ending the war.

In addition, there is an important spiritual dimension to the LRA, although the group is not a cult. Kony uses his spiritual and biblical revelations to manipulate people much like a cult leader, but does not appear to brainwash them heavily: most LRA members end up believing in his spiritual power, but they are not mesmerized by his presence. Kony has a multi-layered spiritual vision, but he also uses this spiritualism to maintain control, starting with his overall vision of liberation and destruction and continuing with individual spirits that “guide” specific military tactics. Thus the following section seeks to give a fuller explanation of why and how Kony’s LRA is fighting, based on interviews with ex-combatants and other who have had direct or indirect contact with Kony. It is important to note that the RLP was unable to interview Kony himself.

What drives the LRA?

The spiritual dimension

Born into a family of peasant farmers with “a reputation for mysticism”, ⁵⁶ Kony has an important spiritual dimension that motivates him. The evidence suggests that Kony, at least some of the time, believes he is fulfilling a spiritual, not a political, vision as a messenger of God. As one intermediary who has made contact with top LRA commanders commented, “Kony believes he is the true man of God sent by God to save the Acholi.” Seemingly strange at first, upon closer examination the vision appears to have a more coherent logic. According to sources familiar with him during his early days as a commander with the UPDA, Kony believed he was:

Sent by God to liberate humanity from disease and suffering. But, he added, he had discovered that healing was senseless as long as those who were healed were killed. He had resolved to fight to destroy all those who wanted to fight. The struggle would last until no one had the wish to fight and longer. He said he had not come to topple the government, but to destroy the evil forces in the world… He wanted justice and righteousness to reign throughout the country.

His early actions confirm such a belief. Fore example, Kony initially wanted to gain the support of the northern population and broke away from the UPDA in November 1987, allegedly to punish them for their unjust plundering and terrorizing of the population.⁵⁹ According to one researcher, “ He wanted to build up a trans-ethnic movement, but failed” and tried to unite different northern rebellions into one group.

he origins of Kony’s vision must be understood in the context of the Acholi socio-political crisis, as discussed above. Like Alice Lakwena before him, Kony believed he had spiritual powers and could lead the Acholi out of this difficult time. However, other Acholi leaders rejected his prophecy, a rejection that Kony took badly. After he asked Alice for support, fore example, she mocked him and told him he should use his limited spiritual powers to become a doctor or a healer, but not to lead a rebellion. Kony reportedly left in silence following Lakwena’s monologue and later allegedly told his followers that he was deeply insulted by her rebuff.

The LRA’s spiritual dimension is in part explained by traditional cultural beliefs. In many African communities, as well as elsewhere in the world, social and cultural problems are interpreted through spiritual media. In particular, calamities afflicting communities are seen as punishment for wrongs that the people themselves committed, and therefore there is a need for atonement and cleansing, or to repulse the evil spirit tormenting them. Kony believes that there is something wrong in “Acholiland” and thinks he can engage in spiritual cleansing to address that wrong. However, while he interprets the problem within this traditional spiritual worldview, he then perverts it to fit his own views rather than the accepted Acholi standard. His justification of violence comes because the people have refused to back him.

This is where he departs from the Acholi tradition whereby life is held sacred, to his personal interpretation of the Bible where he can select certain verses to justify the use of violence on those who have refused to support him. Importantly, all the Acholi traditional leaders interviewed by RLP clearly reject Kony’s spiritual vision and denounce him as a false prophet. As an Acholi elder in Kitgum said, “Kony says he has spirits, but this should be traditionally investigated. We do not see it that way. The origin of this conflict is based on genuine grievances, but any misguided person can try and abuse it.”

Despite Kony’s early dismissal by his potential allies, he continued to claim to have biblical revelations into the 1990s, visions that have allegedly become increasingly apocalyptic and destructive over time. During the late 1980’s the LRA concentrated its attacks mainly on government troops but from 1992 began focusing on civilian targets. As several authors correctly point out, the changes in strategy is explained by Kony’s desire to take revenge on a civilian population that, in 1991-1992, fought against the LRA in government-sponsored “Bow and Arrow” civil defence units instead of lending their support to the LRA.RLP interviews confirm this hypothesis.

Kony reportedly told one abductee, “if the Acholi don’t support us, they must be finished”and then justified his new approach by a different spiritual revelation. He is also alleged to have told LRA members in the bush, “God said in the Bible, ‘I will unleash my wrath upon you and you will suffer pain. And in the end you will be killed by the sword. Your children will be taken in to captivity and will be burnt to death.’ ”

This quote is disturbingly similar to what has taken place on the ground during LRA raids since 1992: the soldiers have burnt villages, abducted children and used pangs (machetes) to kill civilians. As one formerly abducted girl elaborated, “(Kony) said even in the Bible people died and if it is time for you to die, you must die.

It’s not Kony who has killed you but God, because your time has come.”⁶⁷ As another ex-combatant added, “The rebels were indoctrinating us saying government wants to kill us and finish Acholis, Teso and Langis.”

^ENDNOTES

39. Interview with former senior government official, Kampala, 5/12/03.

40. J Barber, Imperial frontier, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1968, chs 10-11, cited in HURIPEC, op cit, p 19.

41. HURIPEC, op cit, pp: 19-20; Doom & Vlassenroot, op cit, pp 7-8.

42. Interview with local politician, Soroti, 7/11/03.

43. Interview with Yoweri Museveni, Drum Magazine (East), October 1985, p9.

44. Interview with former senior government official, Kampala, 5/12/03.

45. Interview with religious leader, Gulu, 7/10/03.

46. Interview with businesswoman, Gulu, 18/12/03.

47. Interview with NGO worker, Kitgum, 10/10/03.

48. Interview with businessman, Kitgum, 14/10/03.

49. Interview with displaced teacher, Soroti, 8/11/03.

50. Interview with teacher, Lwero, 29/10/03.

51. Interview with displaced teacher, Soroti, 8/11/03.

To Be Continued in the Next Issue

POWER QUOTES

I have always found that mercy bears richer fruits than strict justice. Abraham LincolnSpeech in Washington, D.C.,1865

In matter of government, justice means force as well as virtue.Napoleon ILetter to M.Lebrun, quoted by Thibeaudeau,1834

Justice and good will will outlast passion. James A.GarfieldLetter accepting the Republic nomination for president, Jul 12, 1880

When I refuse to obey an unjust law, I do not contest the right of the majority to command, but I simply appeal from the sovereignty of people to the sovereignty of mankind.Alexis, Comte de Tocqueville Democracy in America 1835-39

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