Paper Presented in Riyadh, Saudi-Arabia January, 2005
Some Global and African Perspectives on TerrorismInternational terrorism has become one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. This is underscored by the fact that increased acts of terror in many parts of the world in recent years have caused considerable suffering to civilian lives and endangered the prospects of peace and stability. Terrorist groups have managed to do this by targeting innocent civilians, thereby creating a state of fear and sense of insecurity in the public at large. Terrorists have also refined their tactics by employing sophisticated strategies and instruments of destruction. This is demonstrated by the dreadful and horrendous explosions of September 11 and others. The sheer magnitude of those explosions and the technology with which they were consummated as well as the massive loss of human lives and destruction of property which they caused have demonstrated the changing nature of international terrorism. Besides, this has made it necessary for the international community including major powers like the US to review and refine their policies and strategies of combating international terrorism. They have also been forced to employ a myriad of new tactics and technologies designed to arrest and if possible reverse the menace of this new challenge to global security and prosperity. Against the above background of international insecurity induced by terrorism, African states including those of the Horn of Africa have taken different measures at national, sub-regional and continental levels to combat and mitigate the devastating impact of local and international terrorism. The study hopes to examine the vulnerability of African states to international terrorism and the legislative and other measures taken by them to mitigate, arrest, and hopefully reverse the impact of international terrorism on Africa. PART IOverviewSince September 11, 2001, the United States has declared war on terrorism. Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, has become a significant area in the war on terrorism. While Ethiopia and Kenya are seen as important allies in the war on terrorism, Sudan and Somalia are perceived as breeding ground for terrorists. United States policy for Africa since September 2001 has been one of supporting security forces and intelligence establishments to hunt down terrorists and eliminate the threat of terrorism. The policy is based on a “use fire to eliminate fire” approach. But, this approach only addresses the symptoms without dealing with the causes. Nevertheless, what the United States needs to do is help eradicate poverty, illiteracy and diseases from the Third World including Africa. The above will help dry the swamp in which terrorists sprout and grow. It is poverty, oppression and hopelessness that motivate people to die with those whom they perceive as living in luxury at their expense. Such people want a fair share of the wealth of the world. They see the current economic system as exploitative and unjust. Hence, if the United States and the other rich countries want to get rid of terrorism, they must first eliminate poverty from the face of the earth. What is required is a comprehensive approach to the removal of poverty such as the Marshall Plan. Africa in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001African reactions to the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington were overwhelmingly supportive of the United States. Dozens of African leaders offered support to combat terrorism. Nevertheless, some celebrations were reported among Muslim militants in northern Nigeria in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. In the Somali capital, Mogadishu, thousands of people took to the streets in support of Osama bin Laden and burned American and Israeli flags.1 Some officials assert that Africa, with its large Muslim population, can play a pivotal role in solidifying actions against terrorism. According to press reports, the governments of Djibouti and Kenya offered their sea and airport facilities for use by the United State military. Secretary Powell stated that several officials offered to cooperate with the United States and appeared eager to join the coalition. In October 2001, South Africa and the United states signed a treaty.2 The proximity of some African countries to the Persian Gulf region could prove useful to the United States military in some instances. This link with Africa is important because, Africa has emerged as a safe haven for a number of terrorist groups from the Middle East. Terrorist groups from the Middle East are said to have some presence in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. Nevertheless, contrary to the above some countries in Africa like Ethiopia have managed to keep terrorists out. There have also been responses by others aimed at keeping terrorists at bay. For instance, in 1997 Ethiopian security forces killed a number of terrorists inside Somalia following several terrorist attacks in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, as well as towns like Dire Dawa. In early 2002, a senior Ethiopian official had stated that the government was in possession of “documents and pictures of dead bodies of Afghans and Arabs” captured during the Ethiopian operations against Al-Itthihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) which is an extremist group which operates inside Somalia. Al-Ittihad is one of the many groups targeted by the Bush administration for the seizure of its assets.3 In October 2001, President Bush told more than 30 African ministers who were attending the annual African Growth and Opportunity Act economic forum that “America won’t forget the many messages of sympathy and solidarity sent by African heads of state.”4 Bush administration officials assert that Africa, with its large Muslim population, can play a pivotal role in consolidating support in Muslim and Arab countries. In late October, national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, urged “African nations to speak out at every opportunity that this is not a war of civilizations but a war of civilization against uncivilized people.” Views of African Countries and Leaders on TerrorismSome African officials are concerned that, despite the strong support African governments have provided to the anti-terror campaign, they are not seen as valued coalition partners in the fight against terrorism. “African ambassadors in Washington are also worried that sub-Saharan Africa may become a lower priority and that U.S financial support may be reduced because of the new focus on terrorism.”5 African officials assert that the United States has an obligation to assist them financially because they have suffered economically due to terrorism. Tourism in Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa declined first after 1998. It then declined after 2001 in the case of South Africa. This was so because of cancellation and reduction of flights. Due to the above measures, many African countries are wary about their relationship with the U.S. Some African governments are concerned they might become targets of U.S action after Afghanistan. The Bush administration abstained in late September 2001 on a U.N. Security Council vote permitting the lifting of sanctions against the Sudan. “Somalis are also concerned that their country could become a target because of the activities of Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya and its alleged relationship with Al-Qaeda.”6 Some African officials are eager to see the coalition against terrorism led by the United Nations rather than the United States. Officials, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, see the need for a fair and quick resolution of the Palestinian problem. Democracy and human rights advocates fear that Washington will embrace governments with poor human rights records as long as they cooperate in the anti-terrorism campaign. Others express concern that conflict resolution and development issues could become marginal for policy makers in Washington. Some analysts believe that the United States should expand its intelligence presence in Africa significantly in order to effectively counter the threat of terrorism. Other analysts maintain that Ethiopia and Kenya could provide crucial support to the United States in dealing with terrorist threats in Somalia. They also believe that such support would be good if coupled with encouraging good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights together with measures of poverty alleviation. These are all pivotal in building a strong terrorist-free Africa.”7 Major Terrorist Incidents in AfricaOn August 7, 1998, mid-morning explosion killed 213 people, 12 of whom were U.S. citizens, at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. In addition, eleven people (non- Americans) were killed at the same time by explosions at the U.S. Embassy in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. “On August 20, 1998, President Clinton directed U.S. military forces to attack a terrorist training complex in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan. The latter was believed to be a factory manufacturing precursors for chemical weapons. U.S navy surface ships and submarines, operating in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, fired 75 or more tomahawk cruise missiles at the two targets.”8 U.S. Authorities charged Bin Laden with the embassy bombings. In June 1995, some members of an Islamic Brotherhood allegedly originating in Egypt tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The weapons used in that assassination attempt were flown into Ethiopia by Sudan Airways. According to a U.N. report, the passports used by the terrorists were also prepared in Khartoum. The attempt on the life of president Mubarak of Egypt was foiled when Ethiopian security forces killed five of the assassins and captured three more some days later. Ethiopia then tried to secure the extradition of the remaining terrorists from the Sudan via bilateral diplomatic channels in order to bring them before justices. Nevertheless, the Sudan did not hand over the remaining terrorists on the grounds that they had allegedly left the country. Ethiopia then took the case first to the OAU and next to the United Nations. Soon after Ethiopia filed its case, the UN Security Council passed three resolutions demanding the extradition of the three suspects to Ethiopia. In April 1996, the United Nations Security Council imposed a series of sanctions on the government of the Sudan because of its non-compliance with the resolutions that were passed.”9 In late 2000, the governments of Egypt and Ethiopia expressed support for the lifting of the sanctions, but the Clinton Administration rejected such a move. Nevertheless, in late September 2001 which followed the September 11 attacks on the U.S, the Bush Administration abstained paving the way for the lifting of the sanctions. According to analysts, the abstention of the Bush Administration was predicated on the spirit of cooperation which the Sudan had demonstrated to the U.S. following the disastrous attacks of September 11. Ethiopia Al-Ittihad al Islamiya (AIAI), which is based in Somalia, and indigenous local groups including the Oromo Liberation Front, the militant wing of the Ogaden Liberation Front, and the now quiescent Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia have carried out kidnappings, assassination attempts, mining of roads and bombing of bars, hotels, and public buildings. “But Ethiopia appears to have remained free of terrorist attacks instigated by al Qaeda and other Middle East terrorist groups.” 10 Ethiopian Muslims have not been receptive to Islamic fundamentalism and they lack centralized power. They tend to identify first with their ethnic kin. Muslims and Christians are geographically intermixed throughout most of the country. Islam in Ethiopia has been benign during the past century. But the potential for conflict is present. “Ethiopia has tough, effective security apparatus that dates from the EPRDF’s long conflict with the Derg regime. As a result, Ethiopia is not as soft a target as nearby countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.” 11 KenyaIn May 2003, the Kenyan government admitted that a key member of the al Qaeda terror network was plotting attacks on Western targets, confirming Al-Qaeda’s firm local presence. “Evidence unveiled during the trial in New York of four men linked to the bombing of American embassies in east Africa in 1998 revealed a terror network that had flourished in Kenya, taking advantage of lax immigration and security laws.”12 Working with FBI and Interpol, the government made efforts to destroy the al Qaeda cell, apprehending several suspects in Nairobi and Mombassa. “With 2000 members, AIAI is the most powerful radical band in the Horn of Africa, and it has been funded by al Qaeda in the past. Moreover, in 1998, Kenya had revoked the registration of Muslim NGOs, including al Haramain, because of their links to terrorism.”13 The new government of Mwai Kibaki moved to establish mechanisms to meet the growing threat. These mechanisms point to a more proactive policy on terrorism, but their long-term viability hinge on fundamental reforms in the security services, immigration, and port authorities. DjiboutiIn the 1980s and 90s, ethnic Afar dissidents protesting against lack of inclusion in the government claimed responsibility for a number of incidents resulting in civilian fatalities. “However, Djibouti’s importance in the war on terrorism derives from its transit capabilities rather than its potential as a base for international terrorist organizations. Possible terrorist threats include attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities there and disrupting the port and the Addis-Djibouti rail link.”14 In the war on terrorism, the challenges for Djibouti are to instill professionalism and pay on a timely basis its civil service and teachers and undertake a whole array of activities to create jobs and reduce poverty--a very tall order without external assistance. U.S. policy toward Djibouti should be “aimed at ensuring that emphasis on counter-terrorism measures neither does nor dilute its policy commitment to or Djibouti’s practices on democracy and human rights.”15 SomaliaSomalia has played a role in the activities of Islamic terrorism, albeit a specialized one. “It has served primarily as a short-term transit point for the movement of people and materials through the porous and corrupt border between Somalia and Kenya, which has been a preferred site of terrorist attacks.”16 Yet to date, Somalia has not been the site of significant terrorist activities. The paucity of Western targets inside Somalia also makes it an unlikely site for attacks. Al-Ittihad al Islamiya’s political platform is the imposition of an Islamic government in all Somali-inhabited zones of the region, including eastern Ethiopia. AIAI has adopted a long-term strategy to prepare Somalia for Islamic rule by building up its activities in education, media, the judiciary and commerce. “Some business owners are suspected of being sympathetic to members of AIAI. It is also possible that a few of the Islamic charities in Somalia may be misused as fronts for terrorists.”17 The United States should support national reconciliation in Somalia that may yield in a government of national unity and a partner in law enforcement and counter-terrorism measures. EritreaSince 9/11, Eritrea has been included in the list of countries harboring terrorists, due to allegations that the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) was linked to al Qaeda. The EIJM is the only organization that claims to represent Muslim Eritrean grievances. Eritrean Muslims resent the curtailment of Muslim rights to practice their religion as well as the denial of Eritrea’s Afro Arab heritage by the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). PFDJ is the ruling party in Eritrea.18 EIJM’s origin is traced to the mid 1970s when combatants who objected to the anti-religious propaganda of the EPLF ideologues were routinely imprisoned and ostracized. EIJM’s continuity as an organization is fed by the unwillingness of the PFDJ regime to contemplate real versus virtual political participation of the multicultural citizens of Eritrea.19 It is also argued that the inclusion of Eritrea in the “coalition of the willing” has threatened to widen the gap between moderate and radical Eritrean Muslims. This is allegedly so due to the regime’s use of the “war against terrorism” to eliminate all dissents. Some U.S. analysts have, therefore, suggested that U.S. policy should steer away from the increasing “authoritarianism of the current regime which has alienated the majority of its civilian-secular and non-secular-population.” They add, “Failure to do so will lead to growing support for EIJM and other terrorist organizations.”20 Sudan Sudan has been the only sub-Saharan country on the U.S. list of governments which sponsor state terrorism for some time. This was so because it openly harbored Bin Laden and al Qaeda from 1991 to 1996.21 After the ouster of Hassen al Turabi as chairman of the National Assembly and his eventual imprisonment, Khartoum has accelerated the moderation of its foreign policy and distanced itself from terrorist organizations. At present, the government of the Sudan is in the process of attempting to move in a new direction by holding serious peace negotiations with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A). This has fortunately led to the conclusion of a final peace agreement at Naivasha (Kenya) on May 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005. It has also been trying to improve its bilateral relation with the United States. Nevertheless, it remains hindered by the Darfur conflict which has resulted in an international uproar because of the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis it has entailed. It also faces stiff resistance by high-ranking officials who had held influential positions of leadership after the 1989 coup but still remain committed to a radical Islamic agenda.22 Against the above backdrop, analysts of Sudanese affairs suggest that the United States should remain seized with the Sudan until Khartoum begins to implement the comprehensive peace agreement that was signed between it and the SPLM/A at Naivasha, Kenya on May 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005. It may then embark on other outstanding issues (if any) that have to do with terrorism. Nigeria Nigeria contains the second largest Muslim population (after Egypt) in Africa. For a long time Nigeria retained a delicate balance between northern Muslims and the largely Christian population of the south. However, after General Olusegon Obasanjo, a southerner and born-again Christian got elected as president in 1999, northerners feel that their influence has declined politically, militarily and economically. Northern Nigerians (predominantly Muslim) consider Washington to be colluding in their political and economic decline. U.S. policies have also stirred anti-American feelings; tens of thousands of Nigerians flocked to rallies against the Iraq war. To date, there is no evidence that terrorist cells have penetrated northern Nigeria. But the situation is increasingly dangerous. “The United States has also done little to help Nigeria out of its severe economic depression, which is indirectly responsible for much of the tension in the country. Washington should actively support current economic reforms and be prepared to take the lead in debt rescheduling and other forms of economic support.”23 South Africa South Africa is another country that faces the threat of rising Islamic extremism. “In the 1990s, a small radical Islamic group, the People Against Gangsters And Drugs (PAGAD), emerged. PAGAD started out as a vigilante organization seeking to combat the growing drug trade in poor townships near Cape Town, but it was subsequently hijacked by radical elements.”24 PAGAD is suspected of carrying out a series of bar and night-club bombings that took place in the late 1990s. “South Africa’s intelligence apparatus is sophisticated and sensitive to terrorist threats, having successfully cracked down on PAGAD and extradited any terrorist suspects found in the country.”25 But terrorist threat in South Africa still requires close monitoring. Although only 2 percent of South Africa’s population is Muslim, there is a dangerous concentration of Muslim in Cape Town area. The existing cooperation between the FBI and the Scorpions--South Africa’s aggressive police arm--must be strengthened and extended if terrorism is to be stamped out. 26 Other Areas of Focus for Counter Terrorist Action: Trade in DiamondsResale of diamonds purchased from African rebel movements has been used to fund terrorist attacks. Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network as well as Hezbollah representatives have purchased diamonds from members of the Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF). “A minority of diamond traders in Lebanese Diasporas in Africa have long been believed to be involved in such activities.”27 Diamonds are said to have been smuggled into Sierra Leone by “senior RUF commanders”, and then to have been purchased by al Qaeda affiliated dealers in transactions arranged by Ibrahim Bah, a key RUF official.28 Ibrahim Bah is also reported to have been a key middleman in transactions between RUF and diamond buyers associated with the al Qaeda and Hezbollah organizations. Beginning in September 1998, Al- Qaeda buyers were reportedly able to purchase diamonds at sub-market prices and sell them in Europe at a steep profit worth several--perhaps tens--of millions of dollars.29 The heightened transaction activity could also indicate an increased need to launder funds from a variety of sources--possibly including other illicit dealings, such as drug sales and to transfer their value into the fungible and concentrated form of value that diamonds represent. Moreover, the sale of Congolese diamonds is--and has long been-- tied to the funding of Hezbollah and other radical Islamic groups. U.S. and European investigations are also focusing on the association between the financing of radical Islamic groups and trade in other high-value Congolese commodities, like gold, uranium, and non-diamond gem stones, according to the report.30 U.S. Policy on Terrorism in AfricaSome analysts believe that the United States must significantly expand its intelligence presence in Africa in order to effectively counter the threat of terrorism. They argue that the United States should also help build the security and intelligence capabilities of African governments. The same observers contend that, while it is desirable to secure and win the support of all African countries, only a handful are going to be capable and suitable to join an effective partnership with the United States. Some believe that Washington should identify relevant African actors and establish special security relationship with these governments. In dealing with terrorist threats in Somalia, for example, Kenya and Ethiopia could provide key support to the United States, some analysts maintain.31 Others are wary, fearing that close U.S support for some African governments would be interpreted as reduction in pressure for democratization and economic reform. From their perspective, encouraging good governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights together with poverty alleviation measures are all pivotal in building a strong and terrorist-free Africa. So far the United States has undertaken three initiatives in the war against terrorism in Africa. First, approximately 1,800 U.S. forces are deployed in Djibouti and nearby countries in the Combined Joint Task Force--Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) initiative. In the summer of 2003 (JTF-HOA) forces conducted a three-month joint training exercise with Ethiopian National Defense Forces.32 Second, in 2003, the Department of State launched the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) program to increase border security and the counter terrorism capabilities of four West African countries: Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania. Third, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program focuses on Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, and Kenya. This program aims to upgrade the peace-enforcement capabilities of African militaries.33 THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE OF IGAD COUNTRIES TO TERRORISM
The prevalence of poverty and the recurrence of civil wars have assisted terrorist groups to spread their network and mount terrorist activities in several countries of the Horn of Africa. Against this backdrop, the concern about the magnitude of the challenge of international terrorism and the primacy of focusing on concerted and coordinated international action is reflected in the policy approaches of several member states of IGAD. Observation of the author Horn of African Perspectives on Global TerrorismThe response of many African countries is generally modulated by their own bitter encounters with terrorism. For instance, this is true of member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which brings together Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. Some of the said countries have been forced to take stringent measures to counter terrorism because their populations have sustained the loss of thousands of lives and considerable destruction of property in recent years. Some of the most devastating examples of the destructions that recently occurred in the Horn of Africa sub-region were the bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 291 people and wounded 5000 in August 1998. Equally significant was the explosion that occurred at a tourist hotel in Mombassa which caused the loss of 15 lives and destruction of property in November 2002. Both terrorist attacks are said to have been perpetrated by some of the Al-Qaeda cells in Eastern Africa.1 As noted above, some of the countries of the Horn have been hardest hit. For instance, this is true of Ethiopia, Uganda, and other countries which were targeted by Al-Qaeda and surrogate organizations close to it in the late 1990s and early 2000.2 Ethiopia has also had to contend with infiltrations mainly from Somalia and Kenya which were repulsed by the army and other anti-terrorist squads. Nevertheless, its actions against terrorism were given little or no attention by the international community until the catastrophic destruction of the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001. The sub-region has also suffered from the indirect impact of local and international terrorism due to loss of foreign direct investment and declining incomes from tourism and related sectors which have been adversely affected. The situation is also compounded by the state of inter–and-intra state conflicts which continue to afflict the countries of the sub-region with dire consequences on their individual economic performance and that of the region as a whole.3 Horn of African Perceptions and Responses to International TerrorismAgainst the above backdrop, countries of the IGAD sub-region have responded to the changed global and African environment by taking measures of anti-terrorism. Their response to international terrorism has also been impacted by conventions adopted on terrorism by the OAU and AU, UN and via their close collaboration with the US and EU countries. Furthermore, their response to terrorism has also been inspired and guided by some of the measures taken by the OAU and AU. One of such measures was that the OAU, after a series of consultative meetings at expert and political levels, adopted a proposal on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, in Algiers in July 1999. This was followed by a High Level Inter-Governmental Meeting which also took place in Algiers on September 11-14, 2002.4 At the Algiers meeting, the AU adopted a plan of action to assist Member States implement the Convention. These measures have provided the necessary continental legal framework for the countries of the Horn of Africa. The effort of the IGAD countries in combating international terrorism via coordination among themselves was also boosted by the proposal tabled by the Government of Sudan at the IGAD Council of Misters Meeting held in Khartoum in January 2002. Nevertheless, the issue was not thoroughly discussed at the Khartoum meeting due to time constraint. Albeit, most member states which were keen to counter terrorism had made it very clear that the matter was of serious concern. Some had even underscored the fact that countering terrorism in all its forms should be given high priority on the agenda of the sub-region.5 Consequently, another conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism was held in Addis Ababa on June 25 to 27, 2003. At the Addis Ababa meeting, there was less discussion on theoretical and legal aspects of terrorism. Instead, attention was focused on discussion of sub-regional and bilateral collaboration in combating terrorism. One of the reasons for this was that the borders between member states of the countries of the Horn of Africa are porous and that there is a huge illegal cross boarder movement of people and goods. Of particular concern was also the illicit trafficking and stockpiling of arms, ammunitions and explosives.6 The conference also attempted to map out strategies on how to deal with the issue of illegal transfer of funds that could end up in financing terrorist acts. Further, it tried to streamline cooperation between departments of member states which deal with terrorism. As a result, a modus operandi on how the coordination at the regional level should be continued was also reached. The conference also took stock of the global challenge of international terrorism and of the need for concerted action based on the exchange of information. This point was emphasized by most delegates because terrorism is “an enemy that knows no borders and indiscriminately and sometimes intentionally targets civilians and defenceless populations including women and children.”7 The Emerging Consensus on Terrorism among IGAD CountriesThe most widely held view about international terrorism among IGAD countries is that “terrorism in all its forms is a global problem that has no frontiers and cannot be associated with any particular religion, culture or society.” They also see terrorism as a common enemy which should concern every nation and people “irrespective of race, religion or nationality.”8 The IGAD countries also assert the common view that no section of the international community is immune from the evil acts of terrorism. This also happens to be the most widely held view among countries of the African continent. It was also expressed by all member states of IGAD at the conference on Preventing and Combating Terrorism held in Addis Ababa from June 25 to 27, 2003. As one of the delegates put it, “Africa obviously cannot remain untouched by this global phenomenon. It has now become the most vulnerable part of the world to acts of international terrorism.”9 The above is underscored by the fact that the IGAD sub-region has borne the heaviest brunt of some of the recent attacks perpetrated on the continent by international terrorist groups. Obviously, such groups have taken advantage of statelessness in Somalia and the porous borders between it and its neighbors. They have also capitalized on the absence of government institutions by providing some social services and a measure of localized security functions where they are not provided by the warring factions or the powerless Transitional National Government. Naturally, the prevalence of poverty and the recurrence of civil wars have assisted terrorist groups to spread their network and mount terrorist activities in several countries. Against this backdrop, the concern about the magnitude of the challenge of international terrorism and the primacy of focusing on concerted and coordinated international action is reflected in the policy approaches of several member states of IGAD. The above concern about the menace posed by international terrorism which demands both national and sub-regional concerted action is, for instance, manifest in the policy pronouncements of Kenya, Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia and other IGAD member states. An official of the Ethiopian government had made this very clear when he stated, “it is obvious that no matter how economically and militarily strong a state may be, it cannot alone fight terrorism.” The importance of concerted sub-regional action against terrorism was also emphasized in another statement which underscored that terrorists have established sophisticated and complex global networks which require “genuine and sustained cooperation as well as the solidarity of the entire community of nations.”10 Furthermore, as most IGAD officials concur, globally there is a need to put together “the collective will and wisdom of all nations to address the scourge of this heinous phenomenon in all its dimensions.” Nevertheless, while preventing and combating terrorism are important reactive measures, many policy makers and scholars have emphasized the need to look at the root causes of and possible solutions to the problem. In this context, there is broad agreement that the problems of marginalization and intensifying poverty, absence of democracy, violation of human rights and injustice are major contributors to the speedy spread of terrorism among oppressed communities and social groups everywhere. Policy Approaches of IGAD Countries on International TerrorismAs was underscored at the Addis Ababa meeting on preventing and combating terrorism by several delegates including those of Uganda, Kenya, the Sudan and Ethiopia, in order to succeed in the global campaign against terrorism a comprehensive and effective global strategy that aims at addressing the immediate, medium –and long – term challenges of international terrorism should urgently be put in place. This should, inter alia, deal with those areas where there are outstanding problems which could further promote terrorism. However, even while dealing with the above problems, the IGAD countries also emphasize that the international community should stand united not only in combating the terrorists themselves, but also in taking measures against those countries and groups which provide them sanctuary and financial and logistical support. In the words of an Ethiopian official, as terrorist groups do not operate in a vacuum, “all those who directly or indirectly provide them with any support and encouragement to carry out their evil acts should equally be held accountable.”11 Other IGAD officials have also emphasized the crucial role of the UN by way of providing the necessary legal framework for their activities. Many of the delegates who attended the Addis Ababa conference on anti-terrorism referred to the UN Security Council Resolutions of September 2001 (UNSC/1373/2001) and to that of January 16, 2002 (UNSC/1390/2002) which require states to take a range of measures to combat terrorism and obligate them to report on the steps they have taken to the appropriate Security Council Committee overseeing the implementation of the relevant Resolutions. These were resolutions that were adopted in addition to those measures expected to be taken by the individual states.12 Besides, there is broad consensus among African states including those of the Horn of Africa about the need for effective and systematic cooperation among the UN system, regional organizations and states in combating terrorism. Nevertheless, the African States also expect the support of the United Nations and the major powers in the implementation of the various relevant international and regional legal instruments relating to terrorism. African States demand support from the international community because of the magnitude and complexity of the problems faced by the continent due to “political instability and economic underdevelopment.”13 This, for instance, is the case of the IGAD sub-region which requires considerable resources to ward off the immediate and long-term challenges of international terrorism. Resources are needed not only to coordinate the efforts of all countries of the sub-region and the continent to combat terrorism, but also to expedite their economic growth and development. Economic growth is also important because it can lead to sustainable peace, security and stability in different regions. Given the necessary support, the countries of different sub-regions including those of IGAD could then be expected to demonstrate a much higher commitment for containing and stamping out terrorism. The IGAD countries could, for instance, do this via closer coordination among themselves and by using IGAD as a platform of deliberations and cooperation to counter the crucial challenges of regional as well as international terrorism, which at present is a serious menace to international peace and security. The Perception and Policy Response of Ethiopia to TerrorismIt should be underscored that some of the countries of the Horn, including Ethiopia, have demonstrated their commitment to fight terrorism. Indeed, as one Ethiopian official put it, “as a victim of a series of terrorist attacks in the last ten years, Ethiopia has been fighting it alone without any kind of material, political or moral support from the international community.” In fact, as the official hastened to add, this was why Ethiopia saw the global consensus against terrorism which was mobilized following the September 11, 2001 as a “welcome development which requires to be consolidating.”14 It was against the above background that the Ethiopian government stated that it has accepted the consensus with all the necessary resolve. It has also made it clear that it is committed to cooperate on a regional and continental basis with all the stakeholders by way of sharing intelligence and coordinating as well as improving security arrangements within and along its borders.15 The Ethiopian government has also demonstrated its commitment by taking “various legislative and administrative measures aimed at combating terrorism.”16 Its commitment is also underscored by the fact that the country is party to the following International Conventions and protocols relating to terrorism:
Further, at the regional level, Ethiopia has been one of the major driving forces behind the adoption of the Organization of African Unity’s Convention on the prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999) which it ratified in 2003.17 Besides, the aforesaid international and regional legal instruments relating to combating terrorism are part and parcel of the national law of the country as per Article 9(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.18 Moreover, Ethiopia strongly supports UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which requires “states to take every measure to combat terrorism.” Even more importantly, according to official Ethiopian sources the country has demonstrated, in words and deeds, its unflinching commitment to the above resolutions and conventions. In fact, it has entrusted the Ministry of Justice to assume this responsibility as per Article 23 of Proclamation No. 4/95. The Ministry, in turn, has prepared a legal Memorandum with a view to ensuring the enforcement of the relevant UN conventions related to terrorism. At the institutional level, the National Bank of Ethiopia has been entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing banking and monetary activities in the country. The National Bank, in turn, has instructed all commercial banks and financial institutions in the country to “scrutinize the accounts and transactions of their clients.” As a result of the above, the National Bank has blocked individual bank accounts which were considered suspicious at the Harar branches of the Dashen Bank and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. The accounts that were blocked were those of the Barakat International Companies (BICO) which are said to be involved in financing terrorist activities. Likewise, it has made the illegal transfer of money or property to a foreign country punishable by law as per Article 19 of the Revised Special Penal Code of Ethiopia (1982).19 What is more, Ethiopia is said to have a strict border control system which is sanctioned by the relevant laws and regulations including Proclamation 271/1969. In line with this, the country has tightened its border security and applies stringent immigration and airport safety rules. In this connection, the government has stated that “the Security, Immigration and Refugees Affairs Authority, along with various local government organs, as well as Ethiopian diplomatic missions and consulates abroad control the movement of people coming into and leaving the country.”20 To bolster the above the Security, Immigration and Refugees Affairs Authority and Ethiopian diplomatic missions and consulates abroad have been instructed to take all necessary extra precautionary measures while issuing travel documents and visas.21 Furthermore, the Ethiopian government has made the material forgery of government and public documents and the use of forged instruments punishable by law as per Article 17 of the Revised Special Penal Code of 1982. Ethiopia also seems to have had considerable foresight about what was to come in the area of international terrorism. For instance, the issue of terrorism was taken up in the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957 which criminalizes “acts committed to serve terrorist objectives.” The penalties for such criminal offences are rigorous imprisonment. They could also go as far as capital punishment depending on the gravity of the offences. In addition, the Ethiopian Justice and Legal System Research Institute, which is entrusted with the task of, among other things, revising the Ethiopian Penal Code has included “a provision criminalizing the commission of terrorist acts and making them punishable with rigorous imprisonment and in grave cases with death penalty.” This is expected to be promulgated by Parliament in the near future.22 The Ethiopian government has also made it abundantly clear that it will remain vigilant and willing to cooperate with the global coalition against terrorism and other stakeholders. Besides, it has continued to play a pivotal role in fighting terrorism through the IGAD and East Africa Police Chiefs Committee (EAPCCO). The Perception and Policy Response of Uganda and Kenya to TerrorismLikewise, the Kenyan and Ugandan governments have expressed their readiness to fight terrorism. The main reason why they have decided to vigilantly combat acts of terrorism is that the countries have been victims of terrorist infiltrations from outside. For instance, Uganda like Tanzania has experienced “atrocities committed by terrorist groups operating within the country but with bases outside.” The Ugandan terrorist groups are said to include “the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which have brought continued suffering on the people of Uganda by carrying out terrorist acts such as bombings, maiming, destruction of property and infrastructure.” 23 It is said that ADF alone was responsible for 48 bomb blasts in Kampala and other urban centres that claimed the lives of 84 people, 262 injuries and colossal damage of property. ADF was also responsible for the loss of over 5,000 innocent lives in rural areas. Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony and operating in northern Uganda has resulted in the loss of many innocent lives and destruction of property. Further, as the LRA mainly operates in rural areas it has been responsible for many “gruesome massacres, abductions of children and mutilations.”24 Against the above backdrop, the Ugandan and Kenyan governments have taken several measures to stem the rising spiral of terrorist attacks. For instance, Uganda established a Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JAT) in 1999. The Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force consists of “the Department of Military Intelligence, the Police Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Special Branch (SB), the External Security Organization (ESO) and the Internal Security Organization (ISO).” This body has gone a long way by way of curtailing the menace of terrorist infiltrations and attacks.25 Another important measure taken by the Ugandan government is that parliament passed an anti-terrorism law in 2002. This act gives a legal framework to the war against the menace of terrorism. Uganda has also taken important steps in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) to combat terrorism. It has also demonstrated its commitment to combat terrorism together with Kenya and Tanzania via the establishment of a joint East African Community (EAC) committee which coordinates activities against terrorism. This was motivated by the terrorist bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam and an abortive attempt at the US Mission in Kampala.26 The East African countries including Uganda also remain determined to strengthen collaboration among their regional security/intelligence organizations, law enforcement agencies and financial institutions in order to ensure an effective and coordinated regional response to the threat of terrorism.27 As a result, they have signed several international conventions. Uganda and Kenya also subscribe to the emerging consensus in the IGAD sub-region about the need for concerted efforts to ward off terrorism via specific instruments of action. Both Uganda and Kenya have also expressed willingness to collaborate with the other IGAD member states to ensure that a coordinated regional effort in the war against “all manifestations of terrorism is formulated and implemented.”28 Both countries have also promptly responded to international alerts on terrorism issued particularly by the US and UK. For instance, Uganda had issued special recommendations in the wake of the alert of an imminent attack by Al-Qaeda in mid-2003. This was the time when some international flights to the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were suspended. Some of the measures recommended by the Ugandan government which also, by and large, coincided with those of Kenya, inter alia, included the following: · IGAD member states and other partners should endeavor to mobilize the necessary resources and political will to implement the resolutions of this conference; · Attempts should be made to address some of the underlying causes of terrorism such as the underlying historical injustices and poverty; and · IGAD should also put emphasis on examining the local manifestations of terrorism that have claimed thousands of lives such as the LRA.29 Kenya and Tanzania like Uganda have also strongly expressed their desire to continue to be engaged in the national and regional efforts in the war against terrorism. In fact, both Kenya and Tanzania are signatories to most of the treaties and conventions singed by Uganda. This is also true of the other IGAD countries which have made it clear that they can act against all forms of terrorism with the necessary commitment and support from big powers such as the US and EU. Other countries of the Horn and North East Africa have also demonstrated their firm commitment to fight terrorism individually and collectively by signing different protocols and acceding to international treaties. These include Djibouti, Eritrea and countries of the Great Lakes. Likewise, the de facto State of Somaliland and the TNG of Somalia have added their voices by expressing their readiness to fight terrorism in their own areas. The Perception and Policy Response of the Sudan to TerrorismIn the same vain, the Government of the Republic of the Sudan has underscored its firm commitment to wage war against terrorism which it sees as, “the gravest crime threatening the security of communities, societies and international relations.” Further, it has affirmed its conviction to “enlist every lawful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Relevant Security Council’s resolutions as well as international and regional conventions relating to terrorist acts.” It has also expressed its willingness to take all measures in combating terrorism at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.30 The Sudan had affirmed the above commitment by expressing its condolences to the government and people of the USA and families of the victims following the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania. The Sudan is also said to have lent a hand to the US in its efforts to contain and if possible remove international terrorist cells. In fact, cooperation between the Sudan and the former American Administration in the field of combating terrorism started well before the September 11 events of 2001.31 Further, the Sudan is currently signatory to most international and regional conventions and treaties relating to the prevention and combating of terrorism. The treaties and conventions to which it has affirmed its commitment include the following: · International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; · International Convention Against Transitional Organized Crime; · The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism; · The African Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism; and · The O.I.C Convention on Combating Terrorism.32 The Sudan is also said to have played a lead role by way of introducing the subject of terrorism within the context of IGAD. This led to the adoption of a resolution on anti-terrorism by Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, the Sudan and others at the IGAD Khartoum Submit of January 2002. Besides, the Sudanese government like the other IGAD countries has repeatedly shown “its keen desire to cooperate with the international community in combating terrorism. In this connection, it is important to underline that the Sudan has demonstrated its commitment via concrete actions such as the extradition of the infamous Carlos to France and Osama Bin Laden to Afghanistan in 1996. Further, it had extradited hijackers of an Ethiopian Airline aircraft to Ethiopia. At the domestic level, the Sudan has promulgated the Terrorism Combating Act of 2000, the 1991 Banking Regulation Act and Amendments to the Passport and Migration Act. It has also taken steps on measures regarding, “the review of all records of aliens in the country, the creation of specialized counter terrorism units, enhancement and retraining of monitoring agents and means of controlling the ports of the country and other entry points.33 The Sudan has also introduced national legislations, ratified and acceded to international and regional treaties and instruments to “prevent the country from being a safe haven for terrorists.” It has also created a coordinating national technical committee comprising seven departments specialized in combating terrorism. The committee includes representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Security organs, the Central Bank etc.34 In line with the above, on June 14, 2003, the Mystery of Justice of the Sudan established a prosecuting Bureau for Combating Terrorism. Its jurisdiction includes implementing the Combating of Terrorism Act of 2000 and international conventions, treaties and protocols to which the Sudan is party. Against the above background, it seems that the Sudan has gained useful experience and put in place effective mechanisms of dealing with terrorism through the enforcement of national laws and the creation of new organs which can continuously cope with situations of terrorism. Nevertheless, the government has also expressed the need for the country to be supported materially and technically in order for it to improve and develop its overall capacity for countering acts of terror. For instance, external assistance is needed in such areas as: · Completion of the building of national and specialized information networks; · Support for the implementation of the civil registration project; · Assistance in developing chemical and biological materials and weapons search technologies; · Training in various fields of combating terrorism; and · Support for the counter –terrorism unit of the Ministry of Interior…. etc.35 The Perception and Policy Response of Other IGAD Countries to Terrorism: Djibouti and EritreaThe tragic and unprecedented terrorist attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001 against the United States of America have profoundly shaken and shocked not only the American people but the world at large. As Ambassador Said Djinnit, a senior official of the African Union (AU) put it, “the most powerful country was attacked by terrorists and its symbols were targeted in such a dramatic manner. Many, including Africans, then realized the magnitude of the new scourge of terrorism which had no border and no limit.”36 Indeed the terrorist attacks against the US were condemned all over the world including Africa. Among the African states which decried the act of wanton destruction were the IGAD countries which expressed horror and dismay over the brutal acts of terrorism. The IGAD countries also expressed their solidarity with the American people. As noted earlier, the above position of solidarity was taken both by the IGAD and East African countries. This, for instance, was clearly voiced by the Kenyan and Ugandan governments which belong to both organizations. But, the same sentiment of solidarity was also expressed by other members of IGAD like Ethiopia, the Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and others. The above countries expressed solidarity because of the common menace which they face individually and collectively. They have also agreed to work together to curtail the imminent threat of terrorism which they commonly face. Such security cooperation has even gone beyond the IGAD sub-region. Ethiopia, the Sudan and a non-IGAD country Yemen, have, for instance, reached a common understanding on jointly combating security threats which are commonly faced by them. The position of the Djiboutian government concerning terrorism is also firm and unflinching. The same is true of the position of the Eritrean government. The Djiboutian position is particularly underscored by the fact that the country has provided its facilities to forces of the Global Coalition Against Terrorism including the US, France and Germany. An estimated 1,500 US soldiers are, in fact, said to be stationed in Djibouti. Likewise, some 2,800 French soldiers are said to operate from Djibouti both for strategic military purposes and combating terrorism. Germany and U.S. boats are also engaged in patrolling the coastline to control the movement and possible infiltration of terrorist groups to neighbouring countries like Somalia from Afghanistan and elsewhere. A Growing African and IGAD Consensus on Terrorism The African position of solidarity was emboldened by the summit called by President Wade in Dakar on October 17, 2001. The summit which included the IGAD leaders adopted a declaration against terrorism. Likewise, the Sudan took an initiative on a special session of the OAU Central Organ which was symbolically held in New York on November 11, 2001. The above meetings which were attended by representatives of IGAD member states discussed the issue of terrorism in the light of the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, while the solidarity expressed by Africans with the people of the United States was spontaneous and profoundly emotional, it also brought home the massage that Africa as a whole and the Horn of Africa in particular could be a real and potential soft belly of international terrorism. This is so because in the past decade alone, “thousands of innocent people have lost their lives as a result of terrorist acts in Africa and many more have been direct or indirect victims.”37 The anxiety about terrorism on the part of Africans in general and that of the IGAD countries in particular is also underpinned by the fact that for many years, “people in some African countries have lived in an atmosphere of fear and insecurity.” This is due to the fact that terrorism has killed thousands of Africans and destroyed infrastructure as well as property which were built with great sacrifices. Further, as an AU official laconically put it, “it has traumatized generations of Africans, undermined the social fabric and the values of communities.”38 Moreover, terrorism has sowed the seeds of distrust, suspicion and hatred among Africans of different socio-economic background, political persuasion and religious adherence to the detriment of the speedy socio-economic recovery and development of the continent. It has also left thousands jobless and apathetic about the future driving some of them to cells of terrorist networks. FootnotesPart I 1-9. CRS report to Congress, “Africa and the War on Terror”, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., USA, January 17, 2002. (Unpublished document.) 10-22. United Sates Institute of Peace, “Terrorism in the Horn of Africa,” Washington, D.C., USA January 2004 (Unpublished document) 23-26 Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004) pp. 75-86. 27-30 CRS report to Congress (Jan 17, 2002), Op. cit. 31-33 Ted Dagne, “Africa and the War on Terrorism,” Congressional Research Service, Terrorism briefing book, 2003 (unpublished document) Part II 1 Proceedings of the conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism” (unpublished), Addis Ababa, June 25 – 27, 2003, Ethiopia” 2-3 Ibid 4 Hamad Bashir, Attalla, speech delivered at the IGAD conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism, June 25 – 27, 2003, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia” 5-7 Ibid 8 Conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism, Ethiopian Delegation, June 25 – 27, 2003, UNECA, Addis Ababa 9-15 Ibid 16-22 Proceedings of the conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism” (unpublished), Addis Ababa, June 25 – 27, 2003, Ethiopia” 23 Head of the Ugandan Delegation, Conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism, June 25 – 27, 2003, UNECA, Addis Ababa 24-29 Conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism, Ethiopian Delegation, June 25 – 27, 2003, UNECA, Addis Ababa 30 Conference on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, The Sudan Delegation, June 25 – 27, 2003, UNECA, Addis Ababa 31-35 Ibid 36 Said Djinnit, Interim Commissioner for Peace, Security and Political Affairs of the AU Commission, Conference on Combating and Preventing Terrorism, June 25 – 27, 2003, UNECA, Addis Ababa. 37-38 Ibid |
