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What is the Role of Science in a Globalizing World ? AIDS In Africa: Three Scenarios To 2025 Conflict-Management Structures And Intervention Under The Ethiopian Constitution Private Morality and Capitalism: Learning from the Past By Deepak Lal INTRODUCTION
n thinking about the role of morality in economic life I propose to use an analytical framework I developed in my Unintended consequences (Lal 1998a), which is somewhat different from the one presented by John Dunning in the first chapter. At the same time it will seek to pose and answer some of the questions he has raised concerning the role of morality and global capitalism. This framework is presented in Section 2.2. From this, I provide a highly condensed account of the role of morality in economic life form the Stone Age to the present. In particular I shall emphasize the Great Divergence that took place among the leading Eurasian civilizations in the high middle Ages as a result of two Papal revolutions which replace a communalist ethic, common to most of the agrarian Eurasian civilizations, by an individualist ethic of Western Christendom. This is the theme of section 2.3. These two theories provide an obvious point of departure for the discussion in Section 2.4 of the differences in the ethnics of the great civilizations down to our own day, and the strange course that Western individualism has taken over the last two hundred years. In doing so, I hope it will be possible to examine whether or not a global or universally agreed morality is needed for global capitalism to thrive, and, if its, what form it should take. Section 2.5 relates my conclusions to the role of three of the four institutions of global capitalism identified by Dunning—viz. markets, governments, and civil society—in fostering global capitalism. In doing so, while I accept Dunning’s distinctions between globalization, the global market place, and global capitalism, in intend to use a somewhat narrower definition of the latter—which roughly corresponds to what has been called (sometimes derisively) the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. Analytical framework
orm an economist’s perspective, morality is best looked upon as part of the institutional infrastructure of a society. This institutional infrastructure, broadly defined, consists of informal constraints like cultural norms (which encompass morality) and the formal ones which are embodied in particular and more purposeful organizational structures. Inter alia such formal rules embrace the Common Law, which from a spontaneous order in Fredrich Hayek’s sense (Hayek 19960, 1979) as having evolved without any conscious design, and which constrain human behaviors. But as soon as we talk about constraining human behaviors, we are implicitly acknowledging that there is some basic ‘human nature’ to be constrained. While we take up this question in greater detail below, as a first cut we can accept the economist’s model of ‘Homo Economicus’ which assumes that human beings are both rational and motivated purely by self interest: maximizing utility as consumers and (long term) profits (or some other goal) as producers. So, as a start, the function of the rules constraining human nature which comprise institutions must be to limit such self-seeking behavior. This immediately points to another significant feature and reason for the existence of institutions. If Robinson Crusoe was alone on his island he would have no reason to constrain his basic human nature. It is only with the appearance of Man Friday that some constraints on both him and Crusoe might be necessary if each co-operates so as to increase their mutual gains: and to do so by specializing in tasks in which each has a comparative advantage. This, then immediately leads us to the notion of ‘transactions costs’—a concept which is even more slippery to deal with then that of institutions. The reason why there us a close relation between institutions and transactions costs is that, as Robin Matthews pointed out several years ago, ‘to a large extent transactions costs are costs of relations between people’ (Matthews 1986:906); and that institutions are par excellence of controlling or influencing the form, content, and outcome of these interactions. Culture is the informal aspect of institutions which influence and constrain human behavior. But if ‘institutions’ are a murky concept, ‘culture’ is even more so. From my perspective, I have found an interpretation adopted by ecologists particularly useful (see e.g. Colinvaux 1983). They emphasize that, unlike other animals, the human beings is unique because of its intelligence and motivation to change its environment by learning. It does not have to mutate into a new species to adapt to the changed environment. It learns new ways of surviving in the new environment, and then fixes them by social custom. These social customs form the culture of the relevant group, which is then transmitted to new members of the group (mainly children) who do not have invent these ‘new’ ways de novo for themselves.
his definition of culture fits in well with the economists’ notion of equilibrium. Frank Hahn has described an equilibrium state as one where self-seeking agents learn nothing new so that their behavior is routinized (Hanh 1973). It represents an adaptation by agents to the economic environment in which the economy ‘generates messages which do not cause agents to change the theories which they hold or the policies which they pursue’ (Hahn 1973: 28). This routinized behavior is clearly close to the ecologist’s notion of social custom which fixes a particular human niche. On this view, the equilibrium will only be disturbed if the environment changes, and so, in the subsequent process of adjustment, the human agents will have to abandon their past theories, which would now have been falsified. To survive, they must learn to adapt to their new environment through a process of trial and error. There will then be a new social adapted themselves to their economic environment and where their expectations in the widest sense are in the proper meaning not falsified’ (Hahn, ibid.). This equilibrium need not be unique not optimal, given the environmental parameters. But once a particular adaptation to the new environment, it established, and is proved to be an adequate adaptation to the new environment, it is likely to be stable, as there is no reason for the human agents to alter it in any fundamental manner, unless and until the environmental parameters are altered. Not is this social order likely to be the result of a deliberate rationalist plan. We have known since Adam Smith that it is possible for an unplanned, but coherent and seemingly planned, social system to emerge from the independent actions of many individuals pursuing their different ends, which may lead to final outcomes very different from those intended. Here is maybe useful to distinguish between two major sorts of beliefs relating to different aspects of the environment. These are the material and cosmological beliefs of a particular culture. The former relate to ways of making a living, and beliefs about the material world—in particular about the economy. The latter relate to our understanding of the world around us and mankind’s place in it; which, in turn, will determine how people view the purpose and meaning of their lives, and their interpersonal relationships. There is considerable cross-cultural evidence that material beliefs are more malleable than cosmological ones. The former can and do respond rapidly to changes in the material environment. There is greater hysterisis in cosmological beliefs—on how, in Plato’s words, ‘one should live’. Moreover the cross—cultural evidence shows that, rather than the environment, it is the language group to which people belong that influences these world-views (Hallpike 1986).
his distinction between material and cosmological beliefs is important for economic performance because it translates into two distinct types of transactions costs which are important in explaining not only market but also government (or bureaucratic) failure. Broadly speaking, transactions costs can usefully be distinguished between those associated with the efficiency or exchange, and those associated with policing opportunistic behavior by economic agents. The former relate to the costs of finding potential trading partners and determining their supply—demand offers, and the latter to monitoring or enforcing the execution of promises and agreements.
hese two types of transactions costs need to be kept distinct from each other. The economic historian Douglass North (1990)and the institutionalist theorist Oliver Williamson (1985) have both evoked the notion of transaction costs, and used them to explain various organizational arrangements relevant for economic performance. While both are primarily concerned with the costs of opportunistic behavior, for North these arise as a result of the more idiosyncratic and non-repeated transactions accompanying the widening of the market, while for Williamson they stem from the asymmetries in information facing principals and agents in cases where the critical performance related characteristics of the agent in case where the critical performance related characteristics of the agent can be concealed from the principal. Both these where it is the policing aspects of transactions costs which are at issue, not those concerning exchange. The see the relevance of the distinction between beliefs and transactions costs for economic performance, it may be useful to briefly delineate how material and cosmological beliefs have altered since the Stone Age in Eurasia. Changing Material and Cosmological Beliefs On Human Nature Evolutionary anthropologists and psychologists maintain that human nature was set during the period of evolution ending with the Stone Age. Since the, there has not been sufficient time for any further evolution. This concept of human nature appears darker than Rousseau’s and brighter than Hobbes’ characterizations of it. It is closer to Hume’s view that ‘there is some benevolence, however small…some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent’ (Hume 1740/1985). For even the hunter-gatherer of the Stone Age would have found some form of what evolutionary biologists term ‘reciprocal altruism’ to his own benefit. He would have discovered that, in the various tasks the he had to pursue, co-operation with his fellows yielded gains which might be further increased if he could cheat and be a free rider. In the repeated interactions between the selfish humans comprising the tribe, such cheating could be mitigated by playing the game of ‘tit for tat’. Evolutionary biologists claim that the resulting ‘reciprocal altruism’ was part of our basic human nature in the Stone Age. Archaeologists have also established that the instinct to ‘truck and barter’—the trading instinct based on what John Hicks used to call the ‘economic principle’ (Hicks 1979)1—is also of Stone Age vintage. It is also part of our basic human nature. Agrarian Civilizations
ith the rise of settled agriculture and the civilizations that evolved around them, however, and the stratification this involved between three classes of individuals—those wielding respectively the sword, the pen, and the plough—most of the basic instincts which comprised our human nature in the Stone Age were to become dysfunctional. Thus with the multiplication of interactions between human beings in agrarian civilizations, many of the transactions would have been with anonymous strangers who might never be seen again. The ‘reciprocal altruism’ of the Stone Age which depended upon a repetition of transaction would not be sufficient to curtail opportunistic behavior. Putting it differently, the ‘tit for tat’ strategy of the repeated Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game among a band of hunter-gatherers in the Stone Age, would not suffice with the increased number of one-shot games consequential upon the arrival of settled agriculture, and the widening of the market for its output. To prevent the resulting dissipation of the mutual gains from co-operation, agrarian civilizations internalized restraints on such ‘anti-social’ action through moral codes which were part of their religions. But these religions were more ways of life, and did not necessarily depend upon a belief in God. Throughout much of history, the moral emotions of sham and guilt have been the predominant means by which moral codes embodied in cultural traditions are internalized in the socialization process during infancy. Shame was the major instrument of this internalization in the great agrarian civilizations. Their resulting cosmological beliefs can fairly be described as being ‘communalist’.
he basic human instinct to trade would also be disruptive for settled agriculture. For traders are motivated by instrumental rationality which maximizes economic advantage. This would threaten the communal bonds that all agrarian civilizations tried to foster. Not surprisingly, most of them have looked upon merchants and markets as a necessary evil, and sought to suppress them and the market which is their institutional embodiment. The material beliefs of the agrarian civilizations were thus not conducive to modern economic growth, the major institutions of which can be summed up as capitalism. The Rise of the West
s I have argued elsewhere (Lal 1998b), the great divergence of Western Europe from the other Eurasian civilizations occurred because of a change in the cosmological and material beliefs, mediated by the Catholic Church in the sixth to eleventh centuries. These it promoted thorough encouraging the cult of individualism, first in family affairs and later in material relationships. The first were a series of pronouncements by Pope Gregory I in sixth century on family maters (Goody 1983), and the second those by Gregory VII in the eleventh century on property and institutionally related issues (Berman 1983). This latter pronouncement was particularly important, in that its Eurasian peers. These twin Papal revolutions arose because of the unintended consequences of the church’s search for bequests—a trait that goes back to its earliest days. From its inception it had grown as a temporal power through gifts and donations—particularly from rich widows. So much so that, in July 370 the Emperor Valentinian had addressed a ruling to the Pope that male clerics and unmarried ascetics should not ‘hang around’ the house of women and widows trying to worm themselves and their churches into their bequests, at the expense of the women’s families and blood relations. From its very beginnings then, the church was in the race for inheritances. In this respect, the early church’s extolling of virginity and preventing second marriages helped it in creating more single women who would leave bequests to the church. This process of inhibiting a family from retaining its property and promoting its alienation accelerated with the answers that Pope Gregory I gave to some nine questions that first Archbishop of Canterbury, Augustine, had sent in 597 concerning his new charges. Four of these nine questions concerned issues related to sex and marriage. Gregory’s answer overturned the traditional Mediterranean and Middle Eastern patterns of legal and customary practices in the domestic domain. The traditional system was concerned with the provision of an heir to inherit family property. It allowed marriages between close kin, close affines, or widows, of close kin; it also permitted the transfer of children by adoption, and finally concubinage, which is a form of secondary union. Gregory banned all four practices. There was for instance, no adoption of children allowed in England until the nineteenth century. There was no basis for these injunctions in Scripture, Roman law, or the existing customs in the areas that were Christianized (Goody 1983). This Papal family revolution made the church unbelievably rich. Demographers have estimated that the net effect of the prohibitions on traditional methods to deal with childlessness was to leave 40% of families with not immediate male heirs. The church became the chief beneficiary of the resulting bequests. Its accumulation was phenomenal. In France, for instance, it is estimated that one-third of productive land was in ecclesiastical hands by the end of the seventh century! (Goody 1983). But this accumulation also drew predators from within and outside the church to deprive it of its acquired property. It was to deal with this denudation that Pope Gregory VII instigated his Papal revolution in 1075. In this, he put the power of God—through the spiritual weapon of excommunication—above that of Caesar’s. With the Church then entering into the realm of the world, the new church-state also created on extensive administrative and legal paraphernalia which, in many respects, was the forerunner of our modern polity. This provided the essential institutional infrastructure for the Western dynamic that, in time, was to lead to promethean growth.2 Thus Pope Gregory VII’s Papal revolution lifted the lid on the basic human instinct to ‘truck and barter’, and this triggered a change in the traditional Eurasian pattern of material beliefs with their triggered a change in the traditional Eurasian pattern of material beliefs with their suspicion of markets and merchants. This eventually led to modern economic growth But the first Papal revolution of Gregory the Great also led to a change in the traditional Eurasian family patterns which were based on various forms of ‘joint families’ and family values. This essentially removed the lid placed on the other opportunistic basic instincts by the shame-based moral codes of Eurasia. To counter the potential threat this posed to its way of making a living by way of settled agriculture, the church created a fierce guilt culture in which the concept of Original Sin was paramount, ad morality was underwritten by the belief in the Christian God (Delumeau 1990) Communalism versus Individualism Of the major Eurasian civilizations, the ethic of the Sinic (and its derivatives in Japan and Korea) and the Hindu, has remained distinctly ‘Communalist’ rather than individualist for millennia. But there were important differences in the cosmological beliefs of these two ancient civilizations. Hindu Civilization
he ancient Hindu, unlike the Sinic, civilization did have a role for a form of individualism, which was reminiscent of that found among the Greek Stoics. The anthropologist Louis Dumont has labeled this as ‘out-worldly’ individualism as contrasted with the ‘in-worldly’ individualism, which is the hallmark of the ‘modern’ individual. Hinduism allows the person who renounces the world and becomes an ascetic to pursue his own personal salvation without any concern for the social world. Like the Greek Stoic, this Hindu ‘renouncer is self-sufficient, concerned only with himself. His through is similar to that of the modern Western individual, but with one basic difference: we live in the social world, he lives outside it’ (Dumont 1986: 26). For a Hindu who had not renounced the social world Western individualism is impossible. Ernest Gellner explains why, by imagining a Hindu Robinson Crusoe, a polyglot called Robinson Chatterjee. ‘A Hindu Crusoe’, he notes, ‘would be a contradiction. He would be destined for perpetual pollution: if a priest, then his isolation and forced self-sufficiency would oblige him to perform demeaning and polluting acts. If not a priest, he would be doomed through his inability to perform the obligatory rituals’ (Gellenr 1988: 121). Sinic Civilization
he ancient Sinic civilization did not even have the ‘out-worldly’ individualism of the Hindus and the Greeks. Its central cosmological beliefs may be summarized as its optimism, its familialism and its bureaucratic authoritarianism (Hallpike 1986; Jenner 1992). Interacting and influencing these characteristics were the embedded customs of ‘ancestor worship and its social and political correlates involving hierarchy, ritual deference, obedience and reciprocity’ (keightely 1990: 45). There is little room for even the ‘out-worldly’ individualism of the Hindus or Greeks in these cosmological views which became labeled as Confucianism. This is in spite of the continuing controversy over whether the ancient sage should be lumbered with whatever were (and are) seen to be the distinctive features of Chinese civilization. In our own day and age, partly provoked by the events surrounding Tianenmen Square in 1992, there has been an attempt to reconcile Confucianism with Western notions of ‘human rights’ (de Bary 1998; de Bary and Tu Weiming 1998). But apart from the murkiness surrounding the notion of ‘rights’, even within the Western philosophical tradition, as Henry Rosemont rightly notes, within the Confucian framework. rights-talk was not spoken, and within which I am not a free, autonomous individual. I am a son, husband, father, grandfather, neighbor, colleague, student, teacher, citizen, and friend. I have a very large number of relational obligations and responsibilities, which severally constrain what I do. These responsibilities occasionally frustrate or annoy, they more often are satisfying and they are always binding . . . And my individuality, if anyone wishes to keep the concept, will come form the specific actions I take in meeting my relational responsibilities. (Rosemont 1998:63) As he rightly notes, the attempt to reconcile a different ‘way to live’ with the universal claims of Christianity has been a constant factor in the West’s encounter with China. Throughout history, views have differed between those who though the Chinese way was incompatible with universal Christian beliefs seeking conversion, and others—of a less imperialist bent—who have sought ways of making Chinese beliefs fit the universal Christian ethic. What is the Role of Science in a Globalizing World? Part II What is the Main Thrust of World Science Today?
he overriding concern of man today is that science should function as a tool for sustainable development, a means of improving the quality of life man on earth. This is why attention has been focused on four principal concerns, namely, energy, the environment, food, and communication. Science is expected to find solutions to problems that beset these sectors through research and development in four principal areas, namely;
What are the implications for Africa? Today in the USA, there is active research and development going on in the area of hydrogen fuels obtained form water. When the commercialization of the device succeeds, it will reduce or eliminate the importance of petroleum in world politics. It will also place nations that have not developed the capability to produce this new kind of fuel at a disadvantage. This will include most of the African continent, with the probable exception of South Africa. USA has also built a prototype power station that it is hoped “will turn in a performance that any conventional generating plant would be hard pressed to match. It will derive energy from fuel without burning it, turning it into many kilowatts of electricity, usable heat, and water of a purity that no mountain spring could match. At the same time, it will produce only a modest amount of carbon dioxide.” Eventually, its performance will be more reliable than that of the conventional power plant with a lower cost of operation. Energy consumption is a reliable measure of modern civilization. The bottom line is that, there really is a need for Africa to join in such research as hydrogen fuels and other forms of alternative energy? Africa must not wait for the Americans to produce it then later complain about being enslaved. The January / February 2002 issues of the journal technology review, published by Massachusetts institute of Technology (MIT), some new energy technologies that might propel Americans to the post-petroleum age are discussed in sufficient detail. When they succeed, the five or six discussed methods will send countries Nigeria into panic. African governments should not be laying out blueprints for the post- petroleum age that is in the offing, whether they have petroleum reserves or not. Two or three decades ago, African scientists gave lecturers on strategies that various African nations should adopt for development. The main paradigm at that time was that one had to learn to walk before one could run. At the urging of European countries, African scientists held on to the concept of appropriate technology for Africans, and argued endlessly about what was known as transfer of technology. Appropriate technology is technology packaged to match the state of development or under-development of a developing country. It is based on the assumption that such a country does not have what it takes to grapple with the intricacies of modern technology, and therefore must be assisted. There were those who insisted that there was no such thing as transfer of technology. Others argued that it was there all over the place. That was decades ago. However, it is important to note that many scientists of the older generation consider and appreciate the need for a shift of paradigm of appropriate technology because it does not fit into what is now the global village. An aspect of science in a globalizing world that impacts on Africa is the “Tokunbo syndrome”. “Tokunbo” is Nigerian colloquialism for second hand European goods. The rapid development of technology in the West has given rise to an equally rapid rate of obsolescence, especially in the automobile sector. Equipment that does not satisfy the stringent standards operative in a hi-tech oriented society finds a ready market in Africa. This has both a positive and a negative impact. The positive is that it temporarily takes care of the short-term needs of cash-strapped consumers in Africa. The long-term effect is, however, harmful, as the easy availability of such equipment impedes all efforts at local development of technology, and removes any initiatives that might have been lying dormant in the local folk. The internet has opened up a vast array of possibilities worldwide. Wireless communication has topped it up. There are areas in which Africans can compete quite effectively with the West. One such area is software development, without which computers cannot function. To make scientific progress that would benefit the masses in Africa, it is not necessary for the entire population to engage in scientific research. However, three things are needed:
eapfrogging is used figuratively to denote the process of vaulting over the intermediate steps in technological development. It means jumping from where we are to where we ought to be an active part of the global village that the world is tending to be. It should be the new paradigm for African countries, taking into account the enormous possibilities provided by the internet. In practice, this would involve a selection of a few areas, at a time, and the concentration of effort and resources in this area. Serious work is currently going on in the area of biotechnology directed at improving the yield of Africa’s agricultural products. Frontline research should also be carried out in theoretical/mathematical physics, aspects of material science, natural products chemistry, pharmacology of herbs, and in the applications of solar energy, to mention a few areas. Conclusion
lobalization of science can have a positive impact on the development of African countries if its possibilities are fully grasped. One effective way in which progress can be made in this regard is through the establishment of advanced research laboratories like SHESTCO, Abuja, Nigeria in all African countries. In these laboratories highly motivated scientists should be given the tools and the environment needed to leapfrog into the world stage using the assistance provided by the internet. “A little at a time” should be the slogan at the beginning. The spirit would spread to the universities and other government research institutes. Ultimately, the end users in the street will feel the impact of such ground-breaking innovations. All this requires proper planning and basic commitment at the relevant levels. AFRICAN TECHNOLOGY POLICY STUDIES NETWORK, Awele Maduemezia Quotes This election is not about ideology: it’s about competence.William E. Simon A guide to the 99th Congress, 1985 Every State must conquer or be concurred Michael Bakunin Federalism, socialism and Anti-Thologism 1868 To word state is identical with the word war.Prince Peter Kropotkin Paroles from Plymouth Pulpit1885 AIDS in Africa: Three Scenarios to 2025 Traps and legacies: The whirlpool ‘Traps and legacies’ is a story in which Africa as a whole fails to escape from its more negative legacies, and AIDS deepens the traps of poverty, underdevelopment, and marginalization in a globalizing world. Despite the good intentions of leaders and substantial aid from international donors, a series of seven traps prevent all but a few nations or privileged segments of the population from being able to escape continuing poverty and continued high HIV prevalence. This scenario is told as a series of lectures by an acclaimed African author. She explores why Africa in 2025 still carries a huge AIDS burden, along with widespread poverty and instability. She recognizes that, even in an overall landscape of poverty, there are still those individuals, sectors, and even countries that have done well, but she does not seek to put their stories in the foreground. The scenario suggests that HIV and AIDS will continue to receive very strong emphasis in the near future—but that responses are fractured and short-term, often fail to reflect the realities of everyday life, and therefore fail to deliver a lasting solution. By 2025 the demographic, social, and economic impacts of the epidemic, repeated over several generations (particularly in countries with an HIV prevalence of over 5%), have depleted the resources of households and communities. A ‘missing’ generation of grandparents in just one example of the demographic impacts, while a growing number of children orphaned by the epidemic are less skilled, less cared for, and less socially integrated than their parents. Many have little to lose, and lose, and perhaps feel they may gain from conflict and instability. The effects of these social impacts spill over into countries with lower HIV prevalence. The scenario identifies seven traps that preclude effective, long-term, or widespread development in Africa.
‘Traps and legacies’ describes how AIDS does catalyze people and institutions into a response, but they cannot make sufficient headway with depleted capacities and infrastructure. The additional burden of responding to the AIDS epidemic detracts forms other development efforts—continuing underdevelopment in turn undermines the ability of many countries to get ahead of the epidemic. The scenario shows growing disunity and disintegration, diminishing capacity, ongoing ethnic and religious tensions, and wasted resources, with (initially) abundant funding supporting a growing so-called AIDS industry alongside the epidemic. It shows how, despite good intensions, the epidemic will simply continue across many countries and populations in the continent as:
In this scenario, across the continent by 2025, HIV prevalence remains similar to today, at around 5% of the adult population, with some countries above, or below this level. The high prevalence rate translates into continuing reduced life expectancy across many countries, and an increase in the number of people living with HIV and AIDS of more than 50%. Prevention efforts are not effectively scaled up—although the level of services achieved in 2004 is maintained and expanded, it only grows at the same rate as the population. Efforts to roll out antiretroviral therapy continue, but are impeded by a combination of underdeveloped and overwhelmed systems, and overall cost. By 2015 a little over 20% of people who needed antiretroviral therapy have access to it and this figure stubbornly refuses to budge for the rest of the scenario. Care and treatment for a minority still costs an average of US$ 1.3 billion per year over the 23 years of the scenario. By 2025 this scenario is still costing US$ 4 billion per year in HIV – and AIDS-specific programme costs—just to keep service provision at the level that it is today. Because there is a failure to get ahead of the epidemic in terms of prevention, the costs continue to rise, and this rise continues into the foreseeable future. ‘Traps and legacies’ offers a disturbing window on the future death toll future across the continent, with the cumulative number of people dying from AIDS increasing more than fourfold, and the number of children orphaned by the epidemic continuing to rise beyond 2025. Times of transition: Africa overcomes ‘Times and transition’ is the story of what might happen if all of today’s good intentions were translated into the coherent and integrated development response necessary to tackle HIV and AIDS in Africa. The scenario is told as an account by a storyteller and some pf her friends, as they look back from 2036 at the changes that took place in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. This scenario is about the transitions and transformations that must take place in the way in development, trade, security, and international relations, in order to achieve the goals of having the numbers of people living with HIV and AIDS and ensuring that the majority of those who need antiretroviral therapy have access it by 2025. A set of six interlocking transformations reshaping Africa’s future, and its place in the world, is identified in the scenario:
These transitions begin with a growing perception of crisis; the AIDS epidemic acts as an overarching symbol of many other problems facing Africa and the world in this scenario, including the potential collapse of the regulation of world trade; the failure to meet the Millennium Development Goals; continuing global inequality; the undermining of the multilateral order; the growth of terrorism; and urgent evidence of continuing climate change. The prospect of another century of conflict and impoverishment drives changes in attitudes, values, and behavior—catalyzed by civil society as much as by state leadership. Transitions in the delivery of aid, in the rules around trade, in addressing human security, and in national and international governance are fundamental, leading in time to a more stable world, with benefits for the global North and South. There is a doubling of aid flows to Africa, sustained for a generation, with investments in health systems, agriculture, education, electrification, water, roads, social development, and institutional and governance capabilities. ‘Times of transition’ describes fundamental changes in the ways donors provide aid and the ways governments deal with that aid so that it promotes sovereignty, does not undermine autonomy, is not inflationary, and does not promote dependency. This scenario describes a mobilization of national and international civil society. It begins with treatment activists working towards the safe delivery of antiretroviral therapy, and leads to a gradual broadening of civil society concerns, skills, and engagements. It describes new roles and partnerships for international business. The story suggests that, if these transitions could be made in a generation, they could dramatically reduce the number of people infected with HIV. They could fundamentally alter the future course of Africa, and the world, in the 21st century. In ‘Times of transition’, the number of people living with HIV and AIDS almost halves between 2003 and 2025, despite the fact that the population grows by 50%. The gender bias in infection and prevalence begins to even out, though women are still slightly more adversely affected at the end of the scenario. The scaling up of antiretroviral therapy is dramatic: over the course of the scenario, access expands rapidly, to reach almost half of those who need treatment by 2012. By the end of the scenario, coverage has increased to 70% -- reflecting the fact that expanding care beyond the capacity of existing health systems will be a time consuming and painstaking process. Despite lengthened lives due to antiretroviral therapy, total cumulative deaths on the continent continue to rise, leading to a steady increase in the number of children orphaned by AIDS, although the longer life-spans of parents has made a significant difference in the socialization of many children. Achieving this scenario requires cumulative investments of nearly US$ 200 billion, in the context of greater overall investments in health, education, infrastructure, and social development. HIV- and AIDS – specific funding is increased at an average year-on-year rate of more than 9% and spending is most rapid in the early phases, with external costs. Spending reaches US$ 10 billion per year by 2014 and remains at this level until near the end of the scenario when it begins to tail off, reflecting the fact that earlier investments are paying off. The important message of this scenario is that early expenditure, with a continuous growth in prevention spending, means that the care and treatment budget can being to decline as early as 2019, as the total number of people living with HIV and AIDS begins to fall. Implications and learning from across the three scenarios Taken as a set, the three scenarios introduce some important considerations for activists, policy makers, programme-planers, and those implementing actions to take into account as they think about the future. A sufficient response to the epidemic is still not guaranteed: reversals in the current level of interest are still possible and everything must be done to prevent AIDS fatigue. The scenarios suggest that, while the worst of the epidemic’s impact is still to come, there is till a great deal that can be done to change the longer-term trajectory of the epidemic and to influence the overall numbers of people who the epidemic will affect. Women’s social, economic, and physiological vulnerability to HIV is well understood, but the policies and actions that might best protect them have not been well implemented. In tackling HIV, it is important to go beyond a narrow focus on women’s risk to HIV exposure. Measures to improve the status of women are also needed, such as universal education for girls; reducing violence against women; and ensuring that women have equal access to property, income, and employment. Effectively addressing the gender issues that lie at the heart of the AIDS epidemic would have immense transformative power, catalyzing social, economic and political reforms etc. Comparing Key Issues across the three scenarios HIV and AIDS programmes thus far have been predominantly resourced with external funds and this trend looks as if it will continue for many years to come. However, most commitments do not extend beyond the next five years, and uncertainty remains about the level of resources that will be available in the future. ‘Tough choices’ shows what is possible when there are efficient domestic polices but stagnant external aid: ‘Times of transition’ shows what might happen if there are more efficient domestic policies and increased and high quality external aid; and ‘Traps and legacies’ shows what might happen if there are inefficient domestic polices and volatile or declining external aid. Exceptionalism versus isolationism A line must be drawn between treating HIV as an exceptional disease (exceptionalism) and playing attention only to HIV (isolationism). In ‘Tough choices’, the AIDS epidemic is seen as part of a wider crisis of African underdevelopment, and actions are taken by each nation—within relatively limited domestic and external resources—to tackle underdevelopment and to find development models that suit their particular needs and environments.
In ‘Times of transition’, the AIDS epidemic acts as a catalyst, helping people and institutions across the world to perceive the wider international peace and development crisis. AIDS engenders and exceptional response, but it is not treated in isolation from its wider social and economic context. The funding for AIDS takes place in the context of much wider developmental response. In ‘Traps and transition’, HIV is treated as the object of interventions, in isolation from its social and economic context. Because of the emphasis on antiretroviral therapy, the overall response is medically focused: HIV and AIDS are treated as a medical emergency and they capture much of the additional aid that goes to Africa between 2004 and 2010, diverting resources and capacities from other areas. There is no sustained investment in infrastructure, or in the structural and development issues that fuel the epidemic—including gender relations, poverty reduction, or cultural issues. Resource needs and utilization The scenarios make it clear that it is not only how much that is spent on HIV and AIDS programming the counts, but how well it is spent and the context in which it is spent. They show that major increases in spending will be needed to produce significantly better outcomes in terms of curbing the spread of HIV, extending treatment access, and mitigating impact—but that more resources without effective coordination and an improving context may do more harm than good. Major funding increases may serve to drive a massively improved response. The above figure shows the respective costs and outcomes of the three scenarios. Compared to ‘Traps and legacies’, ‘Times of transition’ achieves the better outcomes, averting 43 million new infections, while ‘Tough choices,’ which averts 24 million new infections, has a lower incremental cost per infection averted and quality-adjusted life year (QALY) saved. In pursuing universal goals, ‘Times of transition’ increase in cost, while ‘Tough choice’ covers the ‘easier to reach’ prevention cases. However, beyond the narrow calculation of relative cost-effectiveness, there is a far broader and longer-term social and economic benefit implied by the broader, concerted response to HIV and AIDS of ‘Times of transition’. Average annual spending in ‘Times of transition’ by 2025 will be almost US$ 11 billion, nearly three times the level of ‘Traps and legacies’, and twice that of ‘Tough choices’. Outcome will diverge dramatically: in ‘Times of transition’, the epidemic will have largely subsided; in ‘Tough choices’, the end will be in sight, but not yet achieved; and in ‘Traps and legacies’ it will continue to be a clear and present danger. Using the scenarios Developing scenarios is only a first step; they are more effectively explored and applied through interactive processes that encourage users to reflect on their individual and collective assumptions and understanding. With these scenarios, the project hopes to achieve the goals outline below.
For those who want to explore further, the accompanying CD-ROM contains most of the material commissioned for the project, both research papers and interviews, searchable by keyword. It also provides detailed reports of the project workshops and a number of presentations, which can be used to present the scenarios. In conclusion... To build scenarios is to engage with time: the drivers of the present and the future, and the legacies of the past. Time has different meanings in the three scenarios. ‘Tough choices’ tells that time is intergenerational: that the past matters; the value of ancestors, family history and identity profoundly shapes the present; and actions in the present are consequential not just for those alive today, but for those generations yet to come. In ‘Traps and legacies’, time is short, returns need to be immediate, targets are time-bound, and action is measured out in political terms of office. Long-wave events such as HIV and AIDS do not respond well to such short-termism. ‘Times of transition’ tells us something about the depth of time, rather that just its length. The transitions and transformations envisaged could take generations if they occurred consecutively. But this scenario tells of a world in which leapfrogging and synergy are dominant metaphors; where rapid progress against the epidemic possible because it rides on the back of other transitions taking place simultaneously. Development processes too rarely take account of time, other than to measure it out in conventional three-year or five-year cycles. Scenarios allow an engagement with a bigger picture, in terms of both the length of time considered and its depth. They allow an engagement with more dimensions of a problem, and provide a fuller canvas to explore. While the value of these scenarios will only be realized if they are widely communicated, debated, and used, what is offered here is a starting point for that process. About all, these scenarios tell us that, while on the one hand, any action is already too late for the millions who have died from AIDS; on the other hand, there is still time to change the further for many, many millions more. Conflict-Management Structures and Intervention Under the Ethiopian constitution BY Hashim Tewfiq Federalism in Ethiopia: Objective and conflict management structures
nder the Ethiopian constitution, there are three venues for the realization of the right to self-determination within the federation. One venue is at the grass-root level, that is, the territory that an ethnic community inhabits, and the others are at the member states’ and at the federal levels. At the grass root level, the implementation of the right to self-determination is manifested by the establishment of self-governments of ethnic communities in their respective habitats, and, at higher level, by their proportional representation in the State and Federal governments.27 For instance, the constitution attempts to fulfill the right of each ethnic community to proportional representation at the federal level by providing that each ethnic community is represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member for each one million population and by providing that there should be at least 20 seats reserved for minority ethnic communities in the House of Peoples’ Representatives, which consists of a maximum of 550 seats for representatives elected on basis of the system of plurality of votes.28 The proportional representation of the ethnic communities of Ethiopia in the federal state is not limited to the two houses of the federal parliament; it applies to the other branches of the government. The same holds true in the case of the constituent States.29 In addition to the right of every ethnic community to a self-rule and shared-rule, the constitution attempts to accommodate the demands of every ethnic community for statehood within the federation. Although the constitution declares nine member state of the federation, it simultaneously recognizes the right of each ethnic community within the states to establish, at any time, its own States30 and lays down the procedures for the exercise of such right.31 Under the constitution, the most important ad relevant constitutional organ for conflict management is the House of the Federation, which is “composed of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples”32. The House was created to maintain and develop the cooperation, partnership and consensual relationships of Ethiopia’s ethnic communities on the basis of equality and respect for their respective diversity while realizing their commitment to uphold the consituion.33 The competences of the House are, therefore, directly interlinked with the need to maintain and promote the constitutional compact of Ethiopia’s ethnic communities. In this regard, the relevant competences of the House are the competences a) to interpret the constitution34, b) to decide upon issues relating to the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession in accordance with the Constitution35, c) to promote the equality of the peoples of Ethiopia enshrined in the constitution and promote and consolidate their unity based on their mutual consnet36, and d) to strive to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between States37. As has bee pointed out above, constitutional supremacy is an essential prerequisite to the operation of any federal system. It establishes the obligation of both federal and constituent governments to be bound by the terms of their constitution. It also signifies the primacy of the constitution over all other rules of law and acts of the organs of state at every level. Hence, the constitution is the supreme law that upholds and validates the whole social, economic, political and legal order of a federated state. Accordingly, the operation of the principle of constitutional supremacy nullifies any laws and other governmental acts that are repugnant to the constitution.
onstitutional umpiring is one of the major implications of the principle of constitutional supremacy.38 Indeed, it is an institutional mechanism to address inter-governmental disputes that might arise from the existence of the vertical division of powers in federations.39 Furthermore, it is aimed at ensuring the autonomy and identity of the federal and the constituent entitles of a federal system. If the authority and identity of the federal and the constitutional disputes were to lie in either level of government alone, it would have made one order of government dependent on another, undermining the division of powers required for the existence of a federal system.40 Therefore, in order to ensure the autonomy and integrity of the federal and the component governments, it is necessary to set up a neutral and independent constitutional umpire. The umpire interprets and applies the federal constitution and passes upon the constitutionality of enactments and actions of the federal government as well as the constituent governments. It is, thus, considered to be the most reliable sanction for the preservation of a federal structure. The existing federations envisage three types of constitutional umpiring arrangements. The first type is constitutional umpiring by the highest Court of law that has jurisdiction over all laws including the constitution as for example is the case in the United States, Canada, Australia, India, Malaysia and Austria. The second type is constitutional umpiring by a separate constitutional court specializing in constitutional interpretation as for example is the case Germany, Belgium and Spain. The third type is reflected in the Swiss federal system. In this case, the Federal High Court has power to adjudicate conflicts of competence between the federal and component entitles or among the latter; and it has also jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints based on the constitutional rights of citizens. In all these circumstances, the court has to apply the laws and generally binding decrees by the Federal Assembly as well as international treaties approved by this Assembly. Moreover, while the Court can rule on the constitutionality of Cantonal legislation, it cannot do so on federal legislation. This one way judicial umpiring of Swiss federalism, is however, balanced since the Swiss people have direct political control over federal legislation by means of popular referendum (that is, compulsory and optional referenda) and people’s initiative. Hence, it is the people and not the courts that umpire constitutionality of federal laws in Switzerland. The Ethiopia federal constitution, on the other hand, introduces a new type of constitutional umpiring mechanism. That is, Constitutional Court, but by the House of Federation, which is one of the Federal Houses. The House of federation is entrusted with the power to interpret the constitution. But the role of constitutional umpiring is not limited to House of Federation. It also involves a quasi-judicial body known as the Council of constitutional Inquiry, which is authorized to investigate constitutional dispute and submit its recommendation to the House of Federation., it is the House of Federation that has the authority to decide on “all constitutional disputes”, it is supported by the Council of constitutional Inquiry, which is established by the constitution with the power to investigate constitutional disputes. The Council is, however, required to submit its recommendations to the House of Federation of it find it necessary to interpret the constitution.
he Constitutional Inquiry Council has eleven members comprising the Chief Justice and the Vice chief Justice of the Federal Representatives and appointed by the President. Furthermore, although the constitution does not provide for the procedural rules that are to be followed in the working of the Constitutional Council, these rules are set down by the House of Federation on the basis of its power to organize the Council. The Council is directly accountable to the House of Federation, which may use the Council’s legal expertise in its attempts to resolve constitutional disputes. Although the federal constitution clearly delineates the competence of the House of Federation and the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, it is silent on the extent and content of the power constitutional interpretation. When Article 62(1), which proclaims that “The House of Federation shall have the power to interpret the constitutional”, is read conjointly with Article 83(1), which says that “All constitutional disputes shall be decided by the House of Federation”, it seems to limit the scope of the power of constitutional interpretation to constitutional disputes. Moreover, on the basis of Article 84(2), which points out that “Where any federal and state law is contested as being unconstitutional and such dispute is submitted to it by any court or interested party, the Council shall consider the matter and submit it to the House of Federation for a final decision”, constitutional disputes might seem to refer to, and be restricted to, court cases involving issues of constitutionality of laws.
n the other hand, the scope of the power of constitutional interpretation seems to have been understood broadly in the evolving practice and jurisprudence of the House of Federation and the Council of Constitutional Inquiry. For instance, these two organs of constitutional umpiring in the case of the Silte accepted and exercised jurisdiction over petitions of individuals claiming for the recognition of the identity of their community. They have also entertained a question of the Prime Minster’s Office requesting constitutional interpretation in regard to whether the House of Peoples’ Representatives could issue a uniform family law to all regional states of the federation. Thus, it is the acceptance and exercise of jurisdiction over such matters by the institutions of constitutional umpiring that suggests a wider meaning to the scope of the power of constitutional interpretation. However, what the power of ‘constitutional interpretation’ purports to signify remains to be ambiguous both in the words of the federal constitution as well as the practice of the institutions of constitutional umpiring. For instance, it is not clear whether it entails jurisdiction over a) conflicts between federal and state laws, b) the delineation and interpretation of the extent of responsibilities allocated to state organs constituted by the federal constitution, c) requests of individuals for enforcement of their constitutionally recognized rights and freedoms. This lack of clarity on the scope of the power of constitutional interpretation is compounded by the Federal Courts proclamation, which gives judicial authority to federal courts over “cases arising on the basis of the federal constitution”. Consequently, the existence of such ambiguity and confusion is a major problem standing in the way of the smooth functioning of the constitutional umpiring process. Therefore, the scope and content of the power of constitutional interpretation need to be delineated and elaborated by law. The competence of the House of Federation in promoting equality and consolidating unity among the various people of Ethiopia directly relates to the fundamental objectives of the constitution, which are to respect and promote ethnic diversity while enhancing and consolidating their unity. By their constitutional compact, as pointed out above, the peoples of Ethiopia have not only found it essentially necessary to guarantee the development of their corresponding identities but also they have committed themselves to build up a political and economic community through which they pursue their common interests. This is in fact predicated upon the recognition that their common destiny can best be served by rectifying the historically unjust relationships resulted from the hegemony of one ethnic identity and the suppression of that of others. In addition to entrenching equal rights for all ethnic groups, the constitution has made the House of Federation the arena through which these rights are protected and realized in practice. In this regard, the House is mandated to strive to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between states, which are the self-governments “established on the basis of the settlement pattern, language, identity and consent of the people concerned”. It is, however, interesting to note that the House of Federation is not expressly given with similar powers in respect to disputes between the federal state and the member states except on matters of constitutional issues. Yet one can detect from the rationale for the existence of the House of Federation that it is also competent to mediate and arbitrate non-constitutional disputes between the federal state and a member state.
n particular, the House of Federation is empowered to render a final decision on the basis of the settlement patterns and wishes of the peoples concerned in regard to questions of state border delineation where the concerned states have failed to reach into agreement. Another key competence of the House is the competence to decide, in accordance with the constitution, on issues relating to the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession. These issues encompass a wide range of demands revolving around the right of self-determination. Questions of preservation and promotion of linguistic and cultural identity, questions of establishing institutions of self-governments and participation in state and federal governments and demands for secession fall within the mandate of the House of Federation. The latter has to resolve such issues in accordance with the constitution. For instance, a demand for secession by any nation, nationality or people has to be approved by two-thirds of the members of its Legislative Council.
lthough the constitution has not clearly spelt out to which organ of the Federal State is such a demand to be made, it should be to the House of Federation simply because the latter has the power to decide on issues relating to the right of self-determination and secession, Moreover, for the same reason, it is the House of Federation that must organize a referendum within three years from the time it has received such demand. Similarly, it is the House of Federation that must transfer power to the concerned Council and prescribe the manner how the division of assets is to be made by law if the demand for secession is supported by a majority vote in the referendum. From the foregoing, one can see that the House of the Federation is given a pivotal role to play in building cooperation, partnership and unity among the diverse peoples of Ethiopia as well as in umpiring constitutional disputes. However, a number of questions that bear on the role of the House in conflict prevention and management might be asked:
The House of Federation is not only the interpreter of the constitution but it is also the ultimate defender of the constitutional compact. It is, for this purpose, empowered to order federal intervention if in violation of the Constitution, a member state endangers the constitutional order. In the following section; I will look into the issue of federal intervention. Endnote 27. Article 54(2) and (3), of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia. 28. Abera Jembere, “The Making of Constitution in Ethiopia.” In: New Trends in Ethiopian Stud | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||