African Linguistic Nationalism and the Discourse of Globalization

Human Security as a Global Public Good

Federalism

Multiculturalism and Federalism        Assefa Fiseha

Abstract 

The central theme of this paper is to consider the 1995 Ethiopian Federation in terms of its ability to forge unity out of diversity.  It is a historical fact that duality of authority between center and regional forces has existed for the greater part of the country’s history until the coming to power of Haile Selassie in 1930.  The last century, however, could mainly be characterized as state failure in many facets of public life and there are no merit schools of thought as to how the crisis can be interpreted.  This author contends that there is no merit in reducing the approach to a purely political or ethnic one.  Rather, it should be viewed as a state crisis resulting form a failure to build a nation out of the various ethno-linguistic and religious groups that were brought together in the second half of the 19^th century.   

ulticulturalism as a current discourse that attempts to address concerns of national minorities and sub-state identities as well as tensions in the nation-state elsewhere, are also vital for the Ethiopian context.  It is for this reason that federalism, as a concept, and federation, as an institution, remains relevant for Ethiopia.  As the experience of other multiethnic federations illustrates, the state should in one way or another reflect diversity without however compromising unity.  The two are prerequisites in any federation but the federation should reflect in its outcome where the forces of unity slightly prevail over the forces of diversity.  The Ethiopian Federation has tried to address this point but one notices the fact that, unlike many other federations, the forces of diversity have somehow prevailed over the forces of unity.  This is evident from the position of the ethnicities and the rights granted to them under the Constitution and in this respect it seems to have gone too far, at least from the federal principle.  This author contends that if as the Constitution claims Ethiopia is at least formally speaking a federation, were it from the unity-diversity combination, the doctrine of state rights, federal practice or contract theory, there is not room for state/ethnic sovereignty, but only respect for state autonomy under single political union. 

On the other hand, the Constitution offers too little in other respects.  Federalism promotes shared rule for some purposes and self-rule for others.  In multiethnic societies, federalism as an ideology forges unity out of diversity.  In this sense, it reshapes the two core values of the nation-state: the concept of popular sovereignty and the procedural aspect of democracy.  While the basic principle of one-man/one-vote is not attacked, it is somehow modified.  Federalism provides an entrenched position to minorities in the central decision making process so that they are not permanently outnumbered by majorities.  In the end, this is a key guarantee in transforming ethnic attachments into the political process and little is being done in this regard. 

“Multiethnic societies can survive only if all respective groups within the polity feel themselves as winners.”  L. Basta Fleiner  

1.  The Conflict Situation 

The Challenges of Building a Multiethnic State

Towards a boarder comprehen-sion of the issues  

ulticulturalism in the sense of co-existence within a given state of more than one ethnic group is gaining popularity after the crises in the former Yugoslavia and the USSR.  The right is national minorities is resulting in a threat to peace and security and thereby frustrating the legitimacy of the state. Multiculturalism arises from the incorporation of previously self-governing or autonomous territorially concentrated groups into a larger state.  The incorporation of such cultures/nations into the single state may be partly voluntary as in the 19^th century Switzerland in which linguistic and religious groups joined to form a federation, or involuntary as in the Ethiopian case of the 19^th century. 

ulticulturalism poses a challenge to the traditional conception of the nation-state.  One such challenge is the fact that the incorporated national minorities wish to remain as a distinct society alongside the majority culture and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as groups.  This goes against the traditional thinking within a nation-state that forces them to abandon their ethnicity providing only (and that is for the lucky ones!) respect for individual rights, as citizens, not as national minorities.  Besides, the nation-state claims universality based on citizens’ equality and homogeneity within a defined territory but plural societies are “polities of identities” (Basta, 2000).  Many authors have already indicated that such identity demands cannot be subsumed under the category of traditional civil and political rights (Kymlicka, 1995).   

Another challenge that multiculturalism poses to the nation-state is the emergence of sub-state nationalism and its subsequent effect on the existing state.  The claim made is that established states are unable to satisfy the interests and cultural demands of smaller, local minorities. These groups are not willing to accept what the ‘majority’ decide nor are the ‘majority willing to concede to a broad and consensus-based decision-making in order to broaden the legitimacy of the state.  The question put broadly is whether it is possible to address such national minority concerns within a liberal state or whether such a liberal state will adapt to these demands, or if we have to think of a new post-liberal state in these kinds of societies.

This is exactly one of the tensions that run through the 20^th century of the Ethiopian States (1930-1991).  Among others, the central government claimed to establish a nation-state with some semblance or respect for human rights (at least formally),  but with an assimilationist approach while the other various linguistic and religious groups urged the recognition of their identity and a fair share of participation in the political process.  

One of the most contested issues in the public discourse on Ethiopian politics remains the difficulty one has in interpreting state failure in the 20^th century.  While there is a consensus about the fact that both the Imperial state (1930-1974) and the military regime (1974-1991) failed to address, among other things, central political and economic issues, there is less consensus on the causes of state failure and in interpreting the conflict.  While some illustrate the cause of the conflict as resulting from the “ethnocratic” nature of the state and hence prescribe empowering the ethnic groups as a solution, others contend that the conflict is merely political, not ethnic, as the cause of disagreement is states power.   

Accordingly, the decentralization of power may be considered an adequate solution to redress the conflict.  The author contends that there is on merit in reducing each factor in diagnosing the conflict for each explains to a certain degree the character of the Ethiopian state in the 20^th century and hence urges a broader comprehension of the issues.   

The majority of authors seem to point to the fact that the over-centralization of power and economic resources by the dominant and elite group principally from Showa, which – despite genealogical marginali-zation of others should be considered as the underlying factor that exacerbated the prolonged war in Ethiopia.  A closer look at these writers would seem to suggest that the outbreak of ethnicity in public discourse is the result of this marginalization and hence cannot be considered as a factor in its own right in order to analyze the conflict. 

Markakis argues that “there is no doubt that ethnicity is one variable involved in analyzing the chemistry of the conflict.  However, ethnicity is often perceived as an independent variable and determining factor in the generation of conflict, and that is a misperception of reality.  The assertion of ethnic identity and aspirations do not always attain political expression, we need to inquire into the circumstances that encourage the politicization of ethnicity and lead to ethnic conflict”.  He then underscores the monopolization of state power on the part of some groups as a crucial factor.  According to him, the monopolization of state power took an “ethnocratic form” connoting the monopolization of power by a few or one ethnic group and the consequent exclusion of others.  The gist of his thesis is that “the conflict is political because the bone of contention is state power.  Monopolization meant that members of excluded ethnic groups lacked access to state power”.  Jon Abbink equally argues, “Ethnic revival is primarily a result of failing state policy, which excludes certain ethno-regional groups, and of a political strategy of aspiring but locked elite groups”  

arkakis casts doubt on the characterization of the conflict as ethnic.  He wrote, “Ethnicity certainly is a factor in the conflict, since in nearly all cases the opposing parties belong to groups with different ethnic identities.  Whether such differences in themselves are sufficient causes for conflict is debatable and to define the conflict a priori as ethnic is questionable” (Markakis, 1994).  Clapham’s position appears to be even stronger in this regard.  He wrote, “it is essential to point out that many of the current and recent conflicts have not in any meaningful sense been ethnic or have included ethnicity only as one element among others” (Clapham, 1994). 

Clapham, Abbink and Markakis then agree that many of the recent conflicts cannot be categorized as ethnic at all, or have included ethnicity as one element among others.  The politicization of ethnicity is however explained by the following contributory factors.  It is important to emphasize once again that according to the authorities the crisis is explained primarily in terms of political power: the centralization of power by what may be defined as a dominant elite group and subsequently the state is defined as an ethnocratic one.   

That the cumulative effect of these all would lead to an outburst of ethnic tension was rightly predicted.  As early as the 1960s, many warned that the march towards centralization, and state building on the assimilationist model could lead to disaster.  In 1965, Levine wrote that Amhara dominance is a fact that leads naturally to an outstanding question that concerns the relationship between the Amhara and non-Amhara peoples of the empire.   

He raised serious doubts as to the integration of the non-Amharas and warned that unless the system fairly incorporated them, “the present state of tribal clam may prove to be long prelude to a wasteful storm”.  Perham equally wrote that a threat of cultural self-determination was one major challenge to the Emperor, unless the traditional administrative provinces and the historic rivalry and cultural difference between Tigray and Shoa were resolved (Perham, 1963).  Clapham, too, pointed out in 1969 that the risk of division along ethnic or tribal lines with little doubt the greatest danger that Ethiopia would have to face (Clapham, 1969). 

One can make two quick observations as to the approach adopted by the authors.  There is no doubt that the approach to the crisis from a political perspective goes a long way to illustrate the conflict.  But to reduce it to only a political one is to miss another essential component of the crisis.  Indeed, their theory is based on two implicit, if not explicit assumptions.  One is the idea that ethnic aspirations do not always attain political expression (Markakis, 1998).  

And the second is the instrumental approach to ethnicity, which, among other things, states that ethnicity is fluid, in a constant flux and has no objective existence.   

Moreover, ethnicity is nothing but an artificial or erroneous comprehension of political and economic deprivation and hence the consequence of adopting more objective political and economic valuables.  But as the experience of India and Switzerland on the one hand and the discourse on ethnicity on the other demonstrate, both assumptions are not necessarily true and ethnicity to a certain degree is also an important variable.  Indeed the ruling party, the Ethiopia Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), interprets crisis solely on this basis and considers the political, economic and cultural factors as something resulting from, not causing it.  According to this perspective, the crisis is explained primary because of ethnic domination not only in political power but also in all other aspects of public life, not to mention the cultural hegemony.  It considers both regimes that defined the much broader notion of Ethiopian nationalism narrowly, structured the state accordingly and left the others at their mercy.  The centralization of power and economic resources at the center is simply a consequence, not the primary cause of this ethnocratic state.  The argument for the empowerment of the ethnic springs from this (Young, 1996).  

Based on this premise, the ruling party defined its struggle not on the basis of class or national party but along ethnic lines.  It believed that emphasizing the national question was the strategy to rally the oppressed peoples.  It stated, too, that the primary contradiction that had to be resolved was ethnic oppression.  It rejected the class-based approach proved very effective – while parties based on class or otherwise tragically failed.        

To be continued in the next issue

African Linguistic Nationalism and the Discourse of Globalization

By Inyani K. Simala

Introduction  

 feeling that is gaining currency among scholars of globalization in Africa is that due to the expansion of global communication networks and languages, the behaviour pattern and language preferences of the people on the continent could in a large way become similar to those of the north.  A wild and merciless globalization, which obeys only the law of competition, could result in the exclusion from society of a considerable number of people. Consequently, it is argued that all-embracing globalization should be guarded against with language counter-movements to reinforce and preserve individual linguistic identities.  

This issue discusses African Linguistic Nationalism (ALN) in the wake of globalization.  The focus of the issues is on the origins, tenets, and the resulting ideological foundations and institutional arrangements that African intellectuals shape in their search for common solutions to the plight of their languages.  In a period of rapid social change, growing political unification and global perspectives, it is natural to raise the question of African linguistic thought.  ALN is treated as an epoch in African cultural and intellectual history, and as part of the cultural component of the New World Order’s program of political and economic reform.   

Globalization and African Languages  

While scholars of varying backgrounds have discussed and analyzed specific elements of globalization such as markets, finances, trade, tourism, health, education, housing, security, etc., not much has been done in confronting and interrogating language as a social institution.  Part of the reason accounting for this marginalization is the way language has been divorced from economic development issues. 

This discourse on globalization compasses a very strong element of mythology.  What is significant is that, both as reality and as myth, globalization has had and continues to exert a profound impact on contemporary life and development.  Whereas the core feature of globalization is the increasingly integrated cross-border organizations of economic and financial activity worldwide, as a phenomenon, globalization itself occupies a social, technological and political space, which locates it as one form of phenomenon amongst a varied series of events, movements, and desires.  In earlier phases, dominant forces of globalization focused on ensuing access to cheap raw materials in the “periphery”.  In its current form, globalization is about power relations and the construction of hegemonic order.  The progeny of the species of globalization now in vogue is ascribed by many to the economic crisis of the 1970s whose search for solutions was via economic policies such as the Structural Adjustment programs propagated by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  However, according to Giddens (1990), it is wrong to think of globalization as just concerning the big systems, like the world financial order.  Globalization isn’t only about what is “out there”, remote and far away from the individual.  It is an “in here” phenomenon, too, influencing intimate and personal aspects of our lives. 

The constituents of globalization have been identified as an interdependent world; a New World Order (Ake 1992; Giddens 1999; Anyang’Nyong’o 1993; Matsecpe-Casaburri 1998); a new international division of labour and unequal and polarized global economy (Harvey 1989; Gahi 1992; Amin 1992, 1993a, 1994); a world of new flows of persons, cultures, ideas, finances, etc. (Aina 1997); and the emergence of new technologies (Graffin and Khan 1992; Amin  1993b).  On his part, Bohnet (1999, 12) distinguishes four kinds of globalization; cultural, political, ecological and economic – all of which are closely intertwined.  This view is shared by Giddens (1999, 4) who sees globalization as being political, technological and cultural, as well as economic.  According to him, globalization, as we are experiencing it, is in many respects not only new, but revolutionary.  It has been influenced above all by developments in systems of communication dating back only to the late 1960s.

The world is witnessing the replacement of an order dominated by orality, with profound revolution in the techniques and devices by which information, skills and ideas are collected, preserved and disseminated.  The new technologies have ushered in a transitional communication, global in its sway and logic.  Technological change and the resulting new standards of competition are at the heart of global communication, global in its sway and logic.  Technological change and the resulting new standards of competition are at the heart of global communication.  These developments have had immense influence on Africa, which now faces several dilemmas.  The north is the largest producer, consumer and exporter of information of all kinds.  Being the most advanced “information society”, it makes the greatest impact on Africa by its influence on media.  Travel, the press, books and literature, education, international conferences, technical assistance, and much more add to the communication flow of more obvious radio, television and satellite transmission.  What is significant enough to acknowledge is that the role of language in this whole process is not that of a passive reflection of other social changes. 

The boundaries that divide local, national and international communities are eroding.  The new communication systems increasingly pervade every home, vehicle and place of work, and involve almost every person everyday.  This globalized world system encourages homogenization of society and civilization.  Indeed, global communication is fast aiding the rapid shrinking of the world into a global village.  Given that globality is achieved on the basis of the expanding domination of given particularities at the expense of others, or on the basis of the consensus and common acceptance of the global standard, there is no doubt that globalization of language, as a core element of culture, is inevitable.  Cultural globalization is about the worldwide assimilation of cultural values through communication technologies, media, tourism, and consumption patterns, as well as the international exchange of ideas.  

It has to be observed that while language is our means of communication, it is not simply a neutral medium for us to understand and make sense of the world by providing a cognitive framework of concepts.  It is through the use of such a framework consisting of words and meanings that we interpret the worlds, represent it into our minds, talk about it and exchange information with other people.  Our entire knowledge and experience of the world is mediated by language.  The way we organize and articulate our experience is an interpretative process that takes place mainly through communication in language.  Thus, language is a social creation, practice and activity, which is more than just a way of thinking about and describing other social activities, but one which constitutes, manages and negotiates all kinds of social relations from family to citizen, to state and to the wider global community.  Contemporary society is in a period of rapid transformation.  What is taking place is the largest scale of acculturation process.  And information and communication are both the life-blood and essence of the momentum.  On the linguistic scene, there is an emerging Darwinian struggle of languages for survival.  In fact, some observers argue that rapidly predominant language.  In principle, linguistic globalization should allow for a better means of communication.   

However, the danger is that eliminating linguistic barriers means at the same time eliminating protection and thus increasing vulnerability.  This essentially leads to loss of genuine linguistic identity.  Throughout history, a small number of languages, sometimes only one, have dominated.  Latin became the lingua franca of Europe through the military might of Rome.  For hundreds of years after the Roman Empire collapsed, Latin was still the means of communication in politics, scholarship, religion and culture.  Until about 1970, French came close to being the dominant international language, at least in affairs between governments, commerce and the arts.  Through still widely used, it continues to lose its influence to English, which, since the Second World War, has increasingly assumed the role of dominant world language.  

Globalization, in its latter-day form, has been linked to modernization.  To many skeptical observers of the phenomenon, it means the Westernization of cultural and educational institutions, beliefs and practices.  It entails the transition from localism to cosmopolitanism as an aspect of the more general change from particularism to universalism.  This process has had a direct effect on key areas of government policies, including language.  Although globalization may provide some countries with opportunities for growth, it also involves the risk of jeopardizing the efforts of others to make independent policy decisions.  Little consideration is given to the effects of this process on the role and sovereignty of the state and other key social institutions and on the relevance of cultural values and norms is social integration and nation building. 

frica finds itself immersed in global dynamics of market-driven development, that which is progressively breaking down not only economic but also ideological and socio-cultural barriers.  The identity that African countries tried so jealously to protect in the past is beginning to change as these societies become part of a global political economy.   All kinds of domestic issues are being linked to what is happening in nations that are more powerful.  In a word, African countries are increasingly becoming dependent on the North.  It should be understood that dependency relationships do not necessarily entail the rich North physically dominating Africa; it is enough that African leaders and /or the elite of the continent hold attitudes, values and interests consistent with those in the rich countries.  In examining the role of the state in social reform in the context of globalization, it is important to consider that the new forms of dependencies of African countries on the north may easily result in greater linguistic vulnerabilities.  This is especially so, considering that every language is a social practice and reflects power relations, domination and ideology of society.  

Language conditions in Africa must be seen to be caused by situations of the rich countries.  The US is the largest producer, processor, repository, and exporter of information in the world.  On the other hand, the European Union has also become an important global player.  The Green Paper on “Relationships between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries on the eve of the 21^st Century” and Article B of the Maastricht Treaty, clearly spell out the goal the EU of asserting its identity at international the level.  These powerful countries exert a homogenizing influence over ideas, culture and language, which deeply penetrates the consciousness of people around the world, and especially in Africa.   

It is evident that the twin forces of globalization and liberalization are powerful processes that ate marginalizing the continent.  This peripheralization of the continent has adverse socio-economic consequences that add to the burdens of everyday life.  It is prudent that Africa guards against forms of globalization, which impose solutions that ignore the historical, cultural and psychological elements peculiar to national or local conditions.  Globalization must not mean uniformity.  Any insistence on “pulling away” power or influence form local communities and nations into the global arena will inevitably result in the revival of local cultural identities.  Local nationalisms spring up as a response to globalizing tendencies, as the hold of older nation-states weakens.  

African Linguistic Nationalism 

An attempt at definition  

An attempt of define exactly what African Linguistic Nationalism (ALN) is would be out of place here.  This is because of two reasons:  First, ALN is a new concept whose exact meaning is not always clear, although its new concept whose exact meaning is not always clear, although its implications now and in the future cannot be ignored.  Second, nationalism is a complex and changing phenomenon, which has never been defined positively and authoritatively.  Further, it is profoundly entangled in other social, political and philosophical cleavages.  A social movement involving a set of demands whose purpose is to advance the interests of one’s nation or nationality characterizes nationalism.  As an intellectual and moral sensibility, nationalism is the common idiom of contemporary political feeling. 

Thus, cultural nationalism is the spiritual source composed of the ethos, language, and socio-economic interests of a people that find genuine expression on an artistic, social and political level.  African Linguistic Nationalism can, therefore, be understood be both an intellectual and a social movement for which the focus on indigenous languages is a central issue.  It is a body of socio-political thought and an expression of true patriotic fervor in that it is striving for language rights.  It is a means of strengthening.  African national feeling so as to avert the threat of linguistic extinction.  Bold minds have appeared to assert and defend the rights of African indigenous mother tongues.  

 language problem is actually a cultural problem, or even more generally a social one.  Consequently, ALN is a social struggle, a struggle for equal linguistic opportunities.   Although cultural nationalism has always been a part of the African experience, with the advent of modern globalization, this nationalistic posture has become particularly significant, for the epoch has contributed to a mood of intense introspection and self-analysis within Africa, a mood which is not new but which is extensive and complex.  The contemporary international system of nation-states is being rigorously challenged not only by radical globalism, but also by the burgeoning phenomenon known as non-state nationalism.  Because language is an important ingredient of national identity, encourages nationalism.  Posting the ubiquity of poly-ethnic states, and even the relative prevalence of multinational states on the continent, our analysis attempts to gain an understanding of the workings and implications of linguistic nationalism in a modernized global African society.                

To be continued in the next issue

Human Security as a Global Public Good

Failures:  International Anarchy versus State Failure 

hereas sustainable deve-lopment propon-ents of human security tend to focus on distributional ‘failures’ in the international system to explain why human security is an underprovided public good (at least in terms of its equity and social justice components), others (the right/rule-of-law and ‘safety of peoples’ adherents) argue that the significant failures are primarily political  as opposed to economic or market-based.  But, here again, there are some important differences between the human security view and traditional realist and liberal positions about what the main political ‘failures’ are in explaining why human security is an underprovided public good in international relations. 

It has long been recognized that the anarchic structure of the international system may create a political demand for various international governance arrangements.  This has frequently been referred to as the ‘security dilemma’, rooted in the absence of supranational authority in international politics and the fact that individual states are forced to provide for their own survival and welfare.  Moreover, in the process for their own security through various military measures, states may set in motion an escalatory dynamic as they seek to provide for their own security, but also to achieve a relative advantage over the military capabilities of other states.  This can lead to arms races and technological competition that can exacerbate political tensions and further heighten security problems. 

Much of the debate between ‘realist’ and ‘liberal’ international relations scholars is not so much about the causes of international conflict per se.  Both schools more or less accept the proposition that international anarchy is at the root of the problem, although they have somewhat different understandings about the meaning and content of ‘anarchy’.  They differ about the kinds of institutional remedies that can best address the security dilemma.  Realists argue that because the distribution of state power and resources generally tends to be unequal in the international system, it may be necessary for state to resort to balancing strategies or bandwagoning  strategies involve the creation of formal (or informal) military alliances as correctives to the power of large and powerful—especially preponderant—states in the international system.  In the realist paradigm, the way to achieve international order is through military alliances that can provide for a stable balance of power.  Realists disagree as to whether a bipolar or multipolar system of alliances is more conducive to stability.  Some realists also argue that technology has had an important impact on international order.  In particular, they argue that nuclear weapons and strategies of nuclear deterrence contributed to international stability, especially during the Cold War. 

Whereas realists favour alliances and military solutions to achieve international order, liberals believe that international institutions promote international peace and security and counter the anarchical tendencies of a

state-based, international system.  The ‘collective security’ viewpoint (which can be traced back to Woodrow Wilson and League of Nations) stresses the contribution of international institutional order.  The principle of collective security is premised on the assumption that sovereign states have an interest in maintaining international order and that international institutions can provide this public good through mechanisms that allow the members of the international community to take action against states that threaten the existing order.   

Unlike realists, who believe that alliances are the best protection against external threats, liberal internationalists believe that international institutions provide the best form of protection insofar as they provide mechanisms for galvanizing the international community against certain or would-be aggressors.

n the ‘liberal’ variant of the ‘democratic peace’ (which dates back to the writings of Immanuel Kant) non-democratic states pose the greatest threat to international peace and security in an anarchic international system.  This is because relations between and among democratic states will be inherently peaceful, being informed by democratic principles and respect for the rule of law.  Authoritarian and autocratic regimes are more likely to resort to aggressive behaviour and to threaten their neighbors because they do not abide by these same democratic norms.  Democratic states may well have to defend themselves by going to war against these states, but they will do so reluctantly.  As Kant argued, their best defence is to establish a peaceful and defensive democratic confederation. 

Realists argue that the logic of collective action and the corrosive impact of national self-interest tend to undermine the efficacy of universal, collective security institutions.  They point to the failure of the League of Nations and the difficulties experienced by the United Nations (especially during the Cold War) in taking collective action as cases in point.  However, some liberal thinkers argue that in the absence of workable collective security arrangements, more modest institutional schemes can be devised to curb the more pernicious aspects of the security dilemma.   

Arms control regimes and confidence-building measures represent one kind of international governance response to the security dilemma of nation-states in an anarchical world.  But it is important to note that these regimes represent only one governance option in a variety of possible responses.  The escalatory dynamics of the security dilemma ‘can be checked by unilateral measures designed to reduce critical uncertainties for the other side regarding its own actions’. 

Although realists and liberals have fundamentally different views about the utility and efficacy of international institutions, they nonetheless share the view that the central challenge to international peace and security originates in the structure of the international system.  Some states may harbour imperialist ambitions and aspire towards systemic hegemony.  Others may seek to defend their hegemonic status by quashing their rivals.  Still others may feel threatened by their neighbours and look for allies to defend themselves against impending attack. Whatever the motivation or reason, states themselves against impending attack.  Whatever the motivation or reason, states themselves are the root of the problem, and as long as we continue to live in an anarchic world comprised of nation-states the threat to international order will never be eliminated.  

In the rights/rule-of-law and humanitarian conceptions of human security, the principal threats to international peace and security come ‘from below’ in the denial of human security to the citizens in one or more states as a result of civil conflict, or form strife within states, or form transnational economic forces that have marginalized certain groups in the world economy.  International anarchy and the global ‘system of states’ do not pose the main threat to international peace and security; rather, the denial of fundamental individual liberties, rights, and socio-economic needs within states is the contemporary sources of conflict.  Thus, in the human security paradigm the problem of international order is redefined and shifted downwards from the systemic to the subsystemic level. 

Proponents of human security argue that the nature of international conflict has fundamentally changed.  They point to the fact that most of the wars in the second half of the twentieth century have been wars within states, which are the result of ethnic, religious, or horizontal inequalities (i.e., the inequitable distribution of wealth and income among different groups within society), and not interstate wars.  These conflicts are fought not by regular armies but between militias, armed civilians, guerrillas, and ethnic groups.  These groups have been able to arm themselves with weapons that they obtain thought the large international market for small arms.  

During the Cold War, the two superpowers were all too willing to intervene in these conflicts.  They helped arm and train rival factions and tried to manipulate the parties to expand their various spheres of influence.  With the end of the Cold War, the superpowers withdrew from many of these conflicts and, perhaps as a direct consequence; the number of wars has actually declined since the late 1980s, as have the number of war-related deaths.  Nevertheless, as Ruben Mendez points out, these intrastate conflicts have generated ‘massive negative externalities’.  He further notes that at the end of 19977 there were more than 22 million refugees and displaced persons.  This figure does not include movements of emigrants seeking to escape poor and deteriorating economic conditions.  As a result of their externalities and the consequences of globalization, such ‘wars can no longer be considered private, national affairs.  They are matters of concern to the entire world community’. 

While some realists are prepared that the nature of international conflict has changed with the end of the Cold War, they also argue that the dynamics of ethnic and communitarian conflicts are not all that different form the dynamics of ethnic and communitarian conflicts are not all the that different from the dynamics of interstate relations in an anarchic international system.  Not only do ethnic communities experience the same kind of security dilemmas as states when the domestic political order breaks down as a result of state failure, but the same kind of offence-defence escalatory spiral can occur as ethnic groups misinterpret the strategic intentions of other groups, thus intensifying the pressure to raise mass armies.   

Furthermore, the risks of war become greater as different nationalities become more densely intermingled with each other, populations become stateless, and the parties to the conflict see borders as illegitimate and indefensible. If the boundaries of emerging states are compatible with ethnic boundaries, the risks of war will be correspondingly lower (Van Evera, 1994). 

For these realists, the use of force and the balance of power play a central role in the resolution of ethnic and intercommunal disputes.  If ethnic groups are not to annihilate each other in their struggle for supremacy and control of the state, particularly if one side is militarily stronger than the others, then a new balance of forces has to be created, either by denying arms and resources to the stronger side or by providing arms and resources to the weaker side to compensate for its militarily inferior position (or some combination of the two).  In some instances, direct military intervention by outside third parties may also be warranted to redress the balance and/or defend the weaker party. 

Although the use of force and balance of power are considered pivotal to the resolution of ethnic and intercommunal disputes for these realists, the incentives for great powers to intervene in such conflicts are limited.  According to these realists, relatively few situations justify the costs associated with military intervention, and such interventions should be limited to those conflicts that not only threaten to spill across interstate borders but also pose a direct threat to international peace and security. 

Proponents of human security argue that force may have to be used to defend human rights and other human security values when they are threatened, even if international peace and security are not directly threatened.  However, in contrast to realism (or its modified, post-Cold War variants), human security approaches see ethnic and communal conflicts less in terms of strategic security dilemmas and more in terms of a set of causal relationships in which the key variables are the denial of human rights, due process of law, and liberal pluralist forms of democracy.  

 As Paul LaRose-Edwards argues, ‘fear of [human rights] violations engenders self-defense and creates the security dilemma that drives escalation’.  Civic intolerance in the form of the denial of minority and communal and religious rights may also be a major cause of conflict.   

This particular view of human security stresses the rule of law and liberal norms as key ingredients in the establishment of a ‘just’ political order both domestically and internationally.  Accordingly, it has its own unique view of the kinds of intervention strategies that may be required to contribute to a peaceful political order.   

n contrast to realism—which sees a role for force and the balance of power in the management of communal or ethnic conflict—humanitarian and  rights/rule-of-law approaches to human security see the challenges of peacebuilding and third-party involvement largely in terms of the creation of participatory governance structures, the development of new social norms, and the establishment of the rule of law and democracy.  Thus, in arguing that ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ state are the principal source of anarchy in contemporary international politics, theses human security advocates also look to very different kinds of ‘political failures’.  

Unlike Kant, who was essentially non-interventionist when it came to promoting democracy and human rights in those states where such institutions were lacking, the proponents of the human security paradigm are much more inclined to be proactive and to favour interventionist approaches to defend and secure human rights, broader human security need, and democracy.  Many liberal thinkers other than Kant, of course, have entertained arguments about intervening with military instruments to defend democracy, human rights, and other human security values when they are threatened.  Even so, there is considerable disquiet in these debates about when intervention is desirable or the conditions under which force and other instruments of intervention should be used.  In the human security view of international politics, however, most of these reservations disappear and intervention, including that involving the use of force, is approved because human security values are threatened, the presumption is that intervening will defend and promote this public good even it means risking international order and ‘violating’ the sovereignty of individual states in the process.   

Providing for Human Security  

In the human security approach to international relations, although international order is a desirable public good, order will not be achieved until basic human security needs are largely fulfilled.  In this respect, the content of international order does matter and as long as the world is filled with ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states where public institutions, governance, and the physical, political, and economic security of citizens are at risk or directly threatened, there is no real prospect for ‘order’ in the international system.  The absence of interstate conflict in the international system—a condition that would presumably satisfy most realists and liberals and be considered a sign of health and stability in international politics—is not sufficient for advocates of human security.   

It may simply mask deeper problems at the intrastate or subsystemic levels.  Genuine order will only be achieved when the majority of the world’s human security needs are met.  This underscores the point that well-founded order can contribute to human security and that there are reciprocal effects of meeting the human security needs of people and providing for a just international order.   

owever, if human security in all of its various dimensions is an underprovided public good, then which international institutions, mechanisms, and actors are best equipped to provide it and to help address these different kinds of political and market failures that are experienced at both the national and international levels?  As we see in the discussion that follows, different arguments are advanced about how best to divide up the fixed (or up-front) costs of providing human security public goods.  Some argue that states are ultimately the most efficient and capable provided through international institutions.   Still others argue that non-state actors, i.e., non-governmental organizations and various elements of civil society are the preferred human security public goods providers not simply on grounds of efficiency but also on grounds of equity and social and political accountability.   

Although there tends to be general agreement that there are diminishing marginal costs of extending the benefits of human security public goods at the global level once these goods are created r provided, there is widespread disagreement about how best to absorb the fixed costs of creating these goods and what other value are involved in allocating these costs.

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