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Embedding ICT in Development

Human Security as a Global Public Good

Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms

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ith the advent of a new century, international situation is undergoing profound and complex changes. Peace and development remain the themes of the times, but uncertain and unstable elements are on the rise. We are faced with rare opportunities as well as grave challenges to realize enduring peace and common development of human society.

Against the backdrop of in-depth development of globalization and increasingly closer interdependence of states, global threats and challenges have become more diverse and interconnected. All threats, new or old, "soft" or "hard", direct or indirect, should be treated with equal seriousness and emphasis without partiality. All countries should make concerted efforts to deepen understanding through contacts, enhance trust through dialogues, and promote cooperation through communications, so as to cope with threats and challenges, especially to eliminate their root causes, by collective action.

The United Nations plays an indispensable role in international affairs. As the universal, representative, authoritative inter-governmental international organization, the UN is the best venue to practice multilateralism, and an effective platform for collective actions to cope with various threats and challenges. It should continue to be a messenger for the maintenance of peace, and a forerunner for the promotion of development. A reformed UN with a bigger role to play will serve the common interests of humanity.

China welcomes the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Millennium Project Report and the comprehensive report of the UN Secretary-General, all of which put forward some useful and feasible approaches and proposals for the rejuvenation and reform of the UN. China is ready to work with all other parties to push for positive results of UN reforms and success of the summit in September.

China maintains that UN reforms should observe the following principles:

  • Reforms should be in the interest of multilateralism, and enhance UN's authority and efficiency, as well as its capacity to deal with new threats and challenges.

  • Reforms should safeguard the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter, especially those of sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful resolution of conflicts and strengthening international cooperation, etc.

  • Reforms should be all-dimensional and multi-sectoral, and aim to succeed in both aspects of security and development. Especially, reforms should aim at reversing the trend of "UN giving priority to security over development" by increasing inputs in the field of development and facilitating the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

  • Reforms shall accommodate the propositions and concerns of all UN members, especially those of the developing countries. Reforms should be based on democratic and thorough consultations and the most broadly-based consensus.

  • Reforms should proceed gradually from tackling more manageable problems to thornier ones and be carried out in a way that will maintain and promote solidarity among members. For those proposals on which consensus has been reached, decision may be made promptly for their implementation; for important issues where division still exists, prudence, continued consultations and consensus-building are called for. It is undesirable to set a time limit or force a decision.

I. Development Issues

Development is the common pursuit of people from all countries and bedrock for a collective security mechanism and the progress of human civilization. Poverty, diseases, environmental degradation are also grave challenges to the international community. Serious attention must be given to the needs of developing countries, with a view to achieving coordinated, balanced and universal development around the world.

1. Poverty

  •    To eliminate poverty, an urgent priority is to facilitate the implementation of the MDGs. This should become the focus of UN reforms and the September summit.

  •   We should steer globalization toward balanced development, and strengthen developing countries' position for equal participation and decision-making in international affairs.

  • China supports developing countries' efforts to promptly formulate and implement comprehensive national strategies in light of their own national conditions for the realization of MDGs. The international community should provide necessary assistance to support these efforts

  • International development assistance should be provided in a way that takes into full consideration the national conditions of developing countries, and increases the recipient countries' autonomy and participation in this process for better results.

  • China is in favor of the Secretary-General's recommendations of a timetable for increasing Official Development Assistance(ODA) to 0.7% of national GDP, and believes that it is necessary to draw detailed implementation plans and set up a monitoring and assessing mechanism.

  • China supports international efforts to explore innovative resources as a useful supplement to ODA, which should continues to play a major role.

  • We shall reform and improve the international financial system to make it consistent with the principle of equality and mutual benefit, and monitor, and guide rational flows of international capital to fend off financial crises.

  • We should establish and improve an open and fair multilateral trading system, based on full consideration of the interests of developing and new members, and eliminate agricultural subsidies and substantially reduce tariff and non-tariff trade barriers as soon as possible in accordance with the mandate provided by the Doha Declaration.

  • The Chinese side supports efforts to promote an agreement on the modality of negotiations at the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in accordance with the July 2004 approximation and the mandate provided by the Doha Declaration, with a view to achieving an early completion of the Doha round and making it a genuine "development round".

  • The developed countries should reduce and forgive, in real earnest, debts owed to them by developing countries, so that more capital will be available for development.

  • We should encourage, strengthen public-private partnerships, and mobilize more resources to promote economic growth and eliminate poverty.

  • China supports to strengthen South-South cooperation, including sharing experience, expanding areas of cooperation and mutual assistance for mutual benefit, in order to enhance capacity building for development.

                   2. Disease

-  All countries should promptly implement the  UN resolutions 58/3 and 59/27 related to "enhancing capacity-building in global public health", put public health development in the context of their own development plans and activities, establish scientific and standardized public health systems, and improve the monitoring, prevention, control, treatment and reporting networks for contagious diseases. The developed world should help the developing countries in this regard.

- Relevant agencies operating within the UN system should consider incorporating public health into their activities, programs and plans, give greater support to all countries in strengthening public health capacity and promote international cooperation.

- We should strengthen the guiding and coordinating role of the World Health Organization and other relevant international organizations in disease prevention and treatment. China is in favor of more resources being channeled for the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network.

- We should make further efforts to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS. The immediate priority is to speed up the implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/ AIDS within the existing cooperation framework. The developed countries shall honor their commitments through the provision of more financial and technical support to the developing countries in the prevention and treatment of HIV /AIDS.

- Currently, there are no universally recognized standards to define whether contagious diseases pose a threat to international peace and security. Given that the Security Council's main function is to deal with issues that pose grave threats to international peace and security, it is unadvisable for it to repeat the work of other agencies.

3. Environmental Issues

- China stands for a scientific concept of development encompassing, inter alia, incorporating sustainable development and environmental protection into national development strategy and coordinating relations between economic, social development and environmental protection.

-   Countries ought to engage in international cooperation for sustainable development according to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, focusing on helping developing countries cope with environmental challenges effectively, especially such urgent issues as water scarcity, urban air pollution, ecological degradation and desertification. Developed countries ought to honour their commitments through technological transfer and provision of financial support aimed at capacity-building of developing countries.

- Sustainable development is the most effective response to global climate change. The international community should consider the immediate needs and challenges of countries when formulating policies on energy, climate change and other related issues.

-The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change provides an fundamental and effective framework for international cooperation in response to climate change. Obligations for 2008-2012 provided for in the Kyoto Protocol, including reduction in emission of greenhouse gases, transfer of know-how to developing countries, financial support and assistance in areas such as capacity-building should be fulfilled in real earnest.

- Developed countries should take the lead in adopting measures to reduce emission after 2012 in continued compliance with the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. Meanwhile, the international community may explore a more pragmatic and flexible mechanism, promote international technical cooperation and enhance international capacity to cope with climate change.

- China is in favor of stepping up coordination and cooperation among existing environmental protection institutions and integrating resources for higher efficiency and better-coordinated policies. China is open to related recommendations aimed at achieving the afore-mentioned goals.

4. Natural Disaster

China supports the establishment of worldwide early warning systems for all natural disasters at an early date, supports the strengthening of coordination and cooperation for emergency humanitarian assistance and disaster reduction at the national, regional and international levels.

II. Security Issues

We endorse the Secretary-General's proposal concerning collective action against security threats and challenges. It is consistent with China's proposal for a new security concept that features "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination". To establish an effective, efficient and fair collective security mechanism, the key lies in adhering to mutilateralism, promoting democracy and rule of law in international affairs, sticking to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, strengthening the authority and capability of the UN and safeguarding the centrality of the Security Council to the collective security system.

1. War and Conflict

-   Inter-state conflict should be addressed through peaceful negotiation and consultation on an equal footing in accordance with the UN Charter and international law.

-   Internal conflicts are complex. Whether they threaten world peace and security needs to be judged on a case-by-case basis. The resolution of internal conflicts should mainly rely on the efforts of the people of the State. External support should be given with caution and responsibility in compliance with the UN Charter and international law and should combine political and diplomatic measures with a prudent and responsible attitude to encourage and facilitate the resolution of problems through consultation and negotiation between the conflicting parties.

2. Counter-terrorism

- China stands for and supports the fight against terrorism in all forms and manifestations. International counter-terrorism efforts should give full play to the UN's leading and coordinating role, address both the root causes and symptoms and avoid politicization and double standards.

-  China supports a global comprehensive strategy against terrorism to be formulated as soon as possible and endorses the five pillars proposed by the Secretary-General as the foundation of such strategy.

- China supports further improvement of the existing counter-terrorism conventions and legal framework. Countries ought to consider early signing and ratifying the existing international counter-terrorism conventions and reach agreement as soon as possible on the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in a cooperative and constructive spirit.

-  China hopes for a consensus on the definition of terrorism. The definition may draw on, as appropriate, the existing international conventions and related provisions of Security Council resolutions.

- Member States and civil society must comply with the UN Charter and relevant norms of international law when participating counter-terrorism cooperation.

-  Acts of violation against human rights that arise in counter-terrorism activities should be addressed by fully utilizing the existing mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights, conventional institutions and supervision mechanism of international humanitarian law. At present, there is no need to set up a new mechanism.

- China supports the strengthening of functions of the Counter-Terrorism Commission of the Security Council and the expansion of the mandate of its Executive Directorate, especially the reinforcement of developing countries' capacity against terrorism and the establishment of a capacity-building trust fund for this purpose.

- China believes it necessary to appoint a UN coordinator for counter-terrorism affairs.     

To be continued in the next issue

Embedding ICT in Development

How can Information and Communication Technology (ICT) support development efforts? ICT cuts across sectors and affects all layers of society; both micro-projects and large institutions use it. And it runs through non-profit, private and government organizations, which in an ideal situation communicate through a set of commonly agreed principles, standards and procedures. A virtual mission impossible for low-capacity countries, one would think, looking at the breadth of issues and the number of actors involved.

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CT has a major bearing on a multitude of support activities performed as part of international development cooperation. Ideally, these should enhance ongoing processes and dynamics, but many initiatives start from scratch.  A key concern then is, how and where to set boundaries for the development of ICT. Should we start small-scale and work bottom-up through a myriad of self-contained projects?  Or should we work top-down from a policymaking level? Or should we perhaps use a mix of the two? Another challenge is how to avoid regarding ICT merely as a technical input, without recognising its complementary potential for enhancing other development efforts. Hence, the need to embed ICT within its environment, to create linkages with policy-making, and to ensure that different actors are included in decisions about strategy and the use of technology. 

Various international organizations have taken up this challenge, among them the International Institute for Communication and Development (IICD), which presents its operational approach as well as some experiences in this issue of Capacity.org. Building on its considerable experience, IICD works through a framework combining practical work on the ground with policy work at sector level. Although this is not an easy task, as is highlighted by people working in the field, the experiences confirm that the combined and integrated application of both aspects is indispensable for successful capacity development.  IICD's Head of Partnership, Ingrid Hagen, presents the framework.   

The second article, written by Ousmane Ly and François Laureys, looks at the start of an ICT health project in Mali that builds on a local initiative to overcome large distances and a shortage of qualified staff. The third article is  about the agricultural sector in Bolivia. The authors, Sandra Marca, Javier Choquevilca and Stijn van der Krogt, share lessons from implementing an ICT strategy under ministerial coordination.  The fourth article, by Constantine Bitwayiki and Arjan de Jager, presents insights from the implementation of an ICT support programme among Ugandan district administrations. There is also an extensive list of further reading containing links to a wealth of ICT case studies and good practice material, as well as a series of policy and issue papers published by various organizations.

Going beyond a project approach: embedding ICT support in a wider development context 

This article presents the framework which the International Institute for Communication andDevelopment (IICD) has recently started to use for supporting ICT-related initiatives in development contexts.The framework has emerged from the IICD's strategy based on the notion of 'ICT-enabled development' introduced in the July 2003 issue of Capacity.org.The framework  builds on several years of experience with ICT support and shows that combining practical work on the ground with policy work at a higher level is the most promising way of achieving added value and impact. 

Embedding ICT in development 

Information and communication technology (ICT) has begun to make its mark as a viable tool that can have a positive impact on national development. End users and beneficiaries of ICT projects, such as health officers, farmers, teachers and students, have benefited from situations in which ICT is used as a supplementary, but fully incorporated tool. 

Although individual projects that make use of ICT as a tool for supporting sector development can set a good example, they should not stand on their own as they do not result in sustainable changes in the development landscape. Lessons learned from individual experiences need to be transferredto a wider organisational setting, to the sector as a whole and - ideally - to a wider national context. 

This translation of individual experiences to higher-level activities is what we at IICD have set out to undertake more systematically. This 'embedding' includes the expansion and replication of individual experiences to an entire organization or a wider sector. Although the national level is recognized as an important higher stage of involvement, it is not part of our current support activities. 

Towards a future approach to embedding 

Embedding ICT for development at project, organisational and sector levels calls for a strategy which can be used flexibly at multiple levels and which involves a range of actors. Embedding is in essence the broadening of the ownership base of ICT and its use for social change and long-term economic development. It is a process that involves significant investment in human resources, in terms of both awareness-raising and technical skills. While this process needs to come from within, we - as outsiders - act as a catalyst by working with a small number of local partners who are the 'ripples in a puddle'. 

While it's relatively easy to work with different actors at a project level, it becomes rather complex at higher levels. A wider range of actors needs to be included to ensure that:

  • activities involving ICT are used as tools  to achieve clear objectives in terms of               alleviating poverty;

  • ICT contributes to core activities that are owned and operated by organizations rather  than select individuals;

  • activities at sector level are fully integrated, based on clear ICT policies that assist in creating a wider enabling environment.

The move from theory to practice has proven to be most challenging for our partners and ourselves. We have tested several approaches as we have moved towards a programmatic way of working and have invested more and more in the institutional capacity development of our Southern partners. 

In June 2004, our annual International Advisory Board workshop brought together stakeholders from the organization and our partners in the South to exchange views and plan. The key questions were 'What to embed?' and 'How to embed?' The following summarizes the debate and lists some specific lessons, which will inform our future, work at project, organizational and sector levels. 

Embedding ICT-related activities at a project level 

At this level, local ownership is the key to the sustainability of activities geared towards ICT development. The majority of our project partners are active in sectors such as agriculture. They are not technical specialists, but farmers and other sector actors.  Articulating and identifying ways in which ICT can help them is a challenge - given their lack of exposure to and experience with any form of ICT, whether old or new. Integrating ICT into sector projects and programmes requires these actors to undergo a change process - a process in which awareness, opportunities and shortcomings are realistically examined in an open dialogue. 

Local ownership of integrated ICT use by project and programme partners involves a good understanding of the potential offered by ICT;ways of exploiting this potential; and the abilities required to make consistent use of ICT.

 Although project partners form expectations based on the answers to these points, a project's momentum can only be maintained if these expectations are met. This is something we understood from the outset, which is why we made sure that the following was part of our approach:

§         Round-table discussions are initiated to ensure that local partners articulate theirown sector needs and to work out how to use ICT to meet these needs. The process includes a multiple-day workshop and project assistance for as long as two years. Awareness and a realistic understanding of ICT is core to the workshop, while the assistance is designed to help project partners get a grip on the business and technical implications of what they want to achieve.

§      We invest a great deal of time and resources in local training partners, to build their capacity to raise awareness, train and mentor other project partners in turn. This 'internalisation' has proven to be an attractive alternative to subcontracting ICT development activities to external organizations.

§     We advise our project partners on technological options that are workable, available and financially feasible, and for which there are good support mechanisms in country. A    poorly selected option or mix of technologies can quickly disillusion project partners, bringing a project to a halt. The most advanced technology available is not always the right solution.  Rather, a combination of traditional and modern options makes a difference. 

Embedding ICT-related activities at an organizational level 

A project can have an impact only if it has a broader ownership base within the organization in question. This challenge became clear once many of our project partners had reached one or two years of operations, and wanted to expand and integrate their activities into the wider organization. A project remains a project -inherently short-term by nature - until it has been integrated into a more stable base and becomes an organizational priority.  

At a project level, we initially worked with 'movers and shakers', i.e. people, who create the momentum and energy needed to delve into the innovations offered by ICT.At some point, however, a stronger foundation is needed to overcome the project stage and integrate experiences into the organization. This move to more broad-based ownership, however, can be very political and difficult. Intense ownership is felt by initiators and implementers who have built up long-term stakes in 'their' project, while other members of the same organization have often not had an opportunity to develop an affiliation with it. 

This experience led us to realize that wider organisational change processes, supported by decision-makers, need to be initiated at the same time as ICT-related activities are introduced. We had not envisaged this type of assistance at the start of our activities, and this engendered a process of strategic reflection about our own role and mandate, the capacities and expertise that are needed to provide the type of assistance required, and the reallocation of operational resources. The outcome of this discussion was the formulation of an approach, which aims to: 

§     ensure that there is more broad-based organizational participation at the start of a round- table process;

§     raise ICT skills among a larger number of an organization’s staff (i.e. beyond the limits of    the project team) who are prepared to invest time and resources in ICT skills;

§    train project initiators and other project team members in wider operational capabilities, such as project management and marketing;

§     advise project partners on more strategic issues, such as long-term planning and   integrating project activities into organizational strategy;

§     twin project partners with private-sector expertise in cases where a project needs     extra support to move ahead. 

Embedding ICT-related activities at a sector level 

To increase opportunities for a wider development impact, ICT activities need to be embedded in an enabling environment. Here, the wider aim is to impact on the formulation and implementation of ICT-friendly policies at a sector level.The experiences to date stem from a bottom-up approach to change, based on testing and learning about ICT in a development context and then expanding such activities more widely. These experiences include the creation of a critical mass of NGO activities which will have an impact on a sector; the stimulation of policy dialogue between project implementers and the government; and pilot projects in the government sector itself. Experience has also shown that informing people about practical examples is imperative for alerting stakeholders and embedding ICT activities more widely. 

Again, this attention to the sector level has required changes in our approach – both strategically and operationally.  Today, we are working with partners in four countries on a variety of sector-reform programmes that include ICT.This experience has highlighted the following needs: 

§     the need to shift away from a project approach to a programme approach. A programme focuses on a variety of activities within a country and embraces the linking of a series of      activities, which - in turn - will complement and reinforce individual project activities;

§    the importance of designing and undertaking complementary activities to target policy-   makers, both local and those of donor agencies located in-country. These activities have a    catalytic nature and include monitoring and evaluation, as well as information and     networking;

§      the need to work more systematically with the local offices of bilateral agencies that play   a significant role in sector reform processes. The aim is to bring them into contact with   local ICT policymakers and to link these to sector reform;

§   the need to involve local policy-makers from the very start of the process in the       formulation of country programmes, e.g. by ensuring that they are invited to participate  in round tables from the very start. 

This article has discussed the lessons learnt by IICD and our partners, and the subsequent changes we have made to our strategies. The following articles provide more insights into the use of this new strategy and the complexities of introducing ICT for development at project, organisational and sector levels. Jointly written by local stakeholders and their IICD project partners, the articles discuss the opportunities and challenges arising from projects in Mali, Bolivia and Uganda. 

                                                             By Ingrid Hagen, Head of Partnerships, IICD (ihagen @iicd.org)

Putting ICT on the Malinean health agenda

 Public health in Mali 

The public health sector in Mali is in bad shape. Lack of funds, corruption, mismanagement, a shortage of trained personnel, and low wages have severely undermined the system over the past twenty years. The problems of geography combined with widespread poverty have added to the challenges of providing accessible health services to the population. One well-equipped and well-staffed national hospital in Bamako is complemented by four capital hospitals, five rather well-equipped but understaffed (in terms of specialists) provincial hospitals and 50 poorly equipped and poorly staffed regional health centres in smaller towns.  Additionally, there are a couple of hundred 'CS-coms' (Centres de Santé Communautaire) in villages and rural areas, with the highest level of available expertise being a doctor, nurse or mid-wife. Highly educated health professionals and specialists tend to stay in Bamako or to move abroad where the career prospects are more lucrative. 

The Keneya Blow'n project 

A project known as the Keneya Blow'n ('health portal' in Bambara) project was conceived in September 2000 in order to address some of these challenges. The project was intended to demonstrate that relaying the main hospitals in Mali through an Internet-based network need not necessarily be a costly exercise, and that the gradual introduction of applications like medical distance learning, medical information services, and mail services for health workers would help to convince the sector of the benefits of ICT. During the pilot phase, a network between two regional hospitals and the capital hospitals was established and a website (www.keneya.net) with medical information was developed. The second phase of the project started in 2003 and was aimed at further improving the services offered, extending the number of health workers reached by the project, offering medical training on-line, developing local skills to produce local medical information, and training health workers in the use of ICT.  

Embedding 

Though not originally termed as such, the process of embedding had to start at the very outset of the project. One principal strategy was to establish and maintain multiple alliances at technical, enabling, content and political levels. This generated a number of strategic partners, including:

§     The Hôpitaux de Genève, providing a technical platform for on-line medical training,      content (on-line demonstrations), and technical and institutional advice;

§      The IICD, who provided pilot financing, institutional advice, capacity development,     thematic networking and, if required, political backing; and

§     SOTELMA, a national telecom utility that supplied technical connectivity infrastructure at a reduced price. 

Other key partners were the national and provincial hospitals, various French teaching hospitals, and the health faculty of the University of Bamako, and INASP, for bibliographic database development. 

Capacity development proved an integral part of the strategy and included awareness-raising (i.e. organising seminars and making use of local and national media), institutionalization (for instance, by creating an advisory structure which was representative of the sector), and embedding within the Ministry of Health. In-situ ICT training workshops, held at the provincial hospitals rather than in the capital Bamako, helped to create awareness and involvement, and provide an opening to regional political decision-makers. 

Future strategies 

Despite the successes to date, embedding is seen as a necessary strategy for the further grounding of the project. Together with the IICD, a number of activities have been planned to support this process. These include:

  • a meeting of people working on IICD-supported health projects to discuss the potential     strengthening of synergies;

  • seminars and conferences, including a national conference on telemedicine in Bamako.     This is being organized with a local information network called Togunet, and will present   the actual results of the projects to date. It will also be an opportunity to further tie-in the   Ministry of Health, raise awareness amongst decision-makers, and attract media publicity;

  • specific telemedicine training workshops for senior civil servants at the Ministry of     Health;

  • the drafting of a chapter on telemedicine as part of the current (ICT) health policy; and

  • Extending the training programme to the 50 regional hospitals in order to gain further recognition and visibility across the country.  

By: Dr Ousmane Ly, project founder Mr. François Laureys, Programme Manager,CapacityDevelopment, IICD

Ethnic Violence Threatens Cocoa Harvest

By Dino Mahtani in Lagos

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oca framers in Ivory Coast have fled their villages following a wave of communal attacks that killed around 100 people earlier this month.The violence in Ivory Coast’s ethnically diverse western region threatens to hit next year’s cocoa crop, much of it bound for the west, if farmers cannot spray pesticides and tend the fields 

Rivalries between ethnic communities over land ownership have worsened as settlers from other parts of Ivory Coast and neighboring countries migrated to the west to grow cocoa, originally encouraged by Felix Houphouet-Boingy, Ivory Coast’s first president. 

Today the former French colony produces about 40 per cent of the world’s cocoa beans, but internal conflict since 2002 has exacerbated tensions in the fields and unnerved cocoa buyers and exporters.  

While cocoa futures have soared during periods of instability since 2002, harvests have generally found export markets, even though some cocoa has ended up being smuggled out via neighbouring countries. But the simmering conflicts in the west, which could worsen if the government and rebels fail to comply with a disarmament programme, have already disrupted cocoa cargoes this year.  Farms in the west produce the bulk of Ivory Coast’s cocoa. 

“If the conflict takes root in the west, it could really hinder the normal functioning of the commercialization of cocoa,” said Jean Luc Agkpo, a cocoa industry analyst at Ivory Coast’s National Bureau for Technical and Development Studies. 

A preliminary report backed by the European Union and published in 2004 said conditions for farmers had failed to improve over the last few years during which a liberalization plan for the industry introduced a complex web of cocoa boards charged with regulating, financing and developing the system.  A full audit of Ivory Coast’s cocoa industry commissioned by the EU was blocked last year by members of the syndicates reluctant to open themselves up to scrutiny. 

Framers complain that middlemen, who need to make their own cut before taxes are levied, cannot pay higher prices as the boards take a significant cut.Many Ivorian middlemen pay farmers much less than the farmers much less than the farmgate price of around $0.75 a kilogram.  By contrast, the government in neighboring Ghana has guaranteed a  minimum price of around $1 per kilo, backed by an internationally syndicated loan worth several hundred million dollars. 

As a result, of the price discrepancy between Ivorian and Ghanaian cocoa, many farmers in the eastern cocoa-growing zone of Ivory Coast smuggle their cocoa across the border to Ghana. 

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ccording to Saga, a French transport company with a major presence in Ivory Coast’s ports, exports of cocoa beans and products between October 1004 and end of April 2005 fell 11.7 per cent to 922,725 tones from the previous season.  This was previous season.  This was because of a poorer harvest this year and smuggling.  In April, the country’s Coffee and Cocoa Bourse () noted a 13 per cent decline in cocoa arrivals at ports between October to March 2003/2004 and 2004/2005. 

The loss in official export revenues from smuggling has increased the pressures on the government’s finances, already squeezed by the conflict.  

Meanwhile, fear stalks the cocoa fields.  “Nobody in Duékoué who was targeted by unknown assailants in an apparent reprisal against attacks o villages inhabited by indigenous communities.

Global Social Justice:  The Moral Responsibilities of the Rich to the Poor

 By Shirley Williams

A More Holistic Approach to Development 

Recognition of the interdependence of economic, social, and political reform is only slowly dawning on the international institutions charged with promoting development.  ‘Good governance’ is now seen as a sine qua non of the effective use of aid and foreign direct investment alike.  As show, inter alia, recent World Development Reports of the World Bank, these institutions are also now aware that ‘good governance’ in weak countries requires both the governments concerned and their interlocutors from the developed countries to abide by decent moral standards of public life.  In this context, the OECD has drawn up a code of conduct for developing nations (OECD 2000).  Offers of development aid are increasingly conditional on the practice of good governance by the receiving nation.  

This new awareness of social and political factors in development is very welcome, but is still only at an early stage.  A few illustrations, in addition to those mentioned by other contributions to this volume (notably Gordon Brown, Hans Küng and Joe Stiglitz), may help to indicate what is going on.  Immensely valuable work is being done by the Council of Europe, for example, to train lawyers and judges in human rights, especially in the transition countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The Commonwealth Secretariat has arranged training, country to assist other member states.  American Universities run many courses for senior civil servants, politicians, and the military, in particular from the transition countries, to understand their role in democratic societies.  The most intensive work of all has been in countries that are candidates to join the European Union, where detailed work on the ‘acquis’, the body of  law and regulation that has to be  accepted in total by members, has been undertaken by government officials.  But what is provided still falls far short of what is needed. 

The rich world’s power structure still supports a fundamentally unjust system of global governance.  The main institutions of that global governance are the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organizations (WTO).  The first two reflect the financial and economic power of the United States and the developed Western nations, the so-called G7.  In the end, what matters most is the attitude of the US Treasury. 

The WTO, while more international in its membership and focus, is, in practice, dominated by the United States and the European Union.  True, there are independent panels to resolve trade disputes, but poor countries cannot afford the expensive legal advice and expert consultants needed to draw up their cases.  Consequently, even when the case is strong, they tend to lose out. 

The last so-called ‘trade round’, the Uruguay round, reduced tariffs across the board, but left in place substantial protection for textiles and agricultures have a comparative advantage.  While talking pieties about the need to reduce world poverty, the European Union has been extraordinarily dilatory in reforming the Common Agricultural Policy, under which European farm exports continue to be subsidized.  The alternative of ‘stewardship contracts,’ in which farmers are subsidized to manage and sustain the rural environment, is still only a minor programme.  

Soon after delivering similar pities at the Monterrey conference in Mexico in March 2002, the US President George W. Bush, approved a Farm bill passed by Congress that increased domestic agricultural subsidies by 80 per cent.1 Among the products to be subsides more generously are wheat and Soya beans, two of the most important exports of Latin America.  And this at a time when Argentina is reeling under the effects of a major economic crisis.  Truly, some Western governments would not shame Machiavelli with the quality of their hypocrisy. 

Exploiting Developing countries

 International institutions apart, western governments have been reluctant to move against the plundering of the resources of the third world, and indeed have profited from it.  Africa has been plagued by warlords and guerrilla groups trying to seize control of gold fields, diamond mines, and oil.  Prolonged and destructive wars have been fought over them.   Western governments and corporations have colluded in two ways—by purchasing goods obtained illegally, and by permitting trade in the arms needed to conduct these wars. 

The trade in illicit diamonds, often smuggled across unguarded frontiers, is slowly being brought under control by identifying the origin of the gems.  Thus legally obtained diamonds forms, say, Sierra Leone or Angola, are marked with their country of origin.  The diamond trade can play a significant part is stamping out the sale of diamonds by guerrilla groups or by neighboring governments engaged in smuggling.  Parliaments and civil societies alike could usefully hold firms engaged in the diamond trade to account for the sources from which the diamonds come.  

This is a good example of the way in which rich and poor countries need to work together if there is to be soundly based development.  Botswana is one of the few African countries that have ploughed revenues from the sale of diamonds back into developing its own country.  It has invested heavily in school and health clinics. Until it was hit recently by the AIDS epidemic, its economy had grown by an average of 10 per cent (Europe, 2001).

 It must of course be acknowledged that developing countries are all too often the victims of their own rulers as well as being the victims of guerrilla groups or cowboy companies.  The examples are legion—Suharto in Indonesia, Mobutu in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Abacha in Nigeria, to name but four.  These rulers have sucked resources out of the countries they led, and translated them into their own personal accounts, tucked away in various financial havens.  The story of development in badly governed and corrupt countries is all too often the story of the dispossession of their inhabitants.  

Western governments, some of whose banks have handled these laundered funds, have been slow to act.  Until recently, the Swiss banks insisted on total secrecy.  Consequently, many dubiously acquired funds were concealed there.  But the Swiss authorities have now taken strong action to curb the inflow of such funds.  Their banks are sent a warning notice to look out for and report unusual deposits that may be money laundered from the public funds of developing countries.  Furthermore, the Swiss authorities have taken active steps to recover such funds.  In the case of Nigeria, over a billion dollars have now been returned.  Other Western governments, including that of the United Kingdom, have been reluctant to take action.  It has taken concern about the financing of terrorism to compel them to do so and even that stops short of active efforts to track down and recover looted state funds.

If good governance is to be encouraged and supported, as in the case of diamonds, a partnership between developed and developing countries is essential, acting together to prevent such forms of exploitation.   

Another example of the need for partnership is the arms trade.  As I have pointed out example of the need for partnership is the arms trade.  As I have pointed out already, the devastating wars of Africa, which have prevented economic and social development in much of that continent, are fought with arms often supplied by Western countries in order to exploit resources then sold to Western countries.  It is a lethal trade.  On humanitarian grounds if no other, not only must the markets in illegal products be stopped, the arms that fuel the civil wars must be stopped as well. 

There has been great reluctance to stop the flow of small arms into Africa, though the European Union initiative, Everything but Arms2 may help.  Suppliers that refuse to respect the criteria limiting arms exports to legitimate defence should  be blacklisted by Western governments and no further arms should be purchased from them. 

As Joe Stiglitz emphasizes in Chapter 4, there is need for a new approach to development; and one, which recognizes that economic development is intertwined with political and social transformation.  Such an approach should encompass the reconfiguration of traditional institutions without destroying social cohesion.  To be successful it also requires the committed co-operation of Western governments and companies as well.  Gordon Brown unveils such a plan in his chapter in this volume.  Inter alia, this would include increased aid, flexible debt relief, transparency in negotiations and in accounting, and codes of conduct for governments and transnational companies alike. 

At Monetary, and subsequently in his speech to the German Bundestag in May 2002, George W. Bush announced an increase in US core development assistance of 50 per cent over the next three years, indicating that aid must be linked to political and legal, as well as economic reforms.  The President also spoke about the benefits of free trade, though neither he nor Mr. Brown spelled out the obligations of the rich countries to make free trade genuinely reciprocal.  

The most imaginative aspect of the original Marshall Plan—designed to help the recovery of Western Europe after the last World War—was not so much to provide aid from the rich to the poor as the co-operative framework within which that aid was administered.  This was not a Plan in which the donor dictated the terms of the structural adjustment programmes and the anti-poverty strategies.  The recipient countries monitored one another, for each had an interest in ensuring the funds were well spent.  Each recipient country contributed what it could in counterpart aid—sometimes in kind.  Each felt involved and committed to the success of the Plan as a whole. 

The American administration of that time was keen to encourage European co-operation.  Hence it called for each national reconstruction plan to be drawn up within the context of an integrated European plan.  Its aspirations were not fully realized.  The prerequisites of co-operation were institutionalized in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (the OEEC).  The countries of Western Europe deliberated, argued and pored over one another’s plans (based on the need for dollar imports, the cost met largely from Marshall Aid funds).  This intensive multilateral process proved highly effective.  Donor and recipients alike were actively and critically engaged in making the best possible use of the available funds (Milward 1984).

The Marshall Plan did not simply emanate from the free market system.  It was a deliberate act of policy, driven by recognition of the United States’ long-term interests in a strong and united Europe.  But there was also a moral dimension, a generosity of spirit and a vision of a continent at last at peace with itself. 

The wealthy world today has a similar long-term interest is obvious.  To put it starkly, the poor will not quietly die.  Television presents them every day with images of unbelievable prosperity, food, water, shelter, cars, and jobs.  Many will take to their boots or their boats to find a better life.  The ‘wretched of the earth’ are already on the move.  Unless the rich world faces up to its responsibility to bring about a fairer distribution of the world’s wealth, there will be many more moving. 

Only two things can stop them—lacks of opportunities in their own countries, or a fortress Europe, fortress North America policy that will deteriorate into the use of brutal force.  We can see the intimations of that already.  A rich world that pulls up the drawbridges from all but the global elite will eventually engender a terrorist response.  To that, military force can provide no lasting answer.  We have no weapons to deal with suicidal would-be martyrs.  There has to be a better way.  

There is a moral dimension too.  It is quite simply morally unacceptable for the inhabitants of the rich world to use up such a large proportion of the world’s expensive way of life when so many almost nothing—one billion people living on less than a dollar a day. 

Democratic governments need the support of their citizens to embark on radical changes of policy.  In this, they are greatly helped by the non-governmental organizations that bring together committed individuals.  There are many effective NGOs concerned with the plight of the poor.  In the US, as a recent article in Newsweek pointed out, donations by foundations and private individuals to developing countries exceed government aid several times over.  

The moral conscience of society is very much alive.  Active campaigners are questioning corporations about their environmental responsibilities, and about the consequences of protecting patents, especially for essential medicines.  In consequence, pharmaceutical companies have allowed some of their products to be made available at cost in developing countries. 

Globalizing brings with it not only fateful moral choices.  It also offers an opportunity for a network of governments, NGOs, firms and individuals to be formed that will one day construct a new model of a socially just global economy. It is an opportunity, which we neglect at our peril.               

Notes  

  1. US Farm Bill, approved by the Senate, 8 March 2002, and signed by president bush 13 may 200. The bill raised subsides by up to 80 per cent a year.

  2. Everything but Arms’ was a European initiative.  It took the form of an amendment to the European Union’s generalized scheme of preferences (GSP) (Council Regulation (EC) No. 416/2001 published in the official journal No. L.50 of 1 march 2001).

Bring them Back

Anti-immigrant sentiment may be on the rise elsewhere, but some Irish want to keep their newcomers

By Brian Lavery Athlone

The story of Elizabeth Odunsi and Iyabo Nwanze beings like the grim familiar tale of illegal immigrants anywhere.  Fleeing religious violence, the two mothers followed a path taken by thousands of other Nigerians, and in 2001 sought refuge in Ireland with their six children.  They lived on government rations in a trailer park built to house refugees on the outskirts of Atholne, a sleepy midlands town, while awaiting a verdict on their asylum applications.   

Community worker Salome Mbugua Henry describes the scene as “kind of like an open prison system.”  The two women took vocational classes and made Irish friends.  But after four years in bureaucratic Limbo, their new lives evaporated in March, when they were deported with their 5-year-old sons.   

T

he women got so little warning that their four other children were left behind, as immigration officers escorted the women to Dublin Airport before the older ones walked home form school.  As the mothers scrounged to bribe police officers and pay hospital bills back in Nigeria-their 5-year-olds had never received vaccinations against African  diseases—the older children went into hiding.  “We expected that they would have been more civil about it,” says Kemi, a friend of the women who refused to give her last name, out of fear that doing so might affect her residency status.  “It’s depressingly shattering.   

It sent shivers through us,” she says, as her 1-year-old son plods across the floor of her trailer, playing with an empty butter tub.  But Odunsi and Nwanze’s story has an Irish twist: Athlone didn’t want to let them go.  Within 24 hours of their departure, more than 4,000 people-nearly one-fifth of the town’s population—had singed a petition asking Ireland’s Justice Minister to reconsider.   

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he town council passed a near-unanimous motion demanding that they be allowed to return, and hundreds of residents marched in a demonstration during which the leader of the Irish Senate declared her support.  Posters still hang in shop windows on Athlone’s main street, showing a three-year-old photograph of Prime Minister Bertie Ahern embracing the women at an election rally, alongside the plea, BRING THEM BACK. 

The families are living in a slum in Lagos, and are often too upset to speak on the phone, people in Athlone say. “We’re not going to give in on this,” says Frank Young, a retired farmer who met Odunsi and Nwanze when they were students in a class taught by his wife.   

Young says his anti-deportations group, Athlone Families Together, is prepared to take a case to the European Court of Human rights in Strasbourg: “People are fiercely determined that justice will be done.”  

While much of Europe is considering restricting immigrants, the Irish, it seems, want to keep theirs.  That sentiment was unheard-of five years ago, when the government began housing asylum seekers in hostels and detention centers around the country.  As busloads of African and East European immigrants arrived in villages that were homogenously Irish—and 100% white—many residents feared exotic diseases, rising crime rates and falling property values.  So they took to the streets to keep foreigners out.  

That was then.  Now, from fishing villages on the south coast to market towns on the border with Northern Ireland, communities are demanding that refugees be allowed to stay.   

Since asylum seekers and economic migrants began arriving in the late 1990s, many Irish people came to accept the refugees, to feel sympathy for their plight, and even to befriend them.  Law lecturer Christopher McDermott, at the Athlone Institute of Technology, is campaigning for a 23-year-old Nigerian accountancy student in Longford who faces deportation this month.  “A lot of communities in Ireland are fed up with their friends being sent home once they’ve integrated here,” he says. 

It is still an Uphill battle.  Refugees are only a fraction of the 50,000 people who immigrated to Ireland last year, and other groups often command more attention. 

"A Lot of Communities in Irelandare fed up with their friends being

sent home once they’ve integrated here.”

Christopher McDermott, Law lecturer

 In the 12 months since the European Union expanded to include 10 new countries, more than 85,000 migrants from Central and Eastern Europe have been granted permission to work in Ireland—that’s more than in any other E.U. state.  Irish trade unions now champion laborers, from Turkish construction crews to Filipino hairdressers.    

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he new mood has not yet got through to officialdom, though.  Justice Minister Michael McDowell has made it harder for refugees to settle.  He has worked to cut the average processing time for new asylum applications to a few weeks-many refugees who arrived a few weeks—many refugees who arrived a few years ago are still waiting for a verdict on their appeals—and most are denied.  Fewer than 4,800 people requested asylum in Ireland last year, a 49% drop from two years ago: the country’s Refugee Applications Commissioner granted asylum to just 430 new applicants out of the 7,121 people whose cases she closed in 2004.

 Ireland has also redefined its rules on citizenship.  Under the Irish constitution of 1937, any baby born in Ireland became a citizen automatically.  But after an amendment was approved in a referendum last summer—by a majority of 79% - citizenship    is now only granted to newborns whose parents have legally resided in the country for three years. 

Since the referendum, though, public opinion seems to have turned around.  Why have the Irish changed their collective mind? Some of the enthusiasm is economic.   

Most refuges would love to work, and most are highly educated, according to Jean-Pierre Eyanga, project officer for the umbrella group integrating Ireland.  “A lot of them are the cream of their home countries; they’re skilled,” he says.   

Immigrants who are allowed to work boosted Ireland’s gross domestic product by 2.6% from 1898 to 2003, but that figure would be 3.3% if their jobs matched their abilities, according to the Economic and Social Research Institute, a government–funded think tank. 

Despite facing formidable obstacles, Ireland’s immigrants have started to integrate.  One-eight of the pupils at the Summerhill elementary school in Athlone are from countries like Croatia, Nigeria, and Romania.  Principal John O’Neill describes how his students handle diversity while they play outside his window: “All of these children are basically Irish children now,” he says. 

Back in Athlone, Young is undaunted. Even as he fights for his friends’ return, he is preparing for other battles.  Lola Adebayo, evangelical preachers, says she came to Athlone in 2002 after Muslims raided a religious event where she was speaking in Nigeria.   

Adebayo and her children face deportation in a few weeks.  Lola cannot imagine having to leave Athlone: “There’s no gunshot, there’s no fear.  There is nobody chasing you to kill you.  I’m peace here,” she says.  If her Irish friends have their way, she will stay right there.                                       

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Human Security as a Global Public Good

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n issue we turn to the question of whether the three contrasting views of human security, when taken together, offer a view of international politics fundamentally different from the established paradigms that inform much of international relations theory.  We argue that the human security vision of international politics is very much at variance with traditional realism and the neo-realist paradigm of international politics.  The human security vision has considerably more in common with liberalism, and many of its assumptions, lie in liberal democratic theory.  Even so, certain aspects of the human security vision also take their cue form socialist theories of international politics.   

This is especially true of the sustainable human development conception of human security, which puts a great deal of emphasis on social justice and the distributive aspects of international politics.  To explain how the ‘theory’ of human security differs from other theories or paradigms of international politics, we will examine the concept in terms of public goods, which offers a useful perspective on the broader theoretical and policy implications of  human security. 

The Global Reach of Human Security 

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n traditional liberal democratic theories of the state, property rights, safety, and security are public goods provided by non-market mechanisms, usually the state.  For example, the ultimate responsibility for maintaining law and order in domestic civil society rests with the state, which provides this public good.  Early liberal theorists like Thomas Hobbes recognized that allowing private citizens to look after their own security was a recipe for social and political anarchy.  Likewise, the various domestic legal institutions and instruments of the state could only in a real sense guarantee property rights.  The large body of law that has developed in the area of contracts, for example, constitutes a kind of public good.  The legal rules and instruments of contract law not only guarantee reciprocity, but also permit private transactions to take place in an orderly and businesslike manner.  As noted by Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, ‘Public goods are recognized as having benefits that cannot easily be confined to as single “buyer”.  Yet, once they are provided, many can enjoy them free.  Street names for example.  A clean environment is another.  Without a mechanism for collective action, these goods can be underproduced’ 

Public goods can be broken into two main categories: so-called ‘pure’ public goods and joint goods.  Pure public goods have two main characteristics, jointness and non-excludability.  Pure public goods are those whose benefits are consumed by all members of a community as soon as any one member produces them.  Relevant example of the polar case of pure public goods is hard to find but one is knowledge, a public intermediate input into the production function of all firms.  Knowledge is both a non-rivalrous and non-excludable good (my consumption of knowledge does not diminish yours).  But common property resources, e.g., the commons, are rivalrous even though they may be non-excludable (my excessive consumption or use of the commons will diminish your consumption and the consumption of other).   

Joint or ‘club goods’ are characterized by their jointness and excludability.  Since the benefits from club goods are excludable, normally through the price mechanism, they can be provided through the private sector, e.g., cable and pay television, movie theatres, recreational facilities.  Club goods, by definition, can be extended or provided to somebody else without raising marginal costs.  When jointness extends to the international level but benefits remain excludable, the optimal club size is international.   

There are different explanations as to why human security is an underprovided public good.  Whereas some scholars argue that the main sources of the human security deficit lie in the domestic and political failures of states, others argue that the sources of this deficit lie in the distributive failures of markets that perpetuate inequalities within and among states and that may, in some circumstances, exacerbate social and political tensions.  According to the sustainable human development view of human security, there is need to change not just the political environment in which human security can be delivered but the economic environment as well.  This boarder view of human security is admittedly controversial, and some skeptics doubt whether there are explicit causal connections between socio-economic inequalities—especially at the kind contemplated by human security, advocates are achievable.  However, an important and growing body of literature suggests that market and state failures do intersect and interact in significant ways that affect human security. 

Within the burgeoning human security literature, there is also an important debate about which are the most efficient, effective, and ‘just’ ways of dividing up the fixed (as opposed to marginal) costs not only of providing human security public goods, but also of creating new institutions that will themselves be the human security public good providers.  Some argue that hegemonic actors (principally the United States) are the most efficient public goods providers because only they have the resources (economic and military) to provide these goods and discipline free riders and renegades.  Others argue that international institutions are more effective because they have greater political legitimacy and that efficiency is not the only factor in the provision of these public goods.  Still others argue that non-governmental actors are the most effective and legitimate providers of human security public goods because they are most sensitive to the different local conditions and to the needs to peoples for whom such goods ultimately are provided.  

Sources of Market and Political Failure in the Human Security Deficit

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n exploring differences among the rights/rule-of-law, ‘safety of peoples’, and sustainable development approaches about the sources of market or political failure that contribute to the human security deficit, it is useful to contrast these views with more traditional liberal arguments about the demand for international institutions.  This will help us understand why proponents of human security believe that it is an underprovided public good.  We will begin our discussion with the maximalist definition or conception of human security—the sustainable human development conception—because it is, in some respects, the most controversial of the three.

Market Failures and the problem of global Equity 

In classical liberal economics, as noted by Rao, ‘global order and efficiency can be secured by the market system so long as nation states do not interfere in cross-border transactions among agents except to enforce property and contractual rights’.   However, this minimalist view of international governance is challenged in more recent neo-liberal accounts about the need and demand for international institutions.  Governance structures in the form of international regimes are typically seen as devices through which political and economic actors can organize and manage their interdependencies. 

In looking to the formation of international regimes and institutions, various scholars have identified different sources or ‘cause’ of market failure.  Some scholars emphasize the role of international transaction costs to explain the demand for international institutions, arguing that in an imperfect world uncertainty and a lack of information generate their own inefficiencies and diseconomies.  International regimes are useful, therefore, when (1) a clear legal framework establishing liability is missing, (2) the market for information is imperfect, and (3) there are positive transaction costs.  Regimes can be designed to reduce the effects of uncertainty (insurance regimes) and to create internal and environmental regularities, thereby reducing the incentives for opportunistic behavior (control regimes) (keohane, 1983).  The notion of transaction costs focuses on the costs involved in market-making under uncertainty; state international governance structures or regimes can function as a way to improve market-making by reducing transaction costs (Casson, 1982).  For example, the creation of international standards or the harmonization of national standards through the GATT/WTO and various bilateral treaties has helped to standards transaction costs when national tax and tariff barriers have acted as barriers to international trade. Similarly, the elimination of border controls in the European Union has reduced interregional transaction costs.

 Others have focused on structural failures involving macroeconomic instabilities to explain the demand for international institutions and new kinds of international governance arrangements.  John Maynard Keynes was the first to argue that capitalist economies could