Dashen Bank Declares 71.2m Br Net Profit

Dashen Bank, one of the six private banks in Ethiopia and the only private bank to have been included in the Africa’s top 100 banks in 2005, as published by African Business magazine, declared a record high profit of 71.2 million Br after tax on November 12.         

 Leulseged Tefari, Dashen’s president, declared another “victorious year both in terms of operational results and in market leadership” among the private banks.

However, it was also a year of challenges and opportunities, according to the President. The sudden surge in global oil and steel price affected the economy negatively, while this was somehow balanced by the rise in price of coffee.         

The new bonanza in flower exports and the bumper harvest last year were attributed to the successful year of the Bank. 

The year’s result shows Dashen’s asset was beefed up by 28pc, to reach 3.4 billion Br, while loans and advances increased to 2.1 billion Br, covering 63pc of its total asset. 

Dashen’s 108 shareholders have seen an increase of 104 Br on their dividend per 1,000 from what they had last year, earning each share 712 Br.    g  

Swedish journalist set free in Eritrea after four years 

STOKHOLM – A Swedish journalist of Eritrean origin was unexpectedly released from a prision in his native country November 19, after being jailed for four years for demanding press freedom in Eritrea, a close friend of Isaak’s family who has led an organization in Sweden fighting for his release.

Obrink said Isaac called him at his home in Lerum in southern Sweden on that day morning after he was set free. “This is incredible, it is so fantastic,” Obrink said. “He was very happy.”

Isaak came to Sweden in 1987 as a war refugee, but returned to the eastern African country in the 1990s to become a reporter at an independent newspaper.  He was one of several journalists at the newspaper who were arrested and imprisoned without a trial after demanding press freedom on September 18, 2001.

Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year guerrilla war, has previously ignored Swedish requests for Isaak’s releases, and it was unclear why authorities decided to set him free.

Obrink credited diplomatic efforts by Swedish Ambassador Bengt Sparre, who has spent several months pressuring Eritrean authorities to release Isaak.   “I think it has a lot to do with (Sparre’s) efforts,” Obrink said.  He said Isaak plans to return to Sweden as soon as possible to be reunited with his wife and three children.

Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds said she felt relief after hearing about the release, Swedish news agency TT reported.

“I have met his wife Sofia, and talked to his children and understand what an extremely terrible situation this has been for them,” Freivalds was quoted as saying.                            g

UN families told to leave Eritrea

The United Nations has ordered the families of its personnel in Eritrea to leave the country, as part of an increased security assessment.

The security zone along the Ethiopian border has been made off-limits to all UN staff except peacekeeping troops. Elsewhere in the country, staffs have been told remain in town, and keep in touch with their headquarters.  

This comes amid fears of new hostility along the border, where the neighbours went to war from 1998 to 2000.

A peace agree-ment in 2000 led to the demarcation of the border by an independent commission. However, Ethiopia has not yet withdrawn its forces from the town of Badme, which was awarded to Eritrea.

In the past few months Eritrea has imposed restrictions on the activities of the UN peacekeeping force. Earlier last month Ethiopia and Eritrea reinforced their military positions along their common border, when the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, warned of the possibility of renewed conflict.                             g

Chad deserters 'used in Darfur' 

Sudan has been accused of using Chadian army deserters who fled across the border to help fight rebels in the western Darfur region.

In an interview with the BBC, Chadian Information Minister Hourmadji Moussa Ndoumgor said Sudan was trying to destabilise his country.

At the weekend, Sudan said its forces clashed with Chadian army deserters in the western region of Darfur. Khartoum said military operations were underway to expel the men. It made no mention of casualties.

 The Chadians mutinied from their army in September this year and claim to number in the hundreds. They say they want to overthrow their president.

According to Sudan, the Chadians number about 120.  

"The weapons they [Sudan's government] are giving to the deserters to fight the Darfur

Government," Mr. Ndoumgor told BBC Afrique.  The long border between Sudan and its western neighbour is porous, with a murky mix of rebel groups and armed militia roaming its arid landscape.

The same ethnic groups are found on both sides of the border.  

A ceasefire is supposed to be in place in Darfur but the Sudanese army, pro-government Arab militias and black African rebel movements have broken it with regularity. Some 2m people have fled the conflict in Darfur, with more than 100,000 crossing the border into Chad.                g 

Uganda rebels in daylight ambush

 At least 12 people have been killed in northern Uganda during an ambush by suspected rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army, LRA.   The attackers shot at a minibus full of people in broad daylight as it approached the town of Pader.  The minibus was set ablaze and as the passengers tried to escape from the burning vehicle they were attacked.  Some 1.5m people have been displaced by the 20-year conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government.  

Following the latest attack, a Ugandan military spokesman said the rebels were being pursued and an investigation had been launched to find out whether any Ugandan soldiers had neglected their duty.  This ambush follows a similar attack when a truck carrying traditional dancers was ambushed. At least five people died.  Worsening plight  

The BBC's Will Ross in Uganda says that despite the governments claim that the rebels have been defeat-ed, a series of ambushes by the LRA is proving that, although weakened, the LRA is still able to cause misery in northern Uganda.  

In what appeared to be a change of tactic, the rebels recently targeted humanitarian aid vehicles. The plight of the displaced could well worsen, as many humanitarian organizations have severely restricted their operations due to insecurity, our correspondent says.  

 The conflict has gained notoriety for the LRA's massacres and its tactic of kidnapping children for use as soldiers and sex slaves.    Several senior commanders of the LRA are wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and the governments of Uganda and Sudan have agreed to cooperate.                                                           g

thiopia’s orphans and vulnerable children today got a chance to share their dreams in a new book – published at the start of a ground-breaking campaign to raise support and funding for the country’s young people. 

Hundreds of street children, orphans and other vulnerable youngsters were asked to describe their hopes for the further in words and pictures for the book entitled “We Have A Dream”. 

Their hard-hitting contributions will now be used as the basis of a campaign to persuade Ethiopian politicians to put the rights of vulnerable children closer to the top of the political agenda and to increase state funding for youth-related schemes.   

“The voices of vulnerable children are too often overlooked or ignored in Ethiopia and many other countries,” said Bjorn Ljungquivst, country Representative for UNICEF in Ethiopia. 

“This book gives a voice to hundreds of those voiceless children.  It contains many strong messages for Ethiopia’s politicians and everyone else who lives alongside Ethiopia’s vulnerable children. 

“One of the main things that have stuck out is the huge appetite these children have for education.  They are desperate to go to school.  They see education as the main way of achieving their dreams. 

“Lots of us have also been struck by the many articulate descriptions of the experience of living as a child in Ethiopia – particularly the intense grief felt by orphans.”

 The editors of “We Have A Dream” went out of their way to collect contributions from street children and orphans form every corner of the country – from Gambella to Tigray and the Somali region. 

The book ends with a call on the Ethiopian government to implement the full terms of the Convention on the rights of the Child, a human rights treaty singed by 192 governments including Ethiopia.  

“We have a Dream” highlights the ways that Ethiopia’s children are still not enjoying their full rights as drawn up under the Convention, particularly in terms of access to education and protection against abuse and discrimination,”  said MR Ljungqvist.  

The book “We a Dream” is the first of a three-part campaign to raise the profile of Ethiopia’s most vulnerable children.  The second – “Run For Their Dreams” – has recruited hundreds of participants in this weekend’s Great Ethiopian Run to raise sponsorship money for vulnerable children projects. 

The third part entitled “Fulfill their Dreams” sets out to persuade local and national politicians in Ethiopia to raise support and funding for orphans and vulnerable children.  Parliamentarians will be asked to increase budget support for vulnerable children through all state avenues, including the Ministry of Labour and Social Affaris.  Candidates children through all state avenues, including the Ministry of Lobar and Social Affairs.  

Candidates in next year’s woreda elections will be asked to sign up to a list of commitments on children’s rights, based on the findings of the “We Have a Dream” book. 

In the long run, the Dream campaign aims to set up a permanent Alliance For Orphans and Vulnerable Children, made up of government bodies, UN agencies, NGOs, religious organizations, civil society groups and interested members of the public.             

On 4 April 1967, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered a powerful speech that is largely forgotten in the annual celebrations commemorating the slain civil rights leader’s legacy. Standing in the pulpit of Riverside Church in New York City, King condemned the government’s escalation of the war in Vietnam and warned that it was “but a symptom of a far deeper malady within the American spirit.”¹ He anticipated the criticism he would receive from those who thought the civil rights leader had no business addressing matters of foreign policy by reminding them that the Nobel Prize for Peace he had received in 1964 obligated him to work for the “brotherhood of man,” regardless of national boundaries. In linking U.S. militarism overseas with the country’s shortcomings at home, the Reverend King followed a tradition of African-American leaders who saw the plight of black Americans as intertwined with the struggles of people of color throughout the world against colonialism. 

This particular perception of the relationship between the global and the national accelerated in the wake of the Second World War.  The United Nations, a transnational organization chart-ered in 1946 and identified with human rights and anticolonia-lism, offered a politically diverse group of black leaders a forum for expressing their grievances against domestic racism. Accordingly, both the moderate National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the left-wing National Negro Congress sought to petition the UN to investigate the Jim Crow treatment African Americans endured. As the predominant member of this world agency, however, the U.S. government succeeded in shelving this embarrassing issue.²

At the same time, the onset of the Cold War in 1947 affected in potent but contradictory ways the impact foreign affairs had on civil rights. On the one hand, black leaders used the nation’s anti-Soviet ideology to pressure Washington to live up to its own democratic rhetoric. President Harry S. Truman recognized the dilemma in trying to win over allies from newly emerging nations in Africa and Asia while tolerating white supremacy in the South.³ On the other hand, Truman’s anti-Communist polic-ies isolated the left wing of the civil rights movement, depriving it of a critical and militant voice in support of economic equality and anti-imperialism. Influential black opposition leaders such as W. E. B. DuBois and Paul Robeson who questioned Cold War dogma became targets of governmental efforts to stifle dissent.⁴ In contrast, by embracing the anti-Communist consensus, the NAACP and other mainstream civil rights groups pragmatically backed Truman’s Cold War measures in the hope that their cooperation would help persuade the federal government to initiate a Second Racial Reconstruction of the South. 

Although important, the Cold War neither fulfilled the expectations of black liberals nor confirmed the doubts of radical black critics. Liberals took satisfaction in Truman’s appointment of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, whose 1947 report established the national legislative agenda to combat segregation and disfranchisement over the next two decades. Though the president failed to enact any civil rights legislation during his tenure in office, he did sign an executive order leading to the desegregation of the armed forces. But black liberals paid a significant price for joining the anti-Communist crusade, because the forces of political reaction that it unleashed stemmed the tide of progressive reform, including that most beneficial to African Americans.⁵ Nevertheless, as Brenda Gayle Plummer has pointed out, whatever sacrifices liberal African Americans may have made in this bargain, “civil rights had always been and remained a greater priority for [them] than foreign policy.”⁶ Besides, even without the Cold War hardening attitudes against racial change, it is questionable that white southerners would have voluntarily dismantled the Jim Crow practices and institutions that kept black citizens oppressed or that the federal government would have forced them to do so.⁷ 

Michael L. Krenn indirectly addresses this controversial issue. The Cold War takes up only a small part of his brief but sweeping study of the efforts of African Americans to integrate the highest levels of foreign policy formulation and imple-mentation from 1945 to 1969. He contends that during the Truman years, “Department of State officials slowly came to the conclusion that race would play an important role in the postwar world” and realized “that America’s domestic racial problem was now a foreign policy problem”.   Krenn acknowledges that the govern-ment’s recognition of the racial interconnection of domestic and foreign affairs did not extend much beyond rhetoric to assure the appointments of high level officials in the State Department and Foreign Service. In 1950, of the thirty-three blacks in the Foreign Service, two-thirds were employed in traditionally black posts in Liberia. Except for the newly appointed ambassador, Edward P. Dudley, nearly all held low-grade positions. 

But, Krenn does not hold the ColdWar primarily accountable for this situation; rather, he places most of the blame on institutional racism and elitism – the “old boys club” mentality that kept blacks and other outsiders from being recruited and employed in the foreign policy bureaucracy. Although Krenn merely hints at this, considerations of gender, ethnicity, and class as well as race severely limited the employment of women, Jews, and other marginalized groups. The preference for white men who were southern bred and/or Ivy League-trained to serve as career officers remained unchanged over the second half of the century no matter what the trajectory of the Cold War. 

Krenn does provide a good deal of evidence to show that the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union waged by Truman and his allies did not shut off attempts by blacks to link foreign affairs with civil rights objectives. From NAACP officials to newspaper editors, African Americans continued to attack colonialism during the 1950s and argued that racial problems at home handicapped attempts to win over nonwhite nations to the U.S. side in the struggle against communism. The desegregation crisis in Little Rock in 1957 underscored the lesson that the rest of the world, aligned and non-aligned was watching closely how the country treated African Americans. Even the State Department, which under the Republican John Foster Dulles practiced gradualism and paternalism toward blacks, realized the importance of improving the United State’s image. 

In a perceptive discussion of the “Unfinished Business” exhibit staged by the United States at the 1958 Brussels World’s Fair, Krenn demonstrates how good intentions fell victim to institutional and political cons-ervatism. In the wake of Little Rock, the State Department fashioned a display of newspaper headlines attesting to the United State’s racial conflicts along with a large photograph of black and white children at play, suggesting that future generations would overcome these problems. Excessively cautious about communicating any shortcomings, the State Department separated this exhibit from the main U.S. pavilion, and only a few weeks following its inception dismantled the controversial presentation after a group of powerful southern congressmen complained about both the unflattering treatment of the South and the interracial image.⁸ Indeed, any attempt to use foreign affairs to promote civil rights was challenged and generally limited by the enormously influential southern bloc in Congress. While segregationists brandished communism as a weapon to smear civil rights activists, racial considerations came first in their opposition to social change. 

Black Diplomacy emphasizes the theme of continuity. Not only does Krenn show that African-American leaders sustained their concern over foreign affairs for the quarter century following World War II he also illustrates the consistency of the State Department in failing to make much progress in appointing blacks to policy and diplomatic posts. By 1969, blacks had broken out of serving only in conventional venues such as Liberia, but their numbers in the ranks of Foreign Service Officers had barely risen. Even the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which were much more racially liberal than Eisenhower’s, produced far less success in enlarging the black diplomatic corps than they did in extending desegregation and voting rights in the South. In a balanced manner, Krenn does point out the complications that hindered increased black appointments. Although many new positions arose as a result of the creation of independent African nations, blacks themselves were divided over whether they should con-centrate on seeking these appointments or trying to gain jobs in more prestigious European locations. Yet they were united in their belief that official State Department explanations were false in claiming that nonwhite nations did not want black represent-tatives for fear of being branded with second-class status. Furthermore, despite attempts in the 1960s to recruit black college graduates for the Foreign Service, the cultural biases of the entrance exam and the desire to elevate career personnel to ambassadorial posts combined to hamper African Americans from making much headway. 

Overall, Krenn presents an illuminating analysis of the juxtaposition of race and foreign policy by concentrating on the hiring practices of the State Department. The book is balanced in its judgments and well informed by research in the archives of government agencies and civil rights groups, black newspapers, and oral histories. Furthermore, the author deliberately goes beyond the historical record by posing the counterfactual question: “What if there had been a greater black voice in America’s foreign policy during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s?”  Yet he shrinks from answering this query, contending that the muted and limited presence of black diplomats precludes a response.  Albeit correct, the author might have been more venturesome in considering possible answers. For example, he could have used the case of Carl Rowan, the black journalist who in the 1960s held important positions as head of the United States Information Agency and ambassador to Finland. At a time when blacks were dividing over the Vietnam War, Rowan conformed to official policy and did President Johnson’s bidding in trying to curtail dissent. In an article written for Reader’s Digest, he accused Martin Luther King, Jr., of having unsavory Communist connections that influenced his opposition to the war.⁹ Perhaps the prerequisite for those African Americans like Rowan who broke through the glass ceiling into the top diplomatic councils was to toe the line and not challenges prevailing beliefs. Unfortunately, Krenn does not discuss Vietnam at all, which was a source of serious disagreement among African-American leaders and groups. This omission underscores the need for future scholarship to examine closely the impact of the most serious Cold War crisis since Korea on the intersection of attitudes toward race nationally and interna-tionally.  Nor does Krenn explore the influence of Africa in the 1960s on the thinking of black leaders as diverse as John Lewis and Malcolm X. 

Overall, Krenn’s study is a useful addition to the most important recent scholarship dealing with the interrelationship between African Americans and foreign affairs. It will help civil rights scholars to broaden their grand narratives to include the international implications of landmark events in such places as Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma, Alabama, Little Rock, Arkansas, and Albany, Georgia, as well as the domestic conseq-uences of those in Sharpsville and Johannesburg, South Africa, and Bandung, Indonesia. At the same time, diplomatic historians can borrow a page from the current work of civil rights scholars and broaden their top down studies of the upper echelon of foreign policy councils. Accordingly, they should look beyond the NAACP and other national groups, no matter how significant they have been, to embrace as well blacks in local communities who perceptively understood their connection to the world scene. To cite only one example, they will find that in 1965, black Mississippians circulated a leaflet calling upon African-American youth not to “fight in Vietnam for the white man’s freedom, until all the Negro people are free in Mississippi.”¹⁰ This piece of evidence only strengthens the conclusion of Krenn and other recent scholars that African Americans have thought globally even as they acted locally.         g

Foot Note  

1. James M. Washington, ed., A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York, 1991). 

2.  Carol Anderson, “From Hope to Disillusion: African Americans, the United Nations, and the Struggle for Human Rights,” Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996):  Robert L.

Harris, Jr., “Racial Equality and the United Nations Charter,” in New Directions in Civil Rights Studies, ed. Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia Sullivan (Charlottesville, 1991), 126–48.

3. Mary L. Dudziak, “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41 (November 1988): 61–120. 

4.  William H. Chafe, TheUnfinished Journey: America sinceWorldWar II, th ed. (NewYork, 1999),

106–8; Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, “Opportunities Lost and Found: Labor, Radicals,

and the Early Civil Rights Movement,” Journal of American History 75 (December 1988): 786–811; Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill, 1996); Gerald Horne, Black and Red:W. E. B. DuBois and the Afro-American Response to the ColdWar, 1644–1963 (Albany, 1986); Martin Bauml Duberman, Paul Robeson (New York, 1989).

 5.  Penny M.Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism 1937–1957 (Ithaca, 1997), 113–14; Gerald Horne,“Who Lost the ColdWar? Africans and African Americans,” Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 613–26.

 6.  Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: African Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960

(Chapel Hill, 1996), 210.

 7. For the opposite conclusion see Horne, “Who Lost the Cold War?” 619.

 8. For a fuller treatment by Krenn see his “Segregation and the 1958 World’s Fair,”  

9. The article is reprinted in C. Eric Lincoln, Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Profile (New York, 1970),

212–18. For Rowan’s version see Carl T. Rowan, Breaking Barriers: A Memoir (Boston, 1991), 286–88.

 10. Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, MA,

1981), 185-86; John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana, 1994), 349–50.

he People’s Republic of China and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia established diplomatic relations in 1970.  After the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic font took power in 1991, the two countries further strengthened political exchanges, broadened trade and economic cooperation and intensified coordination and cooperation in international affairs, thus brining bilateral relations on a fast development track.  Ethiopia unswervingly adheres to the one China policy and supports China’s reunification.  China attaches importance to China-Ethiopia relations and works to strengthen the partnership of all-round cooperation between the two countries. 

The year 2004 witnessed frequent exchanges of high-level visits. From October 31 to November 5, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi paid an official visit to China.  He met with President Hu Jintao and held talks with Premier Wen Jiabao.  The Chinese leaders, speaking highly of bilateral relations, appreciated Ethiopia’s firm support to china on questions of Taiwan and human rights, expressed the readiness to maintain high-level contact and exchanges broaden trade and economic cooperation in international affairs, so as to promote the steady development of the partnership of all-round cooperation, between the two countries.   

Prime Minister Meles thanked China for the unswerving support and help to Ethiopia in its endeavor for peace, stability and development.  He underlined the strong political foundation of bilateral relations, and expressed the readiness to further broaden trade and economic cooperation, and work with China to promote pragmatic China-Africa cooperation under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa cooperation under the framework of the forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 

Dawit Yohannes, Speaker of the House of People’s Representatives, Mulatu Teshome, Speaker of the House of Federation, vice Prime Minister Addisu Leggese and other Ethiopian leaders visited China successively.  On the Chinese side, CPPCC Vice chairman Li Meng, Head of CCCPC International Department Wang Jiarui paid separate visits to Ethiopia. 

Trade and economic cooperation achieved fruitful results.  In June Vice Agriculture Minister Liu Jain visited Ethiopia at the head of a delegation.  In October, the China-Ethiopia Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Cooperation met in Addis Ababa for its sixth meeting.  Vice Commerce Minister Liao Xiaoqui attended the meeting at the head of a delegation and reached agreement with the Ethiopia side on mineral resources prospecting and human resources development.  Two-way trade progressed by leaps and bounds.  Cooperation on investment registered new progress.  With the setting up of Ethiopia-china Acrylic Fibers Products Co. Ltd and Beijing Bricks Mill in Ethiopia, China-funded enterprises in Ethiopia totaled 9 in number. 

Exchanges and cooperation in culture, information, tourism and those between local governments flourished.  Vice President of All China Federation of Trade Unions Xu Zhenhuan, President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign   Countries Chen Haosu, General Administration of Radio, Film and Television delegation visited Ethiopia successively. 

On the Ethiopia side, the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture delegation, the Ministry of Trade and Industry delegation and Mayor of Addis Ababa city visited China on separate occasions.                      g

Security Concerns Caused by Somalia

Life and property are not guaranteed in Somalia.  The Islamic courts and the militia have been trying to maintain law and order.  This has some effect in spite of the fact that Somalis are not known for their adherence to extreme brands of Islam.  

Some form of government is necessary to do away with the anarchy. The alternative is continued chaos.  The Transitional National Government (TNG) faces many challenges. There is still opposition to it from the factional leaders.  The underlying challenge is the threat of international terrorism.² When it comes to security, Somalia is alleged to be a hub or potential hub of international terrorists.  It is said to have served as a strategic base and a launching pad for international terrorism in the Horn and much of East Africa.  

Given the above, Somalia is said to have provided safe haven for terrorists.  Terrorists thrive in a condition of statelessness.  One reason for the choice of Somalia is that it is located at a transit point from the Gulf, the Middle East, Afghanistan, etc.  

Weapons are easily accessible. Small arms and even grenades are easily accessible for purchase and are very cheap. Islamic NGOs are exploited by terrorists.  There is also illicit money transaction.³  

The Risks of the Spillover of Insecurity from Somalia 

The former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, in a recent study entitled “Ethiopia Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism before and After September 11” has brought to light the renewed threat which Ethiopia and the other Horn of African countries face. Shinn refers to how this threat has changed in content and orientation over time, stating: 

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi commented in the mid-1990s that the most significant long-term threat to Ethiopia's security is Islamic fundamentalism. At that time, the principal external threats emanated from Somalia and, especially, the Sudan. The concern with the Sudan has, at least for the time being, dissipated it. On the other hand, the events of September 11, 2001 have caused Ethiopia to focus on the situation in Somalia, particularly on the threat posed by hostile Islamic groups such as Al Itihaad al Islamia (Unity of Islam).⁴ 

Shinn also underscored the significance and vulnerability of Ethiopia adding, "Ethiopia is the linchpin to the Horn of Africa. What happens there impacts the rest of the region."  He then explained why especial attention should be paid to Ethiopia in assessing the future evolution of Islam noting, "the importance of Islam in Ethiopia is not well appreciated by the United States, and U .S. officials are well advised to pay attention to Ethiopian Islam and the way in which Ethiopia interacts with its Islamic neighbors."⁵  

Ethiopia has been exposed to some incidents of threat posed by extremist groups including the assassination attempt on the life of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in June of 1995.  Much has not changed since 1995. What has changed is the global awareness about the virile risk of religious extremism in the Horn and elsewhere. Needless to add, worry about Somalia becoming a safe haven for fugitives from Afghanistan has accentuated the anxiety which is widely felt in the West as a whole. Nevertheless, there are also other historical and current factors which highlight Ethiopia's vulnerability. The former U.S. Ambassador also confirms this view in the passage below: 

This analysis will argue that September 11 has not significantly altered Ethiopia's security situation vis-à-vis the threat from Islamic fundamentalism. What has changed is a new interest by the United States and others in possible Al Qaeda links to the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia, and the prospect that Ethiopia, among others, can take political advantage of this new situation.⁶

Nevertheless, the understanding of the role of Islam must be put in a longer historical context in order to understand why it might continue to be a factor in the security evolution in the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. The Ambassador had this to add, “But before getting to the end of the story, it is important to look first at Ethiopia’s historical interactions with Islam and the status of lslam in Ethiopia today. An understanding of Ethiopia's position also requires a review of the last decade of Islamic fundamentalist threats to Ethiopia from Sudan and Somalia.”⁷

The Strength and Vulnerability of

Neighboring States – Ethiopia

As the country which provided safe haven to the early Moslem refugees and as one which embraced Islam centuries ago, Ethiopia ought to be exempt from Jihad and extremist incursions from Somalia or other states. Indeed, this is also in line with the wish of Prophet Mohammed.  According to tradition, a group of Arab followers of Islam in danger of persecution by local authorities in Arabia are said to have been given safe haven in the Aksumite Kingdom of the Ethiopian Christian highlands early in the seventh century. Besides, they were well treated and permitted to practice their religion as they wished. Consequently, the Prophet Muhammad had said, 'Ethiopia should not be targeted for jihad'.  

However, in spite of the magnanimity which was extended to the early Moslem refugees, Islam in imperial Ethiopia has historically been accorded a secondary place.   Even so, Christian-Islamic relations in Ethiopia remained generally cordial until the Islamic raids led by Ahmed Gragn who invaded the Ethiopian highlands from the Somali port of Zeila in the late fifteenth century.  

It is also worthy of note that Ethiopia, despite the wish of the Prophet, was again exposed to two other Islamic invasions.  One was by Egypt in 1875 and the other by the Sudanese Mahadists in 1888. However, both ended with decisive Ethiopian victories. But, these invasions reflected more of competition for power rather than profound religious motives. Even so, the two invasions also evoked memories of Christian victories which have produced a feeling of vindictiveness among some Moslem countries. The extent of this is, for instance, highlighted by the Sudanese invasion and the Ethiopian response to it as can be discerned in the passage below:    

The last major, organized threat from Islam occurred in 1888, when the forces of the Mahdi in the Sudan sacked the former capital Gonder and burned many of its churches. The following year the Ethiopians defeated the Mahdist troops at the Battle of Metema on the Ethiopian-Sudanese border.⁸ 

But it should be noted that the above history reflects more the Christian-Muslim hegemonic competition for control of the Ethiopian highlands rather than an early effort to impose Islamic fundamentalist rule. Event so, it should once again be emphasized that the non-Muslims, particularly those who held political power, had not forgotten this background as they confronted more threats in subsequent years.   This is probably relevant even at present.  

The above view does not, however, imply that Moslems were fairly treated in Ethiopian history. This, to a large measure, had to do with the historical dynastic legitimacy claimed by Christian Ethiopian rulers and the topography of the country, which consigned Moslems to the costal lowland areas.   This point is further developed below:   

Islam expanded gradually in Ethiopia, especially in the lower-lying parts of the country. Most Ethiopian Muslims belong to indigenous ethnic groups; they are not of Arab descent. Always treated as a secondary religion, Islam emerged in the shadow of Christianity, and Muslims experienced discrimination.⁹  

Christian-Moslem Relations in the Horn of Africa Ethiopia

Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the Christian-Moslem relationship in Ethiopia was characterized more by cohabitation and friendship rather than hostilities.  This was so because, there were only a few brief periods when Christian rulers tried to suppress Islam. This, for instance, was true of the period around the rule of Gonder in the seventeenth century, when Muslim communities enjoyed considerable autonomy.   

But, the antagonism between Christianity and Islam was accentuated by colonialism and what transpired following the Italian occupation of Eritrea.  However, this had to do with domestic power struggle which was taken advantage of by external players.  For instance, three internal developments in the twentieth century had revived Christian concerns about Islam. One of them was that upon the death of Emperor Menelik in 1913, "his grandson, Lij Iyasu, inherited the throne. Iyasu was pushed aside after three years, having made what the Christian leadership considered too many overtures to Muslims, renewing concerns that followers of Islam might try to assume power.  

As noted above, the other factor which had bearing on Christian-Moslem relationship was the colonial policy of Italy which was skewed in favor of Moslems with the aim of fostering hostility between them. This was a ploy of the colonial strategy of divide and control as can be seen below: 

Following its invasion of Ethiopia in 1936, Italy took a number of measures that favored Muslims at the expense of Christians, a policy that led to some incidents that Christians did not soon forget.¹⁰

Another development which negatively impacted the Christian-Moslem relationship in Ethiopia was the secessionist struggle of Eritrea which took root following the end of the Italian and British rule of it. The event which led to this was that, "in 1961 the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) began an armed struggle to create an independent Eritrean state. A largely Islamic movement, the ELF drew its fighters from Muslim nomadic tribes, and its leaders called for a jihad against Christian Ethiopia." Nevertheless, subsequently the leadership of the Eritrean independence movement was taken over by Christians who continued to hold the upper hand when Eritrea became independent in 1993.¹¹  

The Ethiopian Response to Extremist Islam Separation of State and Religion

 The current EPRDF-led government which overthrew the Derg (1991) has done much by way of separating state and religious affairs. This was especially true of the period following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Sellasie I in 1974 who was close to the church by the Socialist/Military regime (1974-91). One can, therefore, safely say that religious troubles were, to a large measure, fostered by outsiders. But there are also other domestic factors which have made Christian-Moslem relationship in Ethiopia less problematic than would have otherwise been the case. The implications of this on the acceptance or rejection of ideas of Islamic fundamentalism in Ethiopia are further elaborated upon below: 

As a result of the way, Islam has developed in Ethiopia and due to more recent concerted efforts to avoid religious conflicts; Ethiopian Muslims are generally not receptive to Islamic fundamentalism. Muslims in Ethiopia tend to identify first with their ethnic kin. They are geographically intermixed throughout the country except for overwhelming concentrations in Somali- and Afar-inhabited areas. Although the Supreme Islamic Council is an important organization, political power among Ethiopian Muslims tends to be decentralized. By and large, the Ethiopian Islamic community is a beginning one.¹² 

During the imperial rule which was based on dynastic credentials of succession, only those who belonged to the Solomonic line of kings were allowed to assume power.  Hence, the political scene was dominated by Christian rulers to the detriment of adherence of Islam and other religions.   But, this was terminated after the overthrow of the imperial rule in 1974.   Since then state and religion have been effectively separated.  

The Impact of Constitutional Reform on Christian-Moslem Relations 

The above happened during the period of the military government, but it was enshrined in the new federal constitution of Ethiopia which was promulgated by the EPRDF in 1995.  The new constitution has declared the equality of all Ethiopians regardless of nationality, color and religion.  Accordingly, all Ethiopians, without any prejudice to religion, can run and be elected for the highest office in government.   

Further, as a result of the constitutional change more and more adherents of Islam in Ethiopia have begun to participate in the political process by being elected as well as appointed.   

The aforesaid constitutional transformation has reduced the tension between adherents of different religious belief systems. It has also extended freedom of worship to all citizens.  This, in practical terms, has separated state and religious affairs.  It has also created a more convivial and harmonies national environment of peaceful coexistence and tolerance.   

To realize the above, constitutional remedies have been taken to boost the healing process of past religious and national conflicts which have plagued Ethiopia for decades, if not centuries.  These include the provisions made on:

a.       The recognition of the equality of nations and nationalities which includes the right to determine their status;

b.      Acceptance of the process and praxis of elected representation, including the concept of an elected government with a defined tenure of office and briefs of accountable mandate; and

c.       Freedom of the individual to practice the religion of his/her choice without any form of discrimination.¹³

 Apart from the above measures, on the relationship between Christianity, Islam and other religions, Donald Levine's example of the common terrain of Ethiopian culture is also an area to capitalize on. This is especially important in order to promote a healthy relationship among all religions in Ethiopia. He writes:

 The larger Ethiopian culture area subscribed to a belief in a supreme heavenly deity, and use similar words to represent this deity--most commonly, cognates of waq, appear among the Afar, Shoa, Somalia, Oromo, Gurage, Hadiya, Timbaro, Sidamo, Konso, Burji, Tsamako, Gamu, Dasenech, and Majangirr: The root [word] also appears in Geez wuqabi, a person's divinely appointed guardian spirit. So one can view the peoples of Greater Ethiopia as monotheists, Semitic (Judaic, Christian, and Islamic) and local, who neverthe­less share a number of other kinds of symbolisms, like the special aura of respect for trees endowed with sacred significance. There has been a great deal of intermixing of different Ethiopian religions historically: Jews and Christians converted back and forth over the centuries, in ways unheard of elsewhere in the world; traditional Oromo rituals and Christian rituals were observed side by side at Zuqwala; Muslims, Christians, and Jews alike made the annual pilgrimage to Kulubi Gabriel; peoples of diverse backgrounds visited the shrine of Sheik Hussein.¹⁴

                                                                                   FOOTNOTES

1. Kinfe Abraham, The Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace, ibid., p. 465.

2-3 Ibid.

4-5 David Shinn, Ethiopia Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism Before and After September 11.

6-12.  Ibid.

13. The State of the Horn (Yearbook of the Eye on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa) Vol. VI, 1998, p. 159.

14. Donald Levine, Cited in Ethiopia from Empire to Federation, 2001, p. 307.

AGOA is Strengthening U.S. - African trade relations.

 ·                    AGOA is the cornerstone of the Administration’s trade and investment policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, which is promoting free markets, expanding U.S. - African trade and investment, stimulating economic growth, and facilitating sub-Saharan Africa’s integration into the global economy.

·                    AGOA requires beneficiary countries to meet eligibility criteria based on “best practices” policies, thereby supporting African efforts to liberalize trade, implement economic reforms, establish the rule of law, reduce poverty, and strengthen labor and human rights.

·                    The annual AGOA Forum brings together senior-level African and American officials, as well as businesspeople and representatives of civil society, to discuss ways of strengthening U.S.-African trade and economic ties.  Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Agriculture Johanns led the U.S. delegation to the July 2005 AGOA Forum in Dakar, Senegal.

·                    In Fiscal Year 2005, the U.S. government provided $199 million in assistance to help sub-Saharan African countries improve their capacity to trade. 

AGOA offers eligible African countries duty-free access to the U.S. market. 

·                    Under AGOA, the 37 currently eligible African countries can export almost any product (nearly 6,500 tariff lines) to the United States duty-free.  The AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 extended AGOA’s trade benefits for an additional seven years, to 2015.

·                    Of particular note, AGOA provides duty-free treatment to qualifying apparel articles.  AGOA’s special; “third-country fabric” provision gives eligible African countries (through September 2007) the most generous access to the U.S. market of any trading partner other than those with which the United States has free trade agreements.

·                    Thanks to AGOA and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 98 percent of U.S. imports from AGOA beneficiary countries entered the United States duty-free in 2004.

AGOA is stimulating U.S.-African trade and investment. 

·                    AGOA trade incentives have helped to create thousands of new jobs in Africa and to attract hundreds of millions of dollars in new investment.

·                    Thanks in part to AGOA, U.S. imports from sub-Saharan increased by over 50% from 2000-2004.  Non-oil imports-including value-added products such as apparel, automobiles, and processed agricultural goods – more than doubled from 2001 to 2004.

·                    Thanks in part to the business-friendly environment AGOA has promoted, U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa have been steadily rising.  They increased 29 percent in the first half of 2005, reaching $5.2 billion.  

Country Analyses

Kenya

Pre-AGOA trade between Kenya and the United States in all of the sectors studied was relatively low.  As can be seen in the Table below, the agribusiness trade under AGOA has maintained this trend.  U.S. sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS_ requirements can account for some of this.  Further, there is the problem of flight connectively and high freight costs, which often make Kenyan agricultural products uncompetitive.  It must be noted, however, that agribusiness registered considerable growth in 2003 (86%) and in 2004 (111%).

The sector the picked up immediately upon the enactment of AGOA is the textile and apparel sector, in which Kenyan exports to the United States increased from a paltry $10 million in 1999 to $45 million  in 2000.  Upon attaining accreditation for textile and apparel, the Kenya exports increased substantially from $122 million in 2002 to $272 million in 2004, an increase of 54%.

While handicrafts and gift articles exports to the U.S. remained small, the sector has registered positive increases under AGOA.  Kenya has historically been active in the export of hand-woven baskets, wood carvings and soapstone curios.  Since AGOA, a new crop of business women have turned to the internet for e-commerce and are now making online sales of a variety of products.  Traditional products have been improved, modernized and adapted to the tastes of export markets.  

In Kenya, AGOA created employment opportunities for the youth, women and the disadvantaged.  New job opportunities are highly linked with expansion of export related production, particularly in the EPZ and the informal sector. 

·                    Employment in the Kenyan EPZs grew from 6,600 in 2000 to over 39,000 in 2003.  Over 75% of these jobholders are women in the 18-24 age brackets.

·                    Kenana Kinitters, a women-owned Kenyan business established in 1998, ventured into export trade in 2002.  From a base of 41 employees in 2001, employment at Kenana Knitters grew to 198 women in 2004.  Over 70 more women seeking employment are currently on Kenana’s wait-list.

·                    More women are gainfully employed in spinning from home, in the production of traditional foods, and tending sheep for wool. For example, Kenana Knitters supports in excess of 160 families in rural Kenya who supply wool either in raw or spun form.  A similar trend exists in Ethiopia, where the cotton is spun by women from home and sold to commercial weavers.    

All the new EPZ’s have been developed through private sector efforts as opposed to the past sites that the government developed.  Women have been the single largest beneficiaries of the revival of textile and apparel sector through AGOA.  Over 75% of the employees in the EPZ are women, the majority of whom are from disadvantaged groups with minimal skills.  Most EPZs recruit from the local communities and retrain the workers.  The catchment areas of the majority of the EPZs are the informal (slum) areas, most of which border the EPAs and are home to over 80% of the urban residents.  Furthermore, 85% of the female employees are in the 18-24 age brackets, most of whom have just left school and are likely to be first time employees.

AGOA has rekindled hope in both the private and public sectors that now appreciate the benefits of globalization.  The textile and apparel business community has been very vocal in lobbying government to improve trade facilitation services.  To ensure against trans-shipment and thus the maintenance of AGOA preferences, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) is the first stop for certification and visa issuance.