|
DIPLOMATIC BRIEFINGS NEWS VIEWS &
REVIEWS |
UN could
leave tense Horn border top
The
United Natins may have to consider withdrawing its monitors from the tense
Ethiopia-Eritrea border, Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned. He said
the Eritrean government had not been cooperating with the UN and had
limited the movement of the UN troops.
The UN border mission
announced the immediate withdrawal of peacekeepers from 18 of its 40
monitoring posts. Eritrea banned helicopter flights two weeks ago. The
two-year war between Eritrea and Ethiopia ended in 2000. Since then, more
than 3,000 UN troops have been monitoring the disputed 1,000km border. "Obviously, our
procedures and operations have been impeded," Mr Annan told reporters.
"If this continues, we will have to take some very hard and critical
decisions as to the usefulness of staying there if we cannot operate."
About 70,000 people are
believed to have died in the conflict. The two countries ended their
border war after a peace agreement which provided for an independent
commission to rule on their disputed border. However, the commission's
findings have yet to be implemented, and Ethiopia continues to occupy
the town of Badme, which the commission ruled belonged to Eritrea.
Last month, Eritrea
warned it might re-start its war with Ethiopia if the UN failed to resolve
a border dispute between the two neighbours. Eritrea became independent
from Ethiopia in 1993, after Ethiopian and Eritrean rebel movements
overthrew the Derg regime in Addis
Ababa.
Pirates hijack UN food aid cargo
Gunmen in the southern
Somali port of Merka have hijacked a UN-chartered vessel which was carry-ing
aid to the east African country.
The ship had offloaded
nearly half of its 850 tonne cargo of food aid, when the hijackers struck.
The six gunmen forced the ship and its ten crew to leave the port, 100km
(62 miles) southwest of Mogadishu. In most cases, the hijackers demand a
hefty ransom in exchange for the return of the vessel and crew.
Insecurity
|

The
WFP is looking for alternative ways to deliver aid to Somalia |
"It is scandalous that
a small number of profiteers would once again hijack humanitarian food
supplies destined for fellow Somalis," said World Food Programme (WFP)
country director Robert Hauser. The WFP said in a statement that the
governor of the Lower Shabelle region, Yusuf Indha Adde, had sent two
small boats to pursue the MV Miltzow. "Given the continued insecurity off
the coast of Somalia, WFP is looking at various alternative routes
including overland from Kenya and through Djibouti," the statement said.
In June, hijackers had
demanded a ransom for the return of a WFP chartered vessel, which the
organization refused to pay. The MV Semlow was eventually returned after
100 days.
Militia leader calls for Islamic rule in Somalia
NAIROBI, Kenya -An
influential religious leader and alleged al-Qaida collaborator vowed in an
Inter view to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, a Horn of Africa
nation the United States fears could grow into a major base for Islamic
terrorists.
|

|
|
Sheik Dahir Hassan Awye (Photo:
AP) |
“The Western world
should respect our own ideas in choosing the way we want to govern our
country, the way we want to go about our own business. That is our right,”
said Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, a key figure in a growing religious camp
vying with secular factions for control of Somalia.
Despite peace talks
and the formation last year of a transitional government, Somalia remains
a patchwork of heavily armed clan fiefdoms — with no government to provide
such basics as schools, hospitals, phone service, even traffic lights.
Earlier this year, the
parliament and Cabinet split into two factions. As a result,
fundamentalists offering Islam as a solution have drawn support in
Somalia, and there are concerns that Aweys’ followers pose a military
threat to the transi-tional government.
DUP Signs Agreement on Participation in
National Unity government
The Democratic
Unionist (DUP), led by Mohamed Osman Al-Mirghani, and the National
congress singed at the headquarters of the National congress an agreement
according to which DUP will participate in the executive and legislative
organs at all levels in the national unity government.
In a press statement,
Deputy chairman and spokesman of the National Congress, Dr. Nafie Ali
Nafie, said after talks between the two parties, which culminated in the
signing of the agreement, that the National Congress welcomes the DUP
participation in the national unity government. He said that the coming
days will witness completion of consultations between the National
Congress and DUP and delivering of DUP nominations for the posts assigned
to the party.
The Chairman of the
Executive Office of the DUP, Ahmed Ali Abu-Bakr, who singed for the party,
described the DUP agreement to participate in the coming government as
complying with its patriotic orientations and the recent protocols of
Jeddah and Cairo, and also aims to guarantee prevalence of unity and
stability in the county.
He added that the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is keen to honour its agreement with the
National Congress and submit its nominations for positions at the
executive and legislative organs as soon as
possible.
Obote's
body back home in Uganda
The body of Uganda's
ex-president, Milton Obote has been flown home from Zambia, where he lived
for 20 years.
He died last month of
kidney failure aged 80. Mr. Obote was president twice - in the 1960s soon
after independence and again during the 1980s. On both occasions Uganda
suffered terrible violence, and Mr. Obote was each time overthrown by the
military. Mr. Obote's body will lie in state in parliament before a
national memorial service and burial. The body arrived at Uganda's Entebbe
airport on a chartered flight from Zambia.
Civil war
During his 20 years in
exile in Zambia, attempts at reconciliation between Mr. Obote and the
current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni failed. The war during the 1980s
bet-ween Museveni's rebel forces and the then President Milton Obote's
national army left hundreds of thousands of civilians dead. But Mr.
Obote's death led to a change of heart by the Ugandan government.
The BBC's Will Ross
in Kampala says that the cabinet was reportedly split over the matter, but
when the Ugandan government announced a state funeral for the former
president, many
Ugandans were
surprised. He says that region-al leaders may have played a role in
persuad-ing the Ugandan government to honour Milton Obote because of the
support he offered during the 1960s to exiled South Africans fighting
against white minority rule.
|

Many Ugandans were surprised when the government announced a state
funeral for Obote |
Critics of Mr. Obote
hold him responsible for decades of violence in Uganda when the national
army was out of control and caused widespread misery across the country.
But as Ugandans prepare to bury the man who played a key role in ushering
in the country's independence, they are reminded that Mr. Obote is the
fourth Ugandan leader to die in exile.
Some argue the
reconciliation has come too late in a coun-try that since its
independe-nce in 1962 has never witness-ed a peaceful transfer of power
from one leader to another.
Ethiopia: Scaling Up
By David Andrews, Lodewyk Erasmus, and Robert Powell
Assessing the impact of a dramatic increase in aid on one of Africa's
poorest countries
Ethiopia, among the
poorest countries in Africa, presents one of the biggest development
challenges in a region beset by frequent drought and food shortages and
hobbled by inadequate roads and communications. A landlocked country of
about 70 million people, sandwiched between Sudan and Somalia in the Horn
of Africa, Ethiopia has suffered bloody upheavals and famine over the past
two decades and is still recovering from a bitter border war with
neighboring Eritrea. It ranks in the bottom 10 of the UN’s Human
Development Index, a composite measure of per capita income, health, and
education (in 2004, it was listed as 170th out of 177).
|
Real GDP at factor cost
Agriculture
Nonagricultural
Real per capita GDP |
Actual
1991/92-2003/04
4.0
2.2
5.8
1.1 |
Government projection
2004/05-2015/16
7.0
7.5
6.6
4.1 |
|
Nominal investment/nominal GDP (at market prices) |
|
Total
Private
Public
Growth accounting
Real GDP at factor cost
Capital stock
Labor
Total factor productivity |
16.8
9.1
7.7
4.0
1.4
2.0
0.7 |
31.4
15.6
15.8
7.0
3.0
2.3
1.7 |
Achievable target? Investment
and productivity will have to rise sharply for Ethiopia to achieve its
growth target.
(average rates of growth)
Source: Ethiopian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and
calculations. |
Donor countries have
targeted Ethiopia for extra assistance because of its size and potential
for growth. Symbolically, the United Nations has selected Koraro in
Ethiopia as one of its test villages, singled out by economist Jeffrey
Sachs in an experiment to monitor the scaling up of aid at the local
level. On current trends, Ethiopia will not meet any of its UN Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) except for the target on primary school
enrollment. Considerably faster economic growth, supported by a strong
policy package, and higher inflows of net official development assistance
(ODA) are therefore needed.
But will a dramatic
scaling up of external assistance really help and what are the potential
pitfalls of such an approach? After all, there is still considerable
controversy surrounding the record of aid in many countries. Against this
background, and in view of the possible lessons for other African
countries, we undertook a study to assess the potential macroeconomic
implications of scaling up assistance to achieve the MDGs. We looked at
the potential impact of higher aid flows on the tradable goods sector and
reviewed priorities for improving fiscal management and financial sector
development. Our findings suggest that Ethiopia faces enormous challenges
in boosting growth and meeting the MDGs, even with far higher levels of
aid—in part because of the need to ensure that this aid is absorbed and
used effectively.
Sources of growth
Reforms aimed at
transforming Ethiopia from a centrally planned economy to a
market-oriented one were launched in 1991 after the overthrow of the
former pro-Soviet Derg regime, boosting the overall GDP growth rate to an
annual 4.0 percent in 1991–2003 from 2.8 percent during the Derg rule
(1974–91). The structure of the economy also changed, with the
contribution of agriculture to real GDP falling from 57 percent in 1991 to
42 percent in 2003, while that of services rose from 34 percent to 47
percent. But the contributions of industry and the private services sector
remained essentially unchanged, and Ethiopia’s growth potential remained
largely untapped.
During 1991–2003,
agricultural value added was driven mostly by increases in the area under
cultivation, rather than improvements in productivity. While the area
under cultivation increased at an average rate of 5.7 percent a year, crop
yields rose on average by only 0.4 percent a year. Despite attempts to
diversify, coffee still accounts for one-third of total exports, and
agricultural output remains very variable and dependent on the climate.
Because of the huge impact of the weather on overall GDP (see Chart 1),
achieving growth of 7 percent a year on average without addressing the
underlying causes of variability implies significantly higher growth in
nondrought years.
In 2002, Ethiopia drew
up a Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) that
targets economic growth averaging 7 percent a year in order to halve
income poverty by 2015. The strategy is premised on a transformation of
agriculture from mostly subsistence to commercial production, which would
act as a catalyst for the development of industry and exports, and the
generation of off-farm employment and income. Specifically, the government
aims to increase agricultural value-added growth from an annual 2.2
percent historically to 7.5 percent a year, and nonagriculture growth from
5.8 percent to 6.6 percent. In the agricultural sector, this strong
improvement in real output is premised on productivity growth rising from
an annual 0.4 percent historically during 1991–2003 to an average of 9.0
percent a year over the medium term.
Can such big increases
in growth be achieved in a country where rainfall variability has such a
big impact on agriculture and where agriculture still sustains around 80
percent of the population? The answer, according to an IMF studies (see
box), is that it would require major increases in public and private
sector investment and productivity (see table on the next page). Public
investment as a ratio of GDP would have to rise to an average of 15.8
percent over the next 15 years compared with 7.7 percent during 1991–2003.
Private investment is expected to be stimulated by the government’s reform
program. In our analysis, we assumed that private investment would rise
broadly in line with public investment, increasing from an average of just
over 9 percent in 1991–2003 to almost 16 percent during 2004–15.
The need for strong
gains in productivity to attain higher growth highlights the importance of
bold implementation of the reform agenda, especially
|
The analytical tools we used
As
part of its regular consultations with Ethiopia, the IMF developed a
preliminary framework to assess the potential macroeconomic
implications of scaling up assistance. Our analysis was built around
the IMF’s financial programming framework, supplemented by a growth
accounting analysis to assess the feasibility of a pickup in growth to
halve income poverty by 2015, and a medium-term expenditure framework
(MTEF) to assess trends in public recurrent and capital expenditure
needed to reach other MDGs. The growth accounting framework models
real GDP growth as a function of the weighted rates of growth in the
capital stock and human capital, and a residual contribution that is
interpreted as the growth in total factor productivity. These elements
were combined with additional analysis and judgments informed by
recent experience to arrive at an overall assessment of the
macroeconomic implications of scaling up external assistance. The
scaling-up scenario is conditioned on both a sustained increase in the
flow of external aid over the medium term and implementation of
accompanying economic policies that would allow the assumed aid flows
to be effectively used and absorbed without destabilizing the economy.
The
possible growth in the capital stock was derived from the MTEF.
Drawing on the public expenditure review conducted by the World Bank
in 2002, the MTEF recognized that achieving the MDGs would require
significant increases in recurrent health and education spending,
especially wages, as well as a doubling of public investment from an
average of less than 8 percent of GDP in 1991–2003 to an average of
about 16 percent of GDP during 2004–15. The labor force was assumed to
grow at its recent trend rate, while education (as measured by average
years of schooling) would increase at an average rate of about 5
percent. |
in agriculture,
private sector development, financial sector development, and external
trade.
In agriculture, the
ambitious objectives for growth underline the importance of reforms to
enhance productivity (for example, by improving security of tenure,
establishing appropriate risk management systems, improving access to
rural finance, and reversing environmental degradation) and access to
markets (for example, by improving the functioning of markets for both
agricultural input and final goods, and improving rural infrastructure).
The required
productivity gains also point to the need for significant progress in the
privatization of remaining public enterprises; removal of impediments to
private sector activity; development of the domestic financial sector; and
improvement in access to urban land and Ethiopia’s infrastructure.
Strong fiscal
management needed
Achieving the MDGs
will require a significant rise in public expenditure. In the absence of a
comprehensive analysis of the costs of achieving the respective MDGs, the
IMF study assumed a doubling of official development assistance as a share
of GDP to meet the MDGs, in line with the Ethiopian government
projections. It was thus assumed that ODA would rise from 11 percent of
GDP in 2003 to 22 percent by 2015, allowing poverty-reducing spending to
rise from about $20 per capita in 2003 to about $78 per capita by 2015.
The projected increase in public expenditure reflects an increase in
recurrent expenditure—as the public wage bill rises to accommodate the
increase in the number of teachers and health workers—and an increase in
public investment in infrastructure. The envisaged increase in social
spending would therefore reorient spending toward recurrent expenditure,
owing primarily to higher wages and salaries. For example, the
reallocation of spending to primary education and health services entails
wage components of about 95 and 60 percent respectively. Capital spending
is projected to increase by 8 percent of GDP. In this context, the overall
fiscal deficit (excluding grants) rises sharply to about 23 percent of GDP
by 2015 (see Chart).

Given the expected strong
increase in donor aid to achieve the MDGs, the capacity of fiscal
institutions would need to be strengthened to secure the desired poverty
reduction outcomes. Strengthening public expenditure management in the
areas of budget formulation, execution, and reporting is particularly
important to ensure proper allocation and monitoring of poverty-reducing
expenditure. Following the extensive decentralization of fiscal functions
to regions and districts, which have assumed primary responsibility for
poverty-reducing expenditure, a key challenge will be to develop the
capacity of these authorities to ensure effective implementation of
poverty-reducing policies.In view of the uncertainty about the form of
additional aid flows (grants or loans), development of a clear public debt
strategy covering both domestic and external debt, and strong institutions
to ensure its implementation, would be key to avoiding an excessive
buildup of debt in a scaling-up scenario. Continued concern regarding
public debt sustainability in Ethiopia, even following debt relief under
the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, led the IMF team
to assume, for simplicity, that all of the additional external financing
would be in the form of grants. Domestic borrowing was contained to below
1 percent of GDP, consistent with a decline in the ratio of domestic debt
to GDP. While these assumptions take care of concerns regarding debt
sustainability, there remain concerns regarding continued aid dependency.
Although large aid inflows can potentially reduce the domestic revenue
mobilization effort, the exercise assumed that revenues would be held at
19 percent of GDP, maintaining Ethiopia’s performance over the last five
years. However, even with this assumption—so that strong growth in real
GDP would yield a corresponding rise in domestic tax revenues—the budget
deficit (excluding grants) would remain high after 2015, reflecting the
impact on recurrent expenditure of commitments created by MDG-related
expenditures.
Trade repercussions
Would this projected
sharp increase in aid flows hurt Ethiopia’s competitiveness by boosting
the real exchange rate and thus dampening exports? We found that the rise
in aid flows through 2002 did not adversely affect Ethiopia’s export
competitiveness (see Chart 3). An econometric analysis of the main
determinants of the real exchange rate in Ethiopia found that although aid
inflows had been associated with an appreciation of the real exchange rate
during the period including the Derg regime, aid had been correlated with
a depreciation of the real exchange rate during the post-Derg reform
period. Moreover, on average, the growth rate of Ethiopia’s noncoffee
exports exceeded the growth in world noncoffee imports (see Chart 4).
However, it was recognized that this experience might not be a reliable
guide to the impact of a much larger increase in aid flows.
In addition,
Ethiopia’s use of part of the aid inflows in recent years to build
international reserves also mitigated pressures for a real appreciation of
the exchange rate (see "The Macroeconomic Challenge of More Aid" on page
28 of this issue). Thus, the potential for wage and price pressures from
high aid flows in the future points to the need for reforms to alleviate
pressure for a real exchange rate appreciation, particularly through
further liberalization of the trade regime, elimination of exchange
restrictions, and streamlining customs procedures. These steps would help
ensure that part of the increased domestic demand would be channeled
abroad. The IMF study therefore projected a significant widening in the
external current account deficit from about 13 percent of GDP in 2003 to
21 percent by 2015. The bottom line
The scaling-up
scenario that we have discussed is not a forecast. It does, however, help
illustrate the considerable challenges that Ethiopia and its development
partners face in ensuring that higher aid inflows result in faster growth
and rapid progress toward meeting the MDGs.
Raising the level of
growth to 7 percent annually, as targeted under the government’s
medium-term scenario for achieving the MDGs, would represent a substantial
improvement over the experience of the past 13 years. But is it really
possible? Achieving the targeted growth rate would require not just
additional external resources, but also a marked acceleration of reforms
aimed at supporting agricultural production, private sector development,
and exports.
Given that the amount
of external aid required to achieve the MDGs would be much higher than in
the past, upward pressure on wage and price levels could potentially cause
a real exchange rate appreciation. It would thus be prudent to implement
policies to counter such pressure, both by further opening up the economy
to foreign trade and by boosting productivity and cost efficiency to help
increase the supply of goods produced domestically.
Government
institutions will also have to be strengthened to cope with higher aid
flows. Advancing structural reforms in the areas of fiscal
decentralization, public expenditure management, and revenue
administration will represent key aspects of a broader reform agenda. In
addition, pursuing these reforms will support decentralized democratic
governance, strengthen budgeting capacity, and build institutions that
foster private sector
development. g

|
Interview
with
H.E Lin Lin, Chinese Ambassador to
Ethiopia |
The
People’s Republic of China and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
established diplomatic relations on November 24, 1970. After the
establishment of the diplomatic relations, the two countries have been
developing friendly cooperative relations smoothly on the basis of mutual
respect, equality and mutual benefit. Since the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came into office in 1991, the two
countries have broadened and intensified the mutually beneficial
cooperation in various fields, thus bringing the bilateral relations on a
faster developing track. In October 1995, H.E. Ato Meles Zenawi, the
Ethiopian Prime Minister, visited China. In May 1996, H.E. Mr. Jiang
Zemin, the Chinese President, visited Ethiopia. Since the beginning of
the 21st century, the relations between the two countries have
maintained a momentum of healthy and continuous development.
As
co-chairs of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, both China and
Ethiopia have made unremitting efforts to boost the development of
friendly cooperative relations between China and African countries. In
December 2003, H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Premier visited Ethiopia
and attended the Second Ministerial Conference of the Forum on
china-Africa Cooperation. In November 2004, Ethiopian Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi visited China again. After these visits, the bilateral ties
between China and Ethiopia have witnessed all-round and speedy
development.
I.
Political Relations
The
new century has been frequent exchanges of high-level visits, the
continuous strengthening of mutual trust in political field and the
increasing intercourse of personnel at all levels between the two
countries. The Ethiopian Government unswervingly adheres to the one China
policy and supports China’s reunification as well as the adoption of the
Anti-Secession Law by the Chinese National People’s Congress. When H.E.
Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, the then Chinese Foreign Minister, visited Ethiopia in
2002, the two Foreign Ministries singed an agreement on establishing a
political consultation mechanism. The cooperation between China and
Ethiopia in political field has been very effective, and the consultation
and coordination between the two countries in international affairs have
been further strengthened. The Ethiopian Government
understands and
supports China’s position on human rights and other important issues. As
co-chair of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Ethiopia attaches great
importance to the Forum
and the cooperation
between China and Africa, and works closely with China, thus making great
contribution to the promotion of the development of China-Africa
relations. In December 2003, the Second Ministerial conference of the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was convened successfully in Addis
Ababa. After that, Ethiopia has played a constructive role in
implementing the follow-up actions of the Forum and in preparing for its
Fourth Senior Officials’ Meeting in China this August.
II. Bilateral
Cooperation in the Fields of Economy, Trade, Investment and Technology
The economic and
technical cooperation between China and Ethiopia started in 1971. Up to
now, China has already built 13 projects for Ethiopia including the
highway, veterinary station, power station and water-supply projects. To
promote the development of economic, trade and technical cooperation, the
two countries signed the Agreement for Economic and Technological
Cooperation, Trade Agreement, Trade Protocol and Agreement for Mutual
Promotion and Protection of Investment.
In
recent years, the economic and trade cooperation between China and
Ethiopia have further developed in depth with continuously expanded
cooperative fields and enriched cooperative content. Both the trade and
investment are increasing rapidly. Starting from this January, China
granted zero-tariff treatment to certain Ethiopian commodities for
entering Chinese market, which effectively boosted the export from
Ethiopia to China. From January to June this year, the Ethiopian export
to China soared to nearly US$40 million comparing with US$ 14.39 million
in the whole year of 2004. From January to July this year, the trade
volume between the two countries reached over US$ 180 million, while the
figure was US$ 200 million for the whole year of 2004.
By
the end of 2003, only 14 Chinese companies invested some US$10.07 million
in Ethiopia. From early 2004, more and more Chinese companies came to
Ethiopia thanks to the continuous improvement of the investment
environment. In more than one year period, 12 new Chinese companies
invested in Ethiopia. Up to now, there are altogether 26 Chinese
companies who have invested in Ethiopia with the accumulated investment
reaching US$ 35.68 million in the areas of highway construction, municipal
engineering, medicine, textile and garniture, commodities catering etc.
Since 1986, Chinese companies started to carry out project contracting
cooperation in Ethiopia, and the scale of which has been contractual value
of the Chinese contracted projects in Ethiopia reached US$1.019 billion
mainly involving highway, hydropower station, telecommunications,
transmission and transformer substation and water-supply projects etc.
The
bilateral cooperation in human resource development has been
strengthened. In 2004, the Chinese side trained 150 officials and
technicians for Ethiopia under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation. Meanwhile some administrative personnel and technicians in
the fields of textile and city planning were also trained under bilateral
arrangement. In this August, the Chinese side dispatched 12 young
volunteers to Ethiopia for the first time which further enriched the
content of the bilateral cooperation.
III.
Bilateral Exchange and Cooperation in the Fields of Culture, Education,
Public Health and Military Affairs
The bilateral
cultural exchanges date back to the 1950’s, even before the establishment
of the diplomatic relations of the two countries. In 1988, the two
countries singed and agreement for cultural cooperation. Since them the
two governments have signed implementation programs of the agreement every
three years to guide the bilateral exchanges and cooperation in the fields
of culture, media, sports, and youth. In recent years, exchanges and
cooperation in these fields between the two countries have witnessed
continuous development. In December 2003, the implementation program of
cultural exchanges and cooperation for 2004-2006 was singed during the
visit to Ethiopia by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.
And
an agreement on educational exchanges and cooperation was signed between
the two Ministries of Education on the occasion of Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi’s visit to China in November 2004. Within the
framework of the two agreements, the exchanges and cooperation in the
educational and cultural areas have been further strengthened and turned
out to be fruitful. China has been providing 10 scholarships annually for
Ethiopian students to study in China since the 1980s. At present, there
are about 40 Ethiopian students studying in china every year under the
Chinese Government Scholarship Program.
Since 2001, China has dispatched more than 200 vocational training
teachers to Ethiopia to participate in IVET programs and spread scientific
knowledge in agricultural and other areas, with their work highly
commended by the Ethiopian side. Exchange visits have been successfully
organized between the two peoples. In 2004, China officially granted
Ethiopia the Approved Destination Status for Chinese tourists. The rich
cultural relics and beautiful natural scenes will definitely attract an
increasing number of Chinese tourists to Ethiopia. In this August, the
performance of the Chinese Flag Song and Dance Ensemble, in celebration of
the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the Sino-Ethiopia
relations, further promoted the cultural exchanges of the two countries
and deepened the understanding between the two peoples.
To
enhance the bilateral cooperation in public health, China has sent
altogether 13 batches of medical teams to Ethiopia since 1974, with an
aggregate of over 150 medical workers. Currently, about 15 Chinese
medical team members are working in Ethiopia.
The
exchange and cooperation in military and security areas has developed
steadily as well after the establishment of diplomatic relations. The
cooperation has registered new progress after the EPDRF took power in
1991. In June 1994, Majo. Gen. Tsadkan Gebre Tensay, chief of Staff of
Ethiopian National Defense force visited chine, initiating the exchange
visits of high level officials between the two armies. There have been
more frequent exchanges of visits in recent years. In November 2003, Lt.
General Lei Mingqui, the political commissar of the Chinese Nanjing
Military Region came to visit Ethiopia as the head of a military
delegation. In this August, Lt. General Zhu Wenquan, the commander of the
Chinese Nanjing Military Region visited Ethiopia. Meanwhile, cooperation
on military training is also progressing steadily.
Both China and Ethiopia are countries with long history, ancient
civilization and splendid culture. And both have a glorious history of
resisting foreign aggression and maintaining the sovereignty and
independence of its own. As two developing countries, we are faced with
the same historical task of speeding up social-economic development. The
two country’s economy is complementary to each other, which means huge
potential of cooperation. The Chinese side will push forward the
all-round development of cooperation in political, economic, cultural,
technical, educational and military areas, continuing to provide Ethiopia
with assistance to the best of its capacity. China will work closely and
coordinate fully with Ethiopia to implement the follow-up actions of the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, with the aim of enhancing the
development of China-Ethiopia and China-Africa relations. Just as what
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, the peaceful development of
China will not only accord with the African interests but also help
safeguard the multiplicity of the world and realize multilateralism. The
development and the buildup of national strength of China will inject new
vitality for the development of China-Ethiopia and China-African
relations.
The
Chinese Government and people treasure the traditional friendship and
cooperation with Ethiopia and would like to work vigorously with Ethiopian
Government and people to broaden the areas and ways of cooperation and to
further between the two countries. The China-Ethiopia relations will
embrace a better tomorrow.
|
Tourism
By Prof. Kinfe Abarham
|

The
World Tourism Organization predicts that international tourism, by the
year 2010, will involve 1,108 million visitors. This tourism will, indeed,
have signi-ficant environmental, economic and cultural implications
world-wide. Closer examination and under-standing of tourism development
processes and experience in various socio-economic and environmental
settings become essential to prognosticate the future of sustainable
tourism.
Issues such as balancing tourism with environment, preserving local,
indigenous culture, and achieving social and economic equity hinge upon
how tourism places itself in the overall process of worldwide
modernization and development in the next millennium.
Sensitizing tourism issues and creating awareness among the general public
and prospective visitors remain crucial matters. Long-term programs and
investments are necessary for sustainable tourism to have real positive
impacts on the environment, economy and culture.
The conceptual
framework
Defining tourism
Tourism is commonly
seen as, and referred to as, an 'industry'. This leads to consideration of
defining tourism as an industry, i.e. in terms of the activities of
suppliers of particular goods or services. However, defining tourism in
terms of the activities of suppliers leads to some difficulty. In
Australia, the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial
Classification (ANZSIC), provides the categories of economic activity
which can be selected to define an industry. Those categories identify the
production or supply of a particular commodity (i.e. a good or service).
However, in the
case of tourism what
makes an economic (or any other type of) transaction 'tourism' is not the
particular type of commodity involved. What identifies a transaction as
tourism is the particular type of consumer involved. The supply of any
product to a person who is a 'tourist' is a tourism activity while the
supply of the same product to a person who is not a 'tourist' is not a
tourism activity. The supplier of that product will in the first case be
part of the 'tourism industry’; while in the second case the supplier will
not be part of the 'tourism industry'. That is, tourism is defined in
terms of consumer activity rather than in terms of supplier activity.
After considerable debate and discussion, this demand side concept of what
constitutes tourism was adopted by the WTO in 1993 as the international
standard for statistical purposes, and the following definition of tourism
was developed: "Tourism comprises the activities of persons traveling to
and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than
one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes." The WTO
has developed a schematic breakdown of all travelers (see Figure 1). At
the highest level, a 'traveler' is defined as: "any person on a trip
between two or more countries or two or more localities within his/her
country of usual residence".
Forms of tourism
The UN/WTO standards
distin-guish three basic forms of tourism:
§
Domestic tourism, involving residents of the given country travelling only
within this country;
§
Inbound tourism, involving non-residents traveling in the given country;
§
Outbound tourism, involving residents traveling in another country.
The same forms of tourism may be described by replacing the word 'country'
with the word 'region'. 'Region' may refer either to an area within a
country or to a group of countries. The three basic forms of tourism set
out above can be combined in various ways to derive the following
categories of tourism:
Tourism
Planning
Tourism is one of many activities in a community or region that requires
planning and coordination. By comprehensive planning we mean planning
which considers all of the tourism resources, organizations, markets, and
programs within a region. Comprehensive planning also considers economic,
environmental, social, and institutional aspects of tourism development.
TWO SIDES OF TOURISM
PLANNING
Tourism planning has
evolved from two related but distinct sets of planning philosophies and
methods. On the one hand, tourism is one of many activities in an area
that must be considered as part of physical, environmental, social, and
economic planning. Therefore, it is common to find tourism addressed, at
least partially, in a regional land use, transportation, recreation,
economic development, or comprehensive plan. The degree to which tourism
is addressed in such plans depends upon the relative importance of tourism
to the community or region and how sensitive the planning authority is to
tourism activities.
Tourism may also be viewed as a business in which a community or region
chooses to engage. Individual tourism businesses conduct a variety of
planning activities including feasibility, marketing, product develop-ment,
promotion, forecasting, and strategic planning. If tourism is a
significant component of an area's economy or development plans, regional
or community-wide marketing plans are needed to coordinate the development
and marketing activities of different tourism interests in the community.
A comprehensive approach inte-grate a strategic marketing plan with more
traditional public planning activities.
STEPS IN
THE PLANNING PROCESS
Like any planning, tourism planning is goal-oriented, striving to achieve
certain objectives by matching available resources and programs with the
needs and wants of people. Comprehensive planning requires a systematic
approach, usually involving a series of steps. The process is best viewed
as an iterative and on-going one, with each step subject to modification
and refinement at any stage of the planning process.
There are six steps in
the planning process:
1.
Define goals and objectives.
2.
Identify the tourism system.
a) Resources (natural, cultural, human -hospitality skills, management
skills,
Seasonal labor force etc and capital- infrastructure financing)
b)
Organizations
c) Markets
3. Generate
alternatives.
4. Evaluate
alternatives.
5. Select and
implement.
6. Monitor and
evaluate.
Tourism,
globalization and sustainable development
Tourism is one of the
fastest growing sectors of the global economy and developing countries are
attempting to cash in on this expanding industry in an attempt to boost
foreign investment and financial reserves. While conceding that the
uncontrolled growth of this industry can result in serious environmental
and social problems, the United Nations contends that such negative
effects can be controlled and reduced. Many developing countries, facing
debt burdens and worsening trade terms, have turned to tourism promotion
in the hope that it brings foreign exchange and investment.
Simultaneously, leading interna-tional agencies such as the World Bank,
United Nations agencies and business organizations like the World Travel &
Tourism Council (WTTC) have been substantially involved to make tourism a
truly global industry. However, tourism in developing countries is often
viewed by critics as an extension of former colonial conditions because
from the very beginning, it has benefited from international economic
relationships that structurally favour the advanced capitalist countries
in the North.
GATS aim to abolish restrictions on foreign ownership and other measures
which have so far protected the services sector in individual countries.
For the hotel sector, for example, GATS facilitates franchising,
management contracts and licensing. Moreover, foreign tourism companies
will be entitled to the same benefits as local companies in addition to
being allowed to move staff across borders as they wish, open branch
offices in foreign countries, and make international payments without
restrictive regulations.
Foreign investment will also be increasingly deregulated under the GATT/WTO
system. According to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs),
foreign companies will no longer be obliged to use local input. The
Multilateral Agree-ment on Investment (MAI) proposed by Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries goes even further,
calling for unrestricted entry and establishment of foreign firms,
national treatment, repatriation of profits, technology transfer, etc.
Accordingly, the WTTC has recently presented its 'Millennium Vision' on
travel and tourism, including the following key areas:
·
Get governments to accept travel and tourism as a strategic
economic development and employment priority;
·
Move towards open and competitive markets by supporting the
implementation of GATS, liberalize air transport and deregulate
telecommunications in international markets;
·
Eliminate barriers to tourism growth, which involves the
expansion and improvement of infrastructure - e.g. the increase of airport
capacity, construction and modernization of airports, roads and tourist
facilities.
It is already a
well-established fact that in some developing countries, more than
two-thirds of the revenue from international tourism never reaches the
local economy because of the high foreign exchange leakages. Now, as the
new free trade and investment policies are being implemented, their
balance sheets may even worsen because the profits and other income
repatriated by foreign companies is likely to grow larger than the inflow
of capital. That means, the claims that globalization and liberalization
of tourism will bring wealth, progress, social achievements and improved
environmental standards to developing countries need to be seriously
questioned.
Economic globalization has also generated considerable criticism because
it comes along with the erosion of power of governments. Opponents argue
that local and national institutions will no longer be able to properly
fulfill their responsibilities such as providing social services,
preserving the environment, and implementing sustainable development
prog-rammes. The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution on
'Sustainable Tourism' as part of its 'Programme for the further
implementation of Agenda 21', the action programme adopted at the Rio
Earth Summit.
This resolution acknowledges the need to consider further the importance
of tourism in the context of Agenda 21. Among other things, it states:
'For sustainable patterns of consumption and production in the tourism
sector, it is essential to strengthen national policy development and
enhance capacity in the areas of physical planning, impact assessment, and
the use of economic and regulatory instruments, as well as in the areas of
information, education and marketing.' Furthermore, the resolution calls
for participation of all concerned parties in policy development and
implementation of sustainable tourism programmes.
Aids
in Africa:
Times of transition: An overview
The human toll
By 2025, the number of
people living with HIV and AIDS had fallen from 25 million in 2003 to 15
million, despite the fact that the population had grown to 1.4 billion
from 0.9 billion in 2003. This represented a fall in overall adult HIV
prevalence from 5.6%. The number of new adult infections annually had
dropped by almost half since 2003.
The gender bias had begun
to even out, but women were still more adversely affected. Adult male HIV
prevalence dropped from 4.9% in 2003 to 1.6% in 2025, and female
prevalence from 6.4% in 2003 to 2.2% in 2025.
The scaling up of
antiretroviral therapy provision had been dramatic: from less than 77,000
people in 2003 to 3.4 million by 2025, representing just over 70% of those
who needed it.
However, the number of
people dying from AIDS, despite the lengthening of their lives with
antiretroviral drugs, had continued to climb. By 2025, 53 million adults
and 15 million children had died since the beginning of the AIDS
epidemic. The annual number of deaths was also still high, reflecting the
fact that reducing the rate of infection was taking time to work through
the population. In 2025, 1.3 million adults across African died from
AIDS, and 260,000 children.
Costing Action
Prevention and care
initiatives prevented a step rise in the numbers of children orphaned by
AIDS, but a significant problem remained, with the number of children
orphaned by AIDS rising from 13 million in 2003 to 18 million at the end
of 2025.
Over the 23 years,
responding to the epidemic required invest-ments of nearly US$ 200
billion, within a larger overall package of investment in health,
education, infrastructure, and social develop-ment. HIV- and AIDS-
specific funding increased in expenditure on prevention, and orphans and
vulnerable children in the initial years, 2003 to 2007. There-after,
expansion continued at a more moderate pace. Care and treatment
expenditure expanded rapidly to 2012, in order to provide access to nearly
50% of those who needed antiretroviral therapy, and then increased more
slowly to achieve more than 70% coverage.
This slower increase
reflected the fact that expanding care beyond the capacity of existing
health systems was a time-consuming and painstaking process. Expenditure
or orphans and vulnerable children leveled off at the rate of population
growth after 2012. The total package, although large, was not an
astronomical sum. By comparison, it was less than half of what the United
States spent on new vehicles in 2003.
During the period,
economic growth was 4% (real GDP growth, not taking into account
inflation) and the Abuja target was net (15% of government spending is on
health). At the same time, overall government budgets grew at 1% per
year. Overall, national governments contributed 40% and individual
out-of-pocket contributions 10%. External contributions accounted for the
remaining 50%. External contributions accounted for the remaining 50%.
Most Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) countries did, in fact, reach the 0.7% of
GDP target for official development assistance (ODA). Even if the entire
budget for Africa’s HIV and AIDS programme had been paid for through ODA,
the US$ 10.5 billion needed in 2025 would have amounted to a mere 3% of
ODA to Africa in 2025. DAC economies had grown strongly, at an average of
3% per year. African economies had also developed, and the decade
2015-2025 saw a gradual transfer of HIV and AIDS costs from external
contributions to domestic budgets. Out-of-pocket spending remained
steady.
In 2003 external
contributions to the AIDS sector were estimated to be just over a US$1
billion. Over the next decade grew steadily until 2014, 2024, when annual
external contributions were estimated at US$ 6.8 billion. Stronger
economies, more generous health budgets, and a leveling off the amount of
resources required for program-mmes meant that, in the years 2015 to 2025,
dependency on external aid flows decreased, slowly but significantly.
Although the costs of the
programme continued to rise, dependency decreased over time after peaking
in 2014, declining to a little over US$ 1.3 billion once the majority of
costs were covered by stronger economies and more generous health
budgets. It is true, however, that budget deficits continued to plague
governments and individuals. Fortunately, donor countries and
international finance institutions took a more relaxed view of these
deficits.
Eastern, and West and
Central Africa faced the greatest costs, but also received the largest
proportion of ODA as the commitments made at Monterrey in 2002 and in the
EMAs of 2009 and 2010 materialized.
Southern Africa required
30% of external contributions over the 23 years, but it was in a far
better position to cover the remaining costs, thanks to improved economic
growth and larger budgets. The region was left with smaller budgets
deficits than East and West and Central Africa.
North Africa, like
Southern Africa, was better able to cover costs through government funds.
However, this was primarily due to much lower infection rates and far
lowers HIV and AIDS programme costs.
Millennium Development Goals
Most part of sub-Saharan
Africa had significant problems in shifting the trajectory towards
achieving the MDGs is the early years of the century. However, the
recommitment from African leaders and their international partners in 2005
really did begin to turn things around. The Extraordinary Meetings and
Agreements (EMAd) of 2009 and 2010 provided additional impetus, as did the
large invest-ment of social sector spending from African governments and
their partners.
By 2015, it was clear
that the trajectory had significantly altered and, while few countries
achieved the targets in 2015, across sub-Saharan Africa the targets were
met by 2025, with some countries achieving them well before that date.
North Africa made rapid of boys to girls in education and the primary
school completion targets were achieved by 2015, as was the under-five
mortality target. Poverty
Both the proportion and
the actual number of people living on less than (in sub-Saharan Africa:
from 50% to 22%) and from 306 million to 217 million. The greatest
reduction in poverty was observed in East Africa (down to 56 million),
with a 23% reduction in Central Africa (to 34 million) and around a 20%
reduction in West and Southern Africa (to 21 million). The number of poor
in North Africa reduced most significantly, by over 60% to 1 million.
All Africa
overview
Adult HIV prevalence
across Africa decreased from 5.6% in 2003 to 1.9% in 2025. This was the
result of an expanded response to the epidemic, involving different types
of prevention interventions, and care and support activities.
The difference between
the number of new infections among women and among men was also reduced as
a consequence of successful prevention programmes that focused on gender
issues. In 2025, there were 650,000 new adult female infections and
540,000 new adult male infections.
Adult deaths from AIDS
per year declined from around 810,000 men and 1 million women in 2004 to
around 580,000 men and 740 000 women in 2025. The pattern of an initial
decline followed by an increase in annual deaths after 2013 was due to the
pattern of antiretroviral therapy coverage and rollout. Anti-retroviral
therapy coverage increased rapidly until 2010 and then increased much more
slowly to 2025. During the rapid increase, many deaths from AIDS were
postponed by successful therapy.
After 2010, however,
people who had been receiving therapy for a number of years begin to fall
ill and die. The number of new people beginning therapy after 2010 was
not significant enough to balance the increasing number of deaths of those
who had been on therapy for a number of years.
Over this period, the
number of cumulative deaths was still high, despite massive efforts to
roll out antiretroviral therapy. Given the high rates of infection at the
beginning of the period, the limited effectiveness of therapy, and the
time it takes for prevention programmes to reduce overall infection rates,
it is difficult to see how these deaths could have been prevented. By
2025, the cumulative number of adult deaths from AIDS since 1980 had
reached nearly 53 million.
Antiretroviral therapy
was successfully and rapidly rolled out so that, by 2025, 73% of people
who needed antiretroviral therapy were receiving it. The number of
children orphaned by AIDS continued to increase during the period,
reaching 18 million in 2025. The total number of orphans (through AIDS
and other causes) exceeded 50 million children in 2025, although this was
less than in 2015—another indication that the epidemic was in decline.
g
Scenarios
and their power
Between now and
2025, profound uncertainty exists about how the AIDS epidemic will develop
and the extent of its impacts. For Africa, what happens over the next 20
years and beyond will depend on actions and decisions taken will not be
easy.
Heritage
culture, experience, training, education, religious beliefs, and
fashions—all these areas people’s perspectives on, and interpretation of,
the world. These influences can help us to focus. They can also create
blind spots and prejudices, making difficult for us to value a different
point of view, or comprehend a fact that challenges our underlying
assumptions. This is particularly true if we are deeply attached to our
assumptions. In the case of HIV and AIDS, there are many myths about the
reasons for the spread of the epidemic in Africa and the ways to tackle
it.
We each need to
look beyond our own assumptions and understandings to encompass other
relevant perspectives.
Revolutionary Consent (Part two)
By Barbara Clark Smith
Courtrooms
Courts of law provided
another occasion for official pomp and display, and thus also for the
people's presence and the public recognition of authority.
In the courtroom, wrote
James Parker in 1746, judges "represent the king's person, they are his
officers, and act in his stead." Their job was to bring the force and
majesty of the law from the centers of power out into the lives of the
people. It followed, said a Virginian, that the justices should be
"members of that estate of Men which are Called Worshipful." In early
Massa-chusetts, Governor John Wint-hrop advised that magistrates take
pains to look impressive: "Magistrates shall appear more solemnly in
public, with attendance, apparel, and open notice of their entrance into
court." Well done, it excited admiration. "The Superior Court met
yesterday and made a Good Figure," wrote Justice Samuel Sewell
approvingly. And in Newark, New Jersey, Judge Sanford declared his
authority on the bench by wearing not only a "hatt and wigg" but a sword.
Hats on top of wigs only approximated crowns, but they surely
distinguished a justice from "the uncovered ranks of society," which is to
say everyone else in court.
Still, the uncovered
ranks had their role in the courtroom. First was the grand jury, a body
composed of 15 or more men qualified to vote in provincial elections,
called together in their respective counties to bring the disorders and
misbehaviors of the people to the jurisdiction of the courts. The great
bulk of criminal matters in the colonies passed through the jurisdiction
of a grand jury. Local justices of the peace might handle some petty
misbehavior on their own knowledge, dealing out summary justice. Moreover,
grand juries were not the only means of bringing significant crimes to
trial. Suspects could be prosecuted based on "information" from the King
or his officers, "without any finding or presentment by the Verdict of
Twelve men," but by "discretion" alone.3
And it was certainly easier for an appointed official to bypass the
grand jury in difficult or controversial cases. Yet even a conservative
jurist, Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts, acknowledged it "a Hardship on
the Subject" for petit trials to proceed without grand jury indictment. By
broad consensus, grand juries were generally needed to bring a suspected
felon to trial.
Much like today, grand
jurors heard charges against suspects, interviewed witnesses, and decided
whether to find "a true bill"—saying the accused was guilty and should go
on to petit trial—or "ignoramus"—literally, "we do not know," hence that
the accused could not be indicted. At least twelve of the jurymen had to
find a true bill to present a defendant to further trial. Besides
identifying malefactors, grand jurors were to discern problems of public
order. English practice licensed grand juries to present public dangers or
nuisances to the court and suggest legislative or executive remedies.
Thus, though it involved no crime and suggested no criminal ran at large
in the county, the "unnecessary multiplication of licensed houses"—that
is, taverns—was a frequent problem that might engage the grand jury. This
and other "things neglected or things damaging"—the sorry condition of the
county jail, the unmet needs of the poor—lay within the "discretionary
power" of the grand jury to notice and bring to the court's attention.
Jurymen might overlook a great deal, leaving out of court the matters they
deemed satisfactorily settled by other means. They were in a position to
judge which disorders were of the scale or of the sort to be brought to
the jurisdiction of the provincial state and its law.
In general, this sort of
discretion was entrusted to men with social stature. South Carolina set
high property standards for participation in the grand jury; everywhere
else, all freemen were eligible to serve, though in practice members of
these panels were often of the better sort. In Connecticut, the men on
grand juries were elected by freeholders at town meetings, two from each
town, but in most places they were selected by an appointed
official—usually the sheriff—who was himself obliged to the governor or
the county court for his position.
Still, grand jurors
gathered "from all the several Parts of the County to represent the State
of it." Other writers similarly spoke of grand juries as representative
bodies. Thus, the New York Weekly Journal waxed rhetorical in 1734: "Does
not the grand jury (tho' chose by the Sheriff) represent the county?"4
In a manner of speaking, yes: grand jurymen represented not a group of
constituents, but local knowledge.
Thus, a vital
qualification for membership in a jury of any sort was geographical, a
qualification of inhabitancy. Petty jurors too needed to come from the
vicinage of the crime and be "neighbours" of the parties. The English
writer John Somers said jurors should be "Companions" of the accused,
"known to him, and he to them, or at least his Neighbours or Dwellers near
about the place where the Crime is supposed to have been committed, to who
something of the Fact must probably be known."
Grand jurymen's
knowledge of local events was sufficient basis on which to act; they might
bring suspects to trial even if no one complained of a crime and no
witness appeared to swear that one had even occurred. Intimate knowledge
of the locality was equally valuable in determining cases brought by third
parties. Which witnesses to believe, which accounts of the parties’
transactions were most plausible—jurors were expected to make such
decisions not merely on the impression and information received at court,
but on the grounds of prior knowledge? The ideal juror would be impartial,
not prejudiced toward one side or the other, but he would also be
informed, able to draw on a familiar history of local relationships.
Indeed, we can easily
underestimate the accepted and vital place of local knowledge in the
courtroom, because we work to expunge prior, local knowledge from the
proceedings of criminal justice. All law needs to simplify the messy
interactions of life, selecting elements to be deemed pertinent,
definitive of legal outcome. "Whatever it is the law is after," says the
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, "it is not the whole story." In the 18th
century, a jury of the vicinage might bring more of the "story" into
account, relying on common information and ordinary judgment in its
determinations. When a "Chymist" of Philadelphia named Dr. Evan Jones came
to trial for the death of an apprentice, witnesses elucidated the facts of
the matter to the jury. Yet in fact, noted The Pennsylvania Gazette, "for
several Months before the Tryal came on, there was hardly any Person in
Philadelphia, who could be ignorant of the Affair in all its horrid
Circumstances." Despite such widespread familiarity with the event, no one
proposed that justice might be better served by trying the case in
Lancaster. To suggest a change of venue to a more neutral site would have
been to value ignorance or equate it with impartiality. But a
substantially different sense of justice informed the colonial process
than informs ours today: a later age would prize informed and opinionated
voters but uninformed jury members; the 18th century preferred something
approaching the reverse.
Petit jury trials were
more broadly public, open to spectators, on the one hand, and engaging
less uncommon commoners as jurors, on the other. Yet the jury did more
than sort through conflicting testimony to conclude what was likely to
have happened. Juries of the 18th century routinely decided law as well as
fact, judging whether a specific action qualified as a greater or lesser
offense or, indeed, whether that action constituted an illegality at all.
Now, the distinction between the "facts" of a case and the pertinent "law"
is a fine and possibly unsustainable matter, since the simplest statement
of events contains assumptions and definitions framed by the law.5
Yet the 18th century insisted on the distinction between the two, and a
good many authorities insisted that the jury had the power to decide them
both.
The reason was simple:
the jury's powers were essential to the English project of preventing
tyranny. Without juries, everyone knew, the law might be used to oppress
the people by imprisoning them or seizing their property unfairly. When a
New York provincial attorney challenged jurymen's right to be "Judges of
Law," the defense insisted on their judicial discretion. "Paenal Laws are
strictly to be taken and interpreted, and not allowed to the ruin of the
Subject, to extend, or be interpreted beyond the plain and strict sense of
the words."6
Surely jurymen, however unlearned, might be able to discern the "plain and
strict sense" of the law.
Even in cases in which
oppression was not at issue—even in the routine determina-tion of legal
outcomes—the jury brought "a democraticall voice," adding "a mixture of
popular power" to the courtroom, where the monarch's representative
presided. When a defendant requested a jury trial, he was said to "put
himself upon God and his country." Judges, one writer wryly insisted, were
not to imagine themselves indicated by either of these terms.
The "country" was a
phrase that referred to neither bench nor bar, but solely to the jury.7
The English legal authority Henry Care put it succinctly in his
17th-century account of "the Free-Born Subject's Inheritance": "This
Birthright of English-men shines most conspicuously in two things: 1.
Parliaments 2. Juries." Through both of these institutions, the theory
ran, the King was confronted with the will of the people.
How well specific juries
expressed the people's will was open to debate. In countless cases,
surely, the issue of defending against tyranny did not arise. Courtroom
transactions between ruler and people might prove a gracious meeting of
the minds. Besides, jurors might be overawed or pressured by their
superiors. Handpicked by those in authority, a grand jury might be "Chosen
on purpose to find the Presentment," as one indicted New Yorker complained
in print and others doubtless complained in private.8
Yet juries were never as compliant as judges might wish. Grand juries
would not indict in countless cases brought before them by officials of
the Crown. In New Jersey, the Proprietors charged that juries were biased
by ties of kinship; the populace retorted that patronage gave the
proprietors control of bench and bar.9
There were frequent denunciations of juries that did nothing or the wrong
thing. The foreman of one New York jury informed the provincial attorney
that, despite the experts' clear statement to the contrary, "the Defendant
had not transgressed any Law."10
Other legal experts also met with opinionated jurors, jurors who dutifully
found fact and law from the perspective of the common ground.
Belief in the value of
that perspective led some colonists to worry about the growing influence
of lawyers in the criminal courtroom. True, advo-cates offered jurors
alternative interpretations of the law, which might sometimes enhance
jurors' discretion. Yet many contem-poraries worried that lawyers were
merely complicating matters that ought to be as plain as day. It was not
just that counsel might "for their fees strive only to baffle Witnesses
and stifle Truth."11
Lawyerly skills might influence the jury's deliberations. Thus, a North
Carolina man urged that the provincial attorney general, Robert Jones Jr.,
be henceforth prevented from courtroom practice, for he used "great
volubility of speech" and other "wiles insinuations and chicanerie" to
play on "the passions of weak juries to blind their conception of Justice
in order to gain his point."12
In short, Jones compromised the essential role of the jury, which was to
bring to the court a "conception of Justice" that was local, ordinary, and
common in its nature.
Finally, there were other
players at court, and these were the spectators, the public who stood
within the courthouse, mingled in the yard outside, or refreshed
themselves at the taverns nearby. "Every male person can attend such a
court and every one is permitted to takes notes," reported a German
observer at a military court martial in Cambridge, Massachusetts. "The
courtroom is packed, and not even the humblest is refused admittance."13
The public administration
of the law had a clear didactic function. In the only partially literate
society of 18th-century Virginia, the historian Rhys Isaac writes, court
day "served not only to make the community a witness to important
decisions and transactions but also to teach men the very nature and forms
of government." Everywhere court day informed people of the law, and it
provided the occasion for the populace to recognize authority in the
persons of magistrates and in their ritualized language, dress, and
gesture. Most adult males in 18th-century Connecticut ended up at court at
one time or another, as litigants, jurors, observers, or witnesses. The
same probably held true in other colonies too, and since even free women
occasionally appeared as litigants, witnesses, or defen-dants, a
substantial portion of society might at one time or another be present at
court.14
Of course, rules of
decorum required that spectators show deference toward the gentleman
justices. Architects of courthouses embodied relations of power in their
designs, sometimes underscoring judges' prominence by seating them above,
placing lawyers within the bar and with their backs to the public, and
providing spaces outside the courthouse to be allocated to less
substantial spectators.15
Still, these efforts to constrain the popular presence reflect the fact
that the proceedings might depend precisely on the quality of spectators'
engagement and reception. Onlookers exerted a force in the courtroom, and
no player remained untouched by it. Judges' social standing could insulate
them from "the humours of the populace," but they reached their decisions
knowing that courtroom events might be widely broadcast throughout the
county.
Good lawyers
concentrated on swaying judge and jury, but it would not hurt to bring
"tears to the eyes" of onlookers too. Finally, what made it plausible to
cast jurymen as an extension of "the people" was in no small measure that
they remained face to face with their peers and inferiors. It is
noteworthy that grand juries met in private, for "People out of Doors will
influence your Conduct if they know the Business you are engaged on." By
contrast, members of the petit jury, less socially exalted to begin with,
were purposefully left vulnerable to the gaze of their peers and
inferiors. The public presence should influence the decisions of jurymen,
according to one Massachusetts clergyman: "The Eyes of Men are upon you,"
he told the jury, "and you may be sure will be so."
g
Notes
3
Sir John Hawkes, The English-man's Right: A Dialogue Between a
Barrister-at-Law and a Jury-Man (London, 1680), pp. 6-7.
4 See Richard D. Younger, The People's Panel: The Grand Jury in the
United States, 1634–1941 (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1963),
p. 5.
5 Bruce Mann says it is "artificial and impossible to maintain in
practice." Mann, "The Evolutionary Revolution in American Law: A Comment
on J.R. Pole's ‘Reflections,'<0x2009>" William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
ser., 50 (1993), p. 170, note 4.
6 "A Narrative of a New and Unusual American Imprisonment of Two
Presbyterian Ministers," (1707), in Peter Force, ed. Tracts, vol. IV, no.
4, pp. 43-44.
7 The quotations are from John M. Murrin, "Magistrates, Sinners, and a
Precarious Liberty: Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-Century New England," in
Saints and Revolutionaries: Essays on Early American History, ed.
David D. Hall, John M. Murrin, and Thad W. Tate (New York: W.W. Norton,
1984), p. 200; John Adams, quoted in William E. Nelson,
The Americanization of the Common Law: the Impact of Legal Change in
Massachusetts Society, 1760–1830 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1975), pp. 20-21. Also making the point that the "country" was the jury
was Hawkes, English-man's Right, p. 8.
8 "New and Unusual American Imprisonment," p. 23.
9 McConville,
Daring Disturbers of the Peace, p. 116.
10 "New and Unusual American Imprisonment," p. 44.
11 Hawkes, English-man's Right, p. 9.
12 Petition of Reuben Searcy and others, 1759, in Boyd, Some 18th
Century Tracts, p. 181.
13 Ray W. Pettengill, trans. Letters from America, 1776-1779; Being
Letters of Brunswick, Hessian, and Waldeck Officers with the British
Armies During the Revolution (Port Washington, N.Y., 1964, 1924), p. 137.
14 Bruce H. Mann,
Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in Early Connecticut
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), p. 8. On
spectators in courts: E. Merton Coulter, ed., The Journal of Peter Gordon,
1732-1735 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963), p. 14; Charles S.
Sydnor, Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Political Practice in
Washington's Virginia (New York: Free Press, 1965), chap. 6; Isaac,
Transformation of Virginia, pp. 88-94.
15 "Memoir of Governor Increase Sumner," New England Historical and
Genealogical Register 8 (1854), p. 116. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, pp.
75-79, 118. Carl Lounsbury, "The Structure of Justice: The Courthouses of
Colonial Virginia," Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture III, ed.
Thomas Carter and Bernard L. Herman, (Columbia, Mo., 1989), pp. 214-226.

Home /UP
|