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DIPLOMATIC BRIEFINGS NEWS VIEWS & REVIEWS

UN could leave tense Horn border  top

 The United Natins may have to consider withdrawing its monitors from the tense Ethiopia-Eritrea border, Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned.  He said the Eritrean government had not been cooperating with the UN and had limited the movement of the UN troops.

 The UN border mission announced the immediate withdrawal of peacekeepers from 18 of its 40 monitoring posts.  Eritrea banned helicopter flights two weeks ago. The two-year war between Eritrea and Ethiopia ended in 2000.  Since then, more than 3,000 UN troops have been monitoring the disputed 1,000km border.  "Obviously, our procedures and operations have been impeded," Mr Annan told reporters.  "If this continues, we will have to take some very hard and critical decisions as to the usefulness of staying there if we cannot operate."  

About 70,000 people are believed to have died in the conflict.  The two countries ended their border war after a peace agreement which provided for an independent commission to rule on their disputed border. However, the commission's findings have yet to be implemented, and Ethiopia continues to occupy the town of Badme, which the commission ruled belonged to Eritrea.  

Last month, Eritrea warned it might re-start its war with Ethiopia if the UN failed to resolve a border dispute between the two neighbours. Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia in 1993, after Ethiopian and Eritrean rebel movements overthrew the Derg regime in Addis Ababa.                                                                    

Pirates hijack UN food aid cargo 

Gunmen in the southern Somali port of Merka have hijacked a UN-chartered vessel which was carry-ing aid to the east African country.  

The ship had offloaded nearly half of its 850 tonne cargo of food aid, when the hijackers struck. The six gunmen forced the ship and its ten crew to leave the port, 100km (62 miles) southwest of Mogadishu. In most cases, the hijackers demand a hefty ransom in exchange for the return of the vessel and crew.  

Insecurity  

Somalis wait for food aid

The WFP is looking for alternative ways to deliver aid to Somalia

"It is scandalous that a small number of profiteers would once again hijack humanitarian food supplies destined for fellow Somalis," said World Food Programme (WFP) country director Robert Hauser. The WFP said in a statement that the governor of the Lower Shabelle region, Yusuf Indha Adde, had sent two small boats to pursue the MV Miltzow. "Given the continued insecurity off the coast of Somalia, WFP is looking at various alternative routes including overland from Kenya and through Djibouti," the statement said.  

In June, hijackers had demanded a ransom for the return of a WFP chartered vessel, which the organization refused to pay. The MV Semlow was eventually returned after 100 days.            
Militia leader calls for Islamic rule in Somalia 

NAIROBI, Kenya -An influential religious leader and alleged al-Qaida collaborator vowed in an Inter view to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, a Horn of Africa nation the United States fears could grow into a major base for Islamic terrorists.

Sheik Hassan Dahir Awye

Sheik Dahir Hassan Awye (Photo: AP)

 

“The Western world should respect our own ideas in choosing the way we want to govern our country, the way we want to go about our own business. That is our right,” said Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, a key figure in a growing religious camp vying with secular factions for control of Somalia.  

Despite peace talks and the formation last year of a transitional government, Somalia remains a patchwork of heavily armed clan fiefdoms — with no government to provide such basics as schools, hospitals, phone service, even traffic lights.  

Earlier this year, the parliament and Cabinet split into two factions. As a result, fundamentalists offering Islam as a solution have drawn support in Somalia, and there are concerns that Aweys’ followers pose a military threat to the transi-tional government.                                                 

DUP Signs Agreement on Participation in National Unity government 

The Democratic Unionist (DUP), led by Mohamed Osman Al-Mirghani, and the National congress singed at the headquarters of the National congress an agreement according to which DUP will participate in the executive and legislative organs at all levels in the national unity government.   

In a press statement, Deputy chairman and spokesman of the National Congress, Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, said after talks between the two parties, which culminated in the signing of the agreement, that the National Congress welcomes the DUP participation in the national unity government.  He said that the coming days will witness completion of consultations between the National Congress and DUP and delivering of DUP nominations for the posts assigned to the party.   

The Chairman of the Executive Office of the DUP, Ahmed Ali Abu-Bakr, who singed for the party, described the DUP agreement to participate in the coming government as complying with its patriotic orientations and the recent protocols of Jeddah and Cairo, and also aims to guarantee prevalence of unity and stability in the county.  

He added that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is keen to honour its agreement with the National Congress and submit its nominations for positions at the executive and legislative organs as soon as possible.                                               

Obote's body back home in Uganda 

Milton Obote

Press split on Obote legacy

The body of Uganda's ex-president, Milton Obote has been flown home from Zambia, where he lived for 20 years.  

He died last month of kidney failure aged 80. Mr. Obote was president twice - in the 1960s soon after independence and again during the 1980s. On both occasions Uganda suffered terrible violence, and Mr. Obote was each time overthrown by the military. Mr. Obote's body will lie in state in parliament before a national memorial service and burial. The body arrived at Uganda's Entebbe airport on a chartered flight from Zambia.

 Civil war  

During his 20 years in exile in Zambia, attempts at reconciliation between Mr. Obote and the current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni failed. The war during the 1980s bet-ween Museveni's rebel forces and the then President Milton Obote's national army left hundreds of thousands of civilians dead. But Mr. Obote's death led to a change of heart by the Ugandan government.

 The BBC's Will Ross in Kampala says that the cabinet was reportedly split over the matter, but when the Ugandan government announced a state funeral for the former president, many

Ugandans were surprised. He says that region-al leaders may have played a role in persuad-ing the Ugandan government to honour Milton Obote because of the support he offered during the 1960s to exiled South Africans fighting against white minority rule.   

Uniformed pallbearers carry Milton Obote's coffin at Uganda's Entebbe airport on a chartered flight from Zambia

Many Ugandans were surprised when the government announced a state funeral for Obote

Critics of Mr. Obote hold him responsible for decades of violence in Uganda when the national army was out of control and caused widespread misery across the country.  But as Ugandans prepare to bury the man who played a key role in ushering in the country's independence, they are reminded that Mr. Obote is the fourth Ugandan leader to die in exile.

 Some argue the reconciliation has come too late in a coun-try that since its independe-nce in 1962 has never witness-ed a peaceful transfer of power from one leader to another.                                  

Ethiopia: Scaling Up
By David Andrews, Lodewyk Erasmus, and Robert Powell

Assessing the impact of a dramatic increase in aid on one of Africa's poorest countries

                                                                                

 

Ethiopia, among the poorest countries in Africa, presents one of the biggest development challenges in a region beset by frequent drought and food shortages and hobbled by inadequate roads and communications. A landlocked country of about 70 million people, sandwiched between Sudan and Somalia in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has suffered bloody upheavals and famine over the past two decades and is still recovering from a bitter border war with neighboring Eritrea. It ranks in the bottom 10 of the UN’s Human Development Index, a composite measure of per capita income, health, and education (in 2004, it was listed as 170th out of 177).

 

 
  


Real GDP at factor cost
  Agriculture
  Nonagricultural
Real per capita GDP

Actual
1991/92-2003/04


4.0
2.2
5.8
1.1

Government projection
2004/05-2015/16


7.0
7.5
6.6
4.1

Nominal investment/nominal GDP (at market prices)

  Total
    Private
    Public
Growth accounting
  Real GDP at factor cost
  Capital stock
  Labor
  Total factor productivity

16.8
9.1
7.7

4.0
1.4
2.0
0.7

31.4
15.6
15.8

7.0
3.0
2.3
1.7

Achievable target?   Investment and productivity will have to rise sharply for Ethiopia to achieve its growth target.   (average rates of growth)      

 

Source: Ethiopian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and calculations.

Donor countries have targeted Ethiopia for extra assistance because of its size and potential for growth. Symbolically, the United Nations has selected Koraro in Ethiopia as one of its test villages, singled out by economist Jeffrey Sachs in an experiment to monitor the scaling up of aid at the local level. On current trends, Ethiopia will not meet any of its UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) except for the target on primary school enrollment. Considerably faster economic growth, supported by a strong policy package, and higher inflows of net official development assistance (ODA) are therefore needed. 

But will a dramatic scaling up of external assistance really help and what are the potential pitfalls of such an approach? After all, there is still considerable controversy surrounding the record of aid in many countries. Against this background, and in view of the possible lessons for other African countries, we undertook a study to assess the potential macroeconomic implications of scaling up assistance to achieve the MDGs. We looked at the potential impact of higher aid flows on the tradable goods sector and reviewed priorities for improving fiscal management and financial sector development. Our findings suggest that Ethiopia faces enormous challenges in boosting growth and meeting the MDGs, even with far higher levels of aid—in part because of the need to ensure that this aid is absorbed and used effectively.

 Sources of growth

 Reforms aimed at transforming Ethiopia from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one were launched in 1991 after the overthrow of the former pro-Soviet Derg regime, boosting the overall GDP growth rate to an annual 4.0 percent in 1991–2003 from 2.8 percent during the Derg rule (1974–91). The structure of the economy also changed, with the contribution of agriculture to real GDP falling from 57 percent in 1991 to 42 percent in 2003, while that of services rose from 34 percent to 47 percent. But the contributions of industry and the private services sector remained essentially unchanged, and Ethiopia’s growth potential remained largely untapped. 

During 1991–2003, agricultural value added was driven mostly by increases in the area under cultivation, rather than improvements in productivity. While the area under cultivation increased at an average rate of 5.7 percent a year, crop yields rose on average by only 0.4 percent a year. Despite attempts to diversify, coffee still accounts for one-third of total exports, and agricultural output remains very variable and dependent on the climate. Because of the huge impact of the weather on overall GDP (see Chart 1), achieving growth of 7 percent a year on average without addressing the underlying causes of variability implies significantly higher growth in nondrought years. 

In 2002, Ethiopia drew up a Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) that targets economic growth averaging 7 percent a year in order to halve income poverty by 2015. The strategy is premised on a transformation of agriculture from mostly subsistence to commercial production, which would act as a catalyst for the development of industry and exports, and the generation of off-farm employment and income. Specifically, the government aims to increase agricultural value-added growth from an annual 2.2 percent historically to 7.5 percent a year, and nonagriculture growth from 5.8 percent to 6.6 percent. In the agricultural sector, this strong improvement in real output is premised on productivity growth rising from an annual 0.4 percent historically during 1991–2003 to an average of 9.0 percent a year over the medium term. 

Can such big increases in growth be achieved in a country where rainfall variability has such a big impact on agriculture and where agriculture still sustains around 80 percent of the population? The answer, according to an IMF studies (see box), is that it would require major increases in public and private sector investment and productivity (see table on the next page). Public investment as a ratio of GDP would have to rise to an average of 15.8 percent over the next 15 years compared with 7.7 percent during 1991–2003. Private investment is expected to be stimulated by the government’s reform program. In our analysis, we assumed that private investment would rise broadly in line with public investment, increasing from an average of just over 9 percent in 1991–2003 to almost 16 percent during 2004–15. 

The need for strong gains in productivity to attain higher growth highlights the importance of bold implementation of the reform agenda, especially

 

The analytical tools we used

As part of its regular consultations with Ethiopia, the IMF developed a preliminary framework to assess the potential macroeconomic implications of scaling up assistance. Our analysis was built around the IMF’s financial programming framework, supplemented by a growth accounting analysis to assess the feasibility of a pickup in growth to halve income poverty by 2015, and a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) to assess trends in public recurrent and capital expenditure needed to reach other MDGs. The growth accounting framework models real GDP growth as a function of the weighted rates of growth in the capital stock and human capital, and a residual contribution that is interpreted as the growth in total factor productivity. These elements were combined with additional analysis and judgments informed by recent experience to arrive at an overall assessment of the macroeconomic implications of scaling up external assistance. The scaling-up scenario is conditioned on both a sustained increase in the flow of external aid over the medium term and implementation of accompanying economic policies that would allow the assumed aid flows to be effectively used and absorbed without destabilizing the economy.

 

The possible growth in the capital stock was derived from the MTEF. Drawing on the public expenditure review conducted by the World Bank in 2002, the MTEF recognized that achieving the MDGs would require significant increases in recurrent health and education spending, especially wages, as well as a doubling of public investment from an average of less than 8 percent of GDP in 1991–2003 to an average of about 16 percent of GDP during 2004–15. The labor force was assumed to grow at its recent trend rate, while education (as measured by average years of schooling) would increase at an average rate of about 5 percent.

in agriculture, private sector development, financial sector development, and external trade.

In agriculture, the ambitious objectives for growth underline the importance of reforms to enhance productivity (for example, by improving security of tenure, establishing appropriate risk management systems, improving access to rural finance, and reversing environmental degradation) and access to markets (for example, by improving the functioning of markets for both agricultural input and final goods, and improving rural infrastructure).

The required productivity gains also point to the need for significant progress in the privatization of remaining public enterprises; removal of impediments to private sector activity; development of the domestic financial sector; and improvement in access to urban land and Ethiopia’s infrastructure.

 

Strong fiscal management needed

 

Achieving the MDGs will require a significant rise in public expenditure. In the absence of a comprehensive analysis of the costs of achieving the respective MDGs, the IMF study assumed a doubling of official development assistance as a share of GDP to meet the MDGs, in line with the Ethiopian government projections. It was thus assumed that ODA would rise from 11 percent of GDP in 2003 to 22 percent by 2015, allowing poverty-reducing spending to rise from about $20 per capita in 2003 to about $78 per capita by 2015. The projected increase in public expenditure reflects an increase in recurrent expenditure—as the public wage bill rises to accommodate the increase in the number of teachers and health workers—and an increase in public investment in infrastructure. The envisaged increase in social spending would therefore reorient spending toward recurrent expenditure, owing primarily to higher wages and salaries. For example, the reallocation of spending to primary education and health services entails wage components of about 95 and 60 percent respectively. Capital spending is projected to increase by 8 percent of GDP. In this context, the overall fiscal deficit (excluding grants) rises sharply to about 23 percent of GDP by 2015 (see Chart).

Chart 2. The price of growth

 

Given the expected strong increase in donor aid to achieve the MDGs, the capacity of fiscal institutions would need to be strengthened to secure the desired poverty reduction outcomes. Strengthening public expenditure management in the areas of budget formulation, execution, and reporting is particularly important to ensure proper allocation and monitoring of poverty-reducing expenditure. Following the extensive decentralization of fiscal functions to regions and districts, which have assumed primary responsibility for poverty-reducing expenditure, a key challenge will be to develop the capacity of these authorities to ensure effective implementation of poverty-reducing policies.In view of the uncertainty about the form of additional aid flows (grants or loans), development of a clear public debt strategy covering both domestic and external debt, and strong institutions to ensure its implementation, would be key to avoiding an excessive buildup of debt in a scaling-up scenario. Continued concern regarding public debt sustainability in Ethiopia, even following debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, led the IMF team to assume, for simplicity, that all of the additional external financing would be in the form of grants. Domestic borrowing was contained to below 1 percent of GDP, consistent with a decline in the ratio of domestic debt to GDP. While these assumptions take care of concerns regarding debt sustainability, there remain concerns regarding continued aid dependency. Although large aid inflows can potentially reduce the domestic revenue mobilization effort, the exercise assumed that revenues would be held at 19 percent of GDP, maintaining Ethiopia’s performance over the last five years. However, even with this assumption—so that strong growth in real GDP would yield a corresponding rise in domestic tax revenues—the budget deficit (excluding grants) would remain high after 2015, reflecting the impact on recurrent expenditure of commitments created by MDG-related expenditures.

 Trade repercussions

 

Would this projected sharp increase in aid flows hurt Ethiopia’s competitiveness by boosting the real exchange rate and thus dampening exports? We found that the rise in aid flows through 2002 did not adversely affect Ethiopia’s export competitiveness (see Chart 3). An econometric analysis of the main determinants of the real exchange rate in Ethiopia found that although aid inflows had been associated with an appreciation of the real exchange rate during the period including the Derg regime, aid had been correlated with a depreciation of the real exchange rate during the post-Derg reform period. Moreover, on average, the growth rate of Ethiopia’s noncoffee exports exceeded the growth in world noncoffee imports (see Chart 4). However, it was recognized that this experience might not be a reliable guide to the impact of a much larger increase in aid flows. 

In addition, Ethiopia’s use of part of the aid inflows in recent years to build international reserves also mitigated pressures for a real appreciation of the exchange rate (see "The Macroeconomic Challenge of More Aid" on page 28 of this issue). Thus, the potential for wage and price pressures from high aid flows in the future points to the need for reforms to alleviate pressure for a real exchange rate appreciation, particularly through further liberalization of the trade regime, elimination of exchange restrictions, and streamlining customs procedures. These steps would help ensure that part of the increased domestic demand would be channeled abroad. The IMF study therefore projected a significant widening in the external current account deficit from about 13 percent of GDP in 2003 to 21 percent by 2015. The bottom line

The scaling-up scenario that we have discussed is not a forecast. It does, however, help illustrate the considerable challenges that Ethiopia and its development partners face in ensuring that higher aid inflows result in faster growth and rapid progress toward meeting the MDGs. 

Raising the level of growth to 7 percent annually, as targeted under the government’s medium-term scenario for achieving the MDGs, would represent a substantial improvement over the experience of the past 13 years. But is it really possible? Achieving the targeted growth rate would require not just additional external resources, but also a marked acceleration of reforms aimed at supporting agricultural production, private sector development, and exports.

Chart 3. Currency effect 

Given that the amount of external aid required to achieve the MDGs would be much higher than in the past, upward pressure on wage and price levels could potentially cause a real exchange rate appreciation. It would thus be prudent to implement policies to counter such pressure, both by further opening up the economy to foreign trade and by boosting productivity and cost efficiency to help increase the supply of goods produced domestically. 

Government institutions will also have to be strengthened to cope with higher aid flows. Advancing structural reforms in the areas of fiscal decentralization, public expenditure management, and revenue administration will represent key aspects of a broader reform agenda. In addition, pursuing these reforms will support decentralized democratic governance, strengthen budgeting capacity, and build institutions that foster private sector development.                                                g

Chart 4. Perking up

 

Interview  with

H.E Lin Lin, Chinese Ambassador to

Ethiopia

 

 


 

The People’s Republic of China and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia established diplomatic relations on November 24, 1970.  After the establishment of the diplomatic relations, the two countries have been developing friendly cooperative relations smoothly on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit.  Since the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came into office in 1991, the two countries have broadened and intensified the mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, thus bringing the bilateral relations on a faster developing track.  In October 1995, H.E. Ato Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, visited China.  In May 1996, H.E. Mr. Jiang Zemin, the Chinese President, visited Ethiopia.  Since the beginning of the 21st century, the relations between the two countries have maintained a momentum of healthy and continuous development.

As co-chairs of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, both China and Ethiopia have made unremitting efforts to boost the development of friendly cooperative relations between China and African countries.  In December 2003, H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Premier visited Ethiopia and attended the Second Ministerial Conference of the Forum on china-Africa Cooperation.  In November 2004, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi visited China again.  After these visits, the bilateral ties between China and Ethiopia have witnessed all-round and speedy development.

 

I. Political Relations

 

The new century has been frequent exchanges of high-level visits, the continuous strengthening of mutual trust in political field and the increasing intercourse of personnel at all levels between the two countries.  The Ethiopian Government unswervingly adheres to the one China policy and supports China’s reunification as well as the adoption of the Anti-Secession Law by the Chinese National People’s Congress.  When H.E. Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, the then Chinese Foreign Minister, visited Ethiopia in 2002, the two Foreign Ministries singed an agreement on establishing a political consultation mechanism.  The cooperation between China and Ethiopia in political field has been very effective, and the consultation and coordination between the two countries in international affairs have been further strengthened.  The Ethiopian Government

 understands and supports China’s position on human rights and other important issues.  As co-chair of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Ethiopia attaches great importance to the Forum

and the cooperation between China and Africa, and works closely with China, thus making great contribution to the promotion of the development of China-Africa relations.  In December 2003, the Second Ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was convened successfully in Addis Ababa.  After that, Ethiopia has played a constructive role in implementing the follow-up actions of the Forum and in preparing for its Fourth Senior Officials’ Meeting in China this August.

 II. Bilateral Cooperation in the Fields of Economy, Trade, Investment and Technology

 The economic and technical cooperation between China and Ethiopia started in 1971.  Up to now, China has already built 13 projects for Ethiopia including the highway, veterinary station, power station and water-supply projects.  To promote the development of economic, trade and technical cooperation, the two countries signed the Agreement for Economic and Technological Cooperation, Trade Agreement, Trade Protocol and Agreement for Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment.

In recent years, the economic and trade cooperation between China and Ethiopia have further developed in depth with continuously expanded cooperative fields and enriched cooperative content.  Both the trade and investment are increasing rapidly.  Starting from this January, China granted zero-tariff treatment to certain Ethiopian commodities for entering Chinese market, which effectively boosted the export from Ethiopia to China.  From January to June this year, the Ethiopian export to China soared to nearly US$40 million comparing with US$ 14.39 million in the whole year of 2004.  From January to July this year, the trade volume between the two countries reached over US$ 180 million, while the figure was US$ 200 million for the whole year of 2004.

By the end of 2003, only 14 Chinese companies invested some US$10.07 million in Ethiopia.  From early 2004, more and more Chinese companies came to Ethiopia thanks to the continuous improvement of the investment environment.  In more than one year period, 12 new Chinese companies invested in Ethiopia.  Up to now, there are altogether 26 Chinese companies who have invested in Ethiopia with the accumulated investment reaching US$ 35.68 million in the areas of highway construction, municipal engineering, medicine, textile and garniture, commodities  catering etc.

Since 1986, Chinese companies started to carry out project contracting cooperation in Ethiopia, and the scale of which has been contractual value of the Chinese contracted projects in Ethiopia reached US$1.019 billion mainly involving highway, hydropower station, telecommunications, transmission and transformer substation and water-supply projects etc.

The bilateral cooperation in human resource development has been strengthened.  In 2004, the Chinese side trained 150 officials and technicians for Ethiopia under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.  Meanwhile some administrative personnel and technicians in the fields of textile and city planning were also trained under bilateral arrangement.  In this August, the Chinese side dispatched 12 young volunteers to Ethiopia for the first time which further enriched the content of the bilateral cooperation. 

III. Bilateral Exchange and Cooperation in the Fields of Culture, Education, Public Health and Military Affairs

 The bilateral cultural exchanges date back to the 1950’s, even before the establishment of the diplomatic relations of the two countries. In 1988, the two countries singed and agreement for cultural cooperation.  Since them the two governments have signed implementation programs of the agreement every three years to guide the bilateral exchanges and cooperation in the fields of culture, media, sports, and youth.  In recent years, exchanges and cooperation in these fields between the two countries have witnessed continuous development. In December 2003, the implementation program of cultural exchanges and cooperation for 2004-2006 was singed during the visit to Ethiopia by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. 

And an agreement on educational exchanges and cooperation was signed between the two Ministries of Education on the occasion of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s visit to China in November 2004.  Within the framework of the two agreements, the exchanges and cooperation in the educational and cultural areas have been further strengthened and turned out to be fruitful.  China has been providing 10 scholarships annually for Ethiopian students to study in China since the 1980s.  At present, there are about 40 Ethiopian students studying in china every year under the Chinese Government Scholarship Program.

Since 2001, China has dispatched more than 200 vocational training teachers to Ethiopia to participate in IVET programs and spread scientific knowledge in agricultural and other areas, with their work highly commended by the Ethiopian side.  Exchange visits have been successfully organized between the two peoples.  In 2004, China officially granted Ethiopia the Approved Destination Status for Chinese tourists.  The rich cultural relics and beautiful natural scenes will definitely attract an increasing number of Chinese tourists to Ethiopia.  In this August, the performance of the Chinese Flag Song and Dance Ensemble, in celebration of the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the Sino-Ethiopia relations, further promoted the cultural exchanges of the two countries and deepened the understanding between the two peoples.

To enhance the bilateral cooperation in public health, China has sent altogether 13 batches of medical teams to Ethiopia since 1974, with an aggregate of over 150 medical workers.  Currently, about 15 Chinese medical team members are working in Ethiopia.

The exchange and cooperation in military and security areas has developed steadily as well after the establishment of diplomatic relations.  The cooperation has registered new progress after the EPDRF took power in 1991.  In June 1994, Majo. Gen. Tsadkan Gebre Tensay, chief of Staff of Ethiopian National Defense force visited chine, initiating the exchange visits of high level officials between the two armies.  There have been more frequent exchanges of visits in recent years.  In November 2003, Lt. General Lei Mingqui, the political commissar of the Chinese Nanjing Military Region came to visit Ethiopia as the head of a military delegation.  In this August, Lt. General Zhu Wenquan, the commander of the Chinese Nanjing Military Region visited Ethiopia.  Meanwhile, cooperation on military training is also progressing steadily.

Both China and Ethiopia are countries with long history, ancient civilization and splendid culture.  And both have a glorious history of resisting foreign aggression and maintaining the sovereignty and independence of its own.  As two developing countries, we are faced with the same historical task of speeding up social-economic development.  The two country’s economy is complementary to each other, which means huge potential of cooperation.  The Chinese side will push forward the all-round development of cooperation in political, economic, cultural, technical, educational and military areas, continuing to provide Ethiopia with assistance to the best of its capacity.  China will work closely and coordinate fully with Ethiopia to implement the follow-up actions of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, with the aim of enhancing the development of China-Ethiopia and China-Africa relations.  Just as what Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, the peaceful development of China will not only accord with the African interests but also help safeguard the multiplicity of the world and realize multilateralism.  The development and the buildup of national strength of China will inject new vitality for the development of China-Ethiopia and China-African relations. 

The Chinese Government and people treasure the traditional friendship and cooperation with Ethiopia and would like to work vigorously with Ethiopian Government and people to broaden the areas and ways of cooperation and to further between the two countries.  The China-Ethiopia relations will embrace a better tomorrow.                                

                         

 

Tourism

By Prof. Kinfe Abarham

 

 


 

The World Tourism Organization predicts that international tourism, by the year 2010, will involve 1,108 million visitors. This tourism will, indeed, have signi-ficant environmental, economic and cultural implications world-wide. Closer examination and under-standing of tourism development processes and experience in various socio-economic and environmental settings become essential to prognosticate the future of sustainable tourism.

Issues such as balancing tourism with environment, preserving local, indigenous culture, and achieving social and economic equity hinge upon how tourism places itself in the overall process of worldwide modernization and development in the next millennium.

Sensitizing tourism issues and creating awareness among the general public and prospective visitors remain crucial matters. Long-term programs and investments are necessary for sustainable tourism to have real positive impacts on the environment, economy and culture.

 The conceptual framework
Defining tourism 

Tourism is commonly seen as, and referred to as, an 'industry'. This leads to consideration of defining tourism as an industry, i.e. in terms of the activities of suppliers of particular goods or services. However, defining tourism in terms of the activities of suppliers leads to some difficulty. In Australia, the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC), provides the categories of economic activity which can be selected to define an industry. Those categories identify the production or supply of a particular commodity (i.e. a good or service). However, in the

case of tourism what makes an economic (or any other type of) transaction 'tourism' is not the particular type of commodity involved. What identifies a transaction as tourism is the particular type of consumer involved. The supply of any product to a person who is a 'tourist' is a tourism activity while the supply of the same product to a person who is not a 'tourist' is not a tourism activity. The supplier of that product will in the first case be part of the 'tourism industry’; while in the second case the supplier will not be part of the 'tourism industry'. That is, tourism is defined in terms of consumer activity rather than in terms of supplier activity. 

After considerable debate and discussion, this demand side concept of what constitutes tourism was adopted by the WTO in 1993 as the international standard for statistical purposes, and the following definition of tourism was developed: "Tourism comprises the activities of persons traveling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes."  The WTO has developed a schematic breakdown of all travelers (see Figure 1). At the highest level, a 'traveler' is defined as: "any person on a trip between two or more countries or two or more localities within his/her country of usual residence". 

Forms of tourism

 The UN/WTO standards distin-guish three basic forms of tourism:

§         Domestic tourism, involving residents of the given country travelling only within this country;

§         Inbound tourism, involving non-residents traveling in the given country;

§         Outbound tourism, involving residents traveling in another country.

The same forms of tourism may be described by replacing the word 'country' with the word 'region'. 'Region' may refer either to an area within a country or to a group of countries. The three basic forms of tourism set out above can be combined in various ways to derive the following categories of tourism:

 

Tourism Planning 

Tourism is one of many activities in a community or region that requires planning and coordination.  By comprehensive planning we mean planning which considers all of the tourism resources, organizations, markets, and programs within a region. Comprehensive planning also considers economic, environmental, social, and institutional aspects of tourism development.

 TWO SIDES OF TOURISM PLANNING

 

Tourism planning has evolved from two related but distinct sets of planning philosophies and methods. On the one hand, tourism is one of many activities in an area that must be considered as part of physical, environmental, social, and economic planning. Therefore, it is common to find tourism addressed, at least partially, in a regional land use, transportation, recreation, economic development, or comprehensive plan. The degree to which tourism is addressed in such plans depends upon the relative importance of tourism to the community or region and how sensitive the planning authority is to tourism activities.

Tourism may also be viewed as a business in which a community or region chooses to engage. Individual tourism businesses conduct a variety of planning activities including feasibility, marketing, product develop-ment, promotion, forecasting, and strategic planning. If tourism is a significant component of an area's economy or development plans, regional or community-wide marketing plans are needed to coordinate the development and marketing activities of different tourism interests in the community.  A comprehensive approach inte-grate a strategic marketing plan with more traditional public planning activities.

 

STEPS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

 

Like any planning, tourism planning is goal-oriented, striving to achieve certain objectives by matching available resources and programs with the needs and wants of people. Comprehensive planning requires a systematic approach, usually involving a series of steps. The process is best viewed as an iterative and on-going one, with each step subject to modification and refinement at any stage of the planning process.

There are six steps in the planning process:

1.        Define goals and objectives.

2.        Identify the tourism system.
a) Resources (natural, cultural, human -hospitality skills, management skills,    

Seasonal labor force etc and capital- infrastructure financing)

         b) Organizations

         c) Markets

3.     Generate alternatives.

4.     Evaluate alternatives.

5.     Select and implement.

6.    Monitor and evaluate.

 

Tourism, globalization and sustainable development

 

Tourism is one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and developing countries are attempting to cash in on this expanding industry in an attempt to boost foreign investment and financial reserves. While conceding that the uncontrolled growth of this industry can result in serious environmental and social problems, the United Nations contends that such negative effects can be controlled and reduced.  Many developing countries, facing debt burdens and worsening trade terms, have turned to tourism promotion in the hope that it brings foreign exchange and investment. Simultaneously, leading interna-tional agencies such as the World Bank, United Nations agencies and business organizations like the World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC) have been substantially involved to make tourism a truly global industry.  However, tourism in developing countries is often viewed by critics as an extension of former colonial conditions because from the very beginning, it has benefited from international economic relationships that structurally favour the advanced capitalist countries in the North.

GATS aim to abolish restrictions on foreign ownership and other measures which have so far protected the services sector in individual countries. For the hotel sector, for example, GATS facilitates franchising, management contracts and licensing. Moreover, foreign tourism companies will be entitled to the same benefits as local companies in addition to being allowed to move staff across borders as they wish, open branch offices in foreign countries, and make international payments without restrictive regulations.

 

Foreign investment will also be increasingly deregulated under the GATT/WTO system. According to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), foreign companies will no longer be obliged to use local input. The Multilateral Agree-ment on Investment (MAI) proposed by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries goes even further, calling for unrestricted entry and establishment of foreign firms, national treatment, repatriation of profits, technology transfer, etc.   Accordingly, the WTTC has recently presented its 'Millennium Vision' on travel and tourism, including the following key areas:

·   Get governments to accept travel and tourism as a strategic economic development and employment priority;

·   Move towards open and competitive markets by supporting the implementation of GATS, liberalize air transport and deregulate telecommunications in international markets;

·   Eliminate barriers to tourism growth, which involves the expansion and improvement of infrastructure - e.g. the increase of airport capacity, construction and modernization of airports, roads and tourist facilities.

It is already a well-established fact that in some developing countries, more than two-thirds of the revenue from international tourism never reaches the local economy because of the high foreign exchange leakages.  Now, as the new free trade and investment policies are being implemented, their balance sheets may even worsen because the profits and other income repatriated by foreign companies is likely to grow larger than the inflow of capital. That means, the claims that globalization and liberalization of tourism will bring wealth, progress, social achievements and improved environmental standards to developing countries need to be seriously questioned.

Economic globalization has also generated considerable criticism because it comes along with the erosion of power of governments. Opponents argue that local and national institutions will no longer be able to properly fulfill their responsibilities such as providing social services, preserving the environment, and implementing sustainable development prog-rammes. The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution on 'Sustainable Tourism' as part of its 'Programme for the further implementation of Agenda 21', the action programme adopted at the Rio Earth Summit.

This resolution acknowledges the need to consider further the importance of tourism in the context of Agenda 21. Among other things, it states: 'For sustainable patterns of consumption and production in the tourism sector, it is essential to strengthen national policy development and enhance capacity in the areas of physical planning, impact assessment, and the use of economic and regulatory instruments, as well as in the areas of information, education and marketing.' Furthermore, the resolution calls for participation of all concerned parties in policy development and implementation of sustainable tourism programmes.                                              

 

Aids in Africa:

Times of transition: An overview

 

The human toll 

By 2025, the number of people living with HIV and AIDS had fallen from 25 million in 2003 to 15 million, despite the fact that the population had grown to 1.4 billion from 0.9 billion in 2003.  This represented a fall in overall adult HIV prevalence from 5.6%.  The number of new adult infections annually had dropped by almost half since 2003.  

The gender bias had begun to even out, but women were still more adversely affected.  Adult male HIV prevalence dropped from 4.9% in 2003 to 1.6% in 2025, and female prevalence from 6.4% in 2003 to 2.2% in 2025.

 

The scaling up of antiretroviral therapy provision had been dramatic: from less than 77,000 people in 2003 to 3.4 million by 2025, representing just over 70% of those who needed it. 

 

However, the number of people dying from AIDS, despite the lengthening of their lives with antiretroviral drugs, had continued to climb.  By 2025, 53 million adults and 15 million children had died since the beginning of the AIDS epidemic.  The annual number of deaths was also still high, reflecting the fact that reducing the rate of infection was taking time to work through the population.  In 2025, 1.3 million adults across African died from AIDS, and 260,000 children. 

Costing Action  

Prevention and care initiatives prevented a step rise in the numbers of children orphaned by AIDS, but a significant problem remained, with the number of children orphaned by AIDS rising from 13 million in 2003 to 18 million at the end of 2025.

Over the 23 years, responding to the epidemic required invest-ments of nearly US$ 200 billion, within a larger overall package of investment in health, education, infrastructure, and social develop-ment.  HIV- and AIDS- specific funding increased in expenditure on prevention, and orphans and vulnerable children in the initial years, 2003 to 2007.  There-after, expansion continued at a more moderate pace.  Care and treatment expenditure expanded rapidly to 2012, in order to provide access to nearly 50% of those who needed antiretroviral therapy, and then increased more slowly to achieve more than 70% coverage. 

This slower increase reflected the fact that expanding care beyond the capacity of existing health systems was a time-consuming and painstaking process.  Expenditure or orphans and vulnerable children leveled off at the rate of population growth after 2012. The total package, although large, was not an astronomical sum.  By comparison, it was less than half of what the United States spent on new vehicles in 2003.  

During the period, economic growth was 4% (real GDP growth, not taking into account inflation) and the Abuja target was net (15% of government spending is on health).  At the same time, overall government budgets grew at 1% per year.  Overall, national governments contributed 40% and individual out-of-pocket contributions 10%.  External contributions accounted for the remaining 50%.  External contributions accounted for the remaining 50%. 

 Most Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries did, in fact, reach the 0.7% of GDP target for official development assistance (ODA).  Even if the entire budget for Africa’s HIV and AIDS programme had been paid for through ODA, the US$ 10.5 billion needed in 2025 would have amounted to a mere 3% of ODA to Africa in 2025.  DAC economies had grown strongly, at an average of 3% per year.  African economies had also developed, and the decade 2015-2025 saw a gradual transfer of HIV and AIDS costs from external contributions to domestic budgets.  Out-of-pocket spending remained steady.   

In 2003 external contributions to the AIDS sector were estimated to be just over a US$1 billion.  Over the next decade grew steadily until 2014, 2024, when annual external contributions were estimated at US$ 6.8 billion.  Stronger economies, more generous health budgets, and a leveling off the amount of resources required for program-mmes meant that, in the years 2015 to 2025, dependency on external aid flows decreased, slowly but significantly. 

Although the costs of the programme continued to rise, dependency decreased over time after peaking in 2014, declining to a little over US$ 1.3 billion once the majority of costs were covered by stronger economies and more generous health budgets.  It is true, however, that budget deficits continued to plague governments and individuals.  Fortunately, donor countries and international finance institutions took a more relaxed view of these deficits.  

Eastern, and West and Central Africa faced the greatest costs, but also received the largest proportion of ODA as the commitments made at Monterrey in 2002 and in the EMAs of 2009 and 2010 materialized. 

 Southern Africa required 30% of external contributions over the 23 years, but it was in a far better position to cover the remaining costs, thanks to improved economic growth and larger budgets.  The region was left with smaller budgets deficits than East and West and Central Africa.

 North Africa, like Southern Africa, was better able to cover costs through government funds.  However, this was primarily due to much lower infection rates and far lowers HIV and AIDS programme costs. 

 Millennium Development Goals

 Most part of sub-Saharan Africa had significant problems in shifting the trajectory towards achieving the MDGs is the early years of the century.   However, the recommitment from African leaders and their international partners in 2005 really did begin to turn things around.  The Extraordinary Meetings and Agreements (EMAd) of 2009 and 2010 provided additional impetus, as did the large invest-ment of social sector spending from African governments and their partners.   

By 2015, it was clear that the trajectory had significantly altered and, while few countries achieved the targets in 2015, across sub-Saharan Africa the targets were met by 2025, with some countries achieving them well before that date.  North Africa made rapid of boys to girls in education and the primary school completion targets were achieved by 2015, as was the under-five mortality target. Poverty 

Both the proportion and the actual number of people living on less than (in sub-Saharan Africa: from 50% to 22%) and from 306 million to 217 million.  The greatest reduction in poverty was observed in East Africa (down to 56 million), with a 23% reduction in Central Africa (to 34 million) and around a 20% reduction in West and Southern Africa (to 21 million).  The number of poor in North Africa reduced most significantly, by over 60% to 1 million.    

All Africa overview

 Adult HIV prevalence across Africa decreased from 5.6% in 2003 to 1.9% in 2025.  This was the result of an expanded response to the epidemic, involving different types of prevention interventions, and care and support activities.   

The difference between the number of new infections among women and among men was also reduced as a consequence of successful prevention programmes that focused on gender issues.  In 2025, there were 650,000 new adult female infections and 540,000 new adult male infections.   

Adult deaths from AIDS per year declined from around 810,000 men and 1 million women in 2004 to around 580,000 men and 740 000 women in 2025.  The pattern of an initial decline followed by an increase in annual deaths after 2013 was due to the pattern of antiretroviral therapy coverage and rollout.  Anti-retroviral therapy coverage increased rapidly until 2010 and then increased much more slowly to 2025.  During the rapid increase, many deaths from AIDS were postponed by successful therapy.   

After 2010, however, people who had been receiving therapy for a number of years begin to fall ill and die.  The number of new people beginning therapy after 2010 was not significant enough to balance the increasing number of deaths of those who had been on therapy for a number of years. 

Over this period, the number of cumulative deaths was still high, despite massive efforts to roll out antiretroviral therapy. Given the high rates of infection at the beginning of the period, the limited effectiveness of therapy, and the time it takes for prevention programmes to reduce overall infection rates, it is difficult to see how these deaths could have been prevented.  By 2025, the cumulative number of adult deaths from AIDS since 1980 had reached nearly 53 million. 

Antiretroviral therapy was successfully and rapidly rolled out so that, by 2025, 73% of people who needed antiretroviral therapy were receiving it. The number of children orphaned by AIDS continued to increase during the period, reaching 18 million in 2025.  The total number of orphans (through AIDS and other causes) exceeded 50 million children in 2025, although this was less than in 2015—another indication that the epidemic was in decline.    g

 

Scenarios and their power

 

Between now and 2025, profound uncertainty exists about how the AIDS epidemic will develop and the extent of its impacts.  For Africa, what happens over the next 20 years and beyond will depend on actions and decisions taken will not be easy.

 

Heritage culture, experience, training, education, religious beliefs, and fashions—all these areas people’s perspectives on, and interpretation of, the world.  These influences can help us to focus.  They can also create blind spots and prejudices, making difficult for us to value a different point of view, or comprehend a fact that challenges our underlying assumptions.  This is particularly true if we are deeply attached to our assumptions.  In the case of HIV and AIDS, there are many myths about the reasons for the spread of the epidemic in Africa and the ways to tackle it.  

 

We each need to look beyond our own assumptions and understandings to encompass other relevant perspectives.

Revolutionary Consent (Part two)

By Barbara Clark Smith

 

Courtrooms

 

Courts of law provided another occasion for official pomp and display, and thus also for the people's presence and the public recognition of authority.  

In the courtroom, wrote James Parker in 1746, judges "represent the king's person, they are his officers, and act in his stead." Their job was to bring the force and majesty of the law from the centers of power out into the lives of the people. It followed, said a Virginian, that the justices should be "members of that estate of Men which are Called Worshipful." In early Massa-chusetts, Governor John Wint-hrop advised that magistrates take pains to look impressive: "Magistrates shall appear more solemnly in public, with attendance, apparel, and open notice of their entrance into court." Well done, it excited admiration. "The Superior Court met yesterday and made a Good Figure," wrote Justice Samuel Sewell approvingly. And in Newark, New Jersey, Judge Sanford declared his authority on the bench by wearing not only a "hatt and wigg" but a sword. Hats on top of wigs only approximated crowns, but they surely distinguished a justice from "the uncovered ranks of society," which is to say everyone else in court.  

Still, the uncovered ranks had their role in the courtroom. First was the grand jury, a body composed of 15 or more men qualified to vote in provincial elections, called together in their respective counties to bring the disorders and misbehaviors of the people to the jurisdiction of the courts. The great bulk of criminal matters in the colonies passed through the jurisdiction of a grand jury. Local justices of the peace might handle some petty misbehavior on their own knowledge, dealing out summary justice. Moreover, grand juries were not the only means of bringing significant crimes to trial. Suspects could be prosecuted based on "information" from the King or his officers, "without any finding or presentment by the Verdict of Twelve men," but by "discretion" alone.3   And it was certainly easier for an appointed official to bypass the grand jury in difficult or controversial cases. Yet even a conservative jurist, Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts, acknowledged it "a Hardship on the Subject" for petit trials to proceed without grand jury indictment. By broad consensus, grand juries were generally needed to bring a suspected felon to trial.  

Much like today, grand jurors heard charges against suspects, interviewed witnesses, and decided whether to find "a true bill"—saying the accused was guilty and should go on to petit trial—or "ignoramus"—literally, "we do not know," hence that the accused could not be indicted. At least twelve of the jurymen had to find a true bill to present a defendant to further trial. Besides identifying malefactors, grand jurors were to discern problems of public order. English practice licensed grand juries to present public dangers or nuisances to the court and suggest legislative or executive remedies. Thus, though it involved no crime and suggested no criminal ran at large in the county, the "unnecessary multiplication of licensed houses"—that is, taverns—was a frequent problem that might engage the grand jury. This and other "things neglected or things damaging"—the sorry condition of the county jail, the unmet needs of the poor—lay within the "discretionary power" of the grand jury to notice and bring to the court's attention. Jurymen might overlook a great deal, leaving out of court the matters they deemed satisfactorily settled by other means. They were in a position to judge which disorders were of the scale or of the sort to be brought to the jurisdiction of the provincial state and its law.

 In general, this sort of discretion was entrusted to men with social stature. South Carolina set high property standards for participation in the grand jury; everywhere else, all freemen were eligible to serve, though in practice members of these panels were often of the better sort. In Connecticut, the men on grand juries were elected by freeholders at town meetings, two from each town, but in most places they were selected by an appointed official—usually the sheriff—who was himself obliged to the governor or the county court for his position.  

Still, grand jurors gathered "from all the several Parts of the County to represent the State of it." Other writers similarly spoke of grand juries as representative bodies. Thus, the New York Weekly Journal waxed rhetorical in 1734: "Does not the grand jury (tho' chose by the Sheriff) represent the county?"4   In a manner of speaking, yes: grand jurymen represented not a group of constituents, but local knowledge.

 Thus, a vital qualification for membership in a jury of any sort was geographical, a qualification of inhabitancy. Petty jurors too needed to come from the vicinage of the crime and be "neighbours" of the parties. The English writer John Somers said jurors should be "Companions" of the accused, "known to him, and he to them, or at least his Neighbours or Dwellers near about the place where the Crime is supposed to have been committed, to who something of the Fact must probably be known."

 Grand jurymen's knowledge of local events was sufficient basis on which to act; they might bring suspects to trial even if no one complained of a crime and no witness appeared to swear that one had even occurred. Intimate knowledge of the locality was equally valuable in determining cases brought by third parties. Which witnesses to believe, which accounts of the parties’ transactions were most plausible—jurors were expected to make such decisions not merely on the impression and information received at court, but on the grounds of prior knowledge? The ideal juror would be impartial, not prejudiced toward one side or the other, but he would also be informed, able to draw on a familiar history of local relationships.  

Indeed, we can easily underestimate the accepted and vital place of local knowledge in the courtroom, because we work to expunge prior, local knowledge from the proceedings of criminal justice. All law needs to simplify the messy interactions of life, selecting elements to be deemed pertinent, definitive of legal outcome. "Whatever it is the law is after," says the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, "it is not the whole story." In the 18th century, a jury of the vicinage might bring more of the "story" into account, relying on common information and ordinary judgment in its determinations. When a "Chymist" of Philadelphia named Dr. Evan Jones came to trial for the death of an apprentice, witnesses elucidated the facts of the matter to the jury. Yet in fact, noted The Pennsylvania Gazette, "for several Months before the Tryal came on, there was hardly any Person in Philadelphia, who could be ignorant of the Affair in all its horrid Circumstances." Despite such widespread familiarity with the event, no one proposed that justice might be better served by trying the case in Lancaster. To suggest a change of venue to a more neutral site would have been to value ignorance or equate it with impartiality. But a substantially different sense of justice informed the colonial process than informs ours today: a later age would prize informed and opinionated voters but uninformed jury members; the 18th century preferred something approaching the reverse.  

Petit jury trials were more broadly public, open to spectators, on the one hand, and engaging less uncommon commoners as jurors, on the other. Yet the jury did more than sort through conflicting testimony to conclude what was likely to have happened. Juries of the 18th century routinely decided law as well as fact, judging whether a specific action qualified as a greater or lesser offense or, indeed, whether that action constituted an illegality at all. Now, the distinction between the "facts" of a case and the pertinent "law" is a fine and possibly unsustainable matter, since the simplest statement of events contains assumptions and definitions framed by the law.5 Yet the 18th century insisted on the distinction between the two, and a good many authorities insisted that the jury had the power to decide them both.  

The reason was simple: the jury's powers were essential to the English project of preventing tyranny. Without juries, everyone knew, the law might be used to oppress the people by imprisoning them or seizing their property unfairly. When a New York provincial attorney challenged jurymen's right to be "Judges of Law," the defense insisted on their judicial discretion. "Paenal Laws are strictly to be taken and interpreted, and not allowed to the ruin of the Subject, to extend, or be interpreted beyond the plain and strict sense of the words."6 Surely jurymen, however unlearned, might be able to discern the "plain and strict sense" of the law.  

Even in cases in which oppression was not at issue—even in the routine determina-tion of legal outcomes—the jury brought "a democraticall voice," adding "a mixture of popular power" to the courtroom, where the monarch's representative presided. When a defendant requested a jury trial, he was said to "put himself upon God and his country." Judges, one writer wryly insisted, were not to imagine themselves indicated by either of these terms.

 The "country" was a phrase that referred to neither bench nor bar, but solely to the jury.7 The English legal authority Henry Care put it succinctly in his 17th-century account of "the Free-Born Subject's Inheritance": "This Birthright of English-men shines most conspicuously in two things: 1. Parliaments 2. Juries." Through both of these institutions, the theory ran, the King was confronted with the will of the people.

 How well specific juries expressed the people's will was open to debate. In countless cases, surely, the issue of defending against tyranny did not arise. Courtroom transactions between ruler and people might prove a gracious meeting of the minds. Besides, jurors might be overawed or pressured by their superiors. Handpicked by those in authority, a grand jury might be "Chosen on purpose to find the Presentment," as one indicted New Yorker complained in print and others doubtless complained in private.8 Yet juries were never as compliant as judges might wish. Grand juries would not indict in countless cases brought before them by officials of the Crown. In New Jersey, the Proprietors charged that juries were biased by ties of kinship; the populace retorted that patronage gave the proprietors control of bench and bar.9 There were frequent denunciations of juries that did nothing or the wrong thing. The foreman of one New York jury informed the provincial attorney that, despite the experts' clear statement to the contrary, "the Defendant had not transgressed any Law."10 Other legal experts also met with opinionated jurors, jurors who dutifully found fact and law from the perspective of the common ground.

 Belief in the value of that perspective led some colonists to worry about the growing influence of lawyers in the criminal courtroom. True, advo-cates offered jurors alternative interpretations of the law, which might sometimes enhance jurors' discretion. Yet many contem-poraries worried that lawyers were merely complicating matters that ought to be as plain as day. It was not just that counsel might "for their fees strive only to baffle Witnesses and stifle Truth."11 Lawyerly skills might influence the jury's deliberations. Thus, a North Carolina man urged that the provincial attorney general, Robert Jones Jr., be henceforth prevented from courtroom practice, for he used "great volubility of speech" and other "wiles insinuations and chicanerie" to play on "the passions of weak juries to blind their conception of Justice in order to gain his point."12 In short, Jones compromised the essential role of the jury, which was to bring to the court a "conception of Justice" that was local, ordinary, and common in its nature.  

Finally, there were other players at court, and these were the spectators, the public who stood within the courthouse, mingled in the yard outside, or refreshed themselves at the taverns nearby. "Every male person can attend such a court and every one is permitted to takes notes," reported a German observer at a military court martial in Cambridge, Massachusetts. "The courtroom is packed, and not even the humblest is refused admittance."13  

The public administration of the law had a clear didactic function. In the only partially literate society of 18th-century Virginia, the historian Rhys Isaac writes, court day "served not only to make the community a witness to important decisions and transactions but also to teach men the very nature and forms of government." Everywhere court day informed people of the law, and it provided the occasion for the populace to recognize authority in the persons of magistrates and in their ritualized language, dress, and gesture. Most adult males in 18th-century Connecticut ended up at court at one time or another, as litigants, jurors, observers, or witnesses. The same probably held true in other colonies too, and since even free women occasionally appeared as litigants, witnesses, or defen-dants, a substantial portion of society might at one time or another be present at court.14

 Of course, rules of decorum required that spectators show deference toward the gentleman justices. Architects of courthouses embodied relations of power in their designs, sometimes underscoring judges' prominence by seating them above, placing lawyers within the bar and with their backs to the public, and providing spaces outside the courthouse to be allocated to less substantial spectators.15 Still, these efforts to constrain the popular presence reflect the fact that the proceedings might depend precisely on the quality of spectators' engagement and reception. Onlookers exerted a force in the courtroom, and no player remained untouched by it. Judges' social standing could insulate them from "the humours of the populace," but they reached their decisions knowing that courtroom events might be widely broadcast throughout the county.

 Good lawyers concentrated on swaying judge and jury, but it would not hurt to bring "tears to the eyes" of onlookers too. Finally, what made it plausible to cast jurymen as an extension of "the people" was in no small measure that they remained face to face with their peers and inferiors. It is noteworthy that grand juries met in private, for "People out of Doors will influence your Conduct if they know the Business you are engaged on."  By contrast, members of the petit jury, less socially exalted to begin with, were purposefully left vulnerable to the gaze of their peers and inferiors. The public presence should influence the decisions of jurymen, according to one Massachusetts clergyman: "The Eyes of Men are upon you," he told the jury, "and you may be sure will be so." g

 Notes

 3 Sir John Hawkes, The English-man's Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister-at-Law and a Jury-Man (London, 1680), pp. 6-7.

4 See Richard D. Younger, The People's Panel: The Grand Jury in the United States, 1634–1941 (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1963), p. 5.

5 Bruce Mann says it is "artificial and impossible to maintain in practice." Mann, "The Evolutionary Revolution in American Law: A Comment on J.R. Pole's ‘Reflections,'<0x2009>" William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 50 (1993), p. 170, note 4.

6 "A Narrative of a New and Unusual American Imprisonment of Two Presbyterian Ministers," (1707), in Peter Force, ed. Tracts, vol. IV, no. 4, pp. 43-44.

7 The quotations are from John M. Murrin, "Magistrates, Sinners, and a Precarious Liberty: Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-Century New England," in Saints and Revolutionaries: Essays on Early American History, ed. David D. Hall, John M. Murrin, and Thad W. Tate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), p. 200; John Adams, quoted in William E. Nelson, The Americanization of the Common Law: the Impact of Legal Change in Massachusetts Society, 1760–1830 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 20-21. Also making the point that the "country" was the jury was Hawkes, English-man's Right, p. 8.

8 "New and Unusual American Imprisonment," p. 23.

9 McConville, Daring Disturbers of the Peace, p. 116.

10 "New and Unusual American Imprisonment," p. 44.

11 Hawkes, English-man's Right, p. 9.

12 Petition of Reuben Searcy and others, 1759, in Boyd, Some 18th Century Tracts, p. 181.

13 Ray W. Pettengill, trans. Letters from America, 1776-1779; Being Letters of Brunswick, Hessian, and Waldeck Officers with the British Armies During the Revolution (Port Washington, N.Y., 1964, 1924), p. 137.

14 Bruce H. Mann, Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in Early Connecticut (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), p. 8. On spectators in courts: E. Merton Coulter, ed., The Journal of Peter Gordon, 1732-1735 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963), p. 14; Charles S. Sydnor, Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Political Practice in Washington's Virginia (New York: Free Press, 1965), chap. 6; Isaac, Transformation of Virginia, pp. 88-94.

15 "Memoir of Governor Increase Sumner," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 8 (1854), p. 116. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, pp. 75-79, 118. Carl Lounsbury, "The Structure of Justice: The Courthouses of Colonial Virginia," Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture III, ed. Thomas Carter and Bernard L. Herman, (Columbia, Mo., 1989), pp. 214-226.

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