he WTO's predecessor, of the GATT, was established on a provisional basis after the Second World War in the wake of other new multilateral institutions dedica-teed to international economic cooperation - notably the "Bretton Woods" institutions now known as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

 The original 23 GATT countries were among over 50 which agreed on a draft Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) - a new specialized agency of the United Nations. The Charter was intended to provide not only world trade disciplines but also contained rules relating to employment, commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, international invest-ment and services.  

In an effort to give an early boost to trade liberalization after the Second World War - and to begin to correct the large overhang of protectionist measures which remained in place from the early 1930s - tariff negotiations were opened among the 23 founding GATT "contracting parties" in 1946. This first round of negotiations resulted in 45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion - or about one-fifth - of world trade. It was also agreed that the value of these concessions should be protected by early - and largely "provisional" - acceptance of some of the trade rules in the draft ITO Charter. The tariff concessions and rules together became known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and entered into force in January 1948.

 Although the ITO Charter was finally agreed at a UN Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana in March 1948 ratification in national legislatures proved impossible in some cases. When the United States' government announced, in 1950, that it would not seek Congressional ratification of the Havana Charter, the ITO was effectively dead. Despite its provisional nature, the GATT remained the only multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1948 until the establishment of the WTO.    

In its 47 years, the basic legal text of the GATT remained much as it was in 1948. However, additions were made to it in the form of "plurilateral" - voluntary membership - agreements and continual efforts to reduce tariffs. This mainly was achieved through a series of "trade rounds".

 THE PROGRESS OF TRADE ROUNDS

 The main progress of inter-national trade liberalization came through multilateral trade negotiations, or "trade rounds", under the auspices of GATT. The Uruguay Round was the latest and most extensive.

 Although often lengthy, trade has generally offered a package approach to trade negotiations. This is an approach with a number of advantages over issue-by-issue negotiations. To start with, a trade round allows participants to seek and secure advantages across a wide range of issues. Second, concessions that were necessary, but which were  otherwise difficult to defend in domestic political terms, were made more easily in the context of a package which also contained politically and economically attractive benefits. Third, developing countries and other less powerful participants had a greater chance of influencing the multilateral system in the context of a round. This was better than in situation of bilateral negotiations with major trading nations.

 Finally, overall reform in politically-sensitive sectors of world trade was more feasible in the context of a global package. The reform of agricultural trade in the Uruguay Round is a good example of this.

The major GATT's early trade rounds were devoted to continuing the process of reducing tariffs. Nevertheless, results of the Kennedy Round of the mid-sixties included a new GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Tokyo Round of the seventies was a more sweeping attempt to extend and improve the system.

 THE TOKYO ROUND

 This was the first attempt to reform the trading system. It was conducted between 1973 and 1979 and with 102 participating countries, the Tokyo Round continued GATT's efforts to progressively reduce tariffs. The results included an average one-third cut in customs duties in the world's nine major industrial markets, bringing the average tariff on manufactured products down to 4.7 per cent compared with about 40 per cent at the time of the creation GATT. The tariff reductions were phased over a period of eight years. They also involved an element of harmonization, bringing the highest tariffs down proportionately more than the lowest.

 In other areas, the Tokyo Round had mixed results. It failed to come to grips with the fundamental problems affecting farm trade and also stopped short of providing a new agreement on "safeguards" of emergency measures. Neverthe-less, a series of agreements on non-tariff barriers emerged from the negotiations. In some cases, Tokyo interpreted existing GATT rules; in others it broke entirely new grounds. In most cases, only a relatively small number of mainly industrialized GATT members ascribed to these agreements. As a consequence, the agreements were often referred to as "codes". They included the following agreements:

 ·          Subsidies and countervailing measures - interpreting Articles VI, XVI and XIII of the General Agreement

·          Technical barriers to trade - sometimes called the Standards Code

·          Import licensing procedures

·          Government procurement

·          Customs valuation - interpreting Article VII

·          Anti-dumping- interpreting Article VI and replacing the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code

·          Bovine Meat Arrangement

·          International Dairy Arrangement and

·          Trade in Civilian Aircrafts

 Many of the above Codes were amended and extended in the Uruguay Round. Those on subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, import licensing, customs valuation and anti-dumping, have now become multilateral commitments within the WTO Agreement.

 In other words, all WTO members are committed to them. However, the agreements on government procurement of bovine meat, dairy products and remain "plurilateral".

 Did GATT succeed?

 In view of its provisional nature and limited field of mandate, the success of GATT in promoting and securing the liberalization of much of world trade over 47 years is remarkable. The continuous reductions of tariffs alone helped spur very high rates of world trade growth. It was around 8 per cent a year on average during the 1950s and 1960s. Further, the momentum of trade liberalization helped ensure that trade growth consistently out-paced produc-tion growth throughout the GATT epoch. The large number of new members during the Uruguay Round partly demonstrated that the multilateral trading system, as then represented by GATT, was recognized as an anchor for development and an instrument of economic and trade reform.

 The limited achievement of the Tokyo Round, apart from the tariff reduction results, signaled the difficult times to come. The success of GATT in reducing tariffs to such a low level, combined with a series of economic recessions in the 1970s and early 1980s, drove governments to devise new forms of protection for sectors facing increased overseas competition. High rates of unemployment and constant factory closures led governments in Europe and North America to seek bilateral market-sharing arrangements with competitors. They also introduced subsidies to maintain their holds on agricultural trade. Both these changes undermined the credibility and effectiveness of GATT.

 In addition to the deterioration in the trade policy environment, it also became apparent by the early 1980s that the General Agreement was no longer as relevant to the realities of world trade as it was in the 1940s. For one thing, world trade had become far more complex and important than 40 years before. The globalization of the world economy was underway. International investment was exploding. Further, trade in services - not covered by the rules of GATT was of major interest to more and more countries.

 At the same time, trading services was closely tied to further increases in world merchandise business. GATT was also wanting in other respects. For instance, it had loopholes in the multilateral system which was heavily exploited. Besides, efforts at liberalizing agricultural trade met with little success. The textile and clothing sector was the only exception. Here, the Multifiber Arrangement was negotiated. Even the institutional structure of GATT and its dispute settlement system were giving cause for concern.

 All in all, these and other factors convinced GATT members that a new effort to reinforce and extend the multilateral system should be attempted. That effort resulted in the Uruguay Round.

 The Uruguay Round

Grouping toward WTO

 The seeds of the idea which germinated in to the Uruguay Round were planted in November 1982 at the Ministerial Meeting of GATT members in Geneva. Although the Ministers intended to launch a new major negotiation, the meeting stalled on the issue of agriculture and was widely regarded as a failure. In fact, the work programme which the Ministers agreed on formed the basis for what was to become the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda.

 However, it took four more years of exploring and clarifying issues and tough consensus building, before Ministers met again in September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to agree to launch the Uruguay Round. They were then able to accept a negotiating agenda, which covered virtually every outstanding trade policy issue including the extension of the trading system into several new areas, notably trade in services and intellectual property. It was the biggest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed and Ministers gave themselves four years to complete it.

 By 1988, the negotiations had reached the stage of a "Mid-term Review". This took the form of a Ministerial Meeting in Montreal, Canada, and led to the elaboration of the negotiating mandate for the second stage of the Round. The ministers agreed on a package of early results which included some concessions on market access for tropical products - aimed to assist developing countries.

 They also streamlined a dispute settlement system and Trade Policy Review Mechanism which led to the first comprehensive, systematic and regular reviews of national trade policies and practices of GATT members.

 Further, at the Ministerial meeting in Brussels, in December 1990, disagreement on the nature of commitments to future agricultural trade reform led to a decision to extend the round. By December 1991, a comprehensive draft text of the "Final Act", containing legal texts fulfilling every part of the Punta del Este mandate, with the exception of market access results, was tabled in Geneva.

 For the following two years, the negotiations lurched conti-nuously from impending failure to predictions of imminent success. Several deadlines came and went. Farm trade was joined by services, market access, anti-dumping rules and the proposed creation of a new institution. Settling differences between the United States and the European Community became central to hopes for a final, successful conclusion.

 It took until 15 December 1993 for every issue to be finally resolved and for negotiations on market access for goods and services to be concluded. On 15 April 1994, the deal was signed by Ministers from most of the 125 participating governments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco.

 Key differences between GATT and the WTO

 The World Trade Organization is not a simple extension of GATT. On the contrary, it has completely replaced its predecessor. Besides, it has a very different attributes. Among the key differences are the following:

 ·    The GATT was a set of rules, a multilateral agreement, with no institutional foundation, only a small associated secretariat that had its origins in the attempt to establish an International Trade Organization in the 1940s. The WTO is a permanent institution with its own secretariat.

·    The GATT worked on a "provisional basis" even if, after more than forty years, governments chose to treat it as a permanent commission. The WTO commitments are full and permanent.

·    The GATT rules applied to trade in merchandise goods. In addition to goods, the WTO covers trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property.

·    GATT was a multilateral instrument, but by the 1980s many new agreements had been added to it. The agreements, which constitute the WTO, are almost all multilateral and, thus, involve commitments for the entire membership.

·    The WTO dispute settlement system is faster, more automatic, and thus much less susceptible to blockages, than the old GATT system. The implementation of WTO dispute findings will also be more easily assured.

 The "GATT 1947" was continued to operate until the end of 1995, thereby allowing all GATT member countries to accede to the WTO. This and permitted an overlap of activity in areas like dispute settlement. In addition, GATT lives on as "GATT 1994". It is the amended and up-dated version of GATT 1947, which is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and which continues to provide the key disciplines affecting international trade in goods.  

Milestones of GATT rounds and their achievements  

1. Geneva (1948) GATT entered into   

    force

2. Annecy (France) (1949) Tariff   

    reduction

3. Torquay (England) (1951) Tariff

    reduction

4. Geneva (1956) Tariff reduction

5. Dillon (1960-62) Tariff reduction

6. Kennedy (1962-67) Tariff reduction

    Anti-dumping code

7. Tokyo (1973-79) Tariff reduction

    Non-tariff barrier codes

8. Uruguay 1986-94 GATT enlarged, to

    World Trade   Organization  

The multilateral trading system — past, present and future. 

The World Trade Organization came into being in 1995. As noted above the WTO which is the successor to GATT [1947] was established very recently. So while the WTO is still young, the multilateral trading system that was originally set up under GATT is already 50 years old. The system celebrated its golden jubilee in Geneva on 19 May 1998, with many heads of state and government leaders attending. 

The past 50 years have seen an exceptional growth in world trade. Merchandise exports grew on average by 6% annually. Total trade in 1997 was 14-times the level of 1950. GATT and the WTO have helped to create a strong and prosperous trading system contributing to unprecedented growth. 

As indicated earlier, the system was developed through a series of trade negotiations, or rounds, held under GATT. The first rounds dealt mainly with tariff reductions but later negotiations included other areas such as anti-dumping and non-tariff measures. The latest round [the 1986–94 Uruguay Round] led to the creation of the WTO. 

The negotiations did not end there. Some continued after the end of the Uruguay Round. In February 1997 agreement was reached on telecommunications services, Then 69 governments agreed to wide-ranging liberalization measures that went beyond those agreed during the Uruguay Round. 

In the same year 40 governments successfully concluded negotia-tions for tariff-free trade in information technology prod-ucts, and 70 members concluded a financial services deal covering more than 95% of trade in banking, insurance, securities and financial information.

 At the May 1998 ministerial meeting in Geneva, WTO members agreed to study trade issues arising from global electronic commerce [e-commerce]. The most recent ministerial conference was held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. In the year 2000, new talks started on agriculture and services.

 The Key Goals and Functions of the WTO

 The declared overriding objective of the WTO is to help trade flow 'smoothly', 'freely', 'fairly' and predictably'.  These objectives are perused by:

 ·          Administering trade agreements

·          Acting as a forum for trade negotiations

·          Settling trade disputes

·          Reviewing national trade policies

·          Assisting developing countries in trade policy issues, through technical assistance and training pogrammes

·          Cooperating with other international organizations

 Until the year 200, the WTO had more than 140 members. They accounted for over 90% of world's trade. Over 30 others are negotiating for membership. Decisions are made by the entire membership.

 This is typically by consensus. A majority vote is also possible but it has never been used in the WTO, and was extremely rare under the WTO’s predecessor, GATT. The WTO’s agreements have been ratified in the national parliaments of all members.                                     g

 By Prof. Kinfe Abra

 1.    Introduction

ifferent regions of the world have taken different paths to democracy and economic development. For some, industrialisation and economic development stretched over several centuries before democracy was installed.  For others, rapid economic development was accompanied by authoritarianism which grudgingly conceded to democratisation only in the closing decades of the 20th century.  In yet other regions, the socialist path was taken and while there was an initial burst of economic growth in the first half of the 20th century, it was a growth which subsequently stalled, thus proving unsustainable in the context of authoritarianism. The countries which developed the economic base first, before the pressure for democratisation began in earnest, include most democracies in the West.  Most East Asian countries vigorously pursued economic growth while putting a lid on demands for democracy during the first seven decades of the 20th century.  There was a mixed picture in Latin America, but much of the late democratisation which has occurred followed, rather than preceded, economic development albeit it was weaker than in East Asia.   

Much of Africa was under colonialism during the first half of the 20th century, with most countries gaining independence from 1960 onwards.  The continent experienced both little economic development and a lack of democracy until independence. It therefore faced a double challenge at independence (which arrived at different times for different countries).  The newly independent states needed to respond to demands both for democratisation as well as for economic growth.  There would be no trade-off between these simultaneous demands, nor would the countries have centuries or many decades in which to conveniently sequence the strident expectations from their citizens for democracy and sustainable development.  This constituted a profound dilemma for the economically and politically weak new states.  Nearly half a century later, most of them are still trying to grapple with the double burden of achieving sustainable growth and building democracy in unfavourable conditions.   

This paper seeks to address the question of whether democracy, sustainable development and poverty are compatible in the African context.  In view of the varied historical experiences and trajectories alluded to above, what chances exist for Africa to accomplish what took different time-spans and a mix of strategies to achieve economic development as well as consolidate democracy elsewhere?  The paper begins by outlining the enormity of the simultaneous challenges facing the continent, and then proceeds to assess the various conceptual, if not the ideological, positions which have been taken to explain the dilemma constituted by these challenges.  The last part of the paper attempts a provisional synthesis. 

2.  Elements of the African Dilemma

rior to providing an overview of trends in democracy, sustainable development and poverty, it is necessary to define briefly what we understand by these somewhat overused terms.  Democracy has often been used to denote a system of rule based on free and fair elections, the rule of law and the protection of individual freedoms and rights.  It is characterised by power-sharing usually through “checks and balances” between branches of the state, namely, the executive, legislature and the judiciary.  Modern democracy has aspired to be a representative democracy, that is, one based on elected representatives who represent citizens, and the concept is linked with the idea of a nation-state (SIDA 1999).  It is important to remember that democracy has not been static but has evolved over the centuries and decades. Democracy was exclusive in its early years: slaves, women, blacks and the colonised were excluded from its ambit in early democracies.  It continues to evolve in different ways in different societies and cultures, although its core characteristics of certain freedoms, rights and pluralism remain central.  Indeed, building democracy itself is not an event but a process, and a long-term one at that.  This process of democratisation has sometimes been described as a “work in progress” since no society can legitimately claim to be fully democratised. Even in such matters as election management, there have been notable lapses in older democracies, most recently in the 2000 US presidential election.  It is in this broader context that we use the concept of democracy.   

By “sustainable development” we refer to a process of development that has a number of features.  Economic development is only one feature among several relating to sustainable development. Sustainable development relates to development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.  Indeed, the argument has been made that sustainable development requires the empowerment of social groups, equity, co-operation and security in a particular country (UNDP 1997).  Sustainable development should give priority to the poor rather than marginalise them, sustain the environment rather than degrade it, and advance women rather than discriminate against them (Speth 1997).  Democracy itself stands better chances of consolidation where there is satisfactory human development.  It is not possible to attain high levels of participation and empowerment in the development and political processes where illiteracy and unemployment are high, where education is lacking, and gender inequalities are glaring (SADC 1998).  The consolidation of democracy and good governance should simultaneously contribute to stronger foundations for sustainable development. There should be synergy between the two processes.   

Let us now look at current trends relating to poverty on the African continent.  It has been estimated that about 300 million Africans—nearly half of the continent’s population—live on US $0.65 a day (in purchase power parity) and that this number is still growing (World Bank 2000a).  One definition classifies those who live on less than US $1 as living in poverty. The conditions relating to poverty currently appear gloomy:   

a severe lack of capabilities—education, health and nutrition—among Africa’s poor threatens to make poverty ‘dynastic’ with the descendants of the poor also remaining poor.  The rural poor account for 80 percent of African poverty, but urban poverty is substantial and appears to be growing (SADC 1998). 

Some estimates state that poverty afflicts more than 40 per cent of the urban population, and the average annual income of this group is put at US $352 a year, compared to an average income of US $163 a year for the rural poor.  Indeed, more than half of the urban population is poor in Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, amongst other countries.  Quite clearly, poverty is the current state of existence of a significant proportion of Africa’s rural and urban populations. A notable feature of poverty in Africa is that it exists in a context of high inequality.  Both rural and urban incomes are unequally distributed, and there is considerable inequity in the distribution of social spending with the higher-income groups benefiting more.  For instance, the poorest 20 per cent of Africans account for just a little over 5 per cent of total house consumption.  Such countries as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe boast high levels of Gini co-efficient of well above 55 per cent.   

The overall picture is therefore of a deepening of poverty on the continent.  Whereas just over 18 per cent of inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa lived on less than US $1a day in 1987, the proportion had grown considerably by the end of the 1990s, as we saw above.  Levels of poverty actually grew in such countries as Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Only a few countries appear to have experienced a decline in poverty, and they include Ghana, Mauritania and Uganda.  A number of factors have contributed to the intensification of poverty.  One of them is HIV/AIDS, which has spread quickly across the continent resulting in the death of an estimated 18 million out of the 23 million HIV/AIDS deaths worldwide.  Some of the highest infection rates are in Southern Africa, where they reach about 20 per cent of the adult population.  The epidemic has a tendency to be concentrated amongst the most productive and more skilled sector of the population, those between 20 and 50 years of age.  Although the economic impact of the epidemic cannot be quantified in precise terms, it is believed to be enormous.  The social impact will be far-reaching with the rapid increase of AIDS orphans, who are likely to top 12 million in Africa soon.  This will exacerbate poverty, at least in the short term, as the size of the dependent population without parental economic support grows.   

This leads us to a consideration of sustainable development in the context of deepening poverty and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Indicators which bear relevance are those that relate to life expectancy, child mortality, and access to basic social services such as education and health.  Drawing from a World Bank report, we can observe that infant mortality is close to 10 per cent with, on average, 157 of every 1000 children dying before the age of five (World Bank 2000a).  In some countries, the rate is above 200 per 1000.  This is an unacceptably high rate of infant mortality which speaks volumes about formidable constraints to access to health facilities and satisfactory nutrition. While access to education is believed to be indispensable to development, there has been no consistence in the levels of provision of education both at primary and secondary levels.  Indeed, it is estimated that primary enrolments dropped between 1980 and 1993 from 80 to 72 per cent (World Bank 2000a).  Primary school enrolments were now even lower amongst the rural poor.  Less than a quarter of the continent’s school-going population is enrolled in secondary schools although the rates vary significantly from country to country.  Income, gender and region determine whether children are enrolled in primary and secondary schools.  Access to basic health services by the poor is similarly handicapped.  This is against the background that ill-health in Africa results much more from infectious diseases and nutritional deficiencies than it does elsewhere.  As it has been observed:   

the burden of disease is dramatically higher in Africa than elsewhere.  And the disease pattern is different.  Malaria, river blindness, sleeping sickness and HIV/AIDS occur elsewhere in the world but are concentrated in Africa.  Malaria, for which 80 percent of cases occur in Africa, accounts for 11 percent of the disease burden in Africa and is estimated to cost many African countries more than 1 percent of their GDP. (World Bank 2000a).   

Public spending on health varies by country but it is often inadequate to meet the enormous needs of health institutions.  Cutbacks under structural adjustment programmes have made further inroads into the already weakened budgets.  The growing number of patients with HIV-related illnesses has imposed a heavy burden on an already fragile social sector.  Unequal access to health facilities is confirmed by a sample of seven countries which showed that the poorest 20 per cent of the population received only 12 per cent of the health subsidy compared to the more than 30 per cent received by the richest 20 per cent of the population (World Bank 2000a).  Finally, life expectancy, which had risen between 1950 and 1990, began to stagnate and went on to decline in the 1990s.  One of the principal factors was, of course, HIV/AIDS, which we have already observed above.  Human development will not improve significantly until the basic indices of life expectancy; education and health show a sustained upward improvement.   

Any discussion of the prospects of sustainable development should not overlook the contribution of civil conflicts to the continent’s predicament.  It has been estimated that about 20 per cent of Africans live in countries wrecked by conflict.  Nearly 20 African countries have experienced at least one period of civil strife since 1960; and the enormous costs have been borne in the shape of destroyed infrastructure, loss of institutional capacity and social capital as well as flight of financial and human capital (World Bank 2000a).  Internal and interstate conflicts have greatly contributed to a decline in the pace of economic development and adversely affected conditions of stability.  The economic, social and political legacies of these conflicts will affect development for decades.  We can see that the African dilemma is a very complex one.  Historical factors, the political environment and internal national policies all have a major bearing on the prospects for democratisation and sustainable development.   

Let us now briefly examine trends relating to democratisation in Africa.  There was a great deal of promise, if not euphoria, in the late 1980s and early 1990s that Africa was then irrevocably set on a path of democratisation.  In some countries, military regimes were giving way to constitutions which enshrined multiparty systems and democratic elections.  In others, national conferences appeared to herald a new era of consultations and consensus on constitutional and political issues.  Political participation seemed to have reached higher levels than at any other time since independence in most countries.  The era of the one-party state was drawing to a close in an international context in which the Cold War had drawn to a close.  There appeared to be a consensus that democracy, through multipartyism and regular “free and fair elections”, was a pre-condition for “good governance,” a new concept which began to be increasingly deployed in the international donor community.

This “new language” of democracy and good governance gained primacy in a global environment in which socialism had received enormous setbacks, if not collapse, leaving the ideological high ground mainly to neo-liberal perspectives of the market and governance. There was a linkage drawn between good governance and economic development as well as access to loans and aid. Countries which demonstrated some progress on the democracy path would be rewarded, while those which showed none were penalised in terms of access to aid and lending.  It was, therefore, scarcely surprising that most countries expected the “democracy dividend” to usher in significant assistance, lending and investment.  It was an era of considerable optimism. As some analysts observed about this short-lived era, starting in 1990, the number of political protests in sub-Saharan Africa rose dramatically, from about 20 incidents annually during the 1980s to a peak of some 86 major protest events across 30 countries in 1991.  The following marked a pinnacle of a trend of increased political liberty in which African governments gradually introduced reforms to guarantee previously denied civil rights. There was also a marked upswing in the number of competitive national elections, from no more than two annually in the 1980s to a record 14 in 1993.  That the general direction of change was toward democracy is evidenced by the gradually increased availability of basic political rights, which climbed steadily from a low point in 1989 to a peak in 1994. . .  (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). 

As a consequence of this continent-wide ferment, some 35 countries had undergone regime change by December 1994.  Adding considerable weight to this democratisation was the transition from apartheid to majority rule in South Africa.  Later in the decade, military rule in Africa’s most populous state of Nigeria collapsed, making way to a democratically elected government in early 1999. 

How sustainable has the democratisation wave been since the mid-1990s?  Building and consolidating democracy was going to be protracted, rather than a smooth and short-term process.  And so it has proved to be more difficult and complicated than the earlier optimism and naiveté allowed.  In certain instances, there have indeed been reverses as the military has overthrown elected governments, spelling an early end to brief democratic experiments and a return to authoritarian rule.  Elsewhere, new democracies survive, but elected rulers have lapsed back into manipulating political rules in order to consolidate their hold on power (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). In these fledging democracies, the formal trappings of democracy co-exist with neo-patrimonial practices.  Contests continue to be waged around citizenship issues, constitutional rights and freedoms as well as on the degree of the “freeness and fairness” of the elections.  The principal challenge remains institutionalising democratic structures, practices and culture in most countries. 

3.  Approaches to Conceptualisation of the Linkage between Democracy and Development 

roadly speaking, there are three contending approaches to the issue of linkage and compatibility between democracy and sustainable development.  The first sees an inextricable connection and posits that democracy would not be sustainable without a parallel process of economic development, and vice versa.  The second approach argues that it is not feasible to build democracy while simultaneously pursuing a vigorous development process.  According to this position, the economic base should first be expanded and strengthened, and this accumulation process is mainly possible under authoritarian political conditions.  The third identifies flaws in both these approaches and argues for a feasible simultaneity of the processes of democracy, development and poverty reduction.   

Let us begin by assessing the proposition that democracy and development go, or ought to go, together.  Those who correlate democracy to economic development seek to build their case for prima facie plausibility on the fact that the wealthiest countries in the world are democracies. As one analyst once observed, the earliest instance of this position was propagated by Adam Smith, who, in his Wealth of Nations, strongly argued for political liberalism as the necessary condition for effective operation of the market, which he considered the engine of economic growth (Ake 2000). 

However, the most sustained argument regarding the correlation between democracy and economic development was that presented by Lipset.  After studying samples of countries from different regions, he established that for each regional set, there was a correspondence between democracy and higher levels of economic development (Lipset 1959). His argument was that economic development was associated with more education, assertiveness and a push for participation and that it tempered the tone of politics and created cross-cutting interests and multiple affiliations which facilitated democratic consensus-building and political stability. Furthermore, economic development was associated with growth and vitality in associational life and civil society (Lipset 1959). In sum, this position argues that the chances for democratic consolidation improve with economic development.  There appeared to be strong positive relationship between education, literacy rates and democracy, and what was undeniable was that fledgling democracies required sustained economic growth whatever the level of economic development they started from (Beetham 1994). This position is broadly supported by international financial institutions such as the World Bank which have sought to link progress on the democracy front, or rather “good governance” as they refer to it, to support for economic reform programmes (World Bank 1997).  According to this position, which sees a correlation between democracy and development, the issue of compatibility of the two processes does not arise.  The correlation is an imperative. However, there is little nuance in this position as regards late developing countries such as those in Africa which have had to grapple with the two processes from a low base.

Introduction  

he concept of globalization has not doubt become a buzzword of the 1990s and beyond.  Giddens (1990, 64) defines it as the “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”  According to him, globalization is the consequence of modernization.  As a process, globalization is the consequence of modernization.  As a process, globalization involves the organization of various processes such as communication and business on a worldwide level, the existence of “an awareness of the interrelations among people on the globe and a recognition of the globe as finite and limited” (Yearley 1996, 9).  It reflects the increasing trend in which people are viewing the world as a single space – or what Robertson (1992, 8) refers to as the compression of the world – and the rising consciousness that humanity is inhabiting one globe.  Born of this process are other related terms that are becoming a commonplace in the social science literature such as the global society, the global village, the global economy and global citizenship, mention a few.  

This paper analyzes the process of globalization with the view to advancing two main arguments.  First, that the process of globalization itself represents nothing new as its genesis can be traced to the incorporation of Africa economies into the World capitalist system through colonization.  What may be said to be new may be the concept itself and the current consciousness about the world as one.  Consistent with this position we posit that globalization is, by and large, a new phase of colonization.  It simply manifests a case of old wine being repackaged in a new wineskin.  That is, globalization manifests a renewed strengthening of the stranglehold the West has maintained all along on African economies.  As such, it may be classified as the third phase of colonization, the second phase being neo-colonization.  Second, with particular reference to Africa, the goal of globalization and sustainable development stand diametrically opposed.  We argue that just as if colonization never resulted in any meaningful development of former colonies, the concept globalization should not be expected to generate any sustainable development for these disadvantaged is geared toward the entrenchment of the same forces, processes and structures that hampered the development of Africa under colonial rule.  The paper attempts to demonstrate the above views.   

The Goals of Colonization

The term colonization has been defined by the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968, 1) as “the establishment and maintenance, for an extended time, of rule over an alien people that is separate form and subordinate to the ruling power.”  It often involved the settlement abroad of a people form a mother country after subduing the local populace through forceful occupation.  We view colonization as a process that starts with the conquest of a people, passes through a period of domination of these people by the conquerors and extends beyond the granting of ‘independence’  by assuming a new form commonly referred to as neo-colonization.   

Colonization is the outcome of the ripple effect of particularly the historical event of the industrial revolution which epitomizes the birth of the Western spirit of capitalism.  As such, the process was propelled mainly by economic gain or what Nabudere (1981, 7) refers to as “free trade imperialism.”  More specifically, it was the economic transformations accompanying the industrial revolution that sparked off colonization.  The revolution transformed the basis of the mode of production from the home-based serf labour to a ‘free’ labor force that was no longer bound to the soil or the feudal lords (Nabudere 1981).   

This new capitalist mode of production implied a shift in the conception of trade and a new inward-looking concentration on the development of production necessarily affected attitudes towards overseas territories (Nabudere 1981, 7).  By this time, European capitalism had advanced to a stage whereby it needed new outlets for its products and new sources of raw materials (Nabudere 1982).  It is the pursuit of such outlets that led to the scramble for Africa by European powers culminating in the October 1884, Berlin International Conference, the carving out of spheres of influence and the actual colonization of the African region.

 Both the result and the purpose of European imperialism are said to have caused the incorporation of the African dependencies into the world capitalist economies just like those of other developing countries became linked with those of the industrialized West serving the role of provision of cheap raw materials and food products for export.  According to neo-Marxist views, such incorporation was necessary if capital means of production were to be maintained in the economies of the imperial powers.  This process has been to protect the economic (and strategic) interests of former colonizers. 

The political practices of the colonial administrators sought to create strong administrative structures with the dual objective of forcing African peoples into the market economy and facilitating the economic exploitation of African peoples without much resistance.  According to Nabudere (1982), colonization established integrative political institutions aimed at tightening their grip over the colonized.  To do so the British utilized a two-pronged approach.   

First was administration through the African chief. Where none was found, they (the British) did not hesitate to create one.  Chiefs were expected to be authoritarian figures who could make quick, final decisions and keep order by commanding respect and even fear.(Leonard 1991).  As Leonard documents, “They were not notable for their respect for the niceties of law or due process, they were known instead for their decisiveness, courage, presence, and ability to hold a crowd” (Leonard 1991, 28).  The role was not popular, but became well established due to the support given it by the British administration, from which it drew legitimacy.

 The second approach utilized by the British to create a strong administration was the adoption of a policy of divide and rule.  This created a paramount group (or “superior” tribe) enjoying considerable political and economic privileges and encouraged rivalry between different tribes with the aim securing the loyalty of one group and, most important, to prevent the emergence of a sense of unity that could threaten colonial rule and interests.  For instance, paramountcy was enjoyed by groups such as the Ngonde in British Nyasaland – today Malawi, the Baganda in British Uganda; the Tutsi in Belgian Rwanda and Burundi in British Nigeria and the Shona in Present-day Zimbabwe.  The outcome was group competition for scarce political, economic and social resources controlled by the state.  

The Components of Globalization  

s alluded to earlier, globalization is an emergent concept reflecting “people’s experiences of the properties of an accelerating phase of the level of social integration comprising the bonds between nation states”.  Theorists of globalization view the world as moving into, or already having entered, a new phase.  According to Hirst and Thompson, “…we live in an era in which the greater part of social life is determined by global processes, in which national cultures, national economies and national border are dissolving.”  Before we can discuss the ways in which globalization represents a third phase of colonization, it is imperative that we identify the various forms in which it has manifested itself.   

The process of globalization has been accompanied by the spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) that have broken down the social distance between the former colonizers and their former colonies that resulted from de-colonization.  Technological developments have revolutionized communications and information provision, diffusion and storage and enabled broadcasters and telecommunications operators to extend beyond their national borders.  While physical distance between the two may be great, ICTs have facilitated social closeness.  The television, in particular, has played an important role in bringing people instantaneous images of distant peoples and events, thus broadening and relativeizing local experiences.  With globalization, distance no longer matters when it comes to staying in touch with other parts/nations of the world. This situation is best summed up by Yearley (1996, 5) when he views the process of globalization as having turned the world into ‘a single, unified place, where in principle everybody can be ‘reached’ and where notions of closeness and convenience are separated from connotations of physical proximity; instead they become questions of electronic connection.” 

A second aspect of globalization is the growth of a common culture.  Through this has emerged a world market of popular music, film, fashion, entertainment media and other consumer goods.  These are enhancing the culture domination established through information transfer by continuing the supplanting of indigenous traditions, practices and consumption patterns and trends that commenced with colonization.  According to Yearely (1996), as products and popular culture become the same wherever people go, their perception as members of a global society becomes stronger.  And the more people consider themselves to be members of a global community, the more they are likely to support global voluntary organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace International.  

The third aspect of globalization applies to the political realm. One may cite the birth of bodies (campaign organizations and pressure groups) focusing on women’s issues, environmental problems, disarmament, human rights and other social developments as efforts in this regard.  The Red Cross, Amnesty Greenpeace International and Transparency International are good examples of some such bodies that assume a worldwide profile.  Of particular significance to the globalization of politics, however, is the push for representative democracy in the developing countries that was ignited by the end of the cold war, as marked by the disintegration of the USSR.  With specific reference to Africa, the continent has been experiencing a considerable movement toward democratization since the early 1990s fronted by Western countries, especially the USA and the United Kingdom, donor and financial aid agencies/institutions and by African political reformers.

 As a process, democratization refers to the act or process of making or becoming democratic.  A democratic government is a form of governance in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them indirectly through a system of representation and delegated authority in which the people choose officials and representatives at periodically held free and fair elections.  In a truly participatory and representative democracy, a humane society is created through the efforts of the people themselves.  A democratic regime should be chosen through competitive (multiparty) elections held on a regular basis.  The government must observe the poltical and social rights as well as civil and human rights and liberties of the vast majority of the population.  Absence of arbitrary arrests, tortures and executions; freedom form costly decisions taken by arrogant rulers; equality before the law for all citizens and constitutional safeguards protecting the rights of the citizenry should obtain in a democratic situation. 

 Central to globalization is the notion of notion of a rapid process of economic globalization.  This is perhaps its most important component because it is the driving force toward cultural and political globalization.  It has its beginnings in the economic turbulence of the 1970s.  Economic globalization involves the internationalization of the world economy.  Those who support this view argue that uncontrollable market forces and truly transnational corporations (TNCs) have come to dominate the basic dynamics of the world global economy.  These (TNCs) owe allegiance to no nation-state and locate wherever in the globe market advantage dictates have become its principal economic actors and major agents of change.  As Yearely (1996, 6) indicates, ‘the relative cheapness of transport and the efficiency of modern shipment systems have combined to ensure that some similar goods are available the world over.’   

This has been accompanied by worldwide spread of manufacturing and sales (global manufacturing and global marketing) as corporations establish bases the world over.  This is in contrast to the old international post-war world-order in which the world was “an aggregate of essentially national economies, linked by trade, where companies produced primarily for domestic markets and only secondarily for export, where the production process took place within national home industries and national forms and devised rules for international trade within intergovernmental forums…”.

 The talk about a global economy suggests, “A truly global economy has emerged or is emerging in which distinct ‘national’ economies and domestic strategies of national economic management are becoming increasingly irrelevant (Hirst and Thompson 1996, 195).  According to Hirst and Thompson (1996, 1), a dominant feature of the international economy is that “process that are determined at the level of national economies still dominate and international phenomena are outcomes that emerge from distinct and differential performance of the national economies.”  The globalization of the economy, however, seeks to rob nations of such processes by autonomizing and socially disembedding the international economic system by making production and markets truly global. 

 Globalization:  A Third Phase of Colonization?  

e argue that globalization, as a process, is really not new.  What may be relatively new are the rise in people’s consciousness of a global identity and the thinking in terms of a global process.  Indeed, the world ‘globalization’ first appeared in Webster’s dictionary in 1961 thus signifying the genesis of ‘explicit recognition in the contemporary period of the growing significance of the worldwide connectedness of social events and relationships’.  Consistent with this reasoning, we consider the process of colonization to have had globalizing consequences and posit that current rising consciousness of global compression is simply a new phase of colonization.  What perhaps distinguishes globalization as a form of economic imperialism from the old order is that the colonial powers are no longer competing among themselves but working more or less in unison.  The existence of a united Europe, the demise of ideological divide of East-West are all pointers to a coming together of what were once competing imperial powers during the age of colonization.

 The process of colonization could be viewed as having entailed the globalization of culture, politics and, most important, production and trade.  This occurred through the linking of the fate of the so-called underdeveloped nations to the actions of the industrialized nations.  This position is clearly underlined by the World-Systems theory when it emphasizes the exploitative linkages between the developed and the underdeveloped that were the outcome of colonization.  The theory, championed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1979, 1991), posited a developing, tripartite, interconnected world structure of nations – the core, the periphery and semi-periphery – and emphasized the centrality of the activities of transnational companies and movements of capital across national frontiers in our understanding of the economic position of developing countries.  It is argued that the ‘Third World’ is not in its impoverished condition because it lacks development but because of exploitation and continued control over trading and finance during the neocolonial period by the industrialized world.

 In our view, what the world-systems model depicts nothing short of the existence of what will be referred to later on as a globalization of industry and business.  Actions such as the establishment of plantations of provide raw materials for European and American industries and the intervention in the economies of developing countries to guarantee markets for Western goods created interdependent economies throughout the world.  In the words of Wallerstein (1990), the transition from feudalism to capitalism was essentially accompanied by the creation of world economy.  In light of this, it can be concluded that the so-called global economy is nothing but an extension of the international economy established during the early 1900s because of the integration of more and more nations and economic actors into world market relationships.

 To understand how globalization manifests the rebirth of colonization, we need to reflect on its various components (or aspects) and assess their consistency with the colonization agenda.  The first of such components it’s the globalization of communication.  By substituting social closeness for the physical contact of colonization, globalization, in our view, has enabled former colonizers to recapture and entrench the continued social, economic and political domination of African and other former colonies.  Former colonizers can now easily contact their physically distant former subjects and carry out many forms of economic (especially manufacturing, buying and selling), social and even political business/transactions. 

 Although the main benefactor of the globalization of communication has been the corporate and the scientific worlds, rising trends in Internet linkages (communication between private individuals) is spreading its effects to ordinary citizens (Yearley 1996).  As the Internet becomes a major way of swapping information, the easy transfer of Western culture to the African continent will be enhanced.  This means that the French can continue to further their ambitions of creating Frenchmen out of their former colonial subjects while the British can carry on their one time ambition to “civilize the natives” without having to maintain physical contacts. 

 The process of globalization may also be said to reduce both physically and psychologically the distance between former imperial powers and their former subjects.  The consciousness of a global compression associated with the concept may be said to bequeath former colonizers with a sense of reunion and closer control of what once belonged to them.  With today’s technology, former colonizers find it even more convenient and cost-effective to “administer” ex-colonies form the safety of their homes, boardrooms, etc.   

Scholars such as Scott (1997), Robertson (1992) and Archer (1990) argue that globalization and modernization are quite distinct.  According to Scott (1997, 3), for example, “The concept of globalization should not act simply as a synonym for a new phase of modernization or for Westernization.”   While we may concur, with Sklair (1991), that globalization is not just Americanization, we are of the view that globalization and modernization are not that much different – the former is an extension of the latter.  The talk of a global culture is illustrative here particularly when viewed in terms of ownership.  In our view, the so-called global culture is inherently Western culture. 

 For a truly global culture to emerge, it must be an amalgamation of different world cultures.  For Africa in particular, the globalization of culture has mainly involved the eclipsing of African cultures by Western culture.  As such, the attempts to further a global culture could be construed as not being any different from the British colonial mission of civilizing the natives by modernizing their cultural practices and habits.  The French colonial policy of assimilation that sought to turn Africans into Frenchman by teaching those French manners and decorum could be viewed in a similar vein.

 With reference to the political component of globalization we argue that the push for the democratization of African states is a renewed attempt by the West to create governance structures that are conducive to the exploitation of African (human and cultural) resources for the benefit of Western industrialized nations.  By establishing western-type formal mechanisms of government decision-making, the West hopes to restore a political semblance of what was once achieved through the ‘strong’ political administrations of colonialism.  That is, democratic rule in Africa and elsewhere is expected to produce the patterns of administration control that approximates the one sought by the colonizers during the period preceding the struggles for independence.  By pushing for democratization in Africa, former colonial powers hope to circumvent the political instabilities that have plagued most of the continent since independence thereby jeopardizing the maximization of economic benefits from the former colonies. 

 By pushing the democracy gospel, the West hopes to reverse some of the major obstacles to democratic rule and political stability in the African continent.   Of particular significance are the lack of a democratic culture (Frimpong 1999) and the absence of strong democratic institutions (Gordon 1997; Pinkey 1997) including strong constitutional frameworks, a strong civil society, strong political parties, independent parliaments and judiciary systems and professional military and other security agencies (e.g., Ottaway 1997; Pinkeny 1997; Hope 1997).

 The final component of the globalization process is the globalization of the economy.  It is our view that the internationalization of the economy (trade, capital flows and monetary system) does not represent a new or unique phenomenon.  We concur with Hirst and Thompson (1996) that evidence of enhanced internationalization of economic relationships since the 1970s is not in itself proof of the emergence of a distinctly ‘global’ economic structure. 

 According to them, the present highly internationalized economy is just “one of a number of distinct conjectures or states of the international economy that have existed since an economy based on modern industrial technology began to be generalized from the 1860s” (Hirst and Thompson 1996, 2).  It is the emergence of this economy that was responsible for the colonization of Africa and the rest of the world.  As such, the globalization of business could be construed as an attempt to propel the concept of a world economy and market which have their roots in colonization to new heights.                                        g

HUAMBO -     Angola may be sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest oil producer but in a town still devastated by decades of brutal fighting, 67- years-old Armando Tiago says he has seen very little of the cash.

 “If it did come here, every-thing would be OK,” Tiago, who lost an arm to a landmine as he foraged for food in 1988, told Reuters in the central Angolan city of Huambo. “But that is not what happens. We have schools and things are better, but we still have no jobs, no work.  We are poor.”

 Post-war investment, peace and rising oil prices are expected to push Angola’s economic growth above 15 percent in 2005.  But malnutrition remains rife, almost half of all children do not attend school and a quarter die by the age of five.

 Since 27 years of civil war ended in 2002, international donors have become increasingly reluctant to fund aid projects in Angola—often citing its massive oil wealth. Some senior aid workers say they may abandon projects if the government does not contribute more cash itself.  

There are sings of change in the former Portuguese colony, where the war destroyed not just lives but the very foundations of the country, leaving vast areas cut off.   While some Western businessmen say privately that corruption say privately that corruption has fallen off since the end of the war, others say that particularly in the construction sector it is rising fast.

 In the capital, Luanda, the division is stark e\between slum dwellers and those who have made money from oil and commerce and who roar around town in four-wheel drive vehicles. “One of the nice things about being an expatriate in Angola is that you don’t get much hassle” said on Western aid worker “Everyone knows the rich Angolans have more money than we do.” Money is pouring into Luanda.  Hotels are overbooked -- some oil companies are said to book 20 rooms every nigh just in case they need to fly in executives or engineers in a hurry – and seats on the daily flight from Johannesburg are hard to get.

 Alongside oil giants like Chevron, mineral firms such as De Beers and diversified Anglo-Australian miner BHP Billiton are scouring Angola’s previously inaccessible interior for gold, diamonds and copper.

 Expatriates flock to drink overpriced beer and imported wine and spirits in the city’s beachside clubs and bars to the sounds of a mix of Western, Angolan and Brazilian music.

 The slums on the edge of the capital remain desperately overcrowded, with poor water supplies and intermittent outbreaks of typhoid and malaria.  Pools of sewage lie around and roads are so badly maintained they are impassable when it rains.

 Residents are increasingly banding together to demand better services and they say things are slowly getting better.  Electricians and builders say they have more work, often as people improve or rebuild their shacks.

 Building materials swiftly sell out in markets in Luanda where people are building new offices, restaurants and hotels or extending their shacks in the slums. 

 But in many parts of the country, little progress has been made since the death of rebel UNITA leader Jonas Savimib, whose house in Huambo still lays in ruins after a government air strike, triggered the end of the war.

Poor roads and destroyed railways have cut off many towns, making commercial farming or industry unviable and leaving the population to suffer starvation, sickness and isolation.

 “We hear of towns that are completely cut off but we’ve been unable to reach them,” Helen Gray, project officer for demining charity HALO Trust, told Reuters.

 In many settlements in what was once said to be the jewel of Portugal’s empire, European-style buildings still have plumbing systems and most streets have lights, but often neither has worked for decades.

 Listless adults and children who have trekked in from isolated rural areas lie in Huambo’s hospital.  Many are seriously malnourished.  Across the cool, central plateau, over half of all children have been permanently stunted by hunger. But there are signs of change.  Some street lights are back in action and a couple of sets of solar-powered traffic lights are working.  The railway to the coast is being rebuilt.

 While most buildings still bear the scars of tough, street by-street fighting in the final years of the war, many are being rebuilt.  A cell-phone store thrives on the ground floor of a building still missing its roof.

 A motorcycle factory has opened in the town, boosting local employment, and new schools and municipal offices are opening.  Much of Angola’s reconstruction is being fuller by a $2 billion loan from China secured against oil revenues.

 Observers say the loan, which will also fund transport repairs opening up whole tracts of the country, could help boost the ruling MPLA ahead of elections scheduled for September 2006.     

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