The Many Meanings of Human
Security top
Debates about the meaning and legitimacy of what constitutes ‘security’ in
international politics are not new. During the Cold War, for
example, there was a widespread—though by no means universal—consensus
among international relations scholars that ‘security’ meant ‘national
security’, i.e., the interests and survival of the state.
Distinctions often were made between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics in
international relations. High politics was the realm f national
security whereas low politics referred to the mundane world of
international trade and finance and various forms of economic and social
transactions that crossed international borders. With the oil shocks
in the early 1970s and the crisis brought on by the Arab oil embargo in
1973 following the Middle East War, the distinction between high and low
politics became increasingly difficult to sustain. Economics was
clearly a matter of high politics if the economic health of the state was
to be jeopardized by skyrocketing energy prices.
If essential sources of supply were threatened because of war or the
actions of oil-producing states, there was clearly little practical
distinction between an ‘economic’ and a ‘national security’ crisis.
As scholars and practitioners developed a better appreciation of how
relations of economic interdependence affect the fundamental health and
welfare of states, the purview of national security studies—and with it,
the concept of security—expanded (see Buzan et al., 1998)
Although many were prepared to accept a definition of national security
that included an economic component, others were resistant to the idea of
expanding the concept further to include other kinds of non-military
threats, such as those of the environmental, biological, and even human
(e.g., refugee) variety (Walt, 1998). Proponents of environmental
security argued that problems such as ozone depletion in the upper
atmosphere or the prospect of global warming posed threats to human health
and survival that were just as serious, if not more so, than the threat of
war from hostile states. With the end of the Cold War, they argued
that the risks and potential costs of these human-induced environmental
threats were more serious than traditional military threats and that
therefore they should receive more attention and correspondingly greater
resources to address them. Defenders of the narrower conception of
security based on traditional military threats to the state retorted that
if the concept of security was expanded to include very conceivable threat
to humanity, it would be so diluted as to mean nothing and would therefore
be of little analytical or policy relevance. They also argued that
although the threat of military confrontation between the two superpowers
had diminished with the end of the Cold War, the prospect of intercommunal
strife and regional conflict had grown and military power still had its
uses.
Even so, some environmentalist believed that the language of national
security was ill-equipped to address problems of the global commons that
required co-operative, as opposed to independent, national solutions.
They argued that the language of national security needlessly
‘militarized’ problems, and in a psychological, way that was damaging to
developing new cognitive frames of reference that would foster
international co-operation. During the Cold War, there were also
critics within the traditional security studies camp who believed that the
existence of nuclear weapons had fundamentally changed the nature of
warfare and international conflict such that the risks of escalation of
conventional conflict to the nuclear level were unacceptable.
These critics advocated a conception of ‘co-operative’ or ‘common’
security premised on the view that nation-states—especially those with
nuclear weapons—had more to gain from co-operation when it came to
reducing the risks of war and avoiding nuclear annihilation. They
questioned the premise that nuclear weapons were useful for deterrence
because the risks of nuclear war were simply too great and the threat of
nuclear use was simply not credible.
The newest turn in the debate about the meaning and content of security
comes from champions of the concept of human security. Like earlier
critics, advocates of human security share grave doubts about the utility
of a concept of security anchored on the nation-state and abstract
definitions of ‘national interest’. However, the
concept of human security is not just an argument about securing basic
human rights.
It is a conception that goes much further in its understanding, both
about the potential sources of threat (or privation) to these rights and
about the conditions and kinds of institutions and governance;
arrangements (domestic as well as international) required sustaining human
rights.
Some proponents of human security also have decidedly ambivalent feelings
about the role of the nation-state in advancing and promoting human
security. Although they recognize that democracy is necessary for
human security, they also believe that the state itself has a potentially
limited role to play in securing many of the conditions necessary for
human security and well-being. Certain aspects of the modern state
are even considered obstacles or impediments to the advancement of human
security. Opinions about the relationship and importance of the
state to human security naturally differ:
some human security advocates have a strong pro-statist orientation
because they believe that a strong, democratic state is ultimately the
best guarantee and instrument of human security. Others,
however, believe that given the changing nature and structure of the
international system and the emergence of a wide range of transnational
forces and actors, new kinds of governance arrangements that transcend the
territoriality and traditional functions of the nation-state must be
created in order to promote human security. They also believe that
current international institutions are also not especially well-suited to
addressing the new threats and challenges to human security because of the
inherent bias towards the nation-state and principles of sovereignty in
these institutions.
Conceptions
of Human Security
In
discussing what is meant by the term ‘human security’ it is important to
recognize that there are different schools of though about the meaning and
implications of the concept. Just as there is an active debate about
the meaning of ‘security’ so, too, is there a growing and lively debate
about the definitional boundaries of ‘human security and how the concept
relates to the wider meanings of security.
Although there is an obvious danger in drawing artificial distinctions in
the current (and admittedly evolving) discourse about ‘human security’,
three rather different understandings about how best to understand and
promoted human security have emerged in this ongoing debate. The
first approach is what might be called a rights-based approach to human
security centred on a fairly board definition of human security (in the
sense of entertaining a wide variety of different legal rights), but
nonetheless anchored in the rule of law and treaty-based solutions to
human security.
The rights-based approach to human security seeks to strengthen normative
legal frameworks at both the international and regional levels while also
deepening and strengthening human rights law and legal and juridical
systems at the national level, i.e., within the nation-state.
According to the human rights/rule-of-law view of human security,
international institutions are central to developing new human rights
norms and for brining about a convergence in different national standards
and practices.
The second approach to human security is centered primarily, though not
exclusively, on a humanitarian conception of human security where the
‘safety of peoples’ (sometimes described as ‘freedom from fear’) is the
paramount objective behind international interventions. This
conception of human security sees war as one of the principal threats to
human security and draws an important moral distinction between combatants
and non-combatants. Given the nature of modern warfare,
non-combatants are increasingly being put in harm’s way not only because
of the way wars are being fought, but also by the kinds of weapons used to
fight them. Since the founding of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) in he nineteenth century, the notion that people
should be protected from violent threats and, when they are harmed or
injured, that the international community has an obligation to assist them
has gained widespread acceptance. Many humanitarian
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have had their
origins in wars.
The ‘safety of peoples’ approach to human security also sees a need to go
beyond the provision of emergency and humanitarian relief in war-torn
societies and conflict settings by addressing the underlying cases of
conflict and violence. As the United Nations and the international
community in general became involved in long-term political and economic
reconstruction as a result of the conclusion of formal peace settlements,
many of which were negotiated in the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance
was recognized of adopting ‘an integrated approach to human security’ that
would, at the same time, address the deeper causes of conflict such as
‘economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression’
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Reflecting this change in thinking, the United
Nations Security Council issued a declaration in 1992 formally recognizing
that ‘the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social,
humanitarian, and ecological fields have become threats to peace and
security’. The goals of human security thus came to be linked to
preventive and post-conflict peace building and to a considerably enlarged
understanding of the challenges, the international community confronted in
reducing the potential for armed conflict and civil violence around the
globe.
The
third and, in some respects, most expansive definition of human security
is what might be termed the ‘sustainable human development’ view of human
security. This conception is associated with the United Nations
Human Development Report (1994), which offered a wide-ranging analysis and
assessment of the different dimensions of human security. Human
security was defined in terms of economic, food, health, environmental,
personal, community, and political security. The Report argued that
the end of the Cold War provided real opportunities to capture the ‘peace
dividend’ and that the real threats to human security in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries were coming from disease such as AIDS and from drug
trafficking, terrorism, global poverty, and environmental problems.
These problems were not local (or national) but global in scope, requiring
new ways of thinking and new institutions and forms of global co-operation
to deal with them. However, underlying many of these problems—though
obviously not all-are fundamental problems of inequality and a lack of
social justice in international relations (also referred to as the
‘freedom from want’ dimensions of human security).
In the discussion that follows, we will elaborate on these three
different conceptions of human security and consider the similarities and
differences between them.
Rights
and Rule of Law
The rights and
rule-of-law conception of human security has its origins in liberal
democratic theory and the foundations of the modern democratic
state. It considers the main threat to human security to lie in the
denial of fundamental human rights, including the right of national
self-determination, and the absence of the rule of law. Of these
rights, the issue of minority rights is the most problematic because
minority rights may conflict not just with the ‘will of the majority’ but
also with the rights of the individual. Although some argue that
minority rights trump many other civil and political rights, others argue
that minority rights are not unlimited and that the political and social
space occupied by such group rights must not curtail or restrict the
fundamental civic rights of the individual.
In international politics, the belief that respect for human rights is
linked to international peace and security arguably goes back to the
so-called Peace to Westphalia, enshrined in the Osnabrück and Munster
Treaties of 1648, which not only ended the religious wars of Europe and
formalized the principle of sovereignty, but also sought to guarantee for
religious minorities the right to practice their own religion with the
understanding that all parties to the treaties would respect these rights
in exchange for territorial (i.e., sovereign) control.
In the American and French revolutions, the ‘rights of man’ were given
political and legal effect, although there was no immediate universal
acknowledgement of these rights. That would come after World War II
in the UN Charter and Declaration of Human Rights. However, in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, international recognition
of majority rights grew. French forces intervened in Turkey in 1860
to protect the local Christian population in Lebanon form being massacred
by the Druses and Russia intervened in Bulgaria in the 1870s to halt the
murder of Christians.
With the end of World War I, minority rights became equated with the
concept of self-determination. Woodrow Wilson’s ‘14 points’ in his
address to the US Congress on 8 January 1918 called for the return of
Alsace-Lorraine to France, the readjustment of Italy’s frontiers ‘along
clearly recognized lines of nationality’, limited self-government for the
people of Austria-Hungary, independence for the Balkan counties,
independence for Poland, and ‘an opportunity to develop self-government’
for those nationalities ‘under Turkish rule’.
The mechanisms of protection included the right of minorities to petition
the League if they felt their rights under of minorities living within
their borders. The mechanisms of protection included the rights of
minorities living within their borders. The mechanisms of protection
included the right of minorities to petition the League if they felt their
rights under the treaties were being violated, the establishment of
special Minorities Committees in the League to oversee these
disputes, and advisory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice on issues pertaining to the interpretation or
application of the treaties. The League of Nations was to ensure
compliance with these treaties, but its record of protection after an
auspicious start in the 1920s worsened in the 1930s because those
countries bound by the treaties rejected the double standard that forced a
distinction between them and the colonial powers.
The Versailles conference in 1919 also saw an attempt to secure rights to
religious freedom and racial equality in the League’s Covenant.
However, Woodrow Wilson strongly opposed any mention of race in the
Charter, so the proposal to include these rights was withdrawn.
There was a second attempt in the 1930s, led by France and Poland, to
develop an international agreement on human rights, but this, too, came to
naughty because of international opposition as well as for fear of
antagonizing Nazi Germany.
The experience with fascism in the 1930s, coupled with Nazi and Japanese
atrocities during World War II, underscored the need for the international
community to pay much greater attention to human rights. Although
the UN Charter does not define the content of human rights per se, it does
suggest a linkage between human rights and international peace and
security.
The linkage is implied in the various affirmations in the Preamble and in
Article 1, which spell out the purpose of the organization. The
Preamble to the Charter ‘reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the person, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small.’ Unlike the Covenant of the League
of Nations, the United Nations Charter states that one of the main
purposes of the organization is ‘To develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of people’ (Article 1, Section 2). In addition,
the United Nations aims to encourage ‘respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, and religion’ (Article 1, section 3).
In Article 55 and 46 all members of the organization pledge themselves to
take ‘joint and stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful
and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples’, and, in addition,
‘universal respect for and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion’.
International efforts to codify and specify the content of human rights
began with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human rights in
1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The resolution
was not building, but it did identify some 30 human rights principles,
which included the following clusters of rights (see Morsink, 1998):
§ Personal rights
(e.g., right to life, recognition before law, protection against cruel or
depredating forms of punishment, and protection against racial, ethnic,
sexual, or religious discrimination);
§ Legal rights
(e.g., access to legal remedies for violations of basic rights, right of
due process, including fair and impartial public trials, protection
against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, etc.);
§ Civil liberties
(e.g., freedom of thought, conscience, and religion);
§ Subsistence rights
(e.g., right to work, rest and leisure, social security); and
§ Political rights
(e.g., right to take part in elections and participate in government,
etc.).
Subsequent UN conventions and covenants have given additional content and
meaning to these rights. They include the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); the International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979); the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981); the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment and
Punishment (1984); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
(see Lauren, 1998; Alston, 1992).
Strategies and Instruments
The human rights/rule-of-law approach to human security has tended to
rely on three different kinds of instruments to promote human security.
These instruments typically have aimed at altering the political
calculations of governments so as to deepen and entrench human rights
norms and principles in national legislation and domestic law.
Setting aside military force, which has been used in a growing number of
humanitarian interventions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and which
is discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters of this book,
following Moravick (1995) the three instruments for promoting domestic
protection of human rights are as follows: sanctioning, shaming, and
co-operation. Sanctions seek to promote respect for human rights by
denying domestic groups access to foreign goods, services, markets, and
capital. When the instrument is effective, domestic élites will
change policies in favour of greater protection of human rights.
Relevant examples include UN sanctions against Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith regime
(1966-79); UN sanctions against South Africa during the apartheid era; UN
sanctions against Iraq following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait
(1989(; and UN sanctions against Haiti following the overthrow of Bertrand
Artisitide’s government by General Cedras and his cohorts, which
were in effect in 1993-4 (Doxey, 1996).
In contrast, shaming works on public opinion by focusing the
international spotlight on state policies and practices that are
detrimental to human rights and at variance with established international
norms, principles, and rules. This process can be instigated through
the close monitoring of human rights by international bodies and through
the dissemination of information and the publicity given to individuals
and groups whose rights have been violated or denied. A well-mounted
international campaign, over a period of time, may tip the domestic
balance of power in favour of greater protection of human rights and force
governments that are fearful of the impact of continuing negative
publicity on their political reputations abroad to change their human
rights policies and practices. Mobilized constituencies and groups
within states, such as business associations of non-governmental
organizations that are keen to see policies changed, can also generate
such pressure.
The process of co-optation is more subtle and typically works through a
combination of direct and indirect means. As noted by Moravick
(1995), co-optation methods involve the use of international or
region-wide courts and commissions that seek to enforce human rights and
promote democracy by promulgating legal norms and suggesting reforms of
domestic juridical structures and legal systems. These bodies also
work with various intergovernmental bodies and networks of organized
pressure groups (transnational and non-governmental) to change domestic
behaviors and law.
The European Court of Justice, for example, has more or less successfully
co-opted domestic courts that request and enforce its judgments. The
process of co-optation is also evident in the various legal and juridical
processes behind the incorporation of the European convention on Human
Rights into domestic jurisprudence and statues.
g
The Shadow
State in Africa: A Discussion
Nikki Funke and Hussein Solomon
Introduction
ecent years have witnessed the burgeoning of literature on the African
State. Most Western authors now speak of the “criminalization of the
African State” or the “chaotic African State”. Whilst there is some
element of truth in some of these characterizations, this is not
something that can be generalized for all African states and neither is
this phenomenon inevitable. This article focuses on William Reno’s
conception of the African State as a “Shadow State”.
William Reno’s
definition of a Shadow State, a phenomenon present in various parts of
post-colonial Africa, has the following core elements. He
perceives it to be a form of personal rule, where decisions and actions
are taken by an individual ruler and do not conform to a set of written
laws and procedures, although these might be present. Shadow State
rulers manipulate external actors’ access to both formal and clandestine
markets, by relying on the global recognition of sovereignty, and are
thereby able to undermine formal government institutions. This is often
to their benefit especially as such institutions may acquire interests
and powers at odds with the rulers’ efforts to retain power. Another way
in which rulers undermine formal government institutions is by way of
weakening bureaucratic structures and manipulating markets in order to
“enrich themselves and control others”. Thus Shadow States or “informal
commercially orientated networks” are created that operate alongside
remaining government bureaucracies (Reno 2000, 434-35).
This essay aims to expand on Reno’s definition, by focusing on three
areas closely linked to the Shadow State phenomenon. The first is the
involvement of external actors in the activities of Shadow State rulers
and the extent to which the former have often been directly supportive
of the maintenance of “Shadow States”. Through such actions, attempts at
democratisation and or peace brokering are undermined.
The second is the presence of symptoms of or actual state collapse in
regimes with strong indications of Shadow State elements. Through
weakening of bureaucratic institutions, Shadow State rulers manage to
exploit their states’ resources and enrich themselves. This comes at a
price, however. If too little is done for the population in terms of
provision of goods and services or accountable representation, this
element of Shadow State rule could have a detrimental effect on the
ruler’s position in the long-term.
The third area to be discussed is that of the importance of civil
society, almost completely disregarded by Reno, both in transitions from
Shadow State regimes, as well as in fledgling democracies. The latter
point is particularly relevant when one considers Reno’s definition of
the Shadow State as a “matter of degree”, rather than an “all or
nothing” phenomenon (p. 442).
The conclusion is in support of Reno’s imperative that material support
is needed for those who “articulate ideological and programmatic
alternatives to this form of despotism” (ibid, p. 459). The important
issue here is that international recognition should not be limited to
the sovereign state, which often only represents the interests of
incumbent elite, but should embrace those who wish to represent the
needs of society.
The Shadow State Unpacked
According to Reno, Shadow State rulers depend on external actors to
recognise the façade of sovereignty. Because of this, government power
can be used as a tool to ensure enrichment of government elites and
control of economic markets with the aim of increasing power and
controlling access to resources. Global recognition of sovereignty also
helps create entrepreneurial opportunities for rulers and enables them
to benefit favoured associates (ibid, p. 437).
External involvement in the Shadow State economy becomes especially
relevant when one considers that Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea
attracted a quarter of private foreign investment between 1994 and 1996,
despite the fact that Nigeria ranks 81st out of 83 states on
Transparency International’s corruption index, while the latter two are
not even ranked. A problem is the involvement of violent youths in areas
with available natural resources, as they are offered economic
opportunities in otherwise often wrecked economy. Foreign firms hired by
Shadow State rulers are thus expected to deal with this “threat to
stability”. The dilemma for foreign investors and officials is that if
stability in a Shadow State is maintained, corruption may be entrenched
at the same time (ibid, p. 458).
In the same way, France upheld the corruptness of Mobutu Sese Seko’s
Zaire during the Cold War. When anti-Mobutu dissidents entered the Shaba
province from Angola in 1977 and the Zairean regime faced near collapse,
France and Morocco intervened. The rebels were driven back into Angola
(McNulty 1999, 62). Thus, Mobutu’s image of a buffer against communism,
as well as the substantial natural resource wealth of the country, which
he used for winning the support of external powers including the United
States, upheld his regime (ibid, p. 64). This is despite the fact that
Mobutu and his inner circle were exploiting the country for their own
benefit. In 1997, the Zairean leader’s wealth was estimated at between
US$ 6 and US$ 8 billion (ibid, p. 60).
It is ironic that western states, traditional representatives of human
rights and democracy, should support an unaccountable and self-enriching
leader. The next logical step would be to examine the importance of
external support to the Shadow State.
Mobutu was supported by the West for the first seven years after the
end of the Cold War, mainly due to threats of an outbreak of ethnic
violence should he lose his grip on power. In 1997, however, France and
the US withdrew their support, which had also undermined attempts at
democratisation. The country’s first democratically elected government
under Etienne Tshisekedi was forced to share power with Mobutu due to
external pressure (ibid, p. 68). Neither of the two intervened when
Laurent Kabila’s Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du
Congo-Zaire (AFDL), together with Rwandan and Ugandan support,
challenged and ultimately overthrew the Zairian dictatorship. Reasons
can be attributed to the US’s disillusionment with intervening in Africa
following the 1992 Somalia crisis. It also placed a great deal of
emphasis on stability in the region, something which it felt Mobutu
could no longer provide. France, due to its questionable record in the
region, was also prevented form intervening (ibid, pp. 73-75). One might
argue here that external intervention might once again have saved the
Shadow State regime, as it had 20 years before.
Similarly, external complicity becomes evident in the ongoing civil war
in Angola, which has also contributed to bringing about a Shadow State
scenario. What differs here from Zaire as a single self-enriching entity
is the fact that both the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA)-dominated government and the opposition National Union for Total
Independence (UNITA) have evolved into billion-dollar enterprises. The
Angolan President, Edoardo dos Santos, is labelled as one of the world’s
50 richest men. In 2000, despite continuous pressure from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government was not able to
account for US $1,5 billion in oil revenues. In the same way, UNITA
benefited from the ongoing civil war by means of its profitable, albeit
illegal, trade in diamonds (Donaldson 2002, 17).
A unilateral ceasefire announced by UNITA on 20 September 1993 was
disregarded by the MPLA, which did not want to cede the four-fifths of
Angolan territory which the opposition controlled at the time. While an
oil and weapons embargo was placed on UNITA by the international
community, due to lack of an official ceasefire agreement between the
two parties, the MPLA was relieved of the ban on arms acquisition, which
had formed part of the 1991 Bicesse Accords. The MPLA recruited
mercenary special forces (a prominent example was Executive Outcomes)
and new weapons. An attack was then launched on UNITA-held territories
throughout the ensuing peace negotiations. UNITA consequently made use
of middlemen, who provided fuel and weapons in return for diamonds, and
the war resumed (Cleary 1999, 146).
One can argue that external support for the MPLA, evident in lifting the
fuel and weapons embargo that had been placed on both parties in 1991,
played a part in fuelling the conflict at this stage of its history. By
favouring one side while discrediting the other, the international
community, even if it cannot be seen as directly responsible for the
resumption of the conflict, bears some responsibility. Here, factors
such as whether UNITA would have honoured its peaceful intentions or
whether war might have resumed even if the arms ban on the MPLA had
stayed in place, have to be taken into account. The aim is to show how
one side, as corrupt and unaccountable as the other, was nonetheless
favoured. Rather than allowing only one of the sides to acquire
ammunition and fuel, emphasis should have been placed on the futility of
a military solution and the focus should have been on awarding both
states equal status.
Leaders of Shadow States also often endanger themselves, in the long
run, by a deliberate weakening of institutional structures and by paying
too little attention to the needs of their population. Here the issue of
state collapse and its link to Shadow State regimes comes in. State
collapse has different elements. A collapsed state is no longer able to
perform the functions expected of it and the process of collapse
involves the disintegration of its authority structure and law and
order. There is no longer a guarantee of security or rule of law and
public services decline or cease to exist (Mathews and Solomon 2001,
25). When such a situation exists, different factors, including internal
and external resistance, may contribute to the downfall of a Shadow
State regime.
Mobutu’s loss of power could be stated as an example here. As published
in 1993, four years before the Zairian dictator was to be ousted,
reasons could already be found for why the population would support an
overthrow of the government. The allocation of scarce economic resource
and operating funds starts in the capital Kinshasa, before extending to
regional and sub-regional capitals, which finally had to allocate funds
to smaller towns and villages. Due to economic scarcity and an
underdeveloped infrastructure, entire rural areas have to operate
without state assistance. Furthermore, at this stage already, poverty
was a serious problem, unemployment levels were high with few
opportunities in the public sector and even fewer in the private sector
(Leslie 1993, 128).
In 1996, options for change seemed limited as the government in the
years before had desperately attempted to hold on to power by silencing
the opposition. In 1991, protesting students at the university campus in
Lubumbashi were massacred. In 1992, a group of demonstrators was killed
by government troops in Kinshasa. When the AFDL thus launched its
military offensive against the government, it effectively managed to
capture resurgent Congolese nationalism, “pushing at an open door of
people wearied by corruption, looting and the collapse of public
services, to hasten its progress across a country in which it was at
best actively supported and at worst unopposed” (McNulty 1999, pp.
74-75).
External factors, which played a role here, demonstrate that sometimes
more is needed than internal resistance. Various other countries in the
region opposed Mobutu’s regime, most noticeably Rwanda and Angola.
Rwanda needed to protect itself against a presumably imminent reinvasion
from defeated Rwandan army (FAR) and Interahamwe forces, by destroying
both the Zairian mini-states, which were harbouring them, as well as the
forces themselves. Angola’s President Dos Santos also wanted to take
revenge on Mobutu, who had continuously attempted to undermine the
Angolan government in Luanda. When the Rwandan-led offensive reached
Kinshasa, Angola supplied tanks and heavy artillery to push UNITA, the
ex-FAR and the rump Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) into Brazzaville
(ibid, pp. 76-77). Other external factors include “the unsustainability
of Mobutu; the failure of French-sponsored propaganda which argued that
he must be sustained nonetheless; the lack of a potential intervener in
the absence of France; and crucially, a corresponding Western (i.e., US)
non-intervention response…” (ibid, p.71).
Another instance where state collapse may lead to an overthrow of an
incumbent leader in the long run is in the case of Zimbabwe’s President
Mugabe. Here the relatively recent government policy of repression of
the opposition and discrimination against white commercial farmers has
caused considerable damage to the country’s economy and infrastructure.
The illegal and violent occupation of farms by thousands of so-called
war veterans, encouraged by Mugabe, began in February 2000 (Robinson
2002, 34). This behaviour was reportedly influenced by Mugabe’s “fast
track” policy, calling for the seizure of 90 percent of white-owned
farmland for black resettlement. A law was passed in May 2000, allowing
government to repossess 841 farms without compensation; an additional
500 were added shortly after the legislative elections (Europa 2001,
4426-4427). While Mugabe and his ruling elite have accumulated
substantial amounts of capital and property, the country has been thrown
into severe economic distress. Unemployment is at 60 percent, 60 percent
of the country’s population live below the poverty line and inflation is
at 112 percent (Robinson 2002, 33). According to Zimbabwe’s Commercial
Farmers’ Union, supplies of maize, wheat, tobacco, coffee, meat and
dairy products have dropped between 20 and 50 percent. Beef exports,
which were worth $90 million in 2000, have completely disappeared
(Hawthorne 2001, 31).
Though this policy seems to have secured government power for Mugabe in
the short term, it remains to be seen to what extent state collapse in
Zimbabwe will continue before the regime itself caves in. As far as
external variables are concerned, Zimbabwe is facing increasing signs of
international isolation. Not only has Zimbabwe been suspended from the
Commonwealth, following a damning Commonwealth observer mission’s
report, but “smart” sanctions against the ruling elite in Zimbabwe
remain very much on the US and European Union (EU) agenda (Forrest and
Pressly 2002, 7). It is therefore unlikely that the international
community would support Mugabe, should an increasingly vehement internal
opposition and a more and more dissatisfied population threaten his hold
on power.
Unlike the Zairian situation, however, Zimbabwe’s immediate regional
neighbours, most noticeably South Africa, do not seem to greatly oppose
Mugabe’s regime. African National Congress (ANC) parliamentarians
declared the Zimbabwe election as a “credible reflection of the people’s
will” and members of the South African observer mission to Zimbabwe
stated, “Zimbabwe is a sovereign country capable of running its own
affairs” (Forrest 2002, 23). This is an invalid assessment taking into
account the abuse which Zimbabwe’s sovereign government is inflicting on
its population, both directly, as in the case of the opposition and
white farmers, and indirectly, as is evident in the country’s dismal
economic situation. According to the Zimbabwe Independent’s editor, Iden
Wetherell, the South Africans “are acting as Mugabe’s apologists” in
terms of every aspect of policy (Forrest and Pressly 2002,
7).Nonetheless, the population’s sentiments and the determined stance of
the opposition in the face of government repression indicate that
Mugabe’s hold on power in the long run is by no means a foregone
conclusion. In 2001, opinion polls showed that 56 percent of Zimbabweans
favour impeachment of the president, while only 14 percent want Mugabe
to remain in office (Moore 2002, 254). Another survey conducted among
1900 households for the Helen Suzman Foundation provided the following
results: 68 percent of respondents said that their lives had
deteriorated in the past five years, whereas 71 percent stated that
their living standards had fallen (Africa Confidential 2000, 1-2). These
sentiments are expressed in the civil society, which has proved to be
essential to the population. Rather than “appealing to government’s
favour or fleeing the country” (Reno 2000, 446), Reno’s expected
behaviour for opposition groupings in a Shadow State, several civil
society groupings in Zimbabwe formed the National Constitutional
Assembly (NCA) in December 1997, calling for a new constitution (Sithole
2001, 161). The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Zimbabwe’s
strongest opposition party which has recently posed a major challenge to
Mugabe’s hold on the presidency, constitutes many former NCA leaders and
has its origins in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. Thus here is
an indication of how civil society is able to organise itself in efforts
to challenge elements of Shadow State rule, as manifest in the current
Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) regime.
Despite having lost the 2002 presidential elections, the fairness of
which is highly contested, the party’s resilience in the face of
government intimidation and harassment is noteworthy.
g
The Role of parliament in
meeting the challenges of Globalization to Democratic Governance in
Africa
By Frene Ginwala
et me at the outset say that since the conference is about globalisation,
I will not bother or dare to try and provide any definition. Except
to declare a personal view, which is that globalisation is inevitable, and
the sooner we learn to live with it and achieve our goals, the better,
because of the progress we need to make. Globalisation poses
challenges to democratic governance in all countries, not only Africa.
Regrettably, in the 19th and particularly in the 20th centuries the
management or response to globalisation has been determined and shaped by
the developed countries of the North, whose priorities, agendas and
ideologies do not necessarily coincide with the needs and values of
developing countries of the South. The result is a reduction in the
capacity of all states to control economic power thus raising particular
challenges for developing countries. However, as always, challenges come
with opportunities, which we need to seize. The legacy of weak
states and the absence of strong entrenched institutions of governance in
post colonial Africa contributed to the lack of democracy and the seizure
of power through undemocratic means, and the over zealous and often
illegitimate exercise of Executive Authority that characterized our
continent in the decades following the independence of most African
States.
These problems were often promoted and sometimes even created by the
continuing and conflicting interests of former colonial powers and by
those engaged in the Cold War. The end of the Cold War regenerated
the pursuit of democracy and good governance on our Continent. Today
there are a large number of countries across the globe (140 out of 200)
which hold multiparty elections, but as you know that is not necessarily
the totality of democracy. The number of wars between countries has
also dropped considerably but at the same time, civil conflicts have
become more damaging than before. In 1990’s alone 3.6 million people
died in wars within states, and the number of refugees and internally
displaced persons increased by 50%. The link between democracy and
development is now well established, and I do not need to dwell on it.
The challenge is how we ensure good governance and pursue development
that will improve the condition of our people, while also managing
globalization to our benefit.
The 2002 Human Development Report shows substantial progress over the
last decades in the level of human development in some countries.
But more revealing is the growing inequality. Of the 173 countries, the 24
countries ranked last in terms of human development are all in the
sub-Saharan Africa. Today, global poverty and inequality are the
main impediments to sustainable development. Unsustainable patterns
of exclusion coupled with poverty and underdevelopment made matters worse.
If the world continues along its current trajectory the combined threats
of ill health and disease, conflicts over natural resources, migration,
underdevelopment, environmental degradation and poverty will undermine
prospects for prosperity and political and social stability. Whereas
sustainable development implies reversing the trend of the marginalisation
of developing countries from the benefits of a globalising world economy,
many countries, particularly those in Africa are excluded from increasing
global flows of trade, investment, finance and technology. As a
result there is growing inequality, poverty and social dislocation between
and within countries.
The NEPAD founding document declares across the continent that, Africans
will no longer allow themselves to be conditioned by circumstance. The
question is how do we actualise this? How do we avoid becoming the
victims of circumstances? I would submit that parliaments composed
of the directly elected representatives of the people need to be more
actively engaged in the processes that are now unfolding. The
starting point for all of us is to strengthen the institutions of
governance. Unless we do so, our nation’s democracies will remain
vulnerable and may not survive the impact of globalization and the new
forces that are exercising powerful influences on our people’s lives.
At the outset we need to recognize that whatever might have been the
ideological preferences for a minimalistic state elsewhere, in developing
countries only a strong state can make the necessary economic and social
interventions and begin to respond to globalization by minimizing the
negative impact and seizing opportunities that open up.
It is necessary to say that a strong state needs to be distinguished from
an authoritarian or dictatorial one: More appropriate description
would be to speak of developmental states. The institutions of governments
would be the ones that would be able to address the particular needs of
each society.
All institutions are based on certain assumptions about power relations,
values and objectives. They can be structured and managed to change
these, or to perpetuate them. Too often we believe that simply by
building capacity to manage, by being more efficient we can change the
outcomes. Managing to run inherited colonial institutions better
than our colonial masters will simply perpetuate the system. We need
to re-examine these assumptions, values and objectives and change them
according to our own objectives.
Only then, we will be able to achieve our objectives. If we are to
meet the challenges of globalization, we need to act on the assumption
that only transformed and appropriate institutions can give us the
capacity to deal in a meaningful way with the negative consequences of
globalization. The very absence of strong institutions opens the way
to enable countries to shape new institutions, not in the image of those
of the colonial powers, but rather to reflect and respond to the
particular needs of society. Without being prescriptive, I would
submit that this will require States, values and institutions geared
towards development, and nowhere more so, than in the institution which is
the custodian of democracy, namely parliament.
In most countries, in Africa and elsewhere, the role of parliaments is
seen simply as making laws and holding the executive to account. I
would submit that this is an outdated concept. As the institution
representing the people, it is necessary for parliaments and members of
parliament to be more actively involved in development rather than to
conduct postmortems on the failures or omissions of the executive to whom
we assign the role of being responsible for development. This
requires that we do not simply ape and reproduce institutions in the image
of European ones, but rather re-conceptualize them for our needs. We
cannot ignore the traditional functions of law making and oversight but we
need to do much more.
To start with, Parliaments must be and must see themselves as both the
custodians and promoters of democratic values and assume responsibility
for consolidating democracy. They provide the interface between the
executive and civil society for the interaction with the executive on an
on-going basis. Equally and on the same basis they must interact with
civil society and be informed by it.
Flowing from this, come additional jobs and functions of parliaments.
Parliaments must be involved in the national project of nation building.
The legislative structures inherited by most post colonial societies were
characterized by a winner takes all culture regardless of electoral
systems in which the needs of the majority were met and the role of the
opposition in its competition for power was limited to being the watchdog
and holding the executive to account. What is being submitted here
is a model that engages the entire institution in certain agreed national
goals, without in any way diminishing the function and rights of the
opposition. Rather it allocates an additional role and
responsibility to the opposition and that is to further the national
project of nation building. To facilitate this other measures are
necessary.
The composition of the legislature must be fully representative of
the full diversity of society since very few legislatures anywhere in the
world are. What this means is that legislative systems and measures
must be those which provide for representation of the broadest range of
views of political parties of otherwise marginalized groups such as women,
young persons, rural populations, workers, the disabled as well as ethnic,
religious and linguistic persons who are not in the majority. This
can be provided through electoral systems and legislation, voluntary
quotas and other actions, education of political parties and society.
In all of these, parliament should be involved, and even take the lead.
Secondly, the organization and functions of the legislature should be
such as to enable all public representatives to participate in all areas
of its work. This would require firstly a change in the culture and
facilities to accommodate women, the disabled and people who speak in
different languages. I think the legislatures are trying to
accommodate women but how many run creches in their parliaments?
Surely if we want women to participate, how many stop debate at 6 or 7 in
the evening on the basis that women should be part of their families.
The South African parliament provides Braille, for we have blind members
and we provide sign language interpretation; and the nightmare is that we
have to cope with 11 official languages. We also need to take account of
the education and economic divisions in society and instituting programmes
to build the capacity of all representatives to participate in the
institution. We tend to structure parliament and assume that those
who come to participate in it are lawyers and other professionals.
But if we want a truly representative parliament, representing the broad
range of people I referred to, can we continue to function on this
assumption without referring that person’s capacity to participate in the
law making and in other functions? We need provision of financial and
other resources to political parties to enable their representatives to
function in the legislature. There should be institutional
support for the proper functioning of the legislature. And
transparency and open access to all of the proceedings of the legislature
to the public and the media.
Parliaments must function to provide the appropriate legislative
framework for agreed policies and objectives in conformity with the
national constitution. If the population is expected to respect
institutions of governance, then democracy must be seen to be more than a
periodic event and citizens must be involved in more than just casting
their votes. This requires that there is public participation in the
making of policy as well as the law making process. The first is the
prerogative of political parties, but the involvement of the public in the
legislative process is crucial, in order to ensure that real needs and
problems are addressed rather than academic and bureaucratic perceptions
of what the people want and what the people need. Therefore,
communities and civil society organizations must be able to come to
legislators to articulate the need and communicate their views on policies
as well as legislation. There are few technical obstacles to
providing for public participation. However, what is required is the
political will and resources which few parliaments in Africa have.
If the public is expected to obey laws, then legislatures need to ensure
that people can understand the laws that are made? How many laws in
our country are enacted in language simple enough that can be understood
by those who are supposed to obey them? The truth is most laws are
written for lawyers and judges and yet we expect the population to respect
and obey the law. How many of us here understand the real detail of
the laws that are in our country? It is possible to produce them
using simple language, but it is a costly exercise both in effort and in
kind.
Legislatures need to build capacity among members and through the
institutional technical and research support provided to ensure that all
bills tabled conform to their constitution and that they do not erode or
violate human rights. To do this, it is necessary that there are
mechanisms within the legislature that constantly monitor all new
legislation. It is also essential that legislatures are engaged in
consolidating democracy through public education programmes which impart
knowledge but also raise awareness and promote vigilance to defend
democracy and counter efforts to curb human rights.
Parliaments need to ensure that security forces are under civilian
control, and mechanisms need to be established in order to monitor their
activities. The political head must account for the activities of the
security forces before the legislators.
Parliaments must introduce and institute mechanisms for proper scrutiny
of those undertaking oversight of the functioning of the executive.
It is often assumed particularly by the opposition parties that the
executive is accountable to the opposition alone and that is false.
The executive is accountable to the entire parliament including members
from the governing party. The challenge here is to ensure, enable
and encourage those members to hold the executive accountable.
It is parliament’s responsibility to provide the mechanisms for doing
this while acknowledging and recognizing that each political party will
perform and conduct itself according to its own policies. An
important mechanism is the implementation of a committee system which
enables detailed scrutiny of legislation, of policy, and of executive and
departmental actions prior to reporting to the legislature for decision
making. Parliaments need to take the lead in fighting corruption
starting off by initiating codes that require declaration of assets of all
public representatives including members of the executive as well as
declaration of all gifts, benefits, and sponsorships.
Public exposure of corruption would have a deterrent effect and bring
support for legislative action. This should cover the private sector
as well taking into account the fact that bribery is a transaction between
two parties not just the receiver of the bribe but also the giver.
We need to make sure that we are in a position to take legal action
against both.
A strong parliament consisting of representatives who have been provided
with training and resources will be able to reassess the national budget,
ensuring allocation of resources to the disadvantaged and preventing
wastage. All parliaments are told you can’t change the budget.
You can’t add to the budget is the truth. There is nothing to stop
parliaments saying No. This programme we are going to adopt, spend
money on that. In most constitutions that is permitted. What
is needed is not a new constitution but a different mind set.
Parliaments need to place international issues on their agendas with
great emphasis on international economic issues. Too often
ratification of international agreements is simply a rubber stamp.
Ideally, systems should be and can be established to involve members in
negotiations prior to the finalization of agreements. Debates in
Parliament, public hearings and special working groups, could place
crucial issues in the public domain, and ensure that the Executive has a
broader understanding of the issues and the views of civil society before
it commits the country to international issues.
Civil Society now functions globally and parliaments can do so also,
using the variety of international forums to exchange information, debate
and build coalitions that will tilt global interaction and interdependence
in favour of the people. The pressure for democratization of
international institutions and economic and trade systems would be
strengthened immeasurably by the proactive involvement of informed
Parliaments acting nationally and internationally. There is nothing
to stop parliaments debating reports whether they are from the World Bank,
IMF or any national or continental institutions; and decisions of
multilateral institutions, exposing them to public scrutiny and debate and
thereby drawing attention to problems and difficulties.
In Africa we often talk about the need for market access and about the
barriers against our agricultural exports. Imagine the impact if on
May 25th next year, every parliament on this continent debated the common
agricultural policy of the European Union and the damage it is doing to
this continent. Public opinion is important and parliaments are one
of the best agents for mobilizing it. On the African continent
Parliaments are devalued in part because of executive action.
It is important to appreciate that Parliaments on the continent have far
more power than they exercise and very often they constrain themselves.
If parliaments could project themselves as partners in governance with a
distinct role, rather than simply watchdogs they can take initiatives.
However, executives would also have to change their own attitudes.
Consumers and the 2005 World Summit for the Review of the Millennium
Development Goals:
Consumers International Recommendations for the Final Outcome Document
Consumers International, the federation of 250 consumer
organisations in 115 countries representing over six billion consumers,
strongly supports the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as positive
political, economic and social measures to ensure that poverty is
eliminated and all people have access to development. The consumer
movement shares the MDGs’ objective of building a just and equitable
society.
Consumers International sees the review of the Millennium Development
Goals as a crucial opportunity for governments, the private sector, and
civil society to revitalise their efforts toward promoting global economic
and social development for all. Failure to achieve the MDGs on schedule
will condemn half of humanity to continue to suffer from the severe, but
preventable, effects of poverty and deprivation, such as lack of access to
food, services, and essential medicines.
As part of the consultation process for the 2005 World Summit, Consumers
International prepared comments on the report prepared by UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan entitled ‘In Larger Freedom’. Our commentary addressed
the need for a greater balance between demand and supply-side, expansion
of the role of international civil society alongside the activities of the
private sector, access to water and sanitation, trade, and the environment
and sustainable consumption.
We recommended that the final report of the 2005 World Summit should
clearly reflect the need for governments everywhere commit themselves to
implement policies that guide us onto a sustainable course and that the
business sector follows the same path. Also, we suggested that the final
report required greater emphasis on the concept of sustainable
consumption. Both sustainable consumption and production can and should
contribute to achieving the MDGs. Equally important are those consumers
learn to manage their consumption patterns in a responsible and equitable
manner.
In the weeks prior to the 2005 World Summit that will produce a final
report assessing the progress made toward achieving the MDGs, as well as
reinvigorating the process toward their implementation, Consumers
International calls on the 191 government who signed the Millennium
Declaration in September 2000 to ensure that the following recommendations
are incorporated:
Global Partnership for Development
· We are encouraged by the language in the revised
draft outcome document that recognises the role of good governance, calls
for enhancement of the role of civil society, and supports the promotion
of international trade as an engine for development. However, Consumers
International stresses that in addition to these elements, in order for
market economies to be more fair and equitable, national governments need
to have in place a ‘competition culture’ or ‘pro-consumer policy
environment’ consisting of an appropriate regulatory framework, effective
competition laws, established standards and means for their verification,
means of consumer redress through consumer protection laws and enforcement
procedures, and consumer education and awareness programmes. Failing this,
consumers and small producers may lose out in benefiting from efficiency
gains. If market economics and the processes of globalisation are to
realise the widespread human benefits so regularly claimed for them,
demand-side considerations must carry the same weight as supply-side
concerns.
· Consumers International calls on the governments of
the UN to provide consumers with an enabling environment that provides
greater freedom of information, democratic, legal and judicial space, and
support to work toward the achievement of the MDGs.
· We also urge the governments of the UN, UN agencies
and inter-governmental institutions such as the World Trade Organization,
World Bank and International Monetary Fund to operate in a transparent,
accountable and inclusive manner and to put in place governance processes
and mechanisms that will ensure this.
Financing for Development
· Developed countries must meet their commitments of
providing 0.7 per cent of their GNP to development assistance. Such a
commitment, in addition to greater debt relief and more just trade rules,
is critical to alleviating poverty, achieving real economic development,
and meeting the Millennium Development Goals.
· Consumers International welcomed the G8 development
assistance package that will provide developing country governments with
increased ability to expand their economic growth. However, the increased
funds will only begin in the year 2010 - five years in the future. This
will delay not only economic growth, particularly in Africa, but also
further delay the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.
Therefore, development assistance should be delivered immediately.
· External development assis-tance should be monitored
to ensure it supports better governance.
Debt
· Consumers International wel-comed the G8 announcement
to write-off debt equaling US$40 billion for 18 Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC). However, while this is an encouraging development,
ana-lysts estimate that a total of 62 poor countries need to have their
debt written off if the Millennium Development Goals are to be met.
Consumers International urges the developed countries of the UN to keep
the momentum going on debt elimination and increase the number of
developing countries eligible for 100 percent debt write-off.
· All debt relief should be monitored to ensure that it
benefits poor consumers.
Trade
· The international consumer movement demands a
multilateral trading system that supports and encourages the protection
and development of consumer rights. Consumer policy is integrated into
trade policy at both the national and international level and this
requires that consumers must be represented in policy making.
· We call on all members of the UN who are members of
the WTO to immediately recommit to ensuring that the WTO Doha Round of
multilateral trade talks is completed no later than 2006.
· Special and differential (S&D) treatment provisions
must be expanded and put into practice as a core principle within the WTO
Agreements, not as an exception to the general rules. S&D must be
mandatory and legally binding as well as subject to the dispute resolution
mechanisms of the WTO.
Rural and Agricultural Development
· Developing countries should be allowed to develop
clearly defined national food policies that address the issues of secure
and reliable food supply and availability, food quality and safety as well
as protection of incomes and jobs of farming households.
· Consumers International urges the governments of the
UN to develop sustainable agricultural policy that provides consumers with
their basic food needs (i.e., food security, fair practices, and safe and
healthy food).
· Consumers International calls on the governments of
the UN who are members of the WTO to agree to the following at the
upcoming Hong Kong Ministerial:
Þ
Industrial countries must eliminate their subsidised agricultural exports
by 2010
Þ
The abolition of dumping agricultural surpluses on world markets
Þ
Phasing out of trade-distorting domestic support in developed countries
Þ
A sustainable agricultural policy that provides consumers with their basic
food needs (ie, food security, fair practices, and safe and healthy food)
Þ
Greater market access for developing country agricultural exports.
Protecting our Common Environment
· Ever-increasing and irresponsible consumption is
putting a strain on the environment, by causing pollution, destroying the
ecosystem and undermining sustainable lifestyles. Poverty and deprivation
continue at alarming levels and disparity in income and consumption is a
feature in all countries. Consequently sustainable development cannot be
achieved without fundamental changes in the way industrial societies
produce and consume. Therefore, Consu-mers International recomm-ends that
the final outcome statement should clearly reflect the need for
gover-nments everywhere commit themselves to implement policies that guide
us onto a sustainable course and that the business sector follows the same
path.
· Also, we suggest that the report would be strengthened
if more emphasis were placed on the concept of sustainable consumption.
Both sustainable consumption and production can and should contribute to
achieving the MDGs. Equally important are those consumers learn to manage
their consumption patterns in a responsible and equitable manner. We hope
that an integrative approach that includes all relevant stake-holders will
improve our under-standing of the environmental threats, but also promote
coherent approaches to over-coming such threats.
Meeting the Special Needs of Africa and Asia
· Consumers International supports the special emphasis
on Africa and the integrated approach to its development including
progress in the areas of trade, debt relief and development assistance.
However, it must also be recognised that consumers in Asia are also among
the most deprived people in the world.
· Consumers International calls on the members of the
UN to:
Þ
Make markets work more effectively to give consumers throughout the world
access to quality goods and services at affordable prices.
Þ
Involve consumers in the development process in order to ensure that their
needs are met.
About Consumers International
Consumers International defends the rights of all consumers,
particularly the poor and marginalised., through empower-ing national
consumer groups and campaigning at the international level. Consumers
International has approximately 230 members in 115 countries. For further
information see:
www.consumersinternational.org
How cans Africa
move from brain
drain to brain gain?
or Francois
Pienaar, the World-Cup-winning former captain, moving back to South Africa
from England in 2002 was one of the best decisions he ever took. Going to
Europe for a few years was a good professional move, but he missed friends
and family and thought South Africa a better place to raise children. He
has now become the poster boy for the Homecoming Revolution, a non-profit
outfit helping South Africans living abroad to come back.
Its aim,
with a warning that it is not for ‘pessimists, racists, bigots and
moaners”, is to bring talent back home. Apartheid deprived the black
majority of high-quality education, leaving the country with a shortage of
skills that the education system is now struggling to remedy. The brain
drain of the most highly qualified has worsened the problem.
Though
hardly new, emigration accelerated after the country moved to democracy in
1994 and its international isolation ended. While 70,000 South Africans
are thought to have left the country in 1989-92, the estimated number
ballooned to over 166,000 in 1998-2001. Some 1.4m South Africans are
thought to be living in Britain
alone. According to official statistics, over 16,000 highly skilled South
Africans emigrated between 1994 and 2001, but the real numbers are
probably three to four times higher. Close to half of the South Africans
living in rich countries, have higher-education degrees.
Official’s
statistics do not offer a racial breakdown of migration, but a survey has
indicated that white professionals are only slightly more likely to
consider emigrating than black professionals are only slightly more likely
to consider emigrating black professionals. Whites probably make up the
majority of those who leave largely because they are disproportionately
well educated: close to 45% of South Africans with a university degree
(and possibly over 70% of those with a doctorate) are white, though they
make up less than 10% of the population.
But South Africa
is hardly alone. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) in
Geneva
reckons that the global stock of international migrants more than doubled
in 30 years to 175m in 2000 and the African continent probably has the
most mobile population in the world. Many Africans are pushed out by
conflict or poverty. Those with exportable skills are lured by countries
that pay better and offer more attractive career prospects, work
conditions or lifestyle. South African expatriates also cite crime as a
reason to leave, while some whites say that affirmative action to advance
blacks is shrinking their career opportunities at home.
The effect
of emigration is hard to assess. According to emigration is hard to
assess. According to the Human Science Research Council, a South African
Science Research Council, a South African think-tank, the country’s
research-and-development activity has been resilient. But the departure
of doctors and nurses, for instance, is hitting the region hard. The
British Medical Journal has reported that 23,000 of them leave Africa
every year. According to some estimates, 10% of hospital doctors in Canada
are South Africans, while the countries whose nurses got the most British
work permits in 2001 were South Africa
and Zimbabwe. The IOM says that more Ethiopian doctors are practicing in
Chicago
than in Ethiopia.
migration is
aggravating already crippling staff shortages in many of Africa’s
state clinics and hospitals. Only 50 of the 600-odd doctors trained in
Zambia since independence have stayed. In South Africa, over a quarter of
annual vacancies for doctors and nurses in the state hospitals and clinics
are unfilled; as many as two-thirds of such jobs outside the bigger cities
are not taken up. About $1 billion has been spent on training South
African health-care professionals now working abroad.
You can
leave and still help
Those who
leave can still, however, help their home countries develop. An
increasing number of diaspora networks, such as the South African Network
of Skills Abroad or the IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa, are
trying to foster research and exchange programmes or even business links
between those who have left and those who have stayed. The Francophone
Initiatives of African Women in France and Europe, another diaspora
networks, has contributed to humanitarian aid, vocational training for
orphans and micro-credit for women in place like Congo, Gabon and
Cameroon. Many African expatriates also send money back to their
families. The amount is a lot higher than the $4 billion officially
recorded in 2002, as cash often travels in suitcases or thought informal
channels. For small countries, such as Cape Verde and Lesotho,
remittances make up 12.5% and 26% of GDP, respect-tively.
In
a regional powerhouse like South Africa,
the migration door swings both ways. The number of foreign students
enrolled in South African universities, most of who are from other African
countries, is reckoned to have grown from 12,600 in 1994 to 35,000 in
2001.
South Africa
has also singed agreements with several countries, including Cuba and
Germany, to lure doctors to South Africa for a specific period. New
immigration rules, in force since last month, are supposed to make it
easier for educated foreigners to move south, while staunching the inflow
of illegal migrants; some 2m Zimbabweans are now said to be in South
Africa.
Most African
countries are still a long way from being tempting places to come back
to. However, those such as South Africa,
with strong and sophisticated economies and fine amenities, are plainly
better placed. South Africa The Good News, an outfit which has produced a
series of books, arranges public events and has a website, all born out of
the frustration of two Johannesburg businessmen tired of hearing their
compatriots moan about their country, is trying to change perceptions.
A lot of
young South Africans working abroad are keeping their options open-and may
come back. The Homecoming Revolution has organized events in London to
convince South Africans that, in the wake or Mr. Pienaar, it is worth
returning.
Burundi: A question of justice
"The army
came to the village. They started killing people," says Jean-Claude
Karenzo, a Hutu who as a child escaped from Tutsi soldiers during Burundi's
brutal civil war. "My mother stayed behind. The soldiers stabbed her to
death. I never saw my father again after that day."
|

Following its poll victory, the FDD now faces tough challenges |
Ten years on,
Jean-Claude has returned to his village to restart his life after the
official end of the 12-year war in which an estimated 300,000 people were
killed. And he, like many of other refugees streaming home, wants to see
people guilty of war crimes during the fighting between Hutu rebels and
the Tutsi-led army brought to justice. Violence like this has scarred
Burundi since independence in 1962 when a small group from within the
Tutsi minority took power. They ruled through a form of ethnic apartheid,
brutally suppressing Hutu opposition.
Balancing act
Finally Hutu
rebels took up arms. But under a peace deal designed to share power
between Hutus and Tutsis, a new government has been elected with former
Hutu rebel leader, Pierre Nkurunziza as president.
His challenge
now is to find a way of delivering justice, while at the same time keeping
stability and reconciling a divided population. Therese Ndahirabusa, a
Tutsi, counts off on her fingers the family members she lost during the
war. "A group of rebels came at night. I was hiding in a hole. When I
went to see what was happening I saw them take my three children," she
says.
"They cut
them with machetes by the gate of my house. I saw them being killed. I saw
my children dying." Therese says the men who killed her children were
from the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) - the former Hutu rebel
group now in power. Huge
task
Now,
every morning former rebel fighters run through the streets of the
capital, Bujumbura,
training with their former enemies in the government army. Together they
make up Burundi's newly united armed forces. It is a remarkable sign of
progress.
President
Nkurunziza, who led the FDD during the war, admits many bad things were
done and that both parties were responsible. For him the planned truth
and reconciliation commission is an opportunity to take things forward.
"I think what is important is to begin to know this truth and after having
the truth, we are going to see how we can begin to bring some people to
justice." The truth commission will have a mixture of international and
local members and a special chamber will try the most serious crimes. But
the task is huge. Ethnic massacres have been committed with impunity over
four decades and many Burundians are sceptical of what the new commission
will achieve.
Backlash
|
 |
There were many bad things were done. Both parties were responsible
President Pierre Nkurunziza |
Louis-Marie
Nindorera, head of the organisation Global Rights in Burundi,
says that is because the former enemies in the civil war have a shared
interest in protecting themselves. "Given the way people have been waging
war in this country, I believe that top officers would be threatened by
this prosecution. It's fairly certain that very important people - MPs,
members of government - could be involved or tried," she says. And there
are fears that if powerful individuals are threatened too quickly it could
provoke a backlash and destabilise Burundi's
hard-won peace. But Ms Nindorera believes the costs of impunity may be
even higher and that if nothing is done the victims will one day take
revenge.
"The people
who will make violence in five years, or in 2010, or in 2015 will be the
victims of today who will ask a lot of questions and who won't have any
answers to their questions and who take advantage of any situation to
retaliate, to kill people," she says. Whether Burundi's new
government can deliver answers to victims like Jean-Claude and Therese
will be one of its first and most difficult testsg
Kofi
Annan urges bold UN reform
UN
chief Kofi Annan has urged world leaders to persevere on UN reforms and
take bolder steps to fight poverty. He told the UN summit the members'
deal on a reform package was a good start, but differences had prevented
progress.
President
Bush urged the UN to pursue meaningful reforms to allow it to meet modern
challenges. He said the US was
committed to helping overcome poverty. The summit of some 150 leaders
opens a day after UN ambassadors reached a watered-down deal on reform
plans.
The
three-day meeting marks 60 years since the founding of the organisation.
The UN Security Council passed a resolution to prevent the incitement of
terrorism and another to prevent conflict, especially in Africa.
"Terrorism won't be defeated until our determination is as complete as
theirs," UK Prime Minister Tony Blair told the Council in prepared
remarks.
Mr Bush said
terrorism, fed by anger and despair, passed easily across oceans and
borders. "There can be no safety in looking away or seeking the quiet life
by ignoring the hardship... of others," he said.
'Posturing' concern
The
UN chief said the lives of millions and the hopes of billions rested upon
leaders' pledges to fight poverty, disease and inequality.
|
|
We
have not yet achieved
the sweeping
and fundamental reform
I... believe is required 
Kofi Annan |
Mr Annan said
members had failed to achieve the profound reform the world body needed.
"We have not yet achieved the sweeping and fundamental reform that I and
many others believe is required," he said. The secretary general said the
biggest failing was in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament, where "posturing" had got in the way of results. He also
expressed concern about the lack of agreement over Security Council
reform. "I urge you... to have patience to persevere, and the vision
needed to forge a real consensus," he said.
The BBC's
Susannah Price at the UN says his words were particularly pointed. They
came after weeks of acrimonious debate among members over their blueprint
for future international action.
Outgoing
General Assembly President Jean Ping, of Gabon,
presented delegates with a compromise text:
·
No international definition of terrorism, although hope remains for an
agreement during the summit
·
Plans to reform the UN's much-criticised Human Rights Commission deferred
to the General Assembly
·
Commitment to break down trade barriers substantially weakened
·
Creation of a peace-building commission to help nations emerging from war
agreed, as well as an obligation to intervene when civilians face genocide
and war crimes
·
Development section backing the UN's Millennium Development Goals, a
long-term strategy for eliminating world poverty.
A spokesman for the UK-based aid agency Oxfam criticized the compromise
deal and accused several countries of undermining the plan. But the
agency welcomed the anti-genocide move.
"This is an achievement worthy of the 60th anniversary of an organisation
set up to save generations from the scourge of war," the agency said in a
statement.
Darfur
talks start despite split
Government
and rebel leaders from Sudan have
begun the latest round of talks on the Darfur
conflict.Representatives of the Sudanese government and the two main rebel
groups are present in Abuja, Nigeria.
However, one
faction of the main SLM group is boycotting the talks, raising fears over
their prospects of success.
Talks to try
to resolve the conflict, in which 200,000 people have been killed and at
least two million displaced, have had limited success.
"The
inter-Sudanese talks have been extremely difficult and at times seem to
have been conducted with complete disregard to the imperative of the
situation on the ground in Darfur," said
Baba Gana Kingibe, a top African Union official, at the opening session of
the talk. But he remained optimistic, saying: "This round may turn out to
be a turning point for the long suffering people of Darfur."
Rebel dispute
Members of
one SLM faction, led by Abdul Wahid Nur, arrived in Abuja
for the talks, but another, headed by Minni Minawi, stayed away. Members
of the dissenting group said they wanted the SLM's differences settled
before it participates in talks.
The BBC's
Yusuf Sarki Mohamed in Abuja says
there is also another splinter group which sprang up last year which has
not been invited. It says it will not recognise anything agreed at the
talks, our reporter says.
Attacks
The
AU-mediated negotiations had originally been due to begin last month, but
were delayed to allow the rebels time to agree their positions. Proposals
include disarmament and increased autonomy for the people of Darfur. Aid
agencies say large-scale bloodshed seems to have been curbed in the region
in recent months, and supplies to refugees are improving. But the United
Nations mission in Sudan says there have been a number of attacks on
humanitarian workers in the past four wee |